Alternate WW1-Realisitic (hopefully)

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Bravo! What an excellent couple of posts. I love the subtle irony that Falkenhayn (though you) has pulled off a 1914 campaign that the Germans in OTL would dream of, but the Germans ITT will play holy hell at his incompetence at failing to take Paris. :rolleyes::D

It's not just the channel ports of course, it's the industry and the shorter supply lines. It's the French resources which are far enough from danger to be used. And it's the British suply lines to the front and of course their moral.

Speaking of the British moral, OTL the solders were fighting to keep the Germans from taking Flanders and crossing the Channel. I wonder what the Army will be fighting for just North of Paris when it becomes obvious the Germans have no interest in landing in Britain?

Excellent Scenario. Excellent understanding of the Front. Looking forward to your next post.
 
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Taking my limited knowledge of WW1 and what I've read in the comments into account I think we well see trenwarfare in the west with a better position for the Germans whilst having a somewhat stronger Army in the east?
 

Deleted member 1487

Bravo! What an excellent couple of posts. I love the subtle irony that Falkenhayn (though you) has pulled off a 1914 campaign that the Germans in OTL would dream of, but the Germans ITT will play holy hell at his incompetence at failing to take Paris. :rolleyes::D

It's not just the channel ports of course, it's the industry and the shorter supply lines. It's the French resources which are far enough from danger to be used. And it's the British suply lines to the front and of course their moral.

Speaking of the British moral, OTL the solders were fighting to keep the Germans from taking Flanders and crossing the Channel. I wonder what the Army will be fighting for just North of Paris when it becomes obious the Germans have no interest in landing in Britain?

Excellent Scenareo. Excellent understanding of the Front. Lucking forward to your next post.

I'm glad someone else recognized that much of the resources captured OTL were not usable by the Germans because of their proximity to the front. Here most of the coal will be usable.

Not only that, but the smaller German losses and the preservation of her volunteer corps should put her in a much stronger position vis a vis the French. France will peak manpower-wise historically, while the Germans will peak later.
 
I like where this is going, mainly because I think winning the Race to the Sea would tip the balance of war in the west toward Germany enough to be of major significance in later years.
 
ss

Good, only one suggestion.
Falkenhayn has to go since in the eyes of the Germans he is the man who failed to achieve victory.
 
Good, only one suggestion.
Falkenhayn has to go since in the eyes of the Germans he is the man who failed to achieve victory.

Maybe, maybe not. I hardly think it would be so black and white. Falkenhayn will be pointing to Tannenburg and the conquest of Flanders. And many people will see he avoided a much bigger loss. He will have friends in high places and will not be as spineless as Molkte.

Do you think Falkenhayn will not be able to play politics?

Wiking- What happened to Verdun?
 
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Thanks for the website, it should prove useful. As for the August corps, I had Falkenhayn send 4 of the east where once they are trained. They really weren't needed here until they are fully ready, unlike OTL where they were frittered away. But I am a bit confused about their composition. Hew Stratchen states that they really don't have many volunteers, as they were mostly older conscripts, while Keegan states that in fact they were mostly University volunteers. Any information one way or the other?

I am not an expert on the composition of these units but I do think they are not as bad as generally presented. Most of them were used in the worst possible way being sent in waves to attack the British at First Ypres. OTOH XXV Reserve Corps performed very well in the East incl. Lodz and likewise XXIV Reserve Corps proved invaluable to the Austrians in the Carpathians. And at Second Ypres the XXIII, XXVI and XXVIII Reserve Corps did nearly all of the fighting and did rather well, though they were probably a bit too cautious.
 

Deleted member 1487

The Eastern Front

Situation

The Eastern Front was essentially the unwanted stepchild of OHL. They were focused on events in the west for most of the year and only reluctantly shipped forces east later in the year when it became apparent that the situation needed to be salvaged. By mid-September it was obvious that the Austro-Hungarians has experienced a disaster of immense proportion in Galicia, a fact confirmed by the demand of the Austrian CiC, Conrad von Hötzendroff, for German troops for his front. Details were sketchy, but rumors seemed to indicate something exceptional had happened. What was known was that the Austrians were in the process of retreating to the Carpathians and Falkenhayn was being solicited for troops. In fact, by the time that the retreat halted, the Austrians had lost over 1/3 of their army, a massive blow, especially as the hardest hit group was the most necessary: experienced junior officers and NCOs. Even more painful, but not immediately apparent how much so, was the loss of nearly half the empire’s rolling stock. This would greatly hinder the AH empire’s ability to redeploy and bring supplies forward, but also would make supplying the cities of the empire with food immensely difficult. Finally, Przemysl, the great fortress of the Habsburgs, was surrounded with more than one hundred thousand soldiers trapped inside. OHL was preoccupied with preparing for a counter offensive in the west and the Eastern Front was left to H-L.

In East Prussia events transpired exactly the opposite of the Galician Front. The 8th army under Hindenburg and Ludendorff had destroyed the Russian 2nd army at the battle of Tannenberg and ejected the Russians from the majority of Prussian territory at the Masurian lakes, a battle that ended on the 14th of September. Despite these massive successes and the disproportionate casualties inflicted on the enemy, German territory was still threatened by the failure of her ally to maintain the front further south. In fact, the threat was so large, as the exposed territory was the resource-rich industrial zone of Silesia, that the matter could no longer be ignored.

In early September after the withdrawal of units to the Aisne line, Falkenhayn had acquiesced to demands for more troops in the east. The resulting transfer of two infantry corps would be crucial to the formation of the 9th army in upper Silesia, but the bulk of the units would come from the 8th army. The weakened army would be tasked with holding East Prussia while its commanders transferred south. Hindenburg, Ludendorff, and Hoffman were to assume command of the 9th army and link up with Austrian forces for a counter attack. Ironically, Conrad demanded that the Austrians assume control over the army, to which Falkenhayn remarked: “If you knew how to run an army, you wouldn’t need this one”! The 9th army would still be concentrating on the 26th, when the last units of the Austrian army finally halted their ignominious retreat. By the 18th the Central Powers’ forces were ready.

Advance to the Vistula

http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/great war/great war pages/great war map 29.htm
On the other side of the hill, the Russians were similarly worried about the German successes in East Prussia. STAVKA and the Southwestern Front were concerned that any advance into Hungary would result in the Germans attacking the flank of the advance. The Northwestern Front was unable to prevent this move given their losses in recent battles. To counter at this threat and satisfy the demands of the French, the Russians pulled four of their armies in Galicia back across the San and marched them behind the Vistula to central Poland to launch their invasion of Silesia. That was the idea at least. Russian command and control was an immensely confused structure in 1914, with the two Fronts having direct control over their sectors, including all matters of supply and offensives. That meant that STAVKA had little authority over the commanders of Fronts other than allocating reserves, which by this point, were mostly committed. As it was, to get offensive approved by the Southwestern Front, STAVKA had to let them keep control of the attacking armies. But as the Northwestern Front controlled the area where the offensive would be conducted in, supply for the armies would have to be drawn from that sector. This muddle ensured that the redirected armies would still not be in place near Ivangorod nearly a month later. The move eastward began in late September and the move north into Poland would happen in October.

In the meantime, German and AH troops linked up and began their advance to the San on opposite sides of the Vistula. Dankl’s 1st army was to be the southern flank cover of the German 9th army. Przemysl was liberated and 16,000 wounded were evacuated as the Austrians advanced to the San. To his north Ludendorff was perplexed when his army, advancing from the railheads north of Krakow only encountered empty space instead of the Russian flank. Convinced that the Russians had decided to abandon the west bank of the Vistula, he had his forces advance to the river and sent a detachment north towards Moscow. Eventually he would realize his error when his troops captured the Russian invasion plans from a captured officer and from signal intelligence. He realized that he had walked into the maw of the Russian bear. Mackensen’s detachment was recalled after it was discovered that the Russian 2nd army was waiting at Warsaw, outnumbering him nearly 2:1. Deciding caution was the better part of valor, he withdrew Mackensen’s unit on October 18th. From here on out the Central Powers would be conducting a fighting retreat. Conrad was not nearly as concerned and had his battered forces try to force the San river in the south while the northern detachment would fall back with the Germans. This would prove to be futile and his convoluted scheme would cost the 1st army 40,000 casualties. The Germans managed better, but still paid significantly. The Russians, though having lost more men, held the field and advanced, once again taking Przemysl, but this time the fortress had had its stores plundered by the retreating AH forces. The lines returned to their starting point by late October. Had the Russian command system been functioning at any capacity and had sheer incompetence not reign on the east side of the Vistula, the Germans and Austrians could very well have been smashed, leaving Germany open to invasion. As it was, the Russians still continued forward with their plans, preparing for an attack in November.

Reorientation

After the battle ended, Ludendorff headed to Berlin to confer with Falkenhayn and request more troops. He wanted 30 more divisions for the east, but OHL was currently occupied with the battles along the Somme. The six corps being formed were needed for the coming counter offensive that would push back the allies once the lines had stabilized. This attack would never happen for reasons to be discussed later, but by this time Falkenhayn denied Ludendorff’s request. The East would have to wait until the situation in the West was wrapped up. Surprisingly Ludendorff was content with the situation, especially was Hindenburg was named supreme commander in the East with Ludendorff and Hoffmann at his side. Mackensen, who had proved himself in the retreat from Warsaw, would inherent the 9th army. OberOst was official on November 1st. However the grandiose ambitions of the trio would begin to manifest themselves and start to assert a radically different direction than devised by OHL. The tensions would further enflame the political discord between the “Easterners” and “Westerners”.

The Battle of Lodz

Ludendorff was fed up with the Austrians and aimed to conduct an active defense of Silesia alone. Is forces having decoded Russian transmissions, he realized that he would have time to prepare and moved the 9th army north to Thorn in five days. He left behind two corps, both reserve formations, which were combined with Austrian troops taken from the Carpathians. Having reached a deal with Conrad whereby the Austrians would occupy three of the attacking Russian armies, Ludendorff would attack the flank of the Russian 2nd army to the north, dislocating the flank of the advance. The commander of the Russian 2nd army expected the 1st army to cover his flank, but Rennenkampf, the Russian commander of the 1st army, was preoccupied with East Prussia. The Russians were also unaware of Ludendorff’s maneuver and still believed his forces were in the Krakow area.

On November 11th the storm broke over the 2nd army. Mackensen crashed into his numerically superior foe, striking towards Lodz. Over frozen ground the German troops advanced, unhinging the Russian advance. Further south the three other Russian armies were stopped and reoriented north to face this supposed threat, but not before Mackensen was able to inflict heavy losses on his opponent and push him back to Lodz. Fighting was fierce and brutal in unimaginable winter conditions. The situation became critical on several occasions, one of the most crucial being the surrounding of a German corps by Russian forces from the 1st and 2nd armies. Trains were brought up to haul off 50,000 prisoners, but due to poor leadership and confusion, the Germans managed to fight their way out and bring over 10,000 miserable prisoners with. The lines stabilized with the Germans coming out ahead. The invasion of Silesia was indefinitely called off and Prussia became the new focus of STAVKA. The worries of the Russia high command were confirmed, as and advance into Germany would have to contend with being flanked by East Prussia. It would need to be reduced before an invasion could strike Germany proper. For now the central front in Poland would be pulled back to the rivers lines of the Bzura and Rawka. The withdrawal in Poland had forced the more successful armies to the south to pull back as well, despite appearing to be at the cusp of taking Krakow. The pull back allowed the Austro-Hungarians to launch their last successful independent attack on the Russians armies, forcing them back to the Dunajec-Biala line and the central Carpathians.

Ober Ost was confirmed in their belief that the salient of East Prussia would allow the Central Powers to launch attacks on the flanks of any Russian advance. The view was also forming that Conrad had been right; an attack should be launched from Galicia and Prussia to close off the Polish salient and bag much of the Russian army. In the meantime, there was a desire to follow up on the incomplete “victory” around Lodz. The battle had really broken off due to weather, the withdrawal to defensible lines, and the Russians bringing up reinforcements that would overwhelm the Germans. However, Germany’s moral superiority was already being exerted against the Russians from top to bottom. The pull back of the Russian armies had less to do with military factors and more with moral. The Russian troops and generals believed that the Germans were far superior warriors, a factor which caused STAVKA and the front commanders to exaggerate German capabilities. This would prove important to later battles, as officers, convinced a loss before had would retire too early and snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.

As it was, OHL was preoccupied with planning an offensive in the West for the new year and refused to give up the newly created formations to Ober Ost to pursue what it felt was waste of time. The Russians could pull back into the strategic depth of Rodina, much like what Napoleon experienced, reasoned OHL. There was no “grand maneuver” that would bring the Russians to peace. Ober Ost instead saw the low troop and firepower density in the East as the saving grace of the theater. In the West fighting had bogged down and decisive victory was unobtainable. The forces that OHL was hording would prove decisive in the East and make a return to mobility in the West possible when troops were transferred after the peace dictated to the Russians. The genesis of the East-West dispute had been born.

The problem of the East was the weakness of the Austo-Hungarians. They had lost close to 1 million men since the start of the war and failed on all fronts. Serbia, the tiny nation that should have been easily overrun proved anything but, humiliating the AH troops repeatedly. The Russians had easily battered the Habsburg troops in the East and stood on conquered soil. The intervention of the Germans had saved them from being overrun, but the fortress of Przemysl with the valuable contingent of experienced troops still remained besieged. Conrad planned for an offensive to relieve the city but needed German troops for his winter battle. All this mounted pressure on OHL to shift East and settle the situation. As winter battles loomed, political struggle began to boil over in the German General Staff.
 

Deleted member 1487

Assessment

With winter approaching and the first campaign season drawing to a close, OHL was wrapped up in vigorous evaluation of the strategic situation and the performance of the German army. The Allies were also going through the same process, setting priorities and plans for the coming year. On all sides massive gaps in the ranks needed to be filled and new formation raised to put increasing pressure on the enemy. Germany was in a particularly dangerous spot, as since August the British had been increasing a blockade of all seaborne trade with Germany and attempting to limit the trade of her neighbors that might be trading war materials imported from abroad.
http://www.ww1accordingtobob.com/pBlockade.php

Though Germany was still able to gain valuable imports throughout the year, by 1915 the blockade had tightened and blockade-runners became increasingly scare. To combat the limited access to resources, Falkenhayn, still head of the war ministry, working in conjunction with the government created the war materials board headed by the famous industrialist and scientist Walter Rathenau. His efforts would enable Germany to continue to fight the war long after critical materials had become scarce. Furthermore, as in all countries, there had been a shell shortage that needed to be rectified. Falkenhayn’s subordinates in the war ministry had been hard at work to increase production and by 1915 demand was being met. The difficult position with regards to nitrates, crucial in shell production, promised to be alleviated by Fritz Haber’s process that drew nitrates from the air. There were still some problems with the method that would need to be worked out and time was needed to construct facilities to produce these nitrates. As Germany’s imports were cut off of this crucial material and blockade running was not fulfilling demand, the situation seemed bleak. That is until the capture of Antwerp in October. Veritable mountains of nitrates were found in the city, enough to tide war industries over until domestic production could be increased.

In France vast tracts of land had been captured from France and the entire nation of Belgium were now in Germany’s sphere of control. From France, nearly 90% of both her coal and steel producing areas had been captured and could now be put to use for the war effort. The region Nord-Pas-de-Calais and the section of Department Somme that had been captured also accounted for 25% of France’s industrial production. Furthermore, these areas were also some of the most productive agricultural regions within the country. In fact almost all of the sugar beet production was now in German hands. Though these were massive losses to the Allied war effort, there were several areas of under- or non-developed coal resources, such as near Rouen, which until the war, had been owned by German industry. These could now be exploited by the French government. Factories would be built to replace those lost and orders placed with neutral nations like the US. Ultimately though, the losses would cause a drop off in production in the interim. This would be the principle reason for drop off in allied attacks after November, as shells could not be produced to keep up with demand. It would also cause the Germans to hold back on the planned counter assaults that month.

OHL had initially anticipated renewing their drive on Paris and turning the Allied flank in September when the 6th army was taken from the frontier and reformed on the Somme. Due to French interior lines being uncut and shorter, they were able to reach the region first and dictate the pace of the campaign. When the 6th army arrived, it was thrown into the desperate fighting raging along the Somme and was pushed back by the furious allied attacks, desperate to pierce the line and open a path to the channel ports. British commanders and politicians were adamant that these cities be liberated, as the Germans could use them as a means to invade the home isles and disrupt supplies line running through the channel. The French also realized the danger that the loss of these ports would entail, as their loss would losing some of their largest facilities and would have the shortest remaining supply lines running from Britain be interdicted by the High Seas Fleet. The arriving German forces were forced to dig in and hold out against the furious attacks all along their front. Through November attacks would be launched by both sides in an attempt to fix the enemy and to probe for weakness. Both sides would experience success: the French would retake Compiegne and push the front back to the Somme river and the German 1st army to Montdidier. The Germans would launch what became known as “bite and hold” attacks in the Argonne, an innovation of the old pioneer general von Mudra, which would push the French out of the forests and inflict over 30,000 casualties. The major successes would be the retention of Verdun by the French and the holding of the Somme line by the Germans

Both sides began forming new units or importing others throughout 1914. British Indian units and French North African formations would appear on the line towards the end of the campaign, while the Germans were still forming several new corps. Falkenhayn was under pressure by his staff and the Kaiser to conclude the western theater by the end of the year. Wetzell, his operations chief and indeed much of his intellectual impetuous, would form much of the policy that would drive the German war effort. Distinctly different from the previous chief, Tappen, Wetzell was everything he was not: hard working, intelligent, young, and middle class. He achieved his position by ability and drive, a metaphor for the change occurring in the Heer. Given his motivation, he would be active in touring the front and trying to form a picture of what was going on. He would put forth a plan that would be adopted by Falkenhayn in October, once it was obvious that the original intention to renew the advance had fallen apart. Wetzell would suggest letting the allies fritter away their strength on German positions and renew the attack when the new corps were ready to be put to use. But as the year went on, Wetzell began to form an entirely different conception of war. Material and not bodies would decide the outcome of battles and it was becoming obvious that Germany needed to preserve its strength while reducing the enemy’s. By November, shells were running short and the additional attack would be running into prepared allied positions. The opportunity for an attack was long gone and the use of the new corps would likely only result in a higher body count. Instead, Wetzell and Falkenhayn by extension, were turning to the successful model of attack being developed by men like von Mudra and crown prince Rupprecht in their attacks in the Argonne and Alsace respectively. Limited attacks supported by heavy artillery concentrations had smashed the enemy and allowed for the capture of important terrain. Of course the older forms of maneuver were still viable in the East, but in the West, with its higher concentration of firepower and men, a new way needed to be developed. Decisive battle and victory was beyond the reach of any one power; there was new way of war needed.

Ermattungsstrategie
By November the need for munitions was dire and with battles in the East now taking precedent, the planned offensive was called off. A new plan was being developed for the new year, one that would involve the terrible concept of attrition. The French would need to be bled out. The British could just continue to send men over from their empire, or pull back to their island. The Russians could retreat into the depths of the Rodina, thoughts of Napoleon present in the minds of all. But the French were uniquely vulnerable and forced to stand and fight. They would have to be bled out until they could no longer stand alone and then become the focus of a decisive battle that would break their will. Then they would be given the option of a white peace. Peace had to be the most attractive option to the enemy to force him out of the war. Once separated the others could be focused on and forced to exit the war. Falkenhayn was convinced that the British were Germany’s main enemy and would need to be the focus of Germany’s long-term plans, once Russia and France were dealt with. In the meantime, they could be interdicted by the navy.

Remarkably, throughout the race to the sea, the navy was never consulted to assist with the destruction of British forces being landed on the continent or to support the German advance. But once the lines had settled, Falkenhayn established firm ties with the Kaiserliche Marine. They would be a crucial component to his plan against France. With the captured channel ports, a guerilla offensive would be waged against the allied supply lines. The High Seas Fleet was outnumbered and currently unwilling to put to sea so close to the British Isles, but the U-Boot force and the torpedo boats were seen as an expendable resource. They could be used to interdict the British supply lines to the continent, as the major ports supplying the expanding BEF were Le Havre and Dieppe, both close to the most forward German port of Boulogne. The ports of Calais and Ostend were sabotaged by the British during their retreat from the continent, but they would come back online by early 1915. The interdiction of supply through the channel would be the priority of the navy for the new year, delaying the British buildup and hopefully forcing a rerouting of supplies to France through a port farther west. The reduction of usable ports would force the allies to expend more rolling stock and time shipping in supplies and resources such as coal. As it was, the delay in having to ship in the necessary resources was having an effect on French production and the interdiction of supply from Britain would hopefully exacerbate this deficiency. Unbeknownst to the Germans, the Royal Navy was planning on establishing a mine barrage that would block access from the captured channel ports to the rest of the Allied controlled areas. The channel would become one of the most hotly contested zones of the, consuming most of the German navy’s resources; they would be forced to cancel several planned capital ships, as their allotted resources would be wrapped up in replacing losses to the torpedo boats, destroyers, and U-boots that would fight the battle of the channel.

The proposed plan that Falkenhayn and Wetzell put forth, though known only to a select few in OHL (Falkenhayn was notorious for taking few into his confidence), was partly apparent, as the offensive actions planned for 1914 were cancelled in favor of limited pushes in 1915. Wetzell, under direction of Falkenhayn solicited plans from each western army for small scale bite and hold attacks to take important ground and wear down the enemy. As this was against the doctrine of decisive battle that had come to dominate the thinking of most of the upper echelons of the officer class, the backlash was abrupt. Much of the fracture that was forming between the new school of Ermattungstrategie and the older school of Vernichtungsstrategie was based on geography. The Easterners were of the mind that the last front of decisive maneuver was in Russia, where Ludendorff had managed to demonstrate traditional flanking attacks and bold movements could still trump numbers and firepower. It helped that the Russian army proved of lesser quality to the German army and the AH’s needed help badly. The Westerners, based off the work that Wetzell was doing to disseminate the strategy of his commander, were of the mind that Germany could not win decisively in this new form of war. The sides were far too evenly matched and it would require that peace be made with one or more opponents to enable German strength to be focused on the remainder. This group was initially small as few knew the scope of the full plan for security reasons, but the principles began to win new converts as members of the Westheer were directly experiencing conditions at the front.

Last Throes
By December the situation in the East had changed dramatically, not for the best. The AH’s were frantic that their fortress, Przemysl, was quickly running out of supplies in the dead of winter, surrounded by the Russians.
The Austrians were going to launch and offensive out of the Carpathians to liberate the fort and requested that the Germans launch their own attack to draw off enemy forces. Ludendorff finally had a decisive argument to leverage some of the considerable reserve of troops that OHL had created to his front. As part of the joint action on the Eastern front, Ober Ost relinquished some of its forces to the Austrians to for the Südarmee to fight with in Galicia. In Prussia the 10th army was created for the pinning offensive and a further corps was released to fill the gap left by the forces given to Conrad. The offensives proved to be polar opposites; German forces in the north smashed the Russian 10th army and forced them out of most of Lithuania, leaving behind tens of thousands of prisoners, masses of supplies and hundreds of guns. The retreating Russian forces, previously unaware of the formation of a new German army, were stunned by the massive forces brought against them in the middle of a blizzard. The battle only served to increase the mythos that had developed among the Russians about the supposed superiority of the German army. Further south von Plehve, the Russian commander of the new 12th army took the Germans in the flank, halting the offensive and breaking down some of their moral superiority. Further south the situation was a disaster. Advancing out of the mountains, AH forces were being slaughtered by the Russians. Many men were lost in the fierce snowstorms and found frozen to death later on. The situation was bleak as more men were lost than at Przemysl, quickly frittering the semblance of order that the Austrians had tried to restore to their forces. The lackluster assaults continued until March, when the fortress surrendered, leading over 100,000 AH soldiers into captivity. The fall of the city caused a drastic fall in moral for the Habsburg forces. It was obvious that something must be done before the Eastern Front fell apart.

Politics
As part of a larger narrative, the first power struggle for control of the war effort began in 1914 when Falkenhayn took over OHL, but the intriguing finally boiled over in December. Many in the Heer considered it unseemly for the head of the war ministry to head OHL simultaneously. It was viewed as a concentration of power that left the Easterners out in the cold. Never mind that the arrangement had done much to remove the tension and overlapping responsibilities between the Feldheer and the war ministry. The army knew exactly what it needed and the war ministry worked with the government directly to get it. But many, such as Ludendorff and Gerhard Tappen, the former operations chief of Falkenhayn, were actively campaigning to get him thrown out of OHL and get a “true” soldier such as Hindenburg into high command. The only problem was that the Kaiser was the personal sponsor of Falkenhayn and it was he who had final say in the matter. Wilhelm was lobbied by a variety of characters including his own son and his wife, who was approached by a junior officer with stories of the incompetence of the current chief. Finally, Hindenburg and Ludendorff, aware of the renown they had built up in the media for their actions at the front, approached the Kaiser in February 1915 with their demands for Falkenhayn to be sacked, implying that they would use their influence with the public to force him into their desired course of action.

Furious that his own family had been used in this power play and that he was being threatened by officers in HIS army, Wilhelm decided matters then and there. Falkenhayn had his full confidence and would remain CiC of the army. He would be removed from his position at the war ministry, but would pick his own successor. Hindenburg and Ludendorff were rebuked for their arrogance and were nearly cashiered. Due to their popularity, it was politically impossible, but they were aware that they had overplayed their hand. Falkenhayn was no idle during this power struggle either. He struck back, impuning the character of his opponents, including Tappen, who was subsequently forcibly retired from the army. He also cleared out the OHL staff of members that had specifically challenged his authority by supporting his political opponents. Once it became apparent that the general was playing for keeps, his opponents in field command positions became remarkably silent about their negative feelings. Falkenhayn left the situation strengthened against his enemies and would emerge with new confidence in his ability to lead Germany without doubts in his character. Nonetheless, there would remain ill will towards the man that many felt threw away victory at the Marne and by remaining on the defensive throughout 1914.

Plans
The situation in the East remained dangerous and after the political game had died down, it was obvious that something had to be done. With a heavy heart, he abandoned his plans for an offensive in the West and turned to the East to secure breathing room for next year to settle the score. Previously OHL had been aware that the defensive would be the default action in the West for some time and von Lossberg, OHL’s tactical expert was dispatched in November to interview the front commanders and develop a new doctrine based on their experience. By 1915 von Lossberg produced a new manual that would take German forces from the linear defense and move them to zonal defense with a focus on strong points. For the tradition bounded German army, the move shift in thinking would take time, for some even years. Wetzell and Lossberg would tour the front to ensure that the methods were being used. They would prove themselves effective and by 1916 most had finally adopted them. The battles over the winter of 1914-1915 would prove them to many in the Westheer and the full allied assaults in 1915 would see their widespread use.

Back in the East, there were numerous plans put forth for the offensive along the front; Ludendorff was fixed on the Baltic, but Conrad had something else in mind. He saw that an offensive at the edge of the Carpathians would give the Central Powers a chance to outflank the Russian units emeshed in the mountains. Falkenhayn also had several operational ideas to experiment with. Aware of the German technical and material superiority over the Russians, he intended to fight according to his strengths and draw the Russians into a set piece battle that would destroy them. Drawing from his experiences in the West with the bite and hold battles, he enlarged the conception to its logical outcome. The blow would fall not where the Russians were the weakest, rather, it would strike at their strength so that they would be forced to defend and send their men into a death trap. The hammer would fall at the fortified area between Gorlice and Tarnow.
 
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It looks very good, but one little nitpick on the most recent update. I don't think that the navy was called the Kriegsmarine until WWII. I believe that it was the Kaiserliche Marine at this time.
 
Eastern Front developments

Sorry for not commenting sooner.

It is a cliche that the 2 corps that Moltke sent east that supposedly caused the defeat at the Marne (that assumption is < ironclad BTW) arrived too late for Tannenberg. That is correct but they did arrive in time for First Masurian Lakes which would make a big difference in that battle so your tidy convergence is already blown.

I am still not sure what you are doing with the extra German reserve divisions of 1914. They came in two waves. The first, often called the August volunteers, were (mis)used at First Ypres but 2 went east to be used at First Lodz , then later 4 more went east---2 to Ober Ost and 2 to help the Austrians in the Carpathians.

Then there were the late Dec wave. All but one of those went east and were used in Second Masurian Lakes which would not happen if those divisions did not exist.

There were two reasons why the Germans made very little use of the captured French resources other than the Briey iron mines. The first is proximity to the front but other is that the all important German industrialists did not want competition. You are overestimating the first and ignoring the second. The large Bethune coal field was used by the French OTL despite proximity to the front.
 

Deleted member 1487

Sorry for not commenting sooner.

It is a cliche that the 2 corps that Moltke sent east that supposedly caused the defeat at the Marne (that assumption is < ironclad BTW) arrived too late for Tannenberg. That is correct but they did arrive in time for First Masurian Lakes which would make a big difference in that battle so your tidy convergence is already blown.

I am still not sure what you are doing with the extra German reserve divisions of 1914. They came in two waves. The first, often called the August volunteers, were (mis)used at First Ypres but 2 went east to be used at First Lodz , then later 4 more went east---2 to Ober Ost and 2 to help the Austrians in the Carpathians.

Then there were the late Dec wave. All but one of those went east and were used in Second Masurian Lakes which would not happen if those divisions did not exist.

There were two reasons why the Germans made very little use of the captured French resources other than the Briey iron mines. The first is proximity to the front but other is that the all important German industrialists did not want competition. You are overestimating the first and ignoring the second. The large Bethune coal field was used by the French OTL despite proximity to the front.

Looks like I might have some retcons to do. I still have both waves appear here, but the first wave is held back entirely until December when 4 corps are used to form the 10th army that is used at the 2nd Masurian lakes. I believe that the 1st battle would still occur and be successful, but less so without the extra guns and troops.

As for Lodz, Norman Stone has lead me to believe that the first wave corps missed out on the initial battles of Lodz and only appeared to be wasted attacking Russian positions after they withdrew from the city. Correct if I am wrong on any of this. Basically, here I had Falkenhayn be much more sparing with his troops and wait until December before he starts to release any to Ober Ost, that he doesn't trust.

From what I have read in Fritz Fischer's book "War of Illusions", German industrialists and the government were eager to get their hands on French resources so as not to use up German reserves, prior to the war. Why would they be any different now that consumption has increased? I do know that the use of the captured resources was lower OTL also because the German army used contract labor through existing Belgain and French power structures and the workers were not fed all that well. In the early years this would not prove decisive until later on when shortages would necessitate ignoring money for survival. (Yes I know that lack of rolling stock would prove decisive).
Please correct/contradict any of this, I am trying to make this realistic ;-)
 
Following Stone is a good move, his book on the WW1 Eastern Front is gold.

I think Fischer doth protest too much, he seems to me to start at the worst excesses of Nazism and work backwards along that theme.
 

Deleted member 1487

Following Stone is a good move, his book on the WW1 Eastern Front is gold.

I think Fischer doth protest too much, he seems to me to start at the worst excesses of Nazism and work backwards along that theme.

Stone has some issues with his work. I don't accept everything at face value and try to cross reference his claims. Unfortunately this is difficult, as there has been little scholarship on the subject in English since Stone's book.

Fischer I believe makes very good points, but his works are somewhat polemic. There was a lot wrong with Imperial Germany. They were by what we today would call neocons, but those guys made Bush look liberal. Germany was on the way to liberalizing, as the major political party before the war was the SPD, but the radicalization of the war destroyed chances for a true constitutional monarchy or strong republic. As a result, the radical nationalists led the country during the war, while had a victory been achieved, there would has been some validation of the nationalists, but a deep ennui and distrust among the lower classes who had done most of the suffering in the war would mitigate a lot of these feelings.
 

Deleted member 1487

Proposed Retcons

I am going to do some adjusting with the TL. These are open to discussion, so let me know what you all think.

The two corps not sent before the Marne are not present at Masurian Lakes, which still happens. The "victory" means that the Germans drive the Russians out of East Prussia, only to be hit by the new Russian 10th army and driven back, as historically. However, the Russians suffer fewer casualties, due to less German troops and Rennenkampf's willingness to retreat. So this means that the Russian 1st army is a stronger than historical.

When Lodz rolls around, the 4 corps from the first wave are sent east, 2 to the Austrians for Sud armee and two 2 Mackensen. The remaining 2 are sent west. So Lodz proceeds as historical, except that the Germans are subject to stronger attacks by a stronger 1st army, which prevents some of the stupid maneuvers of Ludendorff of attacking Russian defensive positions in the dead of the Eastern European winter and wasting lives. Instead, the attacks of the 1st army allow the Russians 2nd army to slip away and the German 9th army to wheel to meet attacks by the ever incompetent Rennenkampf. These assaults turn into nothing and the 2nd wave of German corps building gets turned into the 10th army for Masurian lakes 2 (electric boogaloo).

Eighth army is weaker than historical due to the missing two corps that are sent West. Eventually two other corps are sent East in time for 2nd Masurian.
 
I read once, when I was studying, that the victors go through a period of liberalisation after every war. This would be a great thing for the Kaiserriech, and for the world IMHO. That's why the war has to be on the downward slide to victory by 1916, before it got too radicalised.
 

Deleted member 1487

The Other Side of the Hill

Quick aside...the Allied casualties are as historical and I must say that I never realized how much the French bled in the war. Up until 1916 they lost copious amounts of men!!!

The Allied Camp


From the time that the offensives in the west were winding down in November, GQG was planning a new strategy based off the French experiences during the proceeding months. Like OHL, Joffre had set members of his staff on developing a new doctrine and drawing lessons that he could use to plan the next round of offensives. Painful experience had shown that the Aisne line, the Argonne, and the Vosges were simply too strong of positions to assail. They would form the passive sectors, while the Champagne, Somme, and St. Mihiel areas would be much more conducive to a broader offensive, thus forming the active sectors. Troops would be drawn out of the passive sectors to form reserves in the active ones. Furthermore, experience had shown that artillery needed to be massed for a piercing of enemy lines, which would enable the infantry to strike through and roll up the front. The liberation of Compiegne was used as an example of this tactic succeeding, but unfortunately it seems that no one in GQG recognized that the success hinged on the Germans pulling out to straighten the line and the attack happened to catch the last units retreating.

The strategy that would evolve through January and February was then to launch pinning attacks along the front and then larger breakthrough assaults when the enemy reserves were distracted. The Champagne was to receive particular attention, as the rail hub for the area was only 3.5 miles behind the front. Capturing it would force the enemy to pull out of the area and open up the front to mobile warfare once again. The Somme would also receive this particular treatment, as there were only so many active sectors in the west. Verdun was also of concern to the French, as it was threatened on all sides by the Germans. Limited attacks in the Argonne as well as the seizure of St. Mihiel had cut off most of the supply routes into the region. As a result the St. Mihiel salient would be under constant attack in the coming year.

Along the Somme the British had taken up positions in an exchange with French troops. From the coast to Cantigny, the Poms held the line. By late November, Indian and territorial troops stood alongside the regulars, whose numbers had been hideously thinned. The psychological threat that the channel ports posed had driven general French into launching continuous assaults on the German lines, which had buckled, but not broken. The BEF was ground down in the process, which left many reservists shouldering the burden. The dominion troops were on their way and were to enter the trenches next year, but for the mean time, the situation was dire. Many units had gaps not filled, as the politicians back home had panicked at the fall of Calais and demanded that troops be kept in the home isles to counter the “inevitable” German invasion. Though the German naval codes had been broken, and there was no indication of an invasion threat, the information could not be released to the members of parliament to keep the source secret. Instead, Kitchener was forced to humor the government and keep some troops in reserve. The panic was not allayed as the Germans moved smaller naval units into bases at Boulogne and started raiding in the channel.

Naval Matters

The counter was to be a mine barrage that would block submarines and torpedo boats from interdicting supply lines to the continent. As it was, the lines were stretched, as the ports available for British use (le Havre, Dieppe, etc.) were connected with a weak rail net to the front line. So far the small size of the BEF kept matters relatively simply, but as the number of units increased, so would the problems. The barrage would not be in place until late 1915 and in the meantime, the pressure built. A U-boot managed to sink a transport ship carrying munitions and troops in December, killing over 1000 men. The resulting scandal increased pressure on the RN to find a solution. Ultimately the channel would be shut down to civilian traffic from Cherbourg to Calais and all transport beyond the war zone would have to be escorted by destroyers. Despite this precaution, until the barrage was in place losses continued to occur.
Both the British and the French were building new units, as large numbers of men had come forward to volunteer. The British New Armies would become available in groups from March onwards, but the bulk would not be deployed until 1916. The dearth of trained officers, NCOs, and staff would be a bottle neck to all sides during the war, but ultimately the British would deploy the largest proportion of officers to soldiers of any combatant. The French had 33 divisions forming by the end of the year, but continuous losses forced them to pare back this number occasionally to fill gaps in the line. Losses had also forced an increasing use of African and colonial troops at the front. The Belgians formed a token addition to the British forces, being only able to field a division with a healthy number of replacements. The trickle of refugees that managed to find their way to Britain ensured a steady supply of troops to the division despite losses. The Belgian king was kept in England as a “guest” treated with all the courtesy due to a visiting monarch. However, his movement was restricted, as were the guests allowed to visit with him. There were fears among the British that the increasingly despondent Albert would try to make a separate peace with the Germans. His troops would also be under the command of the BEF, as their supply drew from the British stores.
Allied attacks would begin again in December, but this time only the French were involved. They attacked in the Somme and in the Champagne, but suffered over 100,000 casualties with no gain. Additional attacks were launched near Soissons, but met similar failures. These would continue into the next year, with offensives being launched in the Vosges (limited attacks going after individual peaks), St. Mihiel, the Champagne again, and near the Somme. Every move failed miserably, only raising the body count. Heavy artillery was still lacking and shell production had not yet risen to meet demand. The loss of resources and industry was hampering French efforts to mobilize the economy, despite the opening of new mines, imports, and the construction of new factories. The Germans had also been constructing second and third lines in vulnerable sectors, a departure from pervious doctrine. Scared by the loss of territory to Allied assaults after the pull back, commanders on the spot took it upon themselves to improve their positions with the held of conscripted civilian labor. The Somme and St. Mihiel were especially well entrenched, but the Champagne sector still only boasted a single line. After the initial winter battles, von Lossberg, the German tactical expert, ordered the front commander to prepare multiple positions all the way back to the rail line running near the front.

As the French attacks began to fall off in March, the British began theirs. By March the British front had nearly to the Oise, as Kitchener managed to finally have more troops transferred to the continent. The battle of Cantigny would prove the British army capable, so much so that Joffre had the orders from the attack translated and distributed to his armies as an example of proper staff work. The assault managed to achieve one of the most precious advantages over the enemy: surprise. After a short, sharp bombardment, which was all that the BEF had munitions for, the troops went on the attack. The stunned and battered defenders retreated, most of their positions and heavy weapons destroyed. But the success was not followed up immediately and the delay allowed the defenders to bring up reinforcements and guns. The next phase of the attack, happening in the early morning of the next day, was stopped cold, many of the attackers never even managed to leave their trenches. Though only a minor battle by the standards of the time, with 15,000 casualties for the Brits and 12,000 for the Germans, it had made an impact on both sides. Unfortunately, the BEF drew the wrong lessons, concluding that heavier, long bombardments were needed to achieve success. The Germans were starting to learn that the main line of resistance needed to be held back to avoid the front line getting massacred.

In late 1914 the Ottoman Empire had joined in the war and closed the Dardanelles to Allied shipping. The Russians were cut off from trade and resupply by the Allies. British, Dominion, and French were sent to settle “Johnny Turk’s” hash. Originally conceived by the first lord of the admiralty, Churchill, the straights would be forces by a mixed British/French fleet that would bombard Istanbul, forcing the Ottomans out of the war. However, initial efforts had fail, leaving several ships damaged or sunk. Troops were landed near Gallipoli in an effort to clear the guns guarding the straights and mine fields. Efforts soon bogged down, sucking in manpower instead of being a quick, simple operation. Throughout the year the Ottomans would prove to be a dangerous foe, as they fought on several fronts, from the Caucasus to the Suez Canal and in modern day Iraq. Though they lost some battles they won others and aimed to stay in the war for some time.

Back in Europe, the early months of 1915 were vital to the Germans. OHL had decided on an Eastern strategy and needed to find a way to confuse the allies. It was suggested that the new weapon, poison gas, be employed in the west to convince the Allies of their intention to attack. However, there seemed to be no place to employ it effectively and several other members of OHL, including the operations chief Wetzell, argued that its use would be wasted. Instead the surprise should be save for an actual offensive. In its stead, there would be a combination of efforts. The capture of the channel ports had created a panic in the British government, a fact made clear to them by spies, and there was hope of taking advantage of this fear again. The Zeppelin raids that had begun in January had caused little damage, but intense psychological effects on the British. It was hoped that by expanding the nighttime raids that effect, when used in conjunction with other attacks, could cause the British to hold back more troops. The breathing space it would give them would allow for reserves to be sent east. April would see the first attacks, as Zeppelins raided London several times a week for the whole month. Though several were lost, the effect was enormous. This was multiplied by a stunt pulled in Calais on the 15th of April. Using a couple Zeppelins as spotters, a “Langer Max” cannon was turned on Dover. With a maximum range of 47 km, and the city of Dover only 34 km, the attack was meant to induce terror in the population. The enormous gun was a meant originally as the main weapon of a cancelled class of battleships, but instead fired its first shots on the shores of England from France. When combined with the impact of the Zeppelins and the shelling from France, the U-boot offensive and its increasing pressure on British forces, including the sinking of more transport ships and some of their escorts, caused another panic. This time it seemed like the earlier fears had been prescient. Further reinforcements were held back, at least until June when it had been firmly established that the Germans instead focused on Russia.

In the meanwhile, the French resumed their attacks in April, trying to flatten out the St. Mihiel salient, with little to show by the end of the month. In May more attacks were opened along the Somme and Aisne. The British began limited offensives along the flanks of Cantigny and several attempts were made to force the Somme river near Abbeville. By June all had ended in bloody failure, with the Allies taking the worst of it. In June the Germans started their Meuse-Argonne offensive, with limited results. From July until September the front had quieted down. Shells stocks were increased, heavy guns collected (especially from forts, which were stripped down to the immobile guns), and men trained. The British finally prepared for their first truly large-scale offensive of 1915, which included some units from the war volunteers. GHQ and GQG both coordinated their offensives and on the 20th, the first move was made in the Vosges. Though limited, it was aimed at drawing attention from more important fronts, a task that it failed at. In fact, the Vosges was increasingly becoming the graveyard of the famous Chasseurs, some of the best troops available to the French.

September 25th was the beginning of the Fall offensives, the large pushes aimed at piercing the enemy line and liberating French territory. The British massed over 150,000 men for another push between Cantigny and Montdidier, with an expressed aim of taking the city. The French massed over 300,000 men to in Champagne and the largest concentration of guns yet in the war. However, in both sectors the Germans had established multiple lines of resistance, as the air superiority they had achieved in the Fall with what the Allies called the “Fokker Scourge”, enabled them to blind the enemy, but also monitor the build up of the allied forces. There was also a limited experiment with defensive tactics, elastic defense, based off a French pamphlet that had been captured in May. When both attacks kicked off on the same day, they were initially very successful with the first line being captured in both cases. Soon, however, the attack was ground down by the subsequent lines of defense, well-trained machine gun crews, never-ending counter attacks, and artillery. It was a brutal series of battles that left both sides severely attrited. Ultimately the lines held and the attacker gained little. The experience had shaken Falkenhayn badly and there were points in October that he thought the war was lost in the west. The intervention by von Lossberg, who had taken over command of the Champagne sector after the initial assault, proved decisive, and ultimately led to the withdrawal of most of the French forces from their gains. But the defensive success came at a price. Though the Germans had lost fewer men in the battles, they lost the same proportion of men as the attacks; they simply had thrown fewer men into the grinder. Both sides learned how vulnerable infantry was to focused artillery, even when dug in. The Somme attacks died down in October for nearly 100,000 casualties for the Allies, while the fighting in the Champagne ground on until November. With the conclusion of that battle, the fighting in the West ended for the season. Much had been lost with the Germans suffering 723,000 casualties in the West from December 1914 to December 1915. The British had lost about 306,000 and the French suffering by far the worst with 1,549,000 casualties, of whom nearly 389.000 had died. With the totals from the pervious campaign period, the French had suffered over 800,000 dead since the war began. The exhaustion was setting in.
 
Whe need a Map of the Western Front.

OTL the French used cans of Billy Beef to pave the bottom of the Trenches, as the mud rose they put down more layers of cans.
The Mud in some places being dozens of cans deep. The Allies refused to improve the trenches fearing the Men would then refuse to go over the Top.

OTOH after the war the Allies discovered the oldest German Trenches were paved with Concrete, with tunnels hundreds of feet into the rear.
The tunnels ended in large barracks with Kitchens and Hot showers.

If the Germans are putting more emphasis on Defense in the West than IOTL. I can see even more extensive Construction of the German Trenches.
 
I think the decision of Italy to remain neutral is the biggest advantage now for the Central Powers. What's the political view there at the moment?
 
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