I decided to do a little thing on Iran in my
China TL, with a small allusion to the way the PoD affects America in TTL.
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The Imperial State of Iran is unusual among Middle Eastern countries in that its political system has been relatively one of the most stable in the region. For 95 years now, it has been a constitutional monarchy with the Shah as the head of state, but considerable power is held by the unitary National Constitutional Assembly, or Majis.
Its stability has not been without interruption. Reza Shah Pahlavi was forced to abdicate following the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran in 1941, and a coup d’état towards the democratically elected Mosaddegh government was planned by MI6 in 1953 after the Iranian oil industry was nationalized that would almost certainly have gone ahead had President Taft not died and his successor, Richard Nixon, advocated for Britain buying Alaskan oil to make up its shortfall instead.
The most dramatic, however, was when in 1979, protests against Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s advocacy for the progressive reforms of the Hoveyda government (and generally his authoritarianism) resulted in him being forced to abdicate; his son Reza Pahlavi, only 19 at the time, was functionally a puppet of hardline Islamists, and dissolved the Majis to cause an election that the until-then dominant National Front lost in a landslide.
Ironically, this effectively doomed the theocratic movement, as the world press was appalled by the authoritarianism of new Prime Minister Mohammad-Javad Bahonar’s Fada’iyan government (the recently-formed parliamentary wing of the Fada’iyan-e Islam movement), and in September 1980, Iraq invaded Iran to try and assert itself as the dominant state in the Persian Gulf. Bathonar’s policy of conscription made him hugely unpopular, leftists who had supported the protests to try and get rid of the Shah turned on Bahonar’s government, and things ultimately culminated with the assassination of Bahonar and several members of his Cabinet in the Hashteh-Sharivar bombing of 1981.
After all this, the Fada’iyan government was effectively left in ruins, and when an election was hastily called by the Shah, the National Front returned to power. The new Prime Minister, Mehdi Bazargan, proved to be an effective moderate; by 1982, Iran had reclaimed basically all the land it had lost to Iraq, and during the next seven years he spent in power, he mended Iran’s ties with the international community, privatized elements of the economy the NF had resisted Mohammed Reza Pahlavi’s inclination to privatize, lessened the Shah’s power over Parliament, and continued to (much more carefully) expand social reforms.
By the time Bazargan resigned as PM in 1989, Iran was a very different place. The Iran-Iraq war finally ended in a stalemate the year before, the exiled Ayatollah, Ruhollah Khomeini, who had been a key player in agitating the Islamic fundamentalism that led to the 1979 protests, died that June, and many Iranians had come to see fundamentalism as simply leading to trouble and the current status quo of Shah Reza Pahlavi having a mostly ceremonial role in Iranian politics as for the best.
Consequently, the NF has (or to be strictly accurate, the alliance led by it has; the NF is the largest party in an alliance of it, smaller parties and independents which usually also goes by the name the National Front) effectively been a centrist party of government within Iran ever since, with all but one PM since Bathonar coming from it and its members dividing on economic stances between the ‘Mosaddeghites’, who tend to be advocates of Islamic socialism or at least milder forms of interventionism, and the ‘Bazarganites’, who are more secular and supportive of free market reforms.
Iran’s other major party/alliance, the Freedom Movement of Iran, claims to be the true heir to Mossadegh’s beliefs (though like de Gaulle in France, Mossadegh is as much a figurehead as a real ideological yardstick at this point) and advocates for both secularism and government interventionism. It is sometimes cynically described as effectively a vehicle for Mir-Hossein Mousavi, a prominent and long-active leftist who made a name for himself protesting Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and then the Bahonar government, and who has been leader of the party since he came out of political retirement in 2009. It has only won power once, in the 2012 election, in which the tensions that led to the Arab Spring came to a head in a more democratic form in Iran.
The 2020 election was effectively a repeat of the 2016 election at which the NF regained power; Prime Minister Hassan Rouhani was re-elected with his government winning only 5 seats fewer than it had in 2016. Since the reforms that pre-empted the second post-Bathonar election in 1986, Iran has elected 290 members using its 31 provinces as multi-member constituencies electing a proportional number of multiple members by bloc vote. An interesting idiosyncracy of Iran’s political system is that it has the youngest voting age in the world for men at 15, though women cannot vote until the age of 18.