accident and prelude
The sudden death of Helmuth von Moltke on the night of the 18th of August was the most decisive moment in modern history, Winston Churchill would later write in his history of the Great War. Certainly it seemed an ominous omen for Germany. Though the Kaiser was informed within minutes of the fatal fall, the general public remained in the dark until much later. Even when the newspapers were allowed to report it, the details were shrouded in mystery, as it was deemed unbecoming for the most senior officer of the Reichsheer to succumb to a fall down a flight of stairs. His death was a well-kept secret, so much so that the Allies were not even aware of the change in command until October.
In the meantime, the various officers actually running the war were anxious while waiting the Kaiser’s decision for Moltke’s replacement. Tappen, Hentsch, Groener and the rest were shocked and dismayed by the news, which came at startling speed from Berlin. Until now they had actually run much of the war themselves, with Moltke acting as a bystander most of the time. Eric von Falkenhayn was their collective fear. The minister of war represented a threat to their power and most of OHL resented his presence up to this point in Koblenz. In fact he was purposely kept in the dark to what was exactly happening at the front. It was felt that the minister should be in Berlin where his duties were. Additionally, some of the distain for Falkenhayn had to do with the suspicion that he was the Kaiser’s spy meant to keep tabs on them. Moltke and his staff had felt that the Kaiser was a buffoon and as Falkenhayn was his picked man, having been selected over the heads of many more experience and senior officers for his post in the war ministry, he was viewed in the same light.
Falkenhayn was a man apart from the traditional General Staff officers. He was handsome, well traveled, and bitingly sarcastic, all features that would serve to alienate Moltke’s staff and cause bitter arguments. The first power struggle was not long in coming, as the new commander sought to break up the clique dominating the war planning. The heads of the Operations, Intelligence, Political, and Central Sections (Tappen, Hentsch, Dommes, and Fabeck) of the staff had dominated OHL to the point that Moltke had essentially just confirmed their decisions. Falkenhayn proceeded to break up the group and express that his command would be the only one to be obeyed. This came as a relief to many including Max Bauer, who described the chief of operations as “stupid, arrogant, and ignorant” among other things. But he had alienated several important individuals, who would attempt to obstruct their commander at several crucial junctures in the coming weeks.
Battle of the Frontiers
At the front, the war was just heating up. The fall of Liege had occurred on the 16th and the German army was advancing through Belgium. In Alsace-Lorraine, the French invasion was going badly, with casualties running into the hundreds of thousands. Prince Rupprecht, the commander of the 6th army was demanding permission to launch counter attacks and resume the offensive. Moltke was reluctantly about to give permission, but Falkenhayn was a bit more cautious. Ultimately he gave his assent, but began having Groener plan transfer the 7th army north to reinforce the right wing. Additionally, Falkenhayn had committed the 6 ½ Ersatz divisions tasked with guarding the communication lines in Belgium to the siege at Antwerp. It would take days to conduct the transfers, but the plans were in motion. On the 20th the 6th army threw the French 2nd army out of northern Alsace-Lorraine and caused the withdrawal of the 1st army of Pau to withdraw from the recently captured Mulhouse, as his flank became exposed. By the 22nd the invasion of Germany had returned to its kick off position along the Moselle. The battle of the Ardennes had started on the 21st, as the French 3rd and 4th armies advanced on Neufchateau and bumped into German forces of the 4th and 5th armies, who had methodically advanced through the forest since the 19th. By the 22nd the main forces had come into contact and vicious battles erupting all along the line. Hungry for glory, Rupprecht demanded an additional offensive to smash through the French line.
Further north, the German 2nd and 3rd armies made contact with the French 5th army, which had concentrated on the town of Charleroi. Weakened by transfers of troops and artillery to the invasion of Alsace-Lorraine, the French were sandwiched between two opposing, stronger armies that proceeded to push back and attempted to cut off the French forces. Ultimately unsuccessful, thanks to quick action by Franchet d’Esperey’s corps, the French fell back in disorder on the 23rd. The German 1st army had contacted advanced elements of the BEF on the 22nd and engaged the smaller army on the 23rd. Despite giving the Germans a bloody nose, the BEF withdrew on the 24th as the French 5th army had unexpected fallen back without prior notification.
Aware of battles being fought all along the frontier, Falkenhayn was incensed that OHL had only a vague impression of the situation. As a commander, he was uncomfortable with the concept of Aufträgstaktik and sought a firmer grip on the course of the fighting. The solution to this issue was to move OHL further west, closer to the front. Luxembourg would be the ultimate destination, despite the fears of many on the staff that the HQ would be too near the front. Furthermore, junior officers were dispatched to the various HQ’s of the armies operating on the Western Front with the conceptual overview of Falkenhayn’s war plan and orders to enforce his will. Ostensibly only observers, each man was provided with an aerial “courier” to dispatch important information to OHL and orders. Colonel Hentsch was tasked with the coordination of the incoming information from these sources and would eventually be dispatched himself to coordinate the right wing of the advance. The assignment would detach him from the clique that had given Falkenhayn concern.
Plan of Action
Each man was presented with Falkenhayn’s strategy to help them regulate the army commanders that each would be assigned to. Worried about a mess of independent action impeding the overall strategy during this vast war of movement, each officer was to enforce Falkenhayn’s vision in their various assignments. Committed to Moltke’s large flanking maneuver, the right wing, comprising the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd armies were to project wide around much of the front and encircle Paris and take the French army in the rear. This was the knock out blow that was to finish the war in the West and allow Germany to engage Russia on better terms. But the center would have to do it’s part and wheel around the fortified area of Verdun, separating and destroying the French 3rd and 4th armies, while taking the 1st and 2nd armies in the rear while the 6th army would serve as its fixing force. The 7th army was being transferred north to serve as a reserve to assist in the looping attack of the right wing as it descended on Paris and the furthest flank of the French forces. Transient battlefield opportunities would not be tolerated, the overall battle plan must be maintained. Spacing and direction would be crucial and it would be up to these junior officers to help their commanders to remain in line.
Already Rupprecht threatened to upset things by launching a full scale attack into the heart of the French fortifications and sustain a repeat of what he had just inflicted on the enemy on his own army. This would be unacceptable, but small scale offensives with limited objectives to pin some of the French troops would be tolerated. Ultimately it would be up to the dispatched junior officer to make sure that Rupperecht would not overstep his authorized actions.
The junior officers would all be in place by the 24th, the last arriving at the 1st army in the afternoon. This new arrangement would not be well received in the various HQ’s but the success of the measure would not be felt for some time.