Of course to fix that you need to give Pacfleet a couple more months before Watchtower begins
Which is a bad idea, because by October/November, Lunga Point airfield will be ready to operate - just with IJNAS planes. There will probably be a sizeable and well-equipped IJA contingent on Guadalcanal as well.Of course to fix that you need to give Pacfleet a couple more months before Watchtower begins
Shakes head.Which is a bad idea, because by October/November, Lunga Point airfield will be ready to operate - just with IJNAS planes. There will probably be a sizeable and well-equipped IJA contingent on Guadalcanal as well.
WATCHTOWER was very close timing-wise. If anything, early August was optimal.
Start better and hopefully progress from there. For one thing, avoid the low freeboard layout of the Indiana's (along with their other errors in design). Some learning curve fubars are to be expected, but maybe not so many?
What if the Americans had a clue in 1885? (^^^)
The only way this historically changes is for several things to happen.
1. The USN saves the USS Lexington at Coral Sea. This will ease the flattop shortage, the pilot shortage and will allow for four bird farms to show up at Midway for 2..
2. The USN does better at Midway, getting Hiryu along with the other three KB flattops in that first strike.
Start better and hopefully progress from there. For one thing, avoid the low freeboard layout of the Indiana's (along with their other errors in design). Some learning curve fubars are to be expected, but maybe not so many?
(tosses up a batting practice pitch )
TBD Devastator - which was the bigger problem for the Devastator at Coral Sea and Midway - the limitations of an aging design, the relative skill development of the crews, insufficient fighter protection, the drop limitations and other defects of the torpedoes; or something else?
Mark 13 torpedo. This picture clearly shows the "pickle barrel" nose drag ring and the "ring tail" tail shroud.
Nooooo.That's not a warship, it's a bomb waiting to go off at the first plunging shot.
They also need to do something about that crash safety air bag parked at the land-on. It is a non-stopper. (Joke.).
On the plus side the fire greatly reduces the amount of wreckage that needs to be cleaned up.In hindsight filling the safety bag with Hydrogen was a poor decision.
Glassford did ok with the tactical command of the Asiatic Fleet, until the ABDA command screwed the pooch, IMO he could have done ok at Guadacanal. Biggest Issue in my opinion is Crace did not put anyone else in command while he was gone. Actually the 3 American cruisers should have had a separate Division commander. Also none of the cruiser commanders received warning of the approaching Japanese force.Crutchley on the scene probably, or knowing what I know now, Norman Scott. Maybe Crace, if he had just shut up and learned to play nice with Americans. Or William A. Glassford. As 8th Fleet Actual, he did "alright" in the Mediterranean.
Fletcher has to stay with the Bird Farms and Lee has to stay with him. Also rules out Kincaid, because he is screen. As for Turner, can we ship him off to London with Stark? The real problem is Ghormley. Much as I have heartburn with the Bull, he would be a good fit for WATCHTOWER.
On the plus side the fire greatly reduces the amount of wreckage that needs to be cleaned up.
On the plus side the fire greatly reduces the amount of wreckage that needs to be cleaned up.
It wasn't Crace in command at Savo Island (although he was at Coral Sea as CO TF44). It was Victor Crutchley, who we previously saw as captain of Warspite at Narvik.Glassford did ok with the tactical command of the Asiatic Fleet, until the ABDA command screwed the pooch, IMO he could have done ok at Guadacanal. Biggest Issue in my opinion is Crace did not put anyone else in command while he was gone. Actually the 3 American cruisers should have had a separate Division commander. Also none of the cruiser commanders received warning of the approaching Japanese force.
I did a number on Savo Island where I tried to rehab Crutchley. One may want to read it. Start here. By the time one reaches the casualty lists, one should be shocked at the results, even if everything had gone "right". Two competent navies who know what they are doing, tend to kill each other.It wasn't Crace in command at Savo Island (although he was at Coral Sea as CO TF44). It was Victor Crutchley, who we previously saw as captain of Warspite at Narvik.
As I have remarked, it took a year, and even when the Americans finally had the upper hand with tactics and tech and leadership, they were quite nervous about night SAG actions against the IJN.LOTS of things went wrong at Savo, so trying to get just one thing to save the situation is difficult. TBH, although it may be cold of me to say so, it was an important wake-up call for the Pacific Fleet and friends. They learnt how NOT to do things, very memorably.