Ahh no, I was talking about the 1876 Inflexible and the follow ons to her, the Ajax and possibly the Colossus class Ironclads.
Ahh no, I was talking about the 1876 Inflexible and the follow ons to her, the Ajax and possibly the Colossus class Ironclads.
The joke in name being in regards to the stresses caused by the layout?1. It was a joke.
2.
Cozzens prints – cruiser Raleigh and battleship Maine
“Our Navy, Its Growth and Achievements” 1897 chromolithograph print by Frederick S. Cozzens showing the protected cruiser USS Raleigh (C-8) in her full schooner sail rig, gunboat USS Ca…laststandonzombieisland.com
This example of Victorian Seamanship (USS Raleigh and USS Castine are about to pull an HMS Camperdown and HMS Victoria while Captain Sigsbee of the USS Maine gets out of Dodge.) shows the New Steel Navy during a Three Stooges bit around 1897.
That was the idea, but 1. It literally never worked in terms of cost effectiveness and 2. by the time they had them they also had well over a decade of the pre dreadnought fore aft layout so why bother with the en echelon which was a relic of the sail compromise?
I was referencing how the design above quoted as X4 had a more dreadnought turret layout than invincible/inflexible type, though maybe thats limited by the game.
From what I understand Fisher proposed a design which would have combined the turret arrangement of the 1876 Inflexible with that of the 1875 Dreadnought so getting somethig possibly looking like the Invincible class.
McPherson
Banned
I don't know about the layout stresses. As has been correctly pointed out, there were compromises involved that made less than optimum outcomes that seemed valid at the time. The follow up naval joke was to show that the Royal Navy was not the only navy to have problems figuring out the transition from mixed sail and steam to all steam. "Inflexible" is a state of mind as much as a name of a ship.
Meanwhile the USN dabbed on everyone 30 years later by making a Dreadnought that had better damage control and a more efficient gun layout on 16,000 tons
Done for a Shipbucket Design Challenge:
Haleakala Class Command Ship
CC-21 Haleakala
CC-22 Matafao
CC-23 Lata
CC-24 Kawaikini
CC-25 Cerro Punta
CC-26 Mount Bordeaux
Hull and propulsion: Shared with CGBL
~14000 tons full displacement
LOA 650 feet
Beam 69 feet
Aviation Two Hangers, H-60 sized, helipad sized for V-22, H-47, and H-53 operations
Speed 30+ knots
Crew: ~30 officers, ~270 enlisted
Air Staff: ~10 officers, ~40 enlisted
Command Staff: ~50 officers, ~300 enlisted
Weapons:
16 Mk 41 VLS Cells
4 Mk 38 Mod 2 Gun mounts
2 Mk 32 SVTT
2 100kW Laser CWIS
Electronics:
Extensive including AN/SPY-6(V)4, and a wide range of signals collection and communications gear.
Developed from the CG-74 class cruiser, the CC-21 class fills the role of command ship in the modern American Navy. Named after the tallest mountains on different American Islands, the class was planned to replaced the Blue Ridge class while offering a higher speed platform. The ship's limited self-defense capabilities were selected in part to avoid the ships being tasked to perform mission better suited for a destroyer or a full cruiser, while at the same time allowing the ships to protect themselves if under threat by an opposing force. These ships, commissioned in the early 2000s have recently undergone their first of two planned upgrades, and received AN/SPY-6 radars replacing the original AN/SPY-1 sets. The ships are currently expected to serve into the late 2040s. The most prominent complaints from those aboard the Haleakala class are issues with limited crew spaces.
Haleakala Class Command Ship
CC-21 Haleakala
CC-22 Matafao
CC-23 Lata
CC-24 Kawaikini
CC-25 Cerro Punta
CC-26 Mount Bordeaux
Hull and propulsion: Shared with CGBL
~14000 tons full displacement
LOA 650 feet
Beam 69 feet
Aviation Two Hangers, H-60 sized, helipad sized for V-22, H-47, and H-53 operations
Speed 30+ knots
Crew: ~30 officers, ~270 enlisted
Air Staff: ~10 officers, ~40 enlisted
Command Staff: ~50 officers, ~300 enlisted
Weapons:
16 Mk 41 VLS Cells
4 Mk 38 Mod 2 Gun mounts
2 Mk 32 SVTT
2 100kW Laser CWIS
Electronics:
Extensive including AN/SPY-6(V)4, and a wide range of signals collection and communications gear.
Developed from the CG-74 class cruiser, the CC-21 class fills the role of command ship in the modern American Navy. Named after the tallest mountains on different American Islands, the class was planned to replaced the Blue Ridge class while offering a higher speed platform. The ship's limited self-defense capabilities were selected in part to avoid the ships being tasked to perform mission better suited for a destroyer or a full cruiser, while at the same time allowing the ships to protect themselves if under threat by an opposing force. These ships, commissioned in the early 2000s have recently undergone their first of two planned upgrades, and received AN/SPY-6 radars replacing the original AN/SPY-1 sets. The ships are currently expected to serve into the late 2040s. The most prominent complaints from those aboard the Haleakala class are issues with limited crew spaces.
Dat forward superstructure, though...Done for a Shipbucket Design Challenge:
Haleakala Class Command Ship
CC-21 Haleakala
CC-22 Matafao
CC-23 Lata
CC-24 Kawaikini
CC-25 Cerro Punta
CC-26 Mount Bordeaux
Hull and propulsion: Shared with CGBL
~14000 tons full displacement
LOA 650 feet
Beam 69 feet
Aviation Two Hangers, H-60 sized, helipad sized for V-22, H-47, and H-53 operations
Speed 30+ knots
Crew: ~30 officers, ~270 enlisted
Air Staff: ~10 officers, ~40 enlisted
Command Staff: ~50 officers, ~300 enlisted
Weapons:
16 Mk 41 VLS Cells
4 Mk 38 Mod 2 Gun mounts
2 Mk 32 SVTT
2 100kW Laser CWIS
Electronics:
Extensive including AN/SPY-6(V)4, and a wide range of signals collection and communications gear.
Developed from the CG-74 class cruiser, the CC-21 class fills the role of command ship in the modern American Navy. Named after the tallest mountains on different American Islands, the class was planned to replaced the Blue Ridge class while offering a higher speed platform. The ship's limited self-defense capabilities were selected in part to avoid the ships being tasked to perform mission better suited for a destroyer or a full cruiser, while at the same time allowing the ships to protect themselves if under threat by an opposing force. These ships, commissioned in the early 2000s have recently undergone their first of two planned upgrades, and received AN/SPY-6 radars replacing the original AN/SPY-1 sets. The ships are currently expected to serve into the late 2040s. The most prominent complaints from those aboard the Haleakala class are issues with limited crew spaces.
The mast is clearly derived from the Advanced Enclosed Mast/Sensor which was tested on the USS Arthur W. Radford (DD-968).Dat forward superstructure, though...
Cool!The mast is clearly derived from the Advanced Enclosed Mast/Sensor which was tested on the USS Arthur W. Radford (DD-968).
I am aware of that, but aesthetically it just seems to work out so well. Besides, the Dragon has that nose art.
Indeed. More ships should have somesuch, and in one of my works it's a thing.
Sargon
Is it not like all things a compromise ie do you go for a larger heavier radar lower down or the opposite?
Is it not really a balance of how much you value height for looking at the horizon v weight for a more powerful radar?
I mean, not like optical camouflage matters much in naval terms anymore what with Radar.
Returning to Victorian era peacetime colorschemes (an example would be US Navy in Great White Fleet colors) would also be an option other than nose art or such.
A good point.
I can get behind that easily enough.
I can just imagine the reaction to that on some prim and proper killjoy UK Admiral's face now.
Sargon
The Royal Navy did make the T-class submarine:
I can see them making something that looks very weird, and just rolling with it.
Hiyo-class aircraft carrier (commissioned 1941)
Imperial Japanese Navy
Ships: Hiyo, Junyo
Part One
The Hiyo-class aircraft carriers were possibly the most controversial ships in the maritime history of imperial Japan. The entire idea of converting into carriers two active-service battleships, still in excellent condition and ripe for modernisation, at a time when the IJN was still very much focused on the supremacy of the battleship and the idea of Decisive Battle, flew in the face of established wisdom. As it turned out, however, the two vessels would be some of the most important ships of the Pacific War.
The Hiyo and Junyo were originally the fast super-dreadnoughts Nagato and the Mutsu, respectively; the only ships of the 8-8 fleet programme to make it onto the water in their intended forms. Commissioned in 1920 and 1921, by 1934 they were in good shape but were due for a major set of upgrades. From surviving historical documents, installing these would probably have taken until 1936, and involved the reconstruction of the forward superstructure, lengthening of the stern, installation of torpedo bulges, increased armor protection on the turrets and deck, and many other beneficial features that would have greatly increased the combat efficacy of the two battleships.
However, when astute Japanese naval planners looked at the manner in terms of the grand scheme of things, this did not seem like such a good idea. If the Japanese navy was to get into a major war with either Britain or the United States, its battle-line would be outnumbered from the start. Modernising the Nagato and Mutsu would only yield ships that, at best, were somewhat superior to the US Colorado-class or the British Nelson-class - ships with specifications not powerful enough to ensure success in any future conflict. In contrast, from 1934 onwards, various design studies were emerging from the pens of Japanese naval architects for battleships that would provide these specifications, which would eventually develop into the Yamato-class, the pinnacle of the Decisive Battle mentality. If these ships, of which at least two were projected and several more considered, could handily provide victory, the reasoning went, there would be no need to modernise the Nagatos. This logic was indisputably sound. Despite serious efforts from the IJN's 'gun club' to cut down this scheme before it was born, it began to gain shape and vitality.
Yet the hulls of the two ships were still in good condition, and, as the idea gained credence, Japanese naval planners knew that the two ships had similar designs to the Tosa-class battleships, one of which, the Kaga, had been successfully converted into an aircraft carrier and, in 1934, was just about to start a major refit. Comparing the two classes, it gradually became clear to the Japanese that, based on their experiences with the Kaga, they could successfully convert the Nagato and Mutsu into fleet carriers. This would be done once Japan had pulled out of the various naval treaties, and the tonnage limits they entailed. Thus, for a few more years, Nagato and Mutsu would remain in service, although care would be taken to preserve their machinery in particular.
In due course, Japan denounced the 2nd London Naval Treaty in 1937, and started construction of the Yamato-class battleships and Shokaku-class aircraft carriers. Simultaneously, arrangements started to be made for the conversion of the Nagato sisters; they were decommissioned in 1938, and their eight 16.1" turrets were removed and carefully stored, along with their armor plating. These materials, along with the eight 16.1" turrets left over from the building process of the 8-8 fleet, would later be used in the construction of the four Kii-class fast battleships, which were all laid down in 1939 and were to form the backbone of the future IJN alongside the Yamato and Musashi.
In 1939, despite the continuing protests of many naval officers, the conversion was able to begin, Nagato starting in March and Mutsu starting in June. This entailed the lengthening of the hull, the addition of a flight deck and arresting gear, the construction of a rather large starboard island with an integrated stack - a first for a Japanese carrier - the creation of two superimposed hangars, and replacing the old mixed-firing boilers with new, pure oil-firing units that, alongside new propellors, allowed the ships to easily reach 28 knots. The main AA armament would now consist of six twin 5" guns, three mounts on each side, along with various 25mm cannon emplacements and some machine guns. They would carry an airgroup of 57 aircraft when commissioned in 1941, although this number would vary over the course of the Pacific War.
The conversion was completed in early 1941, and the two ships were renamed Hiyo and Junyo. Upon completing their trials and work-up in September, they were assigned to Carrier Division 6 of Chuichi Nagumo's 1st Air Fleet, or Kido Butai, and would be commanded by Rear Admiral Kakuji Kakuta, not an aviator but still deemed suitable for the post due to his experience as commander of Carrier Division 3. Alongside the rest of 1st Air Fleet, Hiyo and Junyo, also known as the 'Hawk Sisters', would train for the upcoming, complicated Operation Z.
On December 7th, 1941, Operation Z began. The attack was split into two stages. In the first stage, Akagi, Kaga, Hiyo and Junyo attacked the base at Pearl Harbour itself, focusing mainly on the cruisers and destroyers and causing substantial damage. In the second stage, as Admiral Kimmel's fleet of seven surprised but intact battleships made its way into the open ocean to find the Japanese ships, they were set upon by Soryu, Hiryu, Shokaku and Zuikaku, and later by Carrier Divisions 1 and 6 as well. In the repeated air attacks, Tennessee, California and Oklahoma would all be sunk, and Arizona and Nevada would be crippled, to be later finished off by Japanese surface units and submarines. Maryland and West Virginia would only survive thanks to some timely support from planes from the carrier Enterprise, who, although they took severe casualties, were able to distract the Japanese attackers long enough for the battleships to make a getaway. Pearl Harbor was to prove one of the worst defeats in the history of the US Navy, and cemented the importance of the carriers into Japanese naval mythology.
Unfortunately for the IJN, Operation Z had found no aircraft carriers in Pearl Harbor. This meant that the bruised US Pacific Fleet could still call upon Lexington, Saratoga and Enterprise, and later Yorktown and Wasp, along with the rookie sisters Hornet and Constellation to fight. In the meantime, however, they could do little to stop the advance of the Kido Butai. Within months, Nagumo would sweep through the southern and western Pacific, sowing death and destruction in his wake. By March 1942, as it dropped anchor in Staring Bay, Java, Kido Butai had helped Japan seize one of the largest empires in history, destroyed hundreds of Allied planes, and sunk many hapless Allied warships. The force seemed invincible and unstoppable.
It was about to get a lot harder, however...
Imperial Japanese Navy
Ships: Hiyo, Junyo
Part One
The Hiyo-class aircraft carriers were possibly the most controversial ships in the maritime history of imperial Japan. The entire idea of converting into carriers two active-service battleships, still in excellent condition and ripe for modernisation, at a time when the IJN was still very much focused on the supremacy of the battleship and the idea of Decisive Battle, flew in the face of established wisdom. As it turned out, however, the two vessels would be some of the most important ships of the Pacific War.
The Hiyo and Junyo were originally the fast super-dreadnoughts Nagato and the Mutsu, respectively; the only ships of the 8-8 fleet programme to make it onto the water in their intended forms. Commissioned in 1920 and 1921, by 1934 they were in good shape but were due for a major set of upgrades. From surviving historical documents, installing these would probably have taken until 1936, and involved the reconstruction of the forward superstructure, lengthening of the stern, installation of torpedo bulges, increased armor protection on the turrets and deck, and many other beneficial features that would have greatly increased the combat efficacy of the two battleships.
However, when astute Japanese naval planners looked at the manner in terms of the grand scheme of things, this did not seem like such a good idea. If the Japanese navy was to get into a major war with either Britain or the United States, its battle-line would be outnumbered from the start. Modernising the Nagato and Mutsu would only yield ships that, at best, were somewhat superior to the US Colorado-class or the British Nelson-class - ships with specifications not powerful enough to ensure success in any future conflict. In contrast, from 1934 onwards, various design studies were emerging from the pens of Japanese naval architects for battleships that would provide these specifications, which would eventually develop into the Yamato-class, the pinnacle of the Decisive Battle mentality. If these ships, of which at least two were projected and several more considered, could handily provide victory, the reasoning went, there would be no need to modernise the Nagatos. This logic was indisputably sound. Despite serious efforts from the IJN's 'gun club' to cut down this scheme before it was born, it began to gain shape and vitality.
Yet the hulls of the two ships were still in good condition, and, as the idea gained credence, Japanese naval planners knew that the two ships had similar designs to the Tosa-class battleships, one of which, the Kaga, had been successfully converted into an aircraft carrier and, in 1934, was just about to start a major refit. Comparing the two classes, it gradually became clear to the Japanese that, based on their experiences with the Kaga, they could successfully convert the Nagato and Mutsu into fleet carriers. This would be done once Japan had pulled out of the various naval treaties, and the tonnage limits they entailed. Thus, for a few more years, Nagato and Mutsu would remain in service, although care would be taken to preserve their machinery in particular.
In due course, Japan denounced the 2nd London Naval Treaty in 1937, and started construction of the Yamato-class battleships and Shokaku-class aircraft carriers. Simultaneously, arrangements started to be made for the conversion of the Nagato sisters; they were decommissioned in 1938, and their eight 16.1" turrets were removed and carefully stored, along with their armor plating. These materials, along with the eight 16.1" turrets left over from the building process of the 8-8 fleet, would later be used in the construction of the four Kii-class fast battleships, which were all laid down in 1939 and were to form the backbone of the future IJN alongside the Yamato and Musashi.
In 1939, despite the continuing protests of many naval officers, the conversion was able to begin, Nagato starting in March and Mutsu starting in June. This entailed the lengthening of the hull, the addition of a flight deck and arresting gear, the construction of a rather large starboard island with an integrated stack - a first for a Japanese carrier - the creation of two superimposed hangars, and replacing the old mixed-firing boilers with new, pure oil-firing units that, alongside new propellors, allowed the ships to easily reach 28 knots. The main AA armament would now consist of six twin 5" guns, three mounts on each side, along with various 25mm cannon emplacements and some machine guns. They would carry an airgroup of 57 aircraft when commissioned in 1941, although this number would vary over the course of the Pacific War.
The conversion was completed in early 1941, and the two ships were renamed Hiyo and Junyo. Upon completing their trials and work-up in September, they were assigned to Carrier Division 6 of Chuichi Nagumo's 1st Air Fleet, or Kido Butai, and would be commanded by Rear Admiral Kakuji Kakuta, not an aviator but still deemed suitable for the post due to his experience as commander of Carrier Division 3. Alongside the rest of 1st Air Fleet, Hiyo and Junyo, also known as the 'Hawk Sisters', would train for the upcoming, complicated Operation Z.
On December 7th, 1941, Operation Z began. The attack was split into two stages. In the first stage, Akagi, Kaga, Hiyo and Junyo attacked the base at Pearl Harbour itself, focusing mainly on the cruisers and destroyers and causing substantial damage. In the second stage, as Admiral Kimmel's fleet of seven surprised but intact battleships made its way into the open ocean to find the Japanese ships, they were set upon by Soryu, Hiryu, Shokaku and Zuikaku, and later by Carrier Divisions 1 and 6 as well. In the repeated air attacks, Tennessee, California and Oklahoma would all be sunk, and Arizona and Nevada would be crippled, to be later finished off by Japanese surface units and submarines. Maryland and West Virginia would only survive thanks to some timely support from planes from the carrier Enterprise, who, although they took severe casualties, were able to distract the Japanese attackers long enough for the battleships to make a getaway. Pearl Harbor was to prove one of the worst defeats in the history of the US Navy, and cemented the importance of the carriers into Japanese naval mythology.
Unfortunately for the IJN, Operation Z had found no aircraft carriers in Pearl Harbor. This meant that the bruised US Pacific Fleet could still call upon Lexington, Saratoga and Enterprise, and later Yorktown and Wasp, along with the rookie sisters Hornet and Constellation to fight. In the meantime, however, they could do little to stop the advance of the Kido Butai. Within months, Nagumo would sweep through the southern and western Pacific, sowing death and destruction in his wake. By March 1942, as it dropped anchor in Staring Bay, Java, Kido Butai had helped Japan seize one of the largest empires in history, destroyed hundreds of Allied planes, and sunk many hapless Allied warships. The force seemed invincible and unstoppable.
It was about to get a lot harder, however...
Last edited: