Alternate warships of nations

I did a number on Savo Island where I tried to rehab Crutchley. One may want to read it. Start here. By the time one reaches the casualty lists, one should be shocked at the results, even if everything had gone "right". Two competent navies who know what they are doing, tend to kill each other.

As I have remarked, it took a year, and even when the Americans finally had the upper hand with tactics and tech and leadership, they were quite nervous about night SAG actions against the IJN.
Is this another example where a USN failure is passed off as a RN one?

Just checking like

Lets face it Savo went tits up for 4 reasons (not forgetting that the IJN were brilliant that night and man for man and ship for ship the better force)
  • Relatively Green USN crews and officers - and was not yet capable of using its advantage in Radar effectively
  • Bode was more fucking useless than tits on a bull - before, during and after the fight. As far as I am concerned he is the villain of the peice
  • Prewar USN SAG doctrine particularly night fighting was incorrect - it took this fight to focus minds
  • The USN (and it was not alone here) still as late as 1st Savo still had a somewhat racist attitude to the IJN capabilities and technology and seriously underestimated them - again this fight seriously focusing minds.
Had Crutchley been present it is certain that he would have retained a far better grip on events and while it might not have resulted fewer losses for the allies it almost certainly would have made things a lot hotter for the IJN.

The fight was a major kick up the arse as far as the USN was concerned but they did take notice

I have often seen Crutchley criticised for 'leaving his command' but this completely ignores the fact that Adm Turner had 'summoned' him to a meeting in order to discuss his plans to withdraw the amphibious group the next day in light of Fletcher being obliged to withdraw his carriers

Now I cannot fault Fletcher for his decision (needed to refuel) , I cannot fault Turner for his (without carriers his fleet was vulnerable).

Crutchley is criticised for not leaving behind his command ship (or perhaps for not ignoring the summons - as if that would have happened) - but I suspect it also had his task force staff on board and it was very likely far quicker to take the Cruiser rather than fuck about waiting for another ship ( and transferring at night between ships - especially given the urgent nature of the changed mission (Fletcher having suddenly buggered off and Turner wanting to bug out as well) and Crutchley wanting to get the meeting sorted ASAP in order to get the necessary staff work done and his TF moving ASAP.

Had he left HMAS Australia Behind its likely that under Bose's lack of leadership she might simply have added to the losses that night
 
Is this another example where a USN failure is passed off as a RN one?

Just checking like

Lets face it Savo went tits up for 4 reasons (not forgetting that the IJN were brilliant that night and man for man and ship for ship the better force)
  • Relatively Green USN crews and officers - and was not yet capable of using its advantage in Radar effectively
  • Bode was more fucking useless than tits on a bull - before, during and after the fight. As far as I am concerned he is the villain of the peice
  • Prewar USN SAG doctrine particularly night fighting was incorrect - it took this fight to focus minds
  • The USN (and it was not alone here) still as late as 1st Savo still had a somewhat racist attitude to the IJN capabilities and technology and seriously underestimated them - again this fight seriously focusing minds.
Had Crutchley been present it is certain that he would have retained a far better grip on events and while it might not have resulted fewer losses for the allies it almost certainly would have made things a lot hotter for the IJN.

The fight was a major kick up the arse as far as the USN was concerned but they did take notice

I have often seen Crutchley criticised for 'leaving his command' but this completely ignores the fact that Adm Turner had 'summoned' him to a meeting in order to discuss his plans to withdraw the amphibious group the next day in light of Fletcher being obliged to withdraw his carriers

Now I cannot fault Fletcher for his decision (needed to refuel) , I cannot fault Turner for his (without carriers his fleet was vulnerable).

Crutchley is criticised for not leaving behind his command ship (or perhaps for not ignoring the summons - as if that would have happened) - but I suspect it also had his task force staff on board and it was very likely far quicker to take the Cruiser rather than fuck about waiting for another ship ( and transferring at night between ships - especially given the urgent nature of the changed mission (Fletcher having suddenly buggered off and Turner wanting to bug out as well) and Crutchley wanting to get the meeting sorted ASAP in order to get the necessary staff work done and his TF moving ASAP.

Had he left HMAS Australia Behind its likely that under Bose's lack of leadership she might simply have added to the losses that night
I think I was fair to Crutchley. I was accurate about the Americans at Savo. Did you read the ATL treatment?
 
Losing Canberra definitely was Turner's fault though since she probably could have limped away if given a few more hours .And Astoria might have survived if the USN had done vigorous stripping out of unnecessary flammable materials on its ships which it did within a brief period after this battle
 
I think I was fair to Crutchley. I was accurate about the Americans at Savo. Did you read the ATL treatment?
Reading it now - so far so good ;)

(Notes so far: Unless there was another POD I did not read - The deep refitted Warspite of OTL never had 5.25s fitted - her refit was too early - she retained some of the 6"s - 4 a side - and gained a pair of twin 4" AAA on each side - 1 of the port side twin 4" and the Port side 6" single seen below)

HMS Warspite 6 and 4.jpeg
 
None of the QEs had 5.25" fitted. The QE and Valiant got 20 4.5" in twin mounts
Correct

And while I do not have the massive downer on the 5.25s that seems all the rage on the interwebs (other than ignoring all the work on the 5.1" that correctly resulted in its cancellation) if they had asked me at the time (and the buggers did not) I would have dictated twin 4" (as secondary's on Cruisers and primary's on escort ships) and twin 4.5s from the mid 30s (as secondaries on the refits and new builds and primary's on the carriers and new fleet DDs)
 
It wasn't Crace in command at Savo Island (although he was at Coral Sea as CO TF44). It was Victor Crutchley, who we previously saw as captain of Warspite at Narvik.

LOTS of things went wrong at Savo, so trying to get just one thing to save the situation is difficult. TBH, although it may be cold of me to say so, it was an important wake-up call for the Pacific Fleet and friends. They learnt how NOT to do things, very memorably.
I stand corrected on the name of the Officer in charge, but the errors Crutchley made remain the same. Also an incompetent shirking imo coward of a Captain on the Chicago, one of the most experienced radar equipped cruisers in the USN, having been installed in the summer of 1940 ( a photo exists showing the radar installed on the mainmast at that time) Chicago 's radar operators should have better luck identifying the Japanese warships entering the sound.
 
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Reading it now - so far so good ;)

(Notes so far: Unless there was another POD I did not read - The deep refitted Warspite of OTL never had 5.25s fitted - her refit was too early - she retained some of the 6"s - 4 a side - and gained a pair of twin 4" AAA on each side - 1 of the port side twin 4" and the Port side 6" single seen below)

View attachment 635800
Going from what I remember about the Narvik piece? Here.

What about Victor Crutchley?

I cannot fault CAPT Crutchley’s actions. HMS Warspite’s Swordfish communicated well with HMS Warspite and gave her captain almost flawless situation awareness. The battleship promptly dispatched those targets the plane could see and the gunfire support helped the British destroyers a couple of crucial times when the Germans looked to be about to do serious harm to them, especially Warspite’s 152 mm secondaries which dispatched a couple of German pests at anchor. This satisfies me as to how well Crutchley trained his ship and handled her in what must be seen in retrospect as one of the craziest, riskiest and most foolhardy operations ever led by an admiral who seems to have had only two things going for him; Whitworth was a physical hygiene nut, and he knew where all the bodies were buried at the Admiralty because he was a Naval Secretary at the RN personnel section.
152mm/=6 inches in bore diameter.

I know they were the 45 caliber and not the 50 caliber mounted for 2 reasons:

1. This was the Vickers 6" gun available when the QEs were built, and
2. That weight on on the muzzle ring is a balance counter-mass because the original trunnions were intended for the 6"/50 caliber on the QEs.

The RN bodged it due to a war emergency.
 
Going from what I remember about the Narvik piece? Here.


152mm/=6 inches in bore diameter.

I know they were the 45 caliber and not the 50 caliber mounted for 2 reasons:

1. This was the Vickers 6" gun available when the QEs were built, and
2. That weight on on the muzzle ring is a balance counter-mass because the original trunnions were intended for the 6"/50 caliber on the QEs.

The RN bodged it due to a war emergency.
I should have quoted the piece here Its in the inserted bit specifically where you talk about the Deep refit of Warspite and the unresolved legacy issues when he took command.

"On 1 May 1937, Crutchley takes command of HMS Warspite, which has been completely and incompetently refitted, (See remark about the steering gear in short order. McPherson.), in three years at Portsmouth. Due to delayed acceptance trials HMS Warspite cannot be present at the Coronation Fleet Review of King George VI. Additional engineering work on the steering gear (Which has not been repaired from damage inflicted by CADM Hipper’s battle cruisers, taken at Jutland. McPherson) and other equipment (The 5.25 inch guns give nothing but trouble. McPherson) results in weekend leaves for the crew being curtailed, leading to very low morale. "

She had a number of 6" casement guns removed - leaving 4 a side and had 4 x twin 4" AAA mounts - 2 a side fitted. None of the 4 deep refits had 5.25s - with Valiant, Queen Elizabeth and Renown getting rid of the 6" guns and getting 10 x twin 4.5 DP guns (5 pairs a side)

With hindsight I wish they had done this for the KGVs and Vanguard as well as the Dido classes.

But again they did not ask me

I understand why they went for 5.25" - In the Rock/paper/scissors of guns it fired a heavier shell further and faster and higher with the real emerging threat in the mid 30s of higher flying larger bombers and larger DDs launching torpedo's from increasing ranges - this at the cost of a heavier larger slower DP system with a slower ROF

With continued development of the Twin 4.5 system (which ultimately won out) probably could have slapped 12 twin 4.5 DP mounts on the KGV / Vanguard with 4 directors each controlling a trio of guns (or possibly 6 each controlling a pair?).
 
This concept seems a little ridiculous and probably has been discussed here, but WI someone built a battlecruiser-sized ship with no big guns? Basically cram a bunch of 6-inch guns onto the hull with maybe 3-inch or 4-inch guns as a secondary armament along with 4-6 torpedo tubes and rely on speed+rate of fire to deal with an opponent. Armour it well enough against light cruisers and maybe even the 7.5-inch guns common on armoured cruisers. I'd put a seaplane or two on it to maximise the scouting potential. It should simply be used as a fleet scout or used to hunt surface raiders and run from any battleships.

I take it this is just a reinvention of the armoured cruiser concept and thus an expensive ship whose mission can be done by a bunch of smaller ships? There were a lot of odd warship designs OTL so surely someone must have thought this was a good idea even if it's politically impossible to build a cruiser the size of a capital ship without any heavy guns.
 
This concept seems a little ridiculous and probably has been discussed here, but WI someone built a battlecruiser-sized ship with no big guns? Basically cram a bunch of 6-inch guns onto the hull with maybe 3-inch or 4-inch guns as a secondary armament along with 4-6 torpedo tubes and rely on speed+rate of fire to deal with an opponent. Armour it well enough against light cruisers and maybe even the 7.5-inch guns common on armoured cruisers. I'd put a seaplane or two on it to maximise the scouting potential. It should simply be used as a fleet scout or used to hunt surface raiders and run from any battleships.

I take it this is just a reinvention of the armoured cruiser concept and thus an expensive ship whose mission can be done by a bunch of smaller ships? There were a lot of odd warship designs OTL so surely someone must have thought this was a good idea even if it's politically impossible to build a cruiser the size of a capital ship without any heavy guns.
SMS Blucher

Springs to mind.
 
SMS Blucher

Springs to mind.
It would either be like Blücher with another 5-10K tons displacement (and a correspondingly larger secondary battery plus maybe a reduced main battery) or more conservatively Blücher but mounting only the 15 cm guns and no 21 cm guns.

Still hard to make a role from this ship, other than looking fancy outputting a huge amount of firepower at a quick rate. I was thinking that theoretically it could deal with lightly armoured battlecruisers since it has a higher rate of fire and can cripple their main turrets before they get off too many shots. It's a hypothetical counter to the "large light cruiser" of World War I or the German O-class battlecruiser proposal.
 
Still hard to make a role from this ship, other than looking fancy outputting a huge amount of firepower at a quick rate. I was thinking that theoretically it could deal with lightly armoured battlecruisers since it has a higher rate of fire and can cripple their main turrets before they get off too many shots. It's a hypothetical counter to the "large light cruiser" of World War I or the German O-class battlecruiser proposal.
The big question is - what does it bring to the party that a pair of Town/Brooklyn/Mogami 10-12,000 ton 6"-armed cruisers doesn't?
The only advantage I can see is better armour, but then you're heading down the ACR/Blucher cul-de-sac - it's too weak to face true BCs/BBs and too expensive for anything else.
 
The big question is - what does it bring to the party that a pair of Town/Brooklyn/Mogami 10-12,000 ton 6"-armed cruisers doesn't?
The only advantage I can see is better armour, but then you're heading down the ACR/Blucher cul-de-sac - it's too weak to face true BCs/BBs and too expensive for anything else.
Well, that is the question indeed. But it's presumably cheaper than a battlecruiser or a battleship (no big guns after all) and the idea that some big and fancy capital ship that follows the "large light cruiser" concept can be brought down by a seemingly unimpressive and comparatively cheap capital ship that can also act as a leader for escorts/raiders would have some appeal among those trying to think outside the box.

I suppose this idea is a true misfit of a ship design so the challenge would be to have one actually be built, either as a misguided idea that follows the mission I laid out above or through some other circumstance. One idea I figured (that is really hard to make work with the OTL political situation) is that Chile does not receive back the battleships seized by Britain and instead receives a Courageous-class BC (for whatever reason, because it's cheaper, because neither Almirante Latorre-class ship exists anymore, etc.). And then a Chilean rival (probably Argentina) is able to obtain a BC hull converted into an aircraft carrier which is then restored to a battlecruiser with the exception of lacking the large guns. Basically a convoluted scenario like that, even though I'd love to see a ship design like this built by a major power.
 
Well, that is the question indeed. But it's presumably cheaper than a battlecruiser or a battleship (no big guns after all) and the idea that some big and fancy capital ship that follows the "large light cruiser" concept can be brought down by a seemingly unimpressive and comparatively cheap capital ship that can also act as a leader for escorts/raiders would have some appeal among those trying to think outside the box.
The guns of a big gun ship is a surprisingly small portion of its actual cost.

Wiki cites Parks on the Invincible class costing 1.6 million with an additional 90 thousand for armaments.

The Hull size the engines and the armour makes much more of an impact on the costs of a large vessel.

If its battlecruiser sized with light cruiser guns it costs almost as much as a battlecruiser anyway.
 
SPANAW-100.png


What if the Americans had a clue in 1885? (^^^)

Admittedly it was their first modern steel "battleships" and the USN had more or less almost completely missed the design trends and developments of between 1865 and the "New Steel Navy". And even the ACW designs tended more towards being coastal/riverine affairs rather then sea going warships (Though some like New Ironsides were more contemporary in terms of essentially being a ironclad wooden hull sail/steam oceangoing frigate.
 
It would either be like Blücher with another 5-10K tons displacement (and a correspondingly larger secondary battery plus maybe a reduced main battery) or more conservatively Blücher but mounting only the 15 cm guns and no 21 cm guns.

Still hard to make a role from this ship, other than looking fancy outputting a huge amount of firepower at a quick rate. I was thinking that theoretically it could deal with lightly armoured battlecruisers since it has a higher rate of fire and can cripple their main turrets before they get off too many shots. It's a hypothetical counter to the "large light cruiser" of World War I or the German O-class battlecruiser proposal.
Arguably it fills the role I saw a really good argument that Fisher intended for the Large Light Cruisers, whose original concept did not have the heavy guns according to that source*. The idea was for a ship that could operate in the German Bight and serve as a scout for submarines, since in the pre radar days height equals detection distance and submarines are short and slow, as well as hitting enemy commerce. The size means it can ride out heavy weather easily, so that in heavy seas it can still outrun an enemy battlecruiser. Lots of 6" and 4" guns make it almost invulnerable to light cruisers and destroyers for calmer days, combined with sufficient armor to stop 6" shells. A result is you get a ship that can deny enemy free use of waters close to his own shores without a grinding attritional match between light units, or risking a major clash of heavies and make your subs more effective

Note this isn't me, I'm paraphrasing somebody else from a defense of Fisher's large light cruisers

*If I remember it right and the source can be trusted the 15" guns were a we have the room and they are just sitting there addition
 
Arguably it fills the role I saw a really good argument that Fisher intended for the Large Light Cruisers, whose original concept did not have the heavy guns according to that source*. The idea was for a ship that could operate in the German Bight and serve as a scout for submarines, since in the pre radar days height equals detection distance and submarines are short and slow, as well as hitting enemy commerce. The size means it can ride out heavy weather easily, so that in heavy seas it can still outrun an enemy battlecruiser. Lots of 6" and 4" guns make it almost invulnerable to light cruisers and destroyers for calmer days, combined with sufficient armor to stop 6" shells. A result is you get a ship that can deny enemy free use of waters close to his own shores without a grinding attritional match between light units, or risking a major clash of heavies and make your subs more effective

Note this isn't me, I'm paraphrasing somebody else from a defense of Fisher's large light cruisers

*If I remember it right and the source can be trusted the 15" guns were a we have the room and they are just sitting there addition

I remember them being designed to support amphibious landings in the Baltic.
 
The Russians had a design for a torpedo battleship with 4 triple 7.1-inch turrets and something like 84 submerged TT's (most on the beam).

Never left the drawing board.
 
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