Alternate Wikipedia Infoboxes V (Do Not Post Current Politics Here)

There's always one mistake... Already fixed.

 

Here's an infobox for a communist sort-of equivalent to the EU. The "Council for Economic and Political Integration", or more informally, ComInteg, a sort of evolution of/spinoff from the (larger and still existent) ComEcon

There's no concrete, definite timeline to this. But I had a vague idea for a tl, which I will put under the cut because it is kind of long-ish. Long story short, something of a moderate communist-wank, with a continuing Cold War, stopping short of something like a reverse Cold War ending with the western bloc falling by the present day or something like that

Spoiler: scenario

USSR:
Basically, the Russian leftist coalition holds together in 1917 and accepts the initial offer of peace at Brest Litovsk,which involved Russia keeping Ukraine and possibly also Finland, Moldova, and part of the Balkans. (OTL, Lenin wanted the coalition to accept the peace, but many in the coalition did not, leading to the fracture of the coalition, and the Germans would go back on the offensive and take Ukraine and other territories too after the failure to agree to the initial Brest Litovsk offer). Due to the earlier German exit from the east front, and the leftist coalition sticking together rather than descending into infighting, the Russian civil war is shorter and less devastating (the leftist coalition has less need of implementing harsh "war communism", and the famines of 1921-22 are either lessened or don't occur at all, with the shorter war having less of a harsh impact on peasant agricultural production).

The Bolsheviks still end up coming to sort of dominate the coalition and newly forming USSR, but it remains somewhat more politically open and pluralistic. The soviets are somewhat shifted aside in terms of power by the newly forming bureaucracy, but not disbanded or made completely irrelevant, and the ban on factions doesn't occur. The NEP still ends up being the initial policy, and is maintained after Lenin dies, with someone other than Stalin taking power. The USSR is able to industrialize quicker (some suggest that Stalin's brutal methods allowed the USSR to accelerate industrialization, but the industrialization was paid for in no small part due to grain sales, which were significantly disrupted by the rapid collectivization, which here instead is pursued far more gradually over the course of decades, avoiding the disruption and 1932-33 famines), the absence of the Stalinist purges of officers, intellectuals, inventors, and so on lead to a stronger military (with Tukhachevsky remaining in the position to influence military doctrine with deep operations), a more innovative and capable Soviet R&D sphere, and a more vibrant and open cultural sphere. The Stalinist turn towards social conservatism in certain ways does not occur, and instead the USSR remains more committed to social progress (if at times still pursuing it somewhat gradually). The bureaucracy and government is able to evolve in a more constructive direction, facing less of the issues of Stalinist corruption, repression, and ossification. The USSR of the 30s and 40s retains aspects of authoritarianism, but is rather more open compared to OTL, potentially being described as a hybrid regime, and the government pursues a slower transition to socialism (along the lines of the idea that a developed capitalist state is needed before a transition to socialism, one of the OTL criticisms of the Stalinist era), and without the issues of the Stalinist era, is able to remain more committed to that goal over the longer term future (as opposed to something like China under Mao, where the attempts at rapid socialism under Mao led to disaster and were followed by what could arguably be seen as essentially a political rejection of any substantial intention to build socialism as opposed to just an authoritarian nationalist state with a veneer of socialist rhetoric)

China:
Things also go differently in China. In OTL, the CPC and KMT were allied until the late 1920s when Sun Yat Sen died and was succeeded by Chiang Kai Shek, a right-winger who broke the United Front and sought to eliminate the Communists. The KMT had both rightist and leftist wings, so let's say that factional matters go differently somehow and instead of Chiang Kai Shek taking over after Sun, some leftist does. And the CPC sort of takes the dominant position in a United Front with the left-wing of the KMT, and perhaps some other factions like the Guominjun. Perhaps this would result in some rightist-nationalist uprisings and conflicts against the leftist Nanjing government analogous to the OTL communist uprisings and conflicts against the rightist Nanjing government, but perhaps the status of the left controlling the KMT, along with populist appeals of the united front to the peasants, are able to minimize or avoid any significant anti-left uprisings. Here, the communists, in power earlier and without having been cut down by the fighting with the nationalists and having been taken over by Mao, end up basically imitating the new Soviet government, in pursuing NEP-like policy, as opposed to the ineffectual policy of Mao and the Great Leap Forward, so China avoids the issues of the great famine, and, similarly to the USSR here, remains more open and more consistently dedicated to socialism in the long term even though it starts off with a more gradual approach. The Soviets, seeing a fellow socialist government in power in China as opposed to the rightist KMT of Kai Shek in OTL, begin sending somewhat more economic and military aid in the late 20s and early 30s, which further helps cultivate relations between the two states.

Perhaps the Chinese, playing to the United Front/KMT rhetoric and pointing to their own NEP, are able to at least at first sort of give the appearance of playing all sides against each other, lobbying for aid from the US, UK/France, and Germany as well. Also appealing to the US with the open door policy, and appealing to the US and UK/France with the potential to be a counterbalance to the Japanese Empire. Which could maybe give the Chinese an additional boost at the start here.

The Mukden incident still occurs, with the Japanese making sizable initial gains and pushing warlord Zhang Xueliang's Fengtian Army back. But Nanjing government here isn't busy playing whack-a-mole with the communists as in OTL, they are able to send the main force of the central government army up north to assist in fighting the Japanese in Manchuria, along with some forces from other warlords. Along with that, perhaps the USSR engages in a bigger Operation Zet, with more resources sent to China, along with perhaps some military 'volunteers' and officers to help. With these additional factors in their favor, the Chinese forces are able to keep the Japanese contained in Manchuria and eventually push them first out of Manchuria and then off the mainland altogether, occupying Korea and setting up an allied socialist state there. Thus the Second Sino-Japanese War occurs earlier, and lasts perhaps one or two years, ending in a Chinese victory.

Europe, 1930s:
With the USSR avoiding the Stalinist path, the USSR and European communist parties end up less oppositional to European social democratic/labor parties, avoiding the 'social fascism' stuff (though there are still definitely misgivings over, for example, the German social democrats suppressing the attempted revolution, allying with the proto-nazi freikorps, haing Rosa Luxemburg killed, and so on). By the early 1930s in Germany, for example, instead of being split two ways between the SDP and KPD, the left is split three ways roughly equally between the SPD, KPD, and a surviving USPD taking up the political ground between them, with all three on halfway decent terms with one another.

This less divided left (well, divided into more factions, but with the factions being less oppositional to each other), however, has an added effect of frightening the political right and center even more. In Germany, despite doing slightly worse in elections, the Nazis still become the dominant power on the right in the 1930s, and the establishment right and center still choose to enable Hitler to take power. We can just sort of handwave/kill butterflies and say that while things go slightly different, Nazi Germany is still able to rise up, and start WWII, taking Austria and Czechoslovakia, and then conquering Poland by late 1939.

In Spain, with the support of a stronger Soviet Union, the Republicans (increasingly being dominated by a coalition of communists, anarchists, and non-socdem socialists as the war goes on) are able to beat the Nationalists.

European War, 1940s:
Perhaps sometime after the Fall of France, the USSR takes the initiative and initiates war with the Axis. Or perhaps they remain in a defensive posture, but whoever is leading at that point is more believing of reports of a German invasion, and thus the initial response isn't so incompetent and disorganized. Perhaps the Soviets keep most of their forces on the alternate Stalin line rather than moving them up after the alternate Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (or perhaps that pact just doesn't occur). With a more capable officer corps (having avoided the purges), a somewhat more technologically advanced military (due to avoiding purges of inventors, and due to, for example, earlier adoption of-and without the initial bureaucratic opposition to-mass production of the T-34 tank), the avoidance of having much of the airforce destroyed on the ground in the initial invasion (due to a more competent reaction to the war's outbreak), and with a larger base of industrial production and population base (due to a continuation of the NEP and avoidance of the great famine), the Red Army is able to stand up to the Axis, without the massive gains of Barbarossa, and is able to much more quickly take initiative and make advances into Axis territory. Perhaps the war is ended a year or two earlier, and the USSR ends the War on the Rhine rather than where they were OTL.

With no war in the Pacific likely to occur, the US probably remains more isolationist at first, though they may still do lend lease for the Western Allies after mainland Western Europe falls to the Nazis. As the tide of the war turns against the Axis, the US public may become more concerned over the chance of socialist domination of all mainland Europe. Perhaps the US directly enters the war in the later parts, to try and maximize the amount of land under Western Allied control at the end of the war, or perhaps they just stick with considerably increasing their material support for the WAllies, along with still building up their military more, still being concerned for the geopolitics of the post-war era.

With the USSR in a stronger position and acting more independently from the WAllies, there isn't really any equivalent of the Pottsdam conference to determine the postwar borders, so things are rather more tense at the end of the war. With most of the German forces fighting in the east, the UK and French rump based in Algeria (with or without the US directly involved, and possibly leaning more on colonial troops-like the Asians, since territories like India and Indochina won't be under threat from Japan and won't need their troops reserved as much for those areas) make landings in Western Europe at some point, perhaps Italy still flips, and perhaps the Soviets purposely stop at the Rhine to avoid overstretching themselves, or perhaps the WAllies just end up meeting the Soviet forces in their advance around that area.

Postwar, mid 1940s to present:
The Cold War still happens, in some ways different from OTL with more tension, stronger western red scares and opposition to the eastern bloc, and with the Soviets and Chinese never really going through a split, being instead ideologically similar and happy with standing together due to their cooperation in the Second Sino Japanese War and later the European War. The USSR still makes itself the dominant power of the territories taken in Eastern and Central Europe, but governs with a much lighter hand compared to OTL, and focuses rather more on rebuilding the eastern bloc economies as opposed to exploiting them for Soviet gain. Also Yugoslavia is larger (and the Tito-Stalin split doesn't occur), and Germany doesn't lose the eastern territories-apart from East Prussia, which the Soviets spun off into a European alternative to Israel and ended up its own multiethnic state. The Soviets are, in addition to getting Germany up to the Rhine in their sphere, are also able to get Denmark, Norway, and Greece in their sphere. The early years of the Cold War see very high tensions between east and west, but the development of the atom bomb (a little later than OTL by the UK and US, a little sooner than OTL by the Soviets) ends up cementing things in place and avoiding an outright war (the avoidance of a Korean War-type thing also helps temper things somewhat)

Over the course of the later half of the 20th century, the eastern bloc gradually expanded both state-owned enterprises and non-state collectives, to the point where those make up a large portion of the economy by the end of the 20th century. The end of the 20th century also saw the rise of the internet and automation, which offered to give the planned aspects of the economy a significant boost in efficiency along the lines of plans like CyberSyn, which as of the 2010s has been something the eastern bloc has tentatively been experimenting with.

After the European War, the USSR established ComEcon, first as a means to oversee economic aid and rebuilding of the countries of East/Central Europe, which would later expand to also involve developmental aid for China and Korea, as well as the newly emerging socialist countries in the era of decolonization. The ComEcon would expand in its roles as the 20th century went on, sort of like the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Communities, later involving various political matters outside of economic aid. In 1999, the Treaty of Leningrad would be signed between China, Korea, and the Soviet Sphere in Europe, creating the Council for Economic and Political Integration (or ComInteg for short), which would inherit certain roles of the ComEcon but was also founded on the open goal of integrating the various institutions of the member states, with intent for eventual full political union. By present day, Cuba, Nepal, Spain, and Indochina had also joined the ComInteg.

At present, the eastern bloc finds itself still locked in a Cold War with the west, though the Cold War has seen a detente of sorts for the past dozen or so years. The eastern bloc has seen significant reductions in military spending, engaging in recent years in a very large effort to complete the transition to a green economy, and to provide aid to other poorer countries seeking to go green without being impoverished. There is significant debate among the eastern bloc powers on foreign policy, regarding whether aid should be freely provided even to countries with major records of human rights violations, or instead used as a leverage to promote progressive causes abroad, as well as more broadly in regard to the cold war and whether the east bloc countries should play along with the west in the current detente or should be doing more to directly promote revolutionary forces abroad. Debate also exists over intra-bloc and domestic policy, such as in regards to whether political union of the states should be the current goal, vs a more rapid attempt to move to a fully classless and stateless society even with the still considerable opposition by the western bloc.

The ComInteg emerged from the ComEcon sort of like the EU from the European Coal and Steel Community, and takes on a similar role with various matters of economic and political cooperation and coordination. Though the ComInteg has a more open goal of eventual political unification into one united federation, and there's more support among it for its goals, contrasted to the EU of OTL where even the current situation of the EU's existence has generated strong controversy and opposition across the political spectrum, even ignoring the question of further future integration

(In addition, there's a larger version of the map in the wikibox, along with a worlda, here)

 

Wikiboxe inspired by this post in the Map Shitpost thread:

 

To continue to celebrate the release of "Au Bord de l'Abîme" in English under the title "At the Edge of the Abyss" I would like to repost a few old infoboxes.
These are two last aobut the 1st Cycle. You can get the book here do discover the AH and illustration.

 

He's just happy people remember he exists

 

This belongs in the current politics thread

 

The President of Hawaii (Hawaiian: Ke Pelekikena o Hawaiʻi) is the head of state and chief executive of the Republic of Hawaii and its various agencies and departments, under the terms of the Constitution of Hawaii. The President is directly elected for a four-year term. Unlike many other Oceanian heads of state, the Hawaiian Presidency is a powerful, executive post modeled after its American and French counterparts; the President is responsible for enforcing laws passed by the Parliament of Hawaii and upholding rulings of the Hawaiian judiciary, and serves as commander-in-chief of the Hawaii Defense Forces.

De jure, the President's authority only extends to the fields of national security and foreign policy; in all other matters, the "normal" rules of the Westminster system apply, and the President reverts to a figurehead role holding reserve powers only, while day-to-day governance is handled by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, who are responsible to House of Representatives and must maintain its confidence. This state of affairs only exists de facto in case a hostile majority controls the House (cohabitation in French parlance); if the President's party also controls the House, the Prime Minister merely formalizes policy lines already made by the President, but might make independent decisions over their implementation to the extent the President allows.

The current President of Hawaii is Duke Aiona, first elected in 2012 and subsequently re-elected in 2016.

Election

Hawaiian presidential elections are conducted via run-off voting, which ensures that the elected president always obtains a majority: if no candidate receives a majority of votes in the first round of voting, the two highest-scoring candidates arrive at a run-off 21 days later. The first round of the presidential election is held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November; Inauguration takes place on January 20 following a presidential election.

There is no lifetime limit on the number of times a President may be elected, but a President who has been elected to two consecutive terms must be out of office for at least one election cycle before being eligible once again for re-election.

In order to be admitted as an official candidate, potential candidates must receive signed nominations from at least 50,000 voters. Furthermore, every candidate is required to be at least 35 years old and eligible for election to Parliament, and to have been a resident of Hawaii for five consecutive years previous to election.

On taking office, the President must take the following oath, stipulated by the first schedule of the constitution, at a joint sitting of Parliament:

In the presence of everyone assembled here, and in full realization of the high calling I am about to assume, I, [name], do solemnly swear [or affirm] that I will faithfully and conscientiously execute the office of President of the Republic of Hawaii; that I will to the best of my ability and judgement preserve, protect, defend and execute its Constitution and Laws; that I will do justice to every man after the laws and usages of Hawai'i, without fear or favor, affection or ill-will, self-interest or deceit; and that I will consecrate myself to the service and well-being of the nation.​

Powers

Since Hawaii's constitution is based on the "Lancaster House template" used by British self-governing colonies and freshly independent ex-colonies during the 20th century, the President of Hawaii appears at first glance to be about as powerful as, or even somewhat weaker than, the Presidents and Governors-General of most other states in Commonwealth Oceania. In fact, while all of them legally possess the same sweeping powers, most Commonwealth Oceanian Presidents and Governors-General act almost entirely on the advice of the Cabinet (bar when using reserve powers), and thus play a strictly ceremonial role, whereas the Hawaiian President is an independent political actor with clear involvement in day-to-day governance.

In addition, the Hawaiian constitution's exact provisions are typically modified relative to the Lancaster House template to match US and French models more closely, explaining why some powers are apparently weakened. For example, while an unmodified Lancaster House constitution would impose no time limit on the power to dissolve Parliament (while a separate article would subject it, alongside all other Presidential or Gubernatorial-General powers, to the advice of the Prime Minister), the corresponding Hawaiian provision allows the President to dissolve the House of Representatives on his own initiative after consulting the Prime Minister and the speakers of the two houses of Parliament, but prohibits a dissolution within the first year of the House's term unless no government can be formed or a successful motion of no-confidence is passed – almost exactly the same conditions under which the President of France can dissolve the French National Assembly.

The President's greatest power is the ability to choose the Prime Minister. In accordance with the conventions of the Westminster system, the President appoints a person who enjoys the confidence of a majority in the House of Representatives, a requirement bolstered by the House's ability to remove the Cabinet from office through a motion of no confidence. However, owing to the fact the House is elected by a mixed-member proportional (MMP) system, no political party enjoys a majority on its own, making a multi-party coalition or a minority government backed by confidence and supply agreements the only possible government. The President must endeavor to find a candidate acceptable both to himself and to a majority in the House – not necessarily the parliamentary leader of the largest political party among those forming the government – and if no such candidate can be found, the President must dissolve the House and call an election prematurely.

In addition:

• The President appoints and dismisses the other ministers, and assigns their government portfolios, after consulting the Prime Minister.
• The President has the right to dismiss the Prime Minister in case he loses the confidence of the House despite the fact no motion of confidence against the Government is passed (e.g., in case the Senate rejects a supply bill).
• The President has sole responsibility for foreign, defense and national security policy; the corresponding ministers only manage public administration and deal with business in Parliament for these portfolios on his behalf.
• The President assents to bills, and may veto them subject to two-thirds majority override by Parliament; if the president fails to do so within 30 days, the bill automatically becomes law (there is no pocket veto). The President may also refer a bill to the Constitutional Council for review instead of assenting or vetoing it.
• The President has the right to rule by decree for a limited period of time in case of a serious constitutional crisis.
• The President may dissolve the House of Representatives of Hawaii.
• The President appoints up to five senators for life (other senators are either directly elected by universal suffrage or former Presidents serving ex officio).
• The President appoints one-third of the members of the Constitutional Council.
• The President appoints key officials (for instance, Supreme Court Justices, the Attorney-General, the Secretary to the Cabinet, the ʻIolani Palace Chief of Staff, the chairman and members of the Public Service Commission, the Chief of the Defense Staff and the Inspector-General of the Hawaii Police) subject to confirmation by the Senate.
• The President receives foreign ambassadors.
• The President may grant a pardon or reprieve to convicted criminals.

Impeachment

Impeachment in Hawaii follows procedures similar to the United States. The House of Representatives, one of the houses of the bicameral Parliament, has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment against key officials (such as the President, Vice-President, Ministers, Supreme Court Justices and the Ombudsman). When a majority of its membership has endorsed the impeachment proposal, it is then transmitted to the Senate of Hawaii, the other House of Parliament, which tries and decides the impeachment case.

In the Senate, selected members of the House of Representatives act as the prosecutors and the Senators act as judges, with the Chief Justice presiding over the proceedings. Like the United States, to convict the official in question requires that a minimum of two-thirds of the Senate vote in favor of conviction. If an impeachment attempt is unsuccessful or the official is acquitted, no new cases can be filed against that impeachable official for at least one full year.

Succession and incapacity

The Vice-President of Hawaii, elected on the same ticket as the President, acts as President upon the officeholder's absence from the state or if the person is incapacitated — unable to discharge their presidential powers and duties. If the Vice-President is also incapacitated, the authority to act as President devolves to the members of the Cabinet; first to the Prime Minister and, if he is himself not able to act, to the other ministers by order of seniority.

A Vice-President who acts as President exercises all Presidential powers and duties; however, while the Prime Minister or another minister acts as President, the authority to appoint and dismiss the Cabinet passes to the Speaker of the House and the powers to dissolve the House of Representatives or nominate a replacement Vice-President are suspended.

The President may declare his own incapacity by transmitting a statement to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate stating the reasons for the declaration. The President resumes the discharge of the presidential powers and duties upon transmitting, to those two officials, a written declaration stating that resumption.

Additionally, the Vice-President, in conjunction with a majority of the Cabinet, may declare the President's incapacity by transmitting a written declaration to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate stating this. If this occurs, the President can declare that no such incapacity exists and resume the discharge of the presidential powers and duties. If the Vice-President and Cabinet contest this claim, it is up to Parliament, which must meet within two days if not already in session, to decide the merit of the claim.

Vacancies and succession in the office of President may arise under several possible circumstances: death, resignation, and removal from office. If the President's office falls vacant, the Vice-President of Hawaii becomes President; However, if the Vice-President's office is also vacant, the rules for a double incapacity of the President and the Vice-President apply — i.e. the Prime Minister becomes merely acting President, not President in his own right, and must call a special presidential election.

The first round of that special presidential election must be organized on the last Tuesday during the 90-day period following the presidential vacancy. The new President and Vice-President elected in that special election serve only the remainder of their predecessors' term, except when the special election would be held held less than six months before the due date of an ordinary presidential election, in which case the Prime Minister acts as President until the vacant President's term expires. A special presidential election is in fact unlikely to happen, because once the Vice-President becomes President, he will normally name a new Vice-President.

 

a small, incomplete wikibox i did for practice. Thoughts?

 

1993

While Heseltine’s first term had been fairly successful, his second would see enormous upheaval. One of the first major fiascos came when the Local Government Act 1989 had a small clause named Section 28 attached to it. This clause, intended to make the ‘promotion’ of homosexuality in schools illegal, caused enormous controversy as LGBT groups, along with the Labour and Liberal parties, opposed it; though the vote to pass it proved fairly straightforward, the uproar it promoted was highly significant and controversial.

However, there are three moments analysts usually point to as the killing blows for Heseltine’s government. The first came in early 1990, when the ‘community charge’ (informally known as the Poll Tax) was introduced, a series of local rates where every Briton paid exactly the same regardless of income. While the cynical benefits of this were clear- it could theoretically make poor Britons voluntarily take themselves off the electoral register- the problem for the Tories was that most voters saw the tax as either a transparent attempt to gain votes or just a violation of the party’s commitment to low taxation, and riots broke out during a protest in London. With the Tories’ position in the polls collapsing and all three major national parties condemning the charge (albeit for different reasons), Heseltine finally relented in November 1990, announcing that he would replace it with the council tax, which would take the ability to pay into account far more than the community charge had.

Most of 1991 would pass relatively amiably; Heseltine even considered calling an election late in the year due to a popularity bounce following the conflict in Kuwait, but a string of by-election losses as the economy stayed fairly weak dissuaded him; but the next two stumbling blocks for the Tories came almost one after the other, and it soon became clear the next election would probably not be good for the Tories.

In June 1992, Heseltine announced a large round of pit closures, and refused to promise any public spending to stimulate the economies of the areas where these closures were to happen. The NUM were incensed, and after balloting (which was, despite trade union reforms of the government during its first term, a foregone conclusion in the circumstances), miners across the country went on strike. While the effect on the country was not even close to the devastating effect it had had in the strike eighteen years before, public sympathy was overwhelmingly with the miners, and by early August, Heseltine had to relent and promised extensive expenditure packages to the affected areas as well as delaying the closures by eighteen months.

Having averted one crisis with some damage, the next one proved to be even worse. On the 16th September 1992, despite aggressively propping up sterling for months, Heseltine and Chancellor John Major were finally forced to withdraw the UK from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), which both of them had vocally advocated for. The scandal ended Heseltine’s ‘leader in Europe’ ambitions, and by midday of the 17th September, he had announced he could not continue as Prime Minister. The leadership election that followed saw John Major win a ‘coronation’ as he was challenged only by ardent Eurosceptic and Secretary of State for Wales John Redwood, who was most famous to the public as the man who mouthed nonsense to the Welsh national anthem at the Welsh Conservative Party Conference the year before. An anonymous Conservative MP described the choice as being ‘like having to pick whether to be in Hiroshima or Nagasaki on the day they were bombed’; ultimately, it was Major who won out due to the even more intensely negative associations of Redwood and suspicions he was not as loyal to the Tories as he made out.

The eleven months comprising Major’s premiership would be as hard as Heseltine’s had been at its end, if not moreso. Initially he saw some success by publicly apologizing for the government’s conduct in the ERM debacle, but the polls did not significantly move in the Tories’ favour. To make matters worse, by continuing to push for ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, he incurred the wrath of not only the Nat Libs, but a large section of the Tory backbench who were hostile to the arrangement the treaty involved, with figures such as Teddy Taylor voicing their opposition to Major very publicly. His hand was further weakened when, in the middle of the negotiations, the Tories lost the Newbury by-election to the Liberals, being beaten into fourth place behind the Nat Libs and (despite their weakness in the area) Labour. The Tories’ majority had already been reduced by earlier by-election losses, and by this point the party’s majority had already fallen from 104 to 96, but the Maastricht ratification process would prompt rebellion on a scale unseen in the Conservative Party for decades.

When the Third Reading of the Maastricht Treaty passed despite fifty-five Conservative rebels, Major declared that the party must ‘unite or die’ on the treaty, rebel leader Nick Budgen called a press conference and declared that he and his allies ‘would rather die’ than continue to support Major, and all but ten of the fifty-five rebels resigned the Conservative whip. Major’s majority had been slashed from 96 down to just 6 in one fell swoop, and as a final kick in the teeth to Major, the 45 MPs joined the Nat Libs. After an infamous gaffe where it was revealed Major had called the defectors ‘bastards’, the remaining Tories were thoroughly demoralized and exhausted, and after losing the Christchurch by-election in July, it subsequently lost the motion of no confidence called on them by the opposition the following month. Major was left with no option but to call a general election and hope for a miracle.

Unfortunately for him, Labour were in a much, much stronger position than they had been in 1989. Unlike Kinnock, who had been unceremoniously dubbed the ‘Welsh windbag’ by his opponents, John Smith, who had taken over as the party’s leader after the 1989 election, was quite respected and well-liked by Labour voters and the public at large alike, having gone toe-to-toe with Heseltine in the leadership polls and being head and shoulders above Major for the latter’s entire premiership. Despite Penhaligon being fairly overshadowed by Smith and Nat Lib leader William Hague, the Liberals were in good shape too, having won five by-elections in the Parliament (Eastbourne, Ribble Valley, Kincardine & Deeside, Newbury and Christchurch) and looking set to snatch some Tory marginals in the upcoming election as they had done with Bath in 1989.

The Nat Libs, by contrast, were becoming a victim of their own success. With 50 seats, they were the third-biggest party in Parliament, but non-Eurosceptic voters were souring towards them. Most voters, despite being opposed to Major’s handling of Maastricht, were more favourable to Labour’s proposal to incorporate the workers’ protections of the Social Chapter than the Nat Lib policy to reject the treaty’s terms outright. On top of this, the party had won just 2.6% of the national popular vote 4 years prior, had only won one by-election since (holding Cirencester and Tewkesbury after Nicholas Ridley’s death), and the refusal of any of its 45 new MPs to resign their seats and hold by-elections made a mockery of their supposed commitment to the British people deciding their laws. It was also seen as a very small tent party, with Tony Benn at one point describing it as ‘a retirement home for Monday Club Tories’ due to its ardently right-wing membership.

Major, already a figure of mockery for his blandness, was somewhat sidelined in the campaign by Smith and Hague, with few thinking he had much chance of re-election. However, Hague found himself feuding with Budgen thanks to having to share the limelight with him after his pivotal role in the Maastricht rebellion. A moment that proved enormously damaging to the Nat Libs came when, at a press conference in Birmingham, Budgen said that the Nat Libs would be willing to support a Tory government in a confidence and supply arrangement provided the party abandoned ratification of the Maastricht treaty, and the following day Hague, who opposed such a move, was recorded snapping at him that ‘this isn’t your bloody party, it’s mine!’ After this incident, right-wing voters who had considered voting Nat Lib started to drift back towards the Tories, who rose from 23% to 28% in the polls almost instantaneously.

Despite this late surge, these were still abysmal numbers for the Tories, and taking away some of the spoiler vote did not do much to help them against Labour, whose vote had been consistently hovering around the low 40s since the ERM fiasco. There was little doubt in the minds of the public that John Smith would be the next Prime Minister, and their suspicions proved correct.



Somewhat surprisingly, everyone gained at the expense of the Tories, not just Labour. Labour were the main beneficiaries, of course, winning a landslide majority of 141, the second-biggest in their history, and topping their 1951 record for the most votes they had ever won at a general election (and, indeed, the highest number of votes any party has won in any British election), but the Liberals also gained a massive 47 seats, achieving their best result since 1923, and the Nat Libs, despite losing just over half the MPs they had had at dissolution (mostly due to vote-splitting between the Tories and Nat Libs which let Labour win more seats) and not gaining any seats they hadn't held before it, their 24 seat tally was still incredible for such a small, new party.
All of this came at the expense of the Tories, who had a historically disastrous election. They not only won 234 seats less than in 1989, the biggest fall in seats since 1931, but also suffered both their worst ever voteshare (even worse than their previous record in 1832) and their lowest seat tally (even smaller than 1906). Major immediately resigned, with a surprisingly poetic closing phrase: “When the curtain falls, it is time to leave the stage.”

The one-act play of Major’s premiership was over. But the last thing voters expected, and what they were about to get, was another one-act play- at least, in one sense.

 

DUN-NUNN-NUNN-NUNNNNN!

PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE! I REPEAT, PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE!

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(The next time I update you all, by the way, it'll probably be about the Cult of the Illuminati.)

 

The Third Spanish Civil War from Desire the Right

 

I love this thing.

 

--PRAISE BE TO ALBANY--

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The Republic of Pennsylvania is a country of the Confederation of America, located in the American Northeast. ...
...
The Republic was first founded as the Province of Pennsylvania under William Penn, through royal charter. It was among the first countries to join the Confederation of America (being the second total, with New York being the first). It is sometimes called the "Keystone Country," both due to its central position in the Confederation, due to it being an ideological cornerstone of the modern Confederation, due to its proud tradition of equality under law, and due to the major amounts of key documents and figures housed within the country (including the founder of the Confederation, Benjamin Franklin). Further, it has acted as a major destination of German Americans, due to historical groups being located in the country (such as the Deitsch, archaically called Pennsylvania Dutch).

---
Sunshine Revolution
American Broadcasting Corporation​

 

That is certainly a unusual use of the word republic. I mean its to a wrong useage but still unusual.

 

Pennsylvania's always been somewhat odd: it's a republic working within a Commonwealth territory (albeit, a very culturally and politically distant Commonwealth), and as such with a monarch in power. Consider it a Canada without a Governor General, if you want to.

 

I suppose a powerless monarchy with executive power vested in an elected president makes some sense, but how can it be both semi-presidential and parliamentary at the same time?

 

Technically the American Confederation is a parliamentarian state that has the same monarch as Britain does (Commonwealth realm). As such, Pennsylvania is a republic within a parliament.

 

Can I make a somewhat odd request?

So, elsewhere, we were talking about Black Widow, of Marvel fame, and the fact that her surname is "Romanova" came up, and someone mentioned that they think she's officially a cousin of the Russian royal family or something; not anywhere near the throne but still "of the blood", or whatever the proper term is.

Anyways, somehow this inspired someone to imagine a scenario where the aftermath of the fall of the USSR went differently, and we ended up with Natalia I, Tsarina of the Restored Empire of All the Russias.

Anyone up to making a wikibox for that? Bonus if you use the comics concept that she's somehow MUCH older than she looks and was present at the Siege of Stalingrad as a child.

 

On it.

 

Filibuster time in Nobody Expects:

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