Retreat and Reorientation
Note: The eastern front is next, but I have some reading to do so it may be a little while
Retcon: Forces from Antwerp would sally on the 9th not the 3rd as listed in the second post.
The Plan
Accusations of Falkenhayn’s eagerness to retreat during the initial advance on Paris stem from September 4th when, during the OHL planning session that changed Moltke’s war plan, he also had the staff work out a plan for retreat. The plan would envision an army that needed time to rest and refit before resuming the advance on Paris in August. Naturally several situations had to be dealt with: First, where to set the troops up that would be easily defensible and within reach of the damaged railways to bring up supplies and replacements. The Aisne line was chosen, as it would allow fewer men to defend against a numerically superior foe.
Second, there was the issue of the rear. Antwerp was still holding out and represented a drain on resources that were desperately needed elsewhere. It was decided that the situation would be resolved after the siege at Maubeuge was completed and the siege artillery train that had felled Liege and Namur would be available. In the meantime, the corps taken from 1st army would be returned to it, as the 6.5 ersatz divisions were judged to be enough. An additional naval division was also deployed, which helped seal the fortress city better. There were worries that the British naval brigade landed in August would try to relieve the city, but instead it had re-embarked for Britain. It would later pop up under Churchill, first lord of the admiralty, causing some trouble during the Belgian attempts to break the siege.
Third, there was an important issue of the open flank to the west of 1st army. In the event of a retreat it was decided to transfer the 6th army automatically from Alsace to the wing of the right. There was to be no more open flank for the allies to exploit. This was a very real concern, as there remained 6 territorial divisions under the French general d’Amade.
They were mainly made up of old reservists, however the threat remained that they could sweep the flank. Additionally, it would take time for the army to be transferred; the experiences with the smaller 7th army still remembered by Groener, the rail chief. It would be necessary that transfer of the reserve corps from Antwerp to the 1st army would be routed instead to the open flank, as would the other corps and brigade from the 2nd army at Maubeuge upon the completion of that siege. The cavalry corps would be taken from the various armies except the 6th and formed into a large cavalry army that would help screen the gap with the two infantry corps and also move up the coast, securing the channel ports. Falkenhayn and his operations chief Wetzell were worried about the Allies landing troops in their rear and disrupting operations against Antwerp or Paris.
During the actual pull back, the armies would occupy the following positions: 1st army was to hold the line from Compiegne to a point astride the rail line between Beauvais and Cantigny. The transferred two corps and brigade would merge with the cavalry of the 1st army and attempt to hold the open flank with a mobile defense, based around Abancourt, the only major rail hub between the coast and the 1st army. Groener insistent that the defense positions take into account the interior lines that the Allies disposed of and that the defense plan strive to cut the ability of the Allies to redeploy around the flanks of the Germans. The current defense plan prevented the Allies from directly skirting their positions, but there remained a gap from from Dieppe that the Allies could exploit with secondary, single-track lines. They would have to hold out as best they could until the 6th army arrived. This would be somewhat difficult, as, though the region was made up of rolling hills, there were few dominating positions to base a serious defense on. As a result, they were given a final line of resistance that would fall on the Somme. Otherwise, the other armies would take up positions along the Aisne plateau and dig in.
(Maps to help the situation make some sense. The 7th army and 2nd army are switched on the first map, with the 2nd army taking the position of the 1st army and in general everyone else being spread out mores)
http://www.firstworldwar.com/maps/graphics/maps_13_german_retreat1914_(1600).jpg
http://mappery.com/fullsize-name/France-Road-Map-1914
Execution
When the retreat was ordered on the morning of September 8th, the day that Maubeuge fell. This was also the moment that the Allied offensive was kicking in to gear, but the Germans had begun executing Falkenhayn’s orders. Their delaying tactics bought time until the demarked line of resistance was reached and prepared. The Germans would reach their positions on the morning of the 13th, over a day ahead of the lacksidasical Allies. By the time Joffre’s armies made contact with the Germans, the opportunity for decisive action had passed. The invading troops had rallied and began to receive desperately needed supplies and replacements. The situation of the previous week was reversed, as the Allies began to lengthen their supply lines.
The Allies had drawn some inaccurate conclusions from the aftermath of their victory before Paris. The speed of the German retreat was interpreted to mean that the enemy was beaten and needed only a sharp push to be driven back into Germany. Joffre was convinced that total victory was at hand and the barbaric invader was to be crushed. He was quickly disabused of this notion when his troops began to attack all along the line on the 15th. Group d’Amade was without cavalry or aircraft to scout for it and had railed into Abancourt, convinced that the Germans were still kilometers down the path. The forward elements were surprised to be ambushed while pulling into the station and suffered heavy casualties. The rest of the group was forced to disembark outside the city and attempted to seize the junction. The old, badly trained reservists ran into professional soldiers backed up by artillery and machine guns. They were mowed down mercilessly. The battle for control of the flank had begun. Elsewhere armies clashed again, both sides attempting to fix each other while they funneled troops to the flank, attempted to force a breach. The French 6th and German 1st clashed from the 15th to the 19th, while Group d’Amade battled ineffectually to force the flank of German line. The arrival of additional cavalry units proved to be a boon in the mobile battles on the flank, but soon the French brought in units form the 1st and 2nd armies in Lorraine.
The Battle Is Joined
The transfer of French units to the coast would not be complete until the 19th, the same day that the British managed to land their naval division in Flanders. They would actually beat the German 6th army to the front, as the larger German army, relatively intact after the battle along the frontier, had to travel greater distances on damaged tracks to be deployed. In the meantime, the German flank was forced back, as units began to move around the meager German force holding them back. Both the German 1st and the French 6th armies transferred troops to their flank to aid the units already there. The front was pushed back by French troops, who were funneled in large numbers to the area. Joffre was so convinced of the decisiveness of the flanking maneuver that he was unconcerned when the German 5th army captured St. Mihiel due to the transfer French troops that were to defend it and cut part of the supply lines into Verdun.
On the 21st of September the forward elements of Rupprecht’s 6th army entered into the fray. Marching out of Abbeville and Amiens, they collided with the new French 10th army, stopping the advance cold. The German cavalry army was then transferred out of the area with the 21st corps from the 6th army, who in turn inherited the an infantry corps from the beleaguered defenders, allowing the 3rd corps to return to first army and the detached brigade to accompany the advance north along the coast. Despite the great battles raging along the line, by the 23rd the front remained mostly static, as the 6th army had plugged the hole in the German line. Falkenhayn, who had hoped to continue the advance toward Paris once again, was to be disappointed, but soon wrapped up in the drama developing in Flanders and the Nord-Pas-de-Calaise region of France.
Once it became clear that the Germans had managed to hold the flank and that they were moving up the coast, intent on seizing the channel ports, the British rerouted their 4th corps, originally intended for the BEF, to Calais. The BEF itself was to be transferred out of the line along the Aisne where they were fighting, and brought to the coast to aid the French in punching a hole in Rupprecht’s line. It would take some negotiating and time to get the BEF out of the fight, but by October 5th, they were thrown into battle, reinforced by territorials from Britain (such as the London Scottish regiment). Further north, the 4th corps (really just an infantry and cavalry division) landed on the 22nd. The naval division led by Churchill was recalled from its mission to Antwerp to hold Ostend. Before he departed, Churchill sent a message to the Belgian King Albert to abandon Antwerp and join up with the British. The king would disregard the note, intent on defending his national bastion.
The situation near the Somme was desperate, both sides fighting for an advantage. Both sides were funneling in troops, the Germans taking many of their ersatz units, combining them into divisions, coupling them with regular divisions taken from other armies such as the 7th, 3rd and 4th and then deploying them to the Somme. The French were also grabbing any unit and transferring them to region, eager to breakthrough. The British would also join in, which would allow the Allies to push the German back. In the north the lines had come to rest on the Somme river itself while further south the 1st army was dug in around Montdidier and Cantigny with their positions terminating near Compiegne where the 2nd army took over. The trench lines were becoming permanent, aided by the shipment of fortification materials that had arrived from Germany on the 27th.
The French found that their artillery no longer was effective against the German positions, as the gun lacked the trajectory to penetrate dedicated trench works. The shrapnel shells that had wrought so much havoc against exposed infantry were no longer useful against dug in troops. The Germans in turn had perfect weapons for trench and siege warfare. They possessed mortars, howitzers, hand grenades and other advantages that the Allies would not display until 1915. In the meantime, they used the weapons to full effect despite being outnumbered at the decisive sector. Ultimately the lines that had been reached by October along the Somme were to be the lines that held for the remainder of the war with small changes.
In the Nord-Pas-De-Calais region, the Germans managed to occupy up to Boulogne without much resistance. When they began to approach Calais on the 25th, they began to run into entrenched British units. Dismounted, the cavalry and infantry corps made several initial runs at the city, only to be rebuffed and devastated by naval vessels providing fire support. By the 26th, it was decided to leave a screen of troops and to move on down the coast. The British would in turn make runs at the German lines, only to find that the machine guns and artillery of the 21st infantry and 2nd cavalry corps were deadly when managed by professionals. The reduced cavalry army of 3 corps moved on towards Dunkirk.
Back at Antwerp the Germans had defeated another attempt to break the siege on the 9th, which had destroyed the moral of the Belgians. They were not interested in running into the German guns again. On the 28th the guns came to them. The guns of August that had destroyed Liege were now systematically destroying the forts protecting Antwerp. By October 1st the first line had been breached and the ersatz infantry divisions were pouring through. By the 4th the city would no longer house the government and by the 10th the city had fallen. But in the interval between the fall and the relocation of the government, the city began to be evacuated. The king and 50,000 troops left the city on the 6th, headed to Ostend. The city was held by a scratch force of British Royal Marines and half-trained naval troops. By the 4th, the city was surrounded by German cavalry, outnumbering the British 3:1. The movement by the Belgian threatened to take the Germans in the rear and overwhelm them.
Aware of the Belgian evacuation, Falkenhayn had 3 divisions taken from the force attacking Antwerp and sent out in pursuit of King Albert’s force. The Belgians were fearful of being cutoff and captured, so they pressed on at a vigorous pace. The Germans were only 10 hours behind. When the Belgians arrived at the coast on the evening of the 7th, they ran into prepared German positions. However, the cavalry divisions did not possess enough machine guns or artillery to stop the Belgians, only delay them. They managed to breakthrough to the Brits by the morning, but having suffered grievously. Only about 25,000 would escape, the rest captured or killed by the pursuing infantry divisions. Ostend would be abandoned on the 12th, the British troops being shifted to Calais while the Belgians recuperated in England. Further west Calais would hold out until the 20th, when the artillery guns were brought up from Antwerp and were able to pound the city out of range and sight of the Royal Navy. The desire to hold the channel ports had cost the British significantly, but managed to distract the Germans for a crucial time. Though it would matter little in the west, in the east it would enable to Russians time to hurt the Central Powers more.
Results
Though combat would continue until November, there were no more significant gains to be made by either side in the west. The fighting concentrated around the Somme, but the only result would be to destroy the ground and to wrack up the body count. By the end of the year the body count in the west would be high for the Allies with the French suffering over 900,000 casualties and around 400,000 dead, a massive number with an unusually high death rate. The numbers for 1914 would not be released in full for decades, and the casualty statistics for August would not be fully acknowledged until 100 years later. The British would suffer heavily too, with the professional army being wiped out. The butcher’s bill would be over 100,000 and the future burden would be borne by the territorial and newly raised formations. The Germans also suffered heavily, but had won the casualty game by being on the defensive for most of the first year. They suffered 560,000+ casualties in the west and a further 100,000+ in the east. The casualty list was the primary reason for winter break in large-scale operations, but the stabilization period during the winter would still see fighting continue.
Significantly, during the fighting in the north of France, Falkenhayn transferred several corps east, including 3 infantry corps from the 3rd, 4th, and 5th armies in September, followed by the cavalry divisions in October. 6 further corps were in training during the first months of the war, many containing volunteers from Germany’s universities or older conscripts. OHL ultimately opted against deploying them in 1914, as they needed further training to be useful and their presence was unlikely to change anything in the field. 4 of these corps would be sent east and the other two to the west. Conscription would bring in more men to train to expand the Heer.
One final note that would prove surprising during the period of fighting in the north, is that the navy was never contacted by OHL about running joint operations off the coast to support the army or disrupt the British landings or withdrawals. When the navy was informed of the capture of the channel ports, they would be eager to station some units there. The U-boots and torpedo boats of the Kriegsmarine would prove to be valuable assets to the Heer in the coming years and Falkenhayn was quick to set up joint offices once their utility became apparent. In the meantime, the ports at Calais and Ostend were damaged by Allied sabotage when they withdrew and Antwerp was blocked by Dutch neutrality. Early next year the ports would be ready again for use and by mid-year they would support dedicated subpens. In the meantime, both sides settle down to make drastic changes based on the lessons of 1914.