Alternate WW1-Realisitic (hopefully)

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Dynamic Duo?

What will you have the dynamic duo of Ludendorff and Hindenburg doing? Relegated to the east until later or will they move west earlier due to their great victory over the Russians? Perhaps they are sent to reorganize the "corpse?"
 

Deleted member 1487

This is the rough draft, please comment, and prepare for more retcons.

Retcons:

Junior officers will arrive later, the last to 1st army on the 25th. These men would form the basis of the organization later known as the army group. As a result, there is not a subordination of one commander to another, as in OTL (Kluck and Belöw). The transfer of OHL would not begin until the 21st and would be completed on the 25th. The relocation to Koblenz from Berlin had only occurred on the 17th and there needed to be a pause before the transfer could communicated to all concerned.

OHL
The situation at OHL was feverish, as there was simply too much work and not enough time. The situation in the East had to be dealt with, as the loss by the 8th army at Gumbinnen due to von Francois’ impulsive actions. It was with Prittwitz being dismissed and Ludendorff being dispatched East, picking up the retired general Hindenburg, soon to be the most senior officer in the German army. Ludendorff was not well liked in the West for his outspokenness and arrogance. He needed to be rewarded for his bravery and skill in capturing Liege, but also pushed out of the way. The East was perfect for the man, where he could put his skills to effect, without impeding the course of the war in the West. Ultimately, his arrival was without effect, as Colonel Hoffman would conduct the coming battles and win the great victories. Despite the panic in Berlin, with many crying that the “Kosaken Kommt!” Falkenhayn held firm despite requests for more troops, citing their need in the West. This would increase the disgust with the new commander, helping solidify a faction of his command against him, despite the wisdom of this move become apparent later on. Hoffman would prove to the world that this faith in the 8th army was warranted at Tannenberg, but that battle has been described more effectively elsewhere and is outside the scope of this history.
Back at OHL, many, including the Operations chief Tappen, felt that the war had been won. They were incredulous that Falkenhayn had not shipped troops east from Namur, as per the overall plan. Falkenhayn was a more cautious man, who still worried about the increasing distances that the armies were traveling and the need to do something about Paris. Tappen and others were consistently arguing with Falkenhayn for increased offensive action in Alsace, confident as they were that the war was won and that the French needed only a push to collapse. Rupprecht was furious that his fleeting chance at glory in the war was denied, as the Commander in Chief and denied him the right to conduct a broader offensive towards Nancy. In fact, his front was weakened by the transfer of the 7th army north, which meant that he had to conduct any attack now with an insufficient force. This suited Falkenhayn well, concerned as he was that any attack without the 420mm Krupp guns on the French fortress system would be a bloody failure, as with Liege. All that was authorized was short, sharp, limited attacks to capture important terrain. The fighting around Hartmannwillerkopf in the Vosges mountains were testament to his policy.

There was also much concern among the staff that by not pinning the French 1st and 2nd armies in Alsace-Lorraine, they would transfer troops West to fight the Germans closer to Paris. This fear was confirmed in part by Hentsch’s intelligence offices, but the number and power of the units transferred were unknown. Falkenhayn still felt that he had made the right decision by limited the fighting in the rough border region, citing the large number of casualties the French had taken while fighting there and that the fortresses could be used as a force multiplier, sucking in German strength while allowing the French to still make transfers West. Acrimonious shouting matches would be heard down the halls of the Koblenz HQ and later in Luxembourg city, as the faction led by the ever pugnacious Tappen fought with their new commander. Increasingly operations chief was being marginalized, as Falkenhayn turned to Major Wetzell, his subordinate, for fear that the man would disobey his orders and try to implement his own vision. This situation would come to a head later on when Tappen discovered this circumventing of his authority.
In the meantime, Falkenhayn was somewhat buoyed by his correct judgment to reinforce the screen around Antwerp, as the Belgians sorteed on the 23rd, hoping to disrupt German supply lines. The ersatz divisions were still arriving, several units even being thrown into the line directly from arriving trains. The Belgian move was blocked and thrown back into the ring of fortresses surrounding the national redoubt. The tiny nation’s army would be marginalized for the duration of the campaign despite attempting another action of the 7th of September to aid the allies in the battles around Paris. This final move would destroy the moral of the defenders, who would never again attempt an offensive action.

Battle:
The Left-
In the South along the borders of the warring nations, the 6th army under Prince Rupprecht was forced to take over part of the front from the departing 7th army. However, there were still some important areas taken in earlier August still held by the French. The Germans would be able to focus on these spots, as a heavy offensive was beyond their abilities at that moment. The Vosges would become a battleground until 1915 when the Germans would finally push out the French and the sector became inactive. For the moment, the hills and mountains would become the site of small, but vicious fighting. Small landmarks along the border would be struggled over until the transfer of the units from the 6th army later in the year. However, for the moment, the southern front became a sideshow.

The Right-
The fighting in the North had changed into a pursuit, as what was later termed the “Great Retreat” began for the Allies. Several counter attacks were launched during this period by the French to slow the relentless German advance, with varying degrees of success. It was discovered by the long suffering German soldiers that the (in)famous French 75mm field gun was an excellent defensive weapon against exposed, advancing masses of troops, which was characteristic of the German assault columns at the time. The weapon had at its disposal a shrapnel shell with 10,000 ball bearings that exploded 1-3 meters above the ground reliably, making it more effective than a machine gun at stopping attacks cold. Despite the heavy casualties that the Germans were taking, they did experience some successes, such as the capture of Namur on the 25th. This shocked the world, as it was expected to hold out for 6 months. The subsequent loss meant that the Germans would be free to send the troops back to the front.

The most notable and important actions during the retreat include the following:

Le Cateau, where the BEF made a stand on the 26th of August, hoping to halt the Allied retreat. Unfortunately, the battle proved to be a disaster for the British, as the German artillery proved to be the most effective counter to the excellent marksmenship of the “Old Contemptibles”. Of the 40,000 men engaged, nearly a quarter became casualties. Another important factor for the loss, was that the Germans attacked along the flank, overwhelming the defenders, causing nearly 2,600 men to surrender. The French forces in the area, the Group d’Amada, were too far away to be an important factor until much too late. The fortified town of Maubeuge was invested in prior to the battle, which caused the 2nd army of the German right to drop off troops to reduce it. It would fall on the 7th of September.

St. Quentin (also Battle of Guise): After the Allies withdrew from Le Cateau on the night of the 26th the retreat continued. The German armies start to draw out of order, chasing the various Allied armies that they clashed with over the previous week. As there remained little coordination between the armies, save for what could be organized by the junior officers deployed to the various army HQ’s. Aware that the plan was coming unhinged by the pursuits, the general staff officers with Belöw and Kluck attempted to keep the armies in line, despite the separation pulling the 2nd army away from Hausen’s 3rd. Aware of this development, and that the 7th army was transferring from Alsace, Falkenhayn, when he was informed of the move, allowed for the gap to develop, with the intention of sending the 7th army to plug it. In the meantime, Joffre was planning to throw a monkey wrench into the German offensive. Convinced that the campaign was essentially won, Belöw was confused when plans were discovered for a counter attack by the French 5th army on a captured officer on the 28th. Prepared for the worst, they met the attack the next day launching a counter counter attack, forcing Lanrezac’s left over the Oise. However, the French still managed to capture Guise by nightfall. Realizing his precarious position, Lanrezac fell back the next day under order of Joffre, destroying the bridges over the Oise. The battle had delayed Bulöw, forcing him to stay in place on the 30th, further disjointing the link between armies.

The Center-

The 4th and 5th armies would continue to grind through the forests and over the Meuse. The French would become of much more proficient foe, as they had learned from their earlier mistakes quickly. The 4 days along the frontier had cost the French nearly 140,000 men, which would balloon to 260,000 along the whole front, including 75,000 dead by the end of the month. The Germans would overall suffer less at 136,000 for the entire front, but this was not clear at the time. Both sides thought they were winning the casualty game, exaggerating the losses the other was suffering. But it was clear who was in retreat. The slow fighting was separating the Allies from Verdun, their hinge. Sarrial’s 3rd army was stubbornly resisting this move, but the move backward was inexorably occurring. By the 26th, Hausen’s 3rd army had invested Givet and was attacking the border between the French 4th and 5th armies, creating a dangerous situation. This would ultimately be salvaged by troops transferred from the Franco-Italian border, as Italy declared its neutrality after prompting by the Allies, and from troops in Lorraine. This unit, called the Foch detachment, would resist the German 3rd army for the rest of the month before becoming the 9th army and would prevent Hausen from wheeling and taking Larezac’s 5th in the flank/rear in the wake of the battle of Guise.

Results:
By the end of the day on the 30th of August, the situation of the right was critical, at least to Falkenhayn. The engagements fought over the previous 10 days had pulled the overall alignment of the German armies out of joint. After the battle on the 29th, it was obvious that the 2nd army was exhausted and casualties were taking their toll. The 1st army was pulling forward of the 2nd, which left that army behind its other neighbor, the 3rd army. Informed by aerial messenger of the situation after a considerable delay, Falkenhayn ordered the right wing to halt. Disgusted by the opportunities that they appeared to be missing and having recently discovered Major Wetzell’s betrayal, Tappen gave Falkenhayn an ultimatum either he would resign or a resumption of the advance would be ordered. However, it was he who was stunned when Falkenhayn accepted and appointed Wetzell in his place. Choking with rage he left the HQ and would help form some of the greatest resistance to Falkenhayn’s command in the near future. The rest of the command was shocked by the promotion of an officer so junior to such an important staff position as operations chief, but Falkenhayn was pleasantly surprised to find that Wetzell was exceptionally talented, imaginative, hard working and loyal, all qualities his predecessor lacked. To allay some of the disquiet it caused, Wetzell became a Lieutenant-Colonel in the following days, but the entire event scandalized the staff and complaints began to pour into Berlin aimed at the Kaiser. These voices would become increasingly loud in the coming weeks and months causing a show down in the first days of 1915, but that struggle was yet to come.
In the meantime, the 7th army was to entire the line west of Hausen’s 3rd army. Though only possessing 3 corps, this allowed the 3rd army to focus on the French 9th army without needing to struggle and maintain the link with the 2nd army and the German center. But the increase in frontage and armies on the right wing had increased the disorder and competing interests that were overwhelming the single junior staff officers deployed to maintain the advance. The fact that a halt was ordered told Falkenhayn that an army group command level between OHL and the individual armies was needed. Though nearly impossible to create on momentary notice, in the following week, additional officers were dispatched including the Intelligence section chief, Hentsch, as the head. The new layer of command would ostensibly include the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 7th armies as the Nordwest Kommando, which would work together to bring the campaign to a successful conclusion. It would not be complete until September 3rd, and still somewhat sketchy in implimentation. 3rd army would work as the link between the center and the right wing, which meant that it would not completely act as a full member of the Nordwest Kommando, needing to maintain the line with Albrecht’s 4th army. This plan would not work as intended, as, though the 7th army had a corps enter the lines, the remaining 2 corps would be delayed due to the destruction of Belgian railways. Divisions and corps level units would filter into the line over the next week, bolstering the army’s strength throughout September. In the meantime, there remained a gap in the line, covered by the single corps of the 7th army and a reserve corps from the 2nd army that had recently returned from Namur.

The halt of the right wing, which did not include the 3rd army, gave the exhausted and attritted soldiers of the 1st and 2nd armies a badly needed rest. They would have until the 1st of September to prepare themselves, but the short time was still welcomed. Supply was still precarious, made worse by the need to add the 7th army into network. The halt had allowed the diversion of trains to prevent an added hardship on the men, who now had time to requisition food from some of the richest farm country in France. Belöw’s men were given time to catch up and prepare for the next step of the advance around the city of Laon.
The 1st army was now to reorient and continue the advance west of the Oise and Paris. Kluck was furious as he saw his greatest moment slipping away as the French 5th army pulled back, protecting the exposed flank. The slighted general would log vigorous complaints both with the OHL and later the army group commander Hentsch. Additionally, during and after the war, Kluck would be one of the most vociferous opponents of Falkenhayn, claiming he could have destroyed the 5th army if given the chance. This would provide fodder for alternate history fans the world over, but little of his suppositions bore resemblance to the strategic realities of the moment.

The Allies:
On the other side of the hill, the halt had given the allied armies a badly needed rest as well. The French had intercepted the halt order given on the 30th from the Eiffel tower. Though able to intercept, the tower was not yet able to completely jam German transmissions. The line was reformed and the BEF was rallied and brought even with the French 5th army. The French 6th army was forming up on the farthest wing of the Allied left, mostly units drawn from the mostly inactive frontier. By now, even with the addition of the German 7th army, the French outnumbered the German right wing by 1.5:1 with 40 divisions to the German 26. However, the 6th army was not completely formed just yet. Lanrezac’s counter attack had bought the Allies time, unexpectedly so with the inexplicable German right's halt. Also aware of the German 7th army now in the north, Joffre was waiting for the right time to counter attack and envelop the Germans. Not sure of how long the halt would last and unaware of the reorientation of the 1st army, which now aimed directly for the forming 6th army.

The stage was set for the great decisive battle that would decide the course of the war.
 
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this timeline is looking very plausible, lookin forward to the battle itself. Couldn't the pwning center army back up the right flank? as it seems now the right is getting a pounding it can't survive, while center is doing a runaway conquest.

The first priority of the germans would be an even front, so that their army advances like a huge wall without weaknesses. right flank is one of those weaknesses which the allies doubtlessly will try to exploit.
 

Deleted member 1487

The Center is grinding its way forward, not dominating, just like OTL. The massive casualties occurred during the Ardennes fiasco, but on the defensive they are fighting hard and inflicting heavy casualties on the Germans. The coming battle will decide the lines for the war, but it might take some time to post.
 
Wiking,

THIS IS VERY INTERESTING.

IS THE WAR GOING TO END EARLIER THEN HISTORICAL.

ANOTHER BAD DEFEAT SUFFERED BY THE ENTENTE BEFORE APRIL 1915 MIGHT SEE ITALY REMAIN NEUTRAL OR EVEN HONOUR THEIR TREATY OBLIGATIONS DEPENDING OF THE EVENTS ON THE EASTERN FRONT.

PS FORGIVE THE CAPITALS THE CAPS LOCK HAS JUST JAMMED ON SO IT IS LOOKING LIKE I'LL HAVE TO GET A NEW KEYBOARD TOMORROW.:mad:
 

Deleted member 1487

Still trying to figure out how in depth I want to get about this TL's version of the Marne (battle of the Oise-spoiler). I may actually break it into two or more posts, because it is starting to get long. Oh, and the eastern front won't be talked about for a little while. Have patience ;)
 

Deleted member 1487

German OOB September 1st

The French OOB will be following tomorrow or later tonight.


1st army: 4th reserve corps (less one brigade-garrison of Brussels), 2nd corps, 4th corps, 3rd corps, 9th corps, 2nd cavalry corps (4th, 2nd, and 9th cavalry corps)

2nd army: 1st cav. corps, 7th corps (less one brigade-Maubeuge), 10th reserve corps, 10th corps, guards corps, guards reserve corps

3rd: 11th corps, 12th reserve corps, 12th corps, 19th corps

4th: 8th corps, 8th reserve corps, 18th corps, 18th reserve corps

5th: 4th cav. corps, 6th corps (transferred from 4th army), 13th corps, 16th corps...6th, 5th reserve, and 5th corps covering Verdun

6th: 1st, 2nd, 3rd Bavarian corps, 1st reserve corps, Bavarian cav. division, 21st corps, 33rd reserve division (operating out of Metz), 30th reserve division (Strasbourg garrision), and assorted upper Rhein fortress units not opperating in the field

7th: 14th corps, 15th corps, 14th reserve corps, 3rd cav. corps (transferred from 6th army)
 

Deleted member 1487

French OOB

The British maintain the historical OOB

1st army: 8th corps, 13th corps, Group Vosges (2 divisions), Belfort Garrison, 6th cav. division

2nd: 2nd cav. division, Toul Garrison, Group reserve divisions (3), 25th corps, 16th corps

3rd: 7th cav. 5th corps, 6th corps, group reserve (3 divisions), Verdun garrison, 74th corps (arrives Sept. 5th), 15th corps (arrives Sept. 7th)

4th: 17th corps, 12th corps, colonial corps, 2nd corps, 21st corps (arrives on Sept. 8th)

5th: Cavalry corps (3 divisions), 18th corps, 3rd corps, 1st corps, 10th corps, group reserve (2 divisions)

6th:Cavalry corps (3 divisions), 7th corps, group reserve (2 divisions, arrives on the Sept. 4th), Moroccan brigade, cav. brigade, 61st reserve division (arrives Sept. 7th from Paris), 4th corps, 14th corps, Temporary Army Corps (2 divisions)

9th: 42nd division, 9th corps, 52nd reserve division, 11th corps, 60th reserve division, 9th cav. division, 18th corps (arrives on Sept. 8th)
 

Deleted member 1487

I know, I don't have photoshop :(
I may just hand draw something and scan it if I must.
 
I like what you are doing with the Army Group command and moving the erstaz divisions and much of the 7th Army to the right wing. You've resisted the lure to create an Army Group too early and use it too encircle Lanzeracs 5th Army in the 3rd week of August. But you have provided the extra troops needed on the right wing when the advance stalls permanently due to logistical shortfalls.
 

Deleted member 1487

Retcon: The Foch Detachment was created from 3 corps removed from the French 3 and 4th armies, not from units taken off the Italian and German borders. It would be renamed the 9th army after the 1st of September. Also the BEF is not in the Allied lines, as general French was so perturbed by his losses and fears of a French collapse, the result of which would entail the loss of the BEF and the besmirching of his reputation.

September 1st 1914
: Von Kluck was chomping at the bit. He was ready to continue the advance and seal the fate of the French. Reports and exaggerations of great victories from the center had only increased the intense aggressiveness of the 1st army commander. Though concerned by information obtained by his liaison officer from Colonel Hentsch’s still-forming army group command about troop movements around Paris and the possible formation of a new French line of resistance to his front, Kluck was still more than prepared to drive his weary men forward towards Paris and victory.

The men of the 1st and 2nd armies were grateful for the day and a half of rest that they were allowed over the last two days. The supply and heavy artillery sections of those armies were even more appreciative, as they had to play catch up with the fast moving infantry columns that had outpaced them. Supply was especially precarious, as the destruction of tunnels and railways had left the men of the right wing with little to eat and dwindling ammo. Already the infantry was ordered to sleep on the sides of roads as they marched, rather than search for billets for the night. This method saved the army 6 kilometers a day in distance walked, but left the men exposed to the elements.

Bülow, the commander of the 2nd army was much more welcoming of the recent change in the command structure, as his army had experienced a bit of a reversal at Guise, but the halt order had allowed them to recover without falling further behind. Also heartening was the coordination offered by Cl. Hentsch, who would have his flanks covered and offer no room for a French counter move.

Further west, Falkenhayn was seriously concerned by new intelligence suggesting a French counter offensive could be in the works. It was obvious that French corps had been pulled out of the line in Alsace to reinforce the units further west, but how many and where exactly were unclear. The situation in the center, though progressing, was still of grave concern, as the French had proven to be undefeated and capable of inflicting large losses on the Germans. Falkenhayn decided to visit the 3rd and 4th armies to gain a better perspective of the situation on the ground. He arrived on the 2nd of September to armies that had not halted and maintained continuous pressure on the French. When confronted with generals claiming great victories, he drying responded: “Then show me your prisoners and captured guns”. There were precious few to be found, indicating an enemy making an orderly withdrawal, not a rout. The fear at OHL was now that the French were falling back on their supply lines and reinforcements and were preparing for a counter strike once the German army was overextended, exhausted, and out of supply. Indeed, Joffre had that very idea in mind.

Further back from the front, the BEF had halted its retreat on the 1st. General French was finally halted by terse words from his own government and the incredulous Joffre, who referred to the British army in unfair and vulgar terms. It was not obvious at first that the Germans had halted and the British had continued with their pull back. Now that the situation had stabilized, albeit briefly, he let his men rest and have a hot meal. These basic amenities helped to rejuvenate the men after a series of battles and retreats. Moral bounced back from its slump and the men were ready to fight once again on the 2nd, but in the meantime, the French had a serious gap in their lines that the 5th army was struggling to cover.

When the German 2nd army resumed its advance it was with the single infantry and cavalry corps that had arrived from the 7th army recently transferred from Alsace on its flank. The other corps were still marching forward, delayed by the destruction of the Belgian rail system. The French 5th army was forced to retreat by this new threat, thinking incorrectly that the German 3rd army had reoriented itself against their flank. The retreat resumed once again, shattering Joffre’s hope that the German pause would allow for his counter stroke. Unfortunately for the French, the 6th army was still forming on the west bank of the Oise. Though capable of defending itself, offensive action was as yet out of the question.
Kluck was aware of the large gap left by the British when they continued their retreat and longed to pounce on the flank of the 5th army. However, he was being restrained by OHL and its army group command under Hentsch at Le Cateau, the site of his victory over the BEF. Hentsch was worried as more reports came in from intelligence assets and air recon of a new French army forming to the front of the 1st army. Rather than allow Kluck to present his flank, Hentsch ordered him to disrupt the detraining French units ahead of him. Though his task was mostly coordination between the various armies of the right wing, he was authorized to issue orders to maintain the overall strategy when necessary. Given that he was a colonel, it may seem odd to many reading today that he was able to command generals in the field, but as a representative of OHL and nominal head of the Nordwest Kommando, Hentsch was Falkenhayn for all intents and purposes to the men that outranked him.

The 1st army made contact with the organized divisions covering the formation zone of the French 6th army slightly before noon. The offensive, though expected eventually, nevertheless still caught the French by surprise. Given the intelligence on the state of the German army, it was expected that they would require more time for rest and to allow supply and army level assets t to catch up. Many of the French forces were either territorials or reservists used to plug the gaps left in many units after the disastrous plan 17 had gutted many formations in the French 1st and 2nd armies. The 6th army was made of up units transferred from the fighting in the Alsace once it became clear that the Germans had transferred their 7th army out of the region and were not going to attack. Though fighting still raged in isolated sectors, Joffre had taken 6 infantry corps and brought in several other unattached units to create a powerful army on the flank of the German advance. Despite their advantages in manpower and firepower, the army was lacking in organization during its formation, which allowed for the Germans to force the French back. The German advance continued, while Joffre and GQG frantically attempted to establish a line of last resistance to counter attack the mass of men in field grey descending on Paris. As the French forces once again began to pull back, the government in Paris panicked and made plans to flee to Bordeaux. Gallieni, the commandant of the fortified zone that had become the city of light had disabused the government of any notion that Paris was to be declared an open city. He arranged for troops to be transferred to his command, which at first were little more than militia, but the notion that the city was to become a battleground steeled the nerves of the citizenry. They were going to fight. Memories of 1871 began to return and pamphlets were distributed concerning which house pets were edible and how to cook them. The war was coming home.

The Following Days
The German army was advancing further, despite the absolute exhaustion of the long-suffering infantry. The thought that Paris lay only tens of kilometers away drove the men, who muttered to themselves “Only 40 kilometers”. Though fighting sporadically broke out, marching was the major event. Kluck advanced on the west bank of the Oise and Bülow on the right. Compiegne fell on the 3rd, as did Soisson when the 2nd army crossed the Aisne. The BEF also rejoined the line on this day, making their presence known by a short, sharp assault that halted the western wing of Bülow’s army for the rest of the day. The lack of ammunition of the BEF forced it to retire from its gains, as general French had ordered excess gear discarded to speed the retreat earlier and the BEF had not received resupply yet. The gap was now mostly closed, but for the Germans, their armies were pulling away.

The Germans had experienced heavy casualties since the invasion started in the right wing, which, due to its extended position and rapidly lengthening supply lines, had not received replacements or most of their supplies. This was in direct contrast to the French, who, though they had experienced even higher casualties, were falling back on their supply and replacement depots. As they fell back the French actually became stronger vis a vis their opponents. In some German units, regiments consisted of little more than battalions or worse. The force disparity was increasingly widening and would become critical once the French 6th army was fully formed.

Towards the center, on the flank of the German 2nd and 3rd armies, the 7th army was able to field another infantry corps on the 4th of September, which had detrained and force marched 80 kilometers in two days to join their unit. Though exhausted, the 7th army was thrown into battle against the flanks of the French 5th and 9th armies, causing the line to fold further. Lanrezac was retreating to and over the Marne, with the Germans hard on their heels. Foch was forced to pull back further, separating from Lanrezac, worried that his new command was being outflanked by the small, but nimble 7th army. A gap was forming the French lines, which was negated by retreats, but those could only go on for so long before the situation became critical.

As the march toward Paris continued, Falkenhayn and his inner circle at OHL became increasingly concerned. 2nd army and 1st army were diverging along the banks of the Oise leaving a sizable gap between them. It was decided after a long discussion on the evening of the 4th to have 1st army not chase the French 6th army further. The enemy has only being pushed backwards, not flanked and driven in to the bag, as Moltke’s plan dictated. It was obvious that the Allies, operating on internal lines, were able to move faster than the Germans, which invalidated the entire concept of Schlieffen and, by extension, Moltke. Changes needed to be made to salvage the offensive. 1st army was now to cover Paris from the north and screen the city to prevent the French 6th army from falling on the 2nd. The BEF was to be kept at arm’s length while 2nd army and the German center completed their victory over the French 3rd and 4th armies.

Despite these changes, Falkenhayn was having serious doubts about his possibilities of success. As his trips to the front seemed to indicate, the Allies were only being pushed back without decisive engagements being fought. German strength was being sapped by constantly attacking the increasingly tactically adept French. His armies were pulling away from supply and replacement, worn down with no hope for revival. The French, despite the punishment inflicted so far, were showing themselves capable of vicious counter thrusts and a disturbing willingness to fight. There seemed to be a distinct possibility that the Germans were advancing into the Allies’ ground of choice and were going to be annihilated or at very least suffer a decisive setback. Later, Groener, the transportation chief, would state that Falkenhayn, while very intelligent, driven, and a good judge of men, would be an excellent politician (a fact that would serve him well in the later squabbles within the German high command), but a terrible Feldherr. “He possessed none of the necessary resoluteness that a true commander needs. One must be inured to setbacks and be willing to drive forward to the conclusion of the successful campaign, like the Elder Moltke”.

Decision

On September 5th Kluck changed directions on order of the High Command. His army crossed the Oise, aimed directly at Paris. His fatigued soldiers were excited realizing that they were going to take the city, completely oblivious to the threat to their flank. When on the 6th, they took up positions northeast of the city, the soldiers initially thought they were being given time to rest before their victorious parade through the city streets. Soon it became clear that they were still in the war and that thoughts of victory were premature.

Further down the line, the 2nd army had pushed the French back over the two branches of the Morin, pushing the d’Esperey’s (Lanrezac had been relieved on Sept. 2nd) 5th army back towards the southeast away from the BEF. This position meant that part of the army needed to be directed to the west to counter this threat, but the addition of the 7th army and its last corps, newly arrived from Belgium, helped to pin the 5th army into place. Hausen’s 3rd army and part of Heeringen’s 7th had managed to push the 9th army of Foch into the marshes of St. Gond, though the terrain had checked their advance by the 6th of September. In the center the 4th and 5th armies of the Germans had pushed the French 3rd and 4th armies back, with the option of surrounding Verdun from the rear.
The situation looked grim for the allies, but for one spot. The 6th army held an advantage of nearly 4 divisions over the German 1st army, but the French units were at full strength in contrast to the attrited formations of Kluck. Joffre and Galieni saw an opportunity to fold the entire line back and win a decisive victory. The dream of a counter attack had become reality. Joffre issued an army-wide communiqué on the 7th: attack all along the front. The 6th army and its success were to be the linchpin of the offensive. It attacked first in conjunction with the BEF. Gen. French was buoyed by the fighting words of Joffre and launched his army into the gap present between the German 1st and 2nd armies, striking the 2nd army in the flank while the bulk of his army wheeled north to pin the Germans on the Ourcq. By itself the BEF would have been crushed like a walnut between the two prepared armies, aware of the British maneuver. But, to the alarm of both Kluck and Bülow, they were also attacked by the French 5th and 6th armies respectively.

Falkenhayn was worried about falling into a French trap and had previously informed Hentsch that the right wing should fall back immediately if it found itself in a dangerous position, much like the one it was in right now. 1st army was being attacked frontally from Paris, on the flanks from the BEF on the Ourcq and over the Oise by elements of the 6th army. Panicked, Kluck was ordered to pull back by Hentsch’s representatives, armed with the air reconnaissance photos of the converging allied armies. However, Falkenhayn had worked out a plan with OHL in case a retreat was to be ordered: 1st army was to pull back partly over the Oise towards Compiegne, destroying bridges and railroad lines as they went, fighting were possible. In echelon the other armies were to move back to the Aisne line, dig in and hold until the German 6th army could be transferred from Alsace to salvage the situation.

As it was, the Germans executed a nearly flawless extraction from the jaws of the allied offensive. Criticism of the pull back would be leveled for years at Falkenhayn for being paranoid and eager to throw away the hard-won victories of the field armies. This neatly ignores the situation on the ground near the 1st army. It was outnumbered and outmaneuvered by the French and British and in danger of being enveloped. Kluck and his subordinates fought the withdrawal well, delaying the allies while inflicting heavy losses. Though he would lose a significant part of his force to capture (exhausted soldiers unwilling or unable to retreat), the vast majority would be extracted and pulled back to safety. Bülow was especially concerned with being trapped between the BEF and the French, which caused him to retreat hard. Despite his haste, his army as able to rebuff both allied armies, giving him time to blow the bridges over the Morin branches and the Marne. There were similar stories along the line, as armies worried about being left behind retreated before the battered French forces that offered only weak demonstrations of pursuit. Blown bridges and rail lines slowed the allied advance considerably turning a retreat of only a few hours head start into more than a day’s advantage.
The battles along the line had caused massive casualties to both sides, but the Germans had come off better with only 185,000 losses to the allied 220,000. Nevertheless, the Allies had won a clear victory and saved France. Paris cheered for the victory at the battle of the Oise and Marne and for the heroes Joffre and Galieni, but they were unaware of what was transpiring in the field. The German armies, though in retreat, were intact and setting up on ground of their choosing. The Allied citizens were blissfully unaware that their generals were letting the Germans get away or of the losses of the Russians at Tannenberg. The war was just beginning and the tempo was just beginning to step up.
 

Deleted member 1487

http://www.firstworldwar.com/maps/graphics/maps_11_marne1914_5_(1600).jpg

To help you follow the action, here is the historical map. The changes are as follows: 1st army is in their Sept. 2nd position, but with the focus between the Oise and the Ourcq, closer to Paris, oriented directly towards the city.

The 2nd army is in the historical place of the 1st army, with a wing extended towards the BEF (basically the cavalry corps and one infantry corps).

7th army has 2nd army's historical position.

3rd army is actually on the flank of the 9th army covering the gap. The front is also extended to include part of the historical frontage of the 2nd army.

4th and 5th army are historical, as are allied armies.
 

Deleted member 1487

Retreat and Reorientation

Note: The eastern front is next, but I have some reading to do so it may be a little while


Retcon: Forces from Antwerp would sally on the 9th not the 3rd as listed in the second post.

The Plan
Accusations of Falkenhayn’s eagerness to retreat during the initial advance on Paris stem from September 4th when, during the OHL planning session that changed Moltke’s war plan, he also had the staff work out a plan for retreat. The plan would envision an army that needed time to rest and refit before resuming the advance on Paris in August. Naturally several situations had to be dealt with: First, where to set the troops up that would be easily defensible and within reach of the damaged railways to bring up supplies and replacements. The Aisne line was chosen, as it would allow fewer men to defend against a numerically superior foe.

Second, there was the issue of the rear. Antwerp was still holding out and represented a drain on resources that were desperately needed elsewhere. It was decided that the situation would be resolved after the siege at Maubeuge was completed and the siege artillery train that had felled Liege and Namur would be available. In the meantime, the corps taken from 1st army would be returned to it, as the 6.5 ersatz divisions were judged to be enough. An additional naval division was also deployed, which helped seal the fortress city better. There were worries that the British naval brigade landed in August would try to relieve the city, but instead it had re-embarked for Britain. It would later pop up under Churchill, first lord of the admiralty, causing some trouble during the Belgian attempts to break the siege.

Third, there was an important issue of the open flank to the west of 1st army. In the event of a retreat it was decided to transfer the 6th army automatically from Alsace to the wing of the right. There was to be no more open flank for the allies to exploit. This was a very real concern, as there remained 6 territorial divisions under the French general d’Amade.
They were mainly made up of old reservists, however the threat remained that they could sweep the flank. Additionally, it would take time for the army to be transferred; the experiences with the smaller 7th army still remembered by Groener, the rail chief. It would be necessary that transfer of the reserve corps from Antwerp to the 1st army would be routed instead to the open flank, as would the other corps and brigade from the 2nd army at Maubeuge upon the completion of that siege. The cavalry corps would be taken from the various armies except the 6th and formed into a large cavalry army that would help screen the gap with the two infantry corps and also move up the coast, securing the channel ports. Falkenhayn and his operations chief Wetzell were worried about the Allies landing troops in their rear and disrupting operations against Antwerp or Paris.

During the actual pull back, the armies would occupy the following positions: 1st army was to hold the line from Compiegne to a point astride the rail line between Beauvais and Cantigny. The transferred two corps and brigade would merge with the cavalry of the 1st army and attempt to hold the open flank with a mobile defense, based around Abancourt, the only major rail hub between the coast and the 1st army. Groener insistent that the defense positions take into account the interior lines that the Allies disposed of and that the defense plan strive to cut the ability of the Allies to redeploy around the flanks of the Germans. The current defense plan prevented the Allies from directly skirting their positions, but there remained a gap from from Dieppe that the Allies could exploit with secondary, single-track lines. They would have to hold out as best they could until the 6th army arrived. This would be somewhat difficult, as, though the region was made up of rolling hills, there were few dominating positions to base a serious defense on. As a result, they were given a final line of resistance that would fall on the Somme. Otherwise, the other armies would take up positions along the Aisne plateau and dig in.

(Maps to help the situation make some sense. The 7th army and 2nd army are switched on the first map, with the 2nd army taking the position of the 1st army and in general everyone else being spread out mores)

http://www.firstworldwar.com/maps/graphics/maps_13_german_retreat1914_(1600).jpg

http://mappery.com/fullsize-name/France-Road-Map-1914


Execution
When the retreat was ordered on the morning of September 8th, the day that Maubeuge fell. This was also the moment that the Allied offensive was kicking in to gear, but the Germans had begun executing Falkenhayn’s orders. Their delaying tactics bought time until the demarked line of resistance was reached and prepared. The Germans would reach their positions on the morning of the 13th, over a day ahead of the lacksidasical Allies. By the time Joffre’s armies made contact with the Germans, the opportunity for decisive action had passed. The invading troops had rallied and began to receive desperately needed supplies and replacements. The situation of the previous week was reversed, as the Allies began to lengthen their supply lines.

The Allies had drawn some inaccurate conclusions from the aftermath of their victory before Paris. The speed of the German retreat was interpreted to mean that the enemy was beaten and needed only a sharp push to be driven back into Germany. Joffre was convinced that total victory was at hand and the barbaric invader was to be crushed. He was quickly disabused of this notion when his troops began to attack all along the line on the 15th. Group d’Amade was without cavalry or aircraft to scout for it and had railed into Abancourt, convinced that the Germans were still kilometers down the path. The forward elements were surprised to be ambushed while pulling into the station and suffered heavy casualties. The rest of the group was forced to disembark outside the city and attempted to seize the junction. The old, badly trained reservists ran into professional soldiers backed up by artillery and machine guns. They were mowed down mercilessly. The battle for control of the flank had begun. Elsewhere armies clashed again, both sides attempting to fix each other while they funneled troops to the flank, attempted to force a breach. The French 6th and German 1st clashed from the 15th to the 19th, while Group d’Amade battled ineffectually to force the flank of German line. The arrival of additional cavalry units proved to be a boon in the mobile battles on the flank, but soon the French brought in units form the 1st and 2nd armies in Lorraine.

The Battle Is Joined
The transfer of French units to the coast would not be complete until the 19th, the same day that the British managed to land their naval division in Flanders. They would actually beat the German 6th army to the front, as the larger German army, relatively intact after the battle along the frontier, had to travel greater distances on damaged tracks to be deployed. In the meantime, the German flank was forced back, as units began to move around the meager German force holding them back. Both the German 1st and the French 6th armies transferred troops to their flank to aid the units already there. The front was pushed back by French troops, who were funneled in large numbers to the area. Joffre was so convinced of the decisiveness of the flanking maneuver that he was unconcerned when the German 5th army captured St. Mihiel due to the transfer French troops that were to defend it and cut part of the supply lines into Verdun.
On the 21st of September the forward elements of Rupprecht’s 6th army entered into the fray. Marching out of Abbeville and Amiens, they collided with the new French 10th army, stopping the advance cold. The German cavalry army was then transferred out of the area with the 21st corps from the 6th army, who in turn inherited the an infantry corps from the beleaguered defenders, allowing the 3rd corps to return to first army and the detached brigade to accompany the advance north along the coast. Despite the great battles raging along the line, by the 23rd the front remained mostly static, as the 6th army had plugged the hole in the German line. Falkenhayn, who had hoped to continue the advance toward Paris once again, was to be disappointed, but soon wrapped up in the drama developing in Flanders and the Nord-Pas-de-Calaise region of France.

Once it became clear that the Germans had managed to hold the flank and that they were moving up the coast, intent on seizing the channel ports, the British rerouted their 4th corps, originally intended for the BEF, to Calais. The BEF itself was to be transferred out of the line along the Aisne where they were fighting, and brought to the coast to aid the French in punching a hole in Rupprecht’s line. It would take some negotiating and time to get the BEF out of the fight, but by October 5th, they were thrown into battle, reinforced by territorials from Britain (such as the London Scottish regiment). Further north, the 4th corps (really just an infantry and cavalry division) landed on the 22nd. The naval division led by Churchill was recalled from its mission to Antwerp to hold Ostend. Before he departed, Churchill sent a message to the Belgian King Albert to abandon Antwerp and join up with the British. The king would disregard the note, intent on defending his national bastion.

The situation near the Somme was desperate, both sides fighting for an advantage. Both sides were funneling in troops, the Germans taking many of their ersatz units, combining them into divisions, coupling them with regular divisions taken from other armies such as the 7th, 3rd and 4th and then deploying them to the Somme. The French were also grabbing any unit and transferring them to region, eager to breakthrough. The British would also join in, which would allow the Allies to push the German back. In the north the lines had come to rest on the Somme river itself while further south the 1st army was dug in around Montdidier and Cantigny with their positions terminating near Compiegne where the 2nd army took over. The trench lines were becoming permanent, aided by the shipment of fortification materials that had arrived from Germany on the 27th.

The French found that their artillery no longer was effective against the German positions, as the gun lacked the trajectory to penetrate dedicated trench works. The shrapnel shells that had wrought so much havoc against exposed infantry were no longer useful against dug in troops. The Germans in turn had perfect weapons for trench and siege warfare. They possessed mortars, howitzers, hand grenades and other advantages that the Allies would not display until 1915. In the meantime, they used the weapons to full effect despite being outnumbered at the decisive sector. Ultimately the lines that had been reached by October along the Somme were to be the lines that held for the remainder of the war with small changes.

In the Nord-Pas-De-Calais region, the Germans managed to occupy up to Boulogne without much resistance. When they began to approach Calais on the 25th, they began to run into entrenched British units. Dismounted, the cavalry and infantry corps made several initial runs at the city, only to be rebuffed and devastated by naval vessels providing fire support. By the 26th, it was decided to leave a screen of troops and to move on down the coast. The British would in turn make runs at the German lines, only to find that the machine guns and artillery of the 21st infantry and 2nd cavalry corps were deadly when managed by professionals. The reduced cavalry army of 3 corps moved on towards Dunkirk.

Back at Antwerp the Germans had defeated another attempt to break the siege on the 9th, which had destroyed the moral of the Belgians. They were not interested in running into the German guns again. On the 28th the guns came to them. The guns of August that had destroyed Liege were now systematically destroying the forts protecting Antwerp. By October 1st the first line had been breached and the ersatz infantry divisions were pouring through. By the 4th the city would no longer house the government and by the 10th the city had fallen. But in the interval between the fall and the relocation of the government, the city began to be evacuated. The king and 50,000 troops left the city on the 6th, headed to Ostend. The city was held by a scratch force of British Royal Marines and half-trained naval troops. By the 4th, the city was surrounded by German cavalry, outnumbering the British 3:1. The movement by the Belgian threatened to take the Germans in the rear and overwhelm them.

Aware of the Belgian evacuation, Falkenhayn had 3 divisions taken from the force attacking Antwerp and sent out in pursuit of King Albert’s force. The Belgians were fearful of being cutoff and captured, so they pressed on at a vigorous pace. The Germans were only 10 hours behind. When the Belgians arrived at the coast on the evening of the 7th, they ran into prepared German positions. However, the cavalry divisions did not possess enough machine guns or artillery to stop the Belgians, only delay them. They managed to breakthrough to the Brits by the morning, but having suffered grievously. Only about 25,000 would escape, the rest captured or killed by the pursuing infantry divisions. Ostend would be abandoned on the 12th, the British troops being shifted to Calais while the Belgians recuperated in England. Further west Calais would hold out until the 20th, when the artillery guns were brought up from Antwerp and were able to pound the city out of range and sight of the Royal Navy. The desire to hold the channel ports had cost the British significantly, but managed to distract the Germans for a crucial time. Though it would matter little in the west, in the east it would enable to Russians time to hurt the Central Powers more.

Results
Though combat would continue until November, there were no more significant gains to be made by either side in the west. The fighting concentrated around the Somme, but the only result would be to destroy the ground and to wrack up the body count. By the end of the year the body count in the west would be high for the Allies with the French suffering over 900,000 casualties and around 400,000 dead, a massive number with an unusually high death rate. The numbers for 1914 would not be released in full for decades, and the casualty statistics for August would not be fully acknowledged until 100 years later. The British would suffer heavily too, with the professional army being wiped out. The butcher’s bill would be over 100,000 and the future burden would be borne by the territorial and newly raised formations. The Germans also suffered heavily, but had won the casualty game by being on the defensive for most of the first year. They suffered 560,000+ casualties in the west and a further 100,000+ in the east. The casualty list was the primary reason for winter break in large-scale operations, but the stabilization period during the winter would still see fighting continue.
Significantly, during the fighting in the north of France, Falkenhayn transferred several corps east, including 3 infantry corps from the 3rd, 4th, and 5th armies in September, followed by the cavalry divisions in October. 6 further corps were in training during the first months of the war, many containing volunteers from Germany’s universities or older conscripts. OHL ultimately opted against deploying them in 1914, as they needed further training to be useful and their presence was unlikely to change anything in the field. 4 of these corps would be sent east and the other two to the west. Conscription would bring in more men to train to expand the Heer.

One final note that would prove surprising during the period of fighting in the north, is that the navy was never contacted by OHL about running joint operations off the coast to support the army or disrupt the British landings or withdrawals. When the navy was informed of the capture of the channel ports, they would be eager to station some units there. The U-boots and torpedo boats of the Kriegsmarine would prove to be valuable assets to the Heer in the coming years and Falkenhayn was quick to set up joint offices once their utility became apparent. In the meantime, the ports at Calais and Ostend were damaged by Allied sabotage when they withdrew and Antwerp was blocked by Dutch neutrality. Early next year the ports would be ready again for use and by mid-year they would support dedicated subpens. In the meantime, both sides settle down to make drastic changes based on the lessons of 1914.
 
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Very good so far EXCEPT the Belgian king is Albert not Leopold. The loss of the Channel ports is go to have multiple effects. One of them is the BEF is almost certain to be more agressive Dec-Feb than OTL. With no First Ypres I would see Falkenhayn sending half of the "August Volunteers" reserve divisions to the East instead on only 1 corps.

Here is an interesting source that may prove helpful in dealing with Eatern Front http://www.warchron.com/ though Arthur Banks is quite useful up until Nov 1914 when h seems to lose interest in the East.
 

Deleted member 1487

Very good so far EXCEPT the Belgian king is Albert not Leopold. The loss of the Channel ports is go to have multiple effects. One of them is the BEF is almost certain to be more agressive Dec-Feb than OTL. With no First Ypres I would see Falkenhayn sending half of the "August Volunteers" reserve divisions to the East instead on only 1 corps.

Here is an interesting source that may prove helpful in dealing with Eatern Front http://www.warchron.com/ though Arthur Banks is quite useful up until Nov 1914 when h seems to lose interest in the East.


Thanks for the website, it should prove useful. As for the August corps, I had Falkenhayn send 4 of the east where once they are trained. They really weren't needed here until they are fully ready, unlike OTL where they were frittered away. But I am a bit confused about their composition. Hew Stratchen states that they really don't have many volunteers, as they were mostly older conscripts, while Keegan states that in fact they were mostly University volunteers. Any information one way or the other?
 
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