In 1969, as a reflection of the
shifting social views within China, the Ministry of Health and Mental Hygiene officially removed the classification of "mental disorder" from same-sex attraction and relationships. With that, there was no reason for the 'curative mental sanatoriums' to exist, so they were shut down, and the communist party shifted to taking more explicit and active action to protect gay people. In most cases, the shuttering of the sanitoriums saw the former inhabitants leave, going back either to their former homes or to the (generally more open-minded) large cities. In some cases, things went a bit differently
"Curative mental sanatorium 44" was established in what is now the Outer Tibet Autonomous Socialist Republic, a few years after Tibet was brought back under Chinese control. 44 wasn't intended to be any different from the other sanitoriums, but would end up having a reputation as one of the best ones to end up in. Being up in the low-density Tibetan highlands, in the west of China and pretty far away from the great mass of population in eastern and central China, 44 was one of the most isolated sanitoriums. The Ministry of Health and Mental Hygiene attempted to ensure that all sanitoriums were run humanely, but generally had to make some effort to keep up appearances of actually working towards their stated goals. 44's relative isolation, however, gave it greater latitude in comparison to many others. The Han Chinese who took issue with homosexuality were rather far away, and the Tibetan leadership were too bust engaging in delicate negotiations with the national Communist party and with their own aristocrats and traditionalists to do more than cast the occasional anxious eye towards 44. So since early on in its existence, 44 had developed more along the lines of a generic urban settlement than most other of these sanitoriums
When 1969 came, and the sanitoriums were disestablished, many inhabitants of 44 simply stuck around. As the years went by, more people (largely but not solely LGBT people) would move to the area, now by choice - the area's reputation as one of the safest places for at-risk LGBT people in the pre-1969 era, and the existing LGBT community in the area, made it attractive to some. Furthermore, the area had a somewhat peculiar local government - being largely left alone by both the Communist party and the Outer Tibet government, the more hierarchical, planned, party-guided norm was largely absent, with the community developing more along the lines of the anarchist communal model (left-anarchism tended to be pretty popular among the Chinese LGBT community, especially back then)
As the community grew in size, the Communist party looked on it with increasing interest, as did Chinese and Korean social scientists (the oft-cited factoid stating that at one point, nearly 10 percent of the community's population were academics and their assistants is an urban legend, but reflects a genuine interest many in the academic world had for the community). In 1981 (two years after civil unions were legalized), the community was officially established as a township, and five years later (one year after gay marriage and LGBT adoptions were legalized), the community was formally given commune status, being one of the relative few communities to have that status. After consultation among the community, the name "Hexifeierdezhuang" ("Hirschfeld Village") would be chosen - with the community being named after Magnus Hirschfeld ("Hexifeierde" in Chinese), a prominent gay man and early advocate for LGBT rights and sex research who immigrated to China after leaving Germany when the Nazis took power
The growing official recognition and growing size of the commune would generate some worry from the Outer Tibetan leadership - the commune would grow to consist of over 10% of the autonomous socialist republic's total population, with the vast majority of the city being Han Chinese and other non-Tibetans. This created some worries in Outer Tibet, that the commune might be used as a starting point to establish greater numbers of Han and other non-Tibetans in the area, and potentially attempt to make the Tibetans a minority in Tibet. Furthermore, Tibet just wasn't a highly populated area, and there were concerns in regards to how many people the territory could sustain. The Communist party wished to assuage these fears, and while it had given support to the growing commune, it had no desire to replace the Tibetans or shift away from the general policy of avoiding large scale migration into the autonomous socialist republics. So the party stepped in (as was the norm for Chinese anarchist communes, the party retained the ability to intervene, and simply generally chose to do so as little as possible) and placed limits on the area that the commune could expand into. Then, after the city transitioned to extremely high-density building policy and kept expanding in population even more, the party placed limits on density as well, in order to stop the growth of the commune and assuage concerns of the Outer Tibetan leadership
Apart from those limitations, though, the Communist party has generally maintained a hands-off approach to the commune and its anarchist politics. It has become rather acclaimed not just in China but also elsewhere, due to its successes with anarchist communal ideals, its LGBT history and culture (having by some measures the highest percentage of LGBT residents of any city in the world, being well above a majority), its pro-density urbanist policies, and nearby scenic mountains - these various factors have also all contributed to the commune attracting substantial amounts of tourism. The Dalai Lama and Outer Tibetan leadership initially held stances of cautious skepticism towards the commune, but with the passage of time, with Communist party action to assuage their concerns, and with their own shifting ideas on social issues as time went on, they'd come to accept the commune and view it as a positive addition to Tibetan and Chinese society
Hexifeierdezhuang was far from the only well-functioning anarchist commune in China. But it stood out as an early success at a time when many communes ran into various issues. A number of early experimental anarchist communes suffered from the sort of things referred to as "NIMBYism" in the west, as well as some nasty instances of bigotry in various forms, and simple difficulties in management and organization. The party would generally overcome those issues as time went on, through various means, including being more selective towards those who already leaned towards anarchism or at least had more in the way of general political theoretical education and background, as well as doing more to fight (not just for the sake of improving communes - that was rarely if ever the primary motivator, but it helped nonetheless) the various broader issues that contributed to the problems seen in the communes (with the rise of the green movement in China, for example, the party began to push for very high-density housing and urban policy across the country, and the changing views on that matter helped reduce the NIMBYism seen in communes, among many other things)
Even with the improvements in commune function, the party has not made a major push to expand communes across the country - this matter is representative of a broader tension between the anarchists and the party mainstream. While the party maintains that the eventual communist future will involve an eventual transition further and further in the anarcho-communist direction, that is generally seen as a rather long-term goal. The anarchists tend to urge for much broader expansion of communes, and for things like reducing the workweek, attempting to decrease the amount of work done in society rather than worrying as much about efficiency and productivity, and having a very domestic-focused and borderline isolationist stance regarding foreign policy. But the party mainstream tends to see that sort of thing as somewhat putting the cart before the horse. The goal of assisting the world (particularly the developing world) in green development to fight climate change while also fighting poverty, the goal of expanding communist influence abroad (via the prior goal and other means), the goal of preserving a strong military deterrence to fend off the capitalist powers (who control more of the world than the communists do), and other such goals are seen as shorter term goals that could be necessary to assist the longer term communist goals. So the party maintains work standards to fuel efforts to uplift people elsewhere in the world, rather than maintain similar living standards domestically for less work. Some conflicts between factions have occurred over these matters - some subsections of the anarchist movement have urged for working for as little as possible in order to sustain themselves, and in reaction, some, particularly among the more internationalist-minded elements of the younger generations, have adopted the "945 working hour system" trend, increasing their work-week to 35 hours ("945" referring to "9 am to 4 pm, 5 days a week") in an attempt to increase output to benefit the party's goals (the party actively discourages either extreme)
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The Youth Defense, Solidarity, and Readiness Forces (YDSRF) have evolved considerably over the history of the socialist republic
Since the declaration of the socialist republic, China nominally had a system of limited military conscription, but in practice, the regular armed forces never struggled to fill their ranks with volunteers alone. Still, certain militias and auxiliaries existed as well. With as large a population as China has had, the party figured that while a moderate-to-smallish (for China's size, at least) professional volunteer military would be more than enough for its goals, it would also be useful if the great mass of its people had at least some training in firearm use and basic military concepts, so that if worst came to worst, the great numbers of the population could be utilized in some way. The YDSRF was created for that purpose - initially being a sort of general military reserve that all would serve in for two years after high school completion
As it became clear that China just wouldn't need any sort of general mobilization of tens of millions of people, the YDSRF shifted (first informally, and then very explicitly with national legal/policy changes) towards being more along the lines of a youth mandatory civilian service and education thing. Youth would be sent away for three months a year during their last two years of secondary education, and for the first two years of postsecondary if they went that far. The program was organized so that youth would be sent far from home, and placed among a diverse range of youth from across the country - taking some ideas from the militaries of old empires, the party figured that this could help reduce provincial thinking, with exposure to diverse people and places assisting in national unity while also helping encourage the valuing of diversity and other progressive values. The program itself came to consist of community service/"volunscription", introductory vocational training and job shadowing, political education - both in theory and practice (with considerable focus on democratic involvement - the Chinese system was far from a "western" liberal democracy, with many levels and considerable party guidance, but unions, many workplaces, and generally the lowest levels of local government had considerable room for democratic involvement, among other things), sociological awareness, and other things
The YDSRF began as a military reserve program for adults, and would remain partially under military administration, but as time passes and its existence changed, it would come under the joint administration of various civilian ministries, and by the late 80s had essentially lost all military aspects apart from very brief firearm training, which was presented as intended for "self defense training" rather than for a military purpose, and the forces could no longer legally be called on to serve in any wartime military capacity (they never actually were called up even before that). Despite all that, some overseas felt a certain discomfort with the YDSRF, due to the origins as a military program, or just for the "mandatory service" aspect, and some ardent anticommunists abroad have over the years attacked the program as a "child soldier militia", but the Chinese armed forces have banned anyone under 18 from serving in any military or (actually functioning) militias since well before the ratification of the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, so those attacks have had little impact on anything politically or diplomatically
Among Chinese anarchists, inside and outside of the Communist party, the YDSRF has tended to have negative approval, on account if the mandatory element. Some do see a silver lining in the idea that the only conscription-in-practice in China is for civilian purposes and one that has generally been pretty light on the actual "service" element. There's some complicated feelings among anarchists towards the program, though, on account of the political and related training elements, however. With the program's transition to including those elements, including what could essentially be seen as practical experience in a (guided) youth commune among other things, there's been a positive trend in anarchist communes for reduction in various problematic incidents, with the YDSRF generally being seen as having at least some role in this development (along with other expansions in political education at the lower levels), leaving the average Chinese person in the younger generations better prepared for positive involvement in a communal setting
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and one endnote on language - I possess zero Chinese language ability, and have basically just used google translate and some other resources. I don't know for sure if the placename "Hexifeierdezhuang" makes any sense linguistically or if it instead is some sort of linguistic abomination. I generated it simply by taking Magnus Hirschfeld's last name from the Chinese wikipedia, which was, there, presented as " 赫希菲尔德 ", and which google translate seems to transliterate as " Hè xī fēi'ěrdé ". And onto that, I simply tacked " 庄 ", or "-zhuang", which apparently translates as "village" among other things, and has occurred as a suffix for some Chinese settlements (
Shijiazhuang, among others). It sounded like the sort of thing that would make sense, but again, I am someone with zero Chinese language knowledge, and I am very much open to alternative suggestions if the current naming doesn't make any sense