Alternate warships of nations

Of course to fix that you need to give Pacfleet a couple more months before Watchtower begins
Which is a bad idea, because by October/November, Lunga Point airfield will be ready to operate - just with IJNAS planes. There will probably be a sizeable and well-equipped IJA contingent on Guadalcanal as well.

WATCHTOWER was very close timing-wise. If anything, early August was optimal.
 
Which is a bad idea, because by October/November, Lunga Point airfield will be ready to operate - just with IJNAS planes. There will probably be a sizeable and well-equipped IJA contingent on Guadalcanal as well.

WATCHTOWER was very close timing-wise. If anything, early August was optimal.
Shakes head.

Functionally from Savo Island until the USN finally puts its SAG doctrine together after Vella laVella is a year of learning the hard way at the cost of ~100,000 tonnes of warships and ~5,000 lives.

The only way this historically changes is for several things to happen.

1. The USN saves the USS Lexington at Coral Sea. This will ease the flattop shortage, the pilot shortage and will allow for four bird farms to show up at Midway for 2..
2. The USN does better at Midway, getting Hiryu along with the other three KB flattops in that first strike.
3. The Americans pre-war stage mock war games with an allied navy (nominate Argentina) and figure out what they, the USN, are doing wrong in their own fleet problems. I think that dissimilar forces training is the only way they learn proper destroyer tactics, understand what is wrong with their torpedoes and learn the nuts and bolts of practical methods of fighting at sea.

It sure would get them ready for the Battle of the Atlantic and teach them about surface battles with cruiser/destroyer SAGs.
 
SPANAW-100.png


What if the Americans had a clue in 1885? (^^^)
 

Driftless

Donor
SPANAW-100.png


What if the Americans had a clue in 1885? (^^^)
Start better and hopefully progress from there. For one thing, avoid the low freeboard layout of the Indiana's (along with their other errors in design). Some learning curve fubars are to be expected, but maybe not so many?
 
you would think they would have been able to understand that masts should not be in front of the turrets firing arcs
 

Driftless

Donor
The only way this historically changes is for several things to happen.

1. The USN saves the USS Lexington at Coral Sea. This will ease the flattop shortage, the pilot shortage and will allow for four bird farms to show up at Midway for 2..
2. The USN does better at Midway, getting Hiryu along with the other three KB flattops in that first strike.

(tosses up a batting practice pitch :biggrin: )

TBD Devastator - which was the bigger problem for the Devastator at Coral Sea and Midway - the limitations of an aging design, the relative skill development of the crews, insufficient fighter protection, the drop limitations and other defects of the torpedos; or something else?
 
Start better and hopefully progress from there. For one thing, avoid the low freeboard layout of the Indiana's (along with their other errors in design). Some learning curve fubars are to be expected, but maybe not so many?

You think about the conjectural design seen above (^^^) and one might get the six gun specials that I describe in the Teddy Roosevelt timeline I author.

(tosses up a batting practice pitch :biggrin: )

TBD Devastator - which was the bigger problem for the Devastator at Coral Sea and Midway - the limitations of an aging design, the relative skill development of the crews, insufficient fighter protection, the drop limitations and other defects of the torpedoes; or something else?

The problem is that for 1935, the Devastator was real state of the art, but Ed Heinemann genius though he was, would not know what we know now. If the aircraft designers of the day had figured out what we know now, which is that air frames outlast engine capability. then he would have designed the Devastator to have an engine swap-out capability along with an evolved series of props to take advantage of the watts through props upgrades. I do not see where one could obtain additional fuel by volume or mass, and I certainly do not see where one can cure the parasitic drag problem in that belly fluster cluck of a bomb bay gallery, but if one could put in a 900 kW engine instead of a 770 kW engine, and a four paddle constant pitch HS prop, the result might be a tolerable aircraft of about 70 m/s ~ (136 knots) at 250 km or 135 nm strike radius, That would solve the launch platform for 1937-1944. BUT now we need to work on the torpedo.

The motor is okay. Nothing major is problematic in it. It will run true at 15 m/s for 300 seconds and IT WILL HIT a ship, provided the torpedo can drop and run without breaking up or diving too deep on water entry and or roll out of control when the gyro tumbles.

But it has to be fixed so it can be dropped at 70 m/s from 2000 meters altitude to give the Devastator a fighting chance to fly to its drop point and escape. This probably means a ballute and a wire controlled water entry system. Or make the torpedo entry kit with a bomb pointer breakaway tail and a nose entry shock absorber float system, also breakaway.
View attachment 634784
WTUS_WWII_m13_pic.jpg

From Navweaps http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WTUS_WWII.php
Mark 13 torpedo. This picture clearly shows the "pickle barrel" nose drag ring and the "ring tail" tail shroud.

Obviously the USN has to solve the torpedo, because not even the AVENGER could deliver the crap fish used at Midway.
 
Anyone have the drawings for the 40,000 tons Saratoga and Lexington conversions the USN wanted to do but couldn't because of the WNT?
 
Crutchley on the scene probably, or knowing what I know now, Norman Scott. Maybe Crace, if he had just shut up and learned to play nice with Americans. Or William A. Glassford. As 8th Fleet Actual, he did "alright" in the Mediterranean.

Fletcher has to stay with the Bird Farms and Lee has to stay with him. Also rules out Kincaid, because he is screen. As for Turner, can we ship him off to London with Stark? The real problem is Ghormley. Much as I have heartburn with the Bull, he would be a good fit for WATCHTOWER.
Glassford did ok with the tactical command of the Asiatic Fleet, until the ABDA command screwed the pooch, IMO he could have done ok at Guadacanal. Biggest Issue in my opinion is Crace did not put anyone else in command while he was gone. Actually the 3 American cruisers should have had a separate Division commander. Also none of the cruiser commanders received warning of the approaching Japanese force.
 
Glassford did ok with the tactical command of the Asiatic Fleet, until the ABDA command screwed the pooch, IMO he could have done ok at Guadacanal. Biggest Issue in my opinion is Crace did not put anyone else in command while he was gone. Actually the 3 American cruisers should have had a separate Division commander. Also none of the cruiser commanders received warning of the approaching Japanese force.
It wasn't Crace in command at Savo Island (although he was at Coral Sea as CO TF44). It was Victor Crutchley, who we previously saw as captain of Warspite at Narvik.

LOTS of things went wrong at Savo, so trying to get just one thing to save the situation is difficult. TBH, although it may be cold of me to say so, it was an important wake-up call for the Pacific Fleet and friends. They learnt how NOT to do things, very memorably.
 
It wasn't Crace in command at Savo Island (although he was at Coral Sea as CO TF44). It was Victor Crutchley, who we previously saw as captain of Warspite at Narvik.
I did a number on Savo Island where I tried to rehab Crutchley. One may want to read it. Start here. By the time one reaches the casualty lists, one should be shocked at the results, even if everything had gone "right". Two competent navies who know what they are doing, tend to kill each other.
LOTS of things went wrong at Savo, so trying to get just one thing to save the situation is difficult. TBH, although it may be cold of me to say so, it was an important wake-up call for the Pacific Fleet and friends. They learnt how NOT to do things, very memorably.
As I have remarked, it took a year, and even when the Americans finally had the upper hand with tactics and tech and leadership, they were quite nervous about night SAG actions against the IJN.
 
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