Alternate warships of nations

Discussion in 'Alternate History Discussion: After 1900' started by zeppelinair, Sep 6, 2014.

  1. jsb Well-Known Member

    Jun 30, 2013
    Terrible at what? For anti surface its an 80lb shell v a 55lb shell, before radar it will simply destroy the lighter gun at range or if it needs to penetrate protection.

    9,500 yards (8,690 m) 3" (76 mm) SAP - 3.25 lbs. (1.47 kg) TNT
    7,400 yards (6,770 m) 3.0" (76 mm) Special Common Mark 38 - 2.04 lbs. (0.9 kg) Explosive D

    Max range (not that they will hit at this but range they can hit will likely be a % reduction of this in daylight before radar, especially as shell splash size will determine salvo spotting range)
    45 degrees 23,400 yards (21,397 m)
    45 degrees 17,575 yards (16,070 m)
    All of the above are as you say a balance as is the cost between two 3000t ships (super DDs) and a 6000t ship (CL) what did you want and where and who will you fight will decide what’s best.
    Do you have more details (or links?) doctrine and fleet plans will be drive more by your nations sats and objectives than ship designs (that should come after)....?
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  2. Driftless Geezer

    Sep 16, 2011
    Out in the Driftless Area
    That is as nifty a visual explanation of the timeline of Midway as I've ever seen.
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  3. HMS Warspite Well-Known Member

    Oct 1, 2009
    2nd star to the right and then straight on.

    Based on the guncharacteristics of the 5.25"/50 (13.4 cm) QF, Mark I was a good gun itself, though the mountings of both the Mark I (King George V & Vanguard Class) and Mark II (Dido and Spartan Classes) were troublesome. See quote from Navweaps:

    1. The mountings used on the King George V and Dido classes were very cramped and difficult to maintain. They were also difficult to train in the non-powered mode using the hand mechanisms. Their rather slow training speeds meant that they could not track fast-moving aircraft. These last two problems were highlighted during the Japanese attacks on HMS Prince of Wales. When she took up a 10-11 degree list as a result of damage received, it was found that some of the mounts could not be trained to engage the succeeding attacks.
    2. The Mark I mounting used on battleships was a "short trunk" design where the shells and cartridges were sent to a handling room just below the mounting.
    3. The following description is adapted from "Naval Weapons of World War Two" by John Campbell: The ammunition supply for the King George V class was different for end and middle mountings. In P1, P4, S1 and S4, there were three fixed electric-powered, endless-chain hoists for LA shell, HA shell and cartridges. These hoists ran from the shell room and magazines to a handling room below each mounting. Here, shells and cartridges were fed into chutes leading to circular rings around the mounting at working chamber level. Cartridges were passed to hand-ups to the gunhouse while HA and LA shells were raised by hydraulic pusher hoists for each gun. The HA hoists raised the shell horizontally to a hand-controlled extension hoist near the inner trunnions. The shell then rolled into the fuze setting tray and afterwards was then moved by hand to the loading tray. The LA hoists came up in rear of the HA hoists with the shell raised vertically and was moved by hand to the loading tray. The loading tray was manually operated but ramming was hydraulically operated. In P2, P3, S2 and S3, there were two sets of fixed lower hoists with a break and transfer via chutes on the lower deck. The shell hoists of the lower set were dredger type, with the shells horizontal and not vertical as in the endless-chain hoists. Otherwise, the supply was the same as for the end mountings.
    4. The Mark II mounting used on cruisers was a "long trunk" design with a combined magazine and shell room on one deck. The trunk contained two HA shell hoists, two LA shell hoists and two cartridge hoists. All hoists were hydraulic pusher types which delivered shells to the gunhouse as in the Mark I mountings. Movement of shells and cartridges inside the gunhouse was the same as for the Mark I mounting. These changes reduced manning by about 12 crewmen compared to the Mark I mounting.
    5. RP10 mountings were equipped with RPC. These mountings had vertical rollers added to steady the turret, the drives in the training and elevating gear were altered to smooth the motions and the loading tray was converted to power operation with an automatic ramming link.
    6. The Vanguard's RP10 Mark I* mountings had a larger gunhouse, RPC, fuze setting equipment in the hoists very similar to those for USN 5"/38 (12.7 cm) twin mounts and were tied to the USN Mark 37 GFCS, making for a more successful weapon system. These mounts also had a joystick for better local control and had the motor and pump moved to the fixed structure in order to lower the revolving weight. The relative positions of the HA and LA hoists were transposed compared to the other mountings so as to allow the use of Mark VII Metadyne fuze setters, which were located above the HA hoists. It is noted that these fuze setters were not considered to be very successful.
    7. Mounting weights given above include crew and ammunition on the revolving structure.
    8. Late in World War II, the two after mountings on the cruiser Argonaut and all eight mountings on the battleship Anson were converted to the RP10 standard.
    9. Mark I and Mark II mountings were driven by a 80 bhp (peak 160 bhp) electric motor and oil hydraulic pump mounted on the revolving structure. Training was by a hydraulic motor with two worm and pinion drives. Elevation was by a hydraulic motor for each gun which drove a worm gear. Hand gears were provided for both elevation and training. Compressed air was used for runout. Guns were individually sleeved. Guns needed to be dismounted in order to change barrels. A total of twelve crewmen were in the gunhouse plus additional crew in the handling and magazine spaces.
    10. As noted above, wartime shortages meant that three of the Dido class cruisers were completed with only four instead of five turrets and two others were completed with eight 4.5" (11.4 cm) guns. For obscure reasons, the third turret on the bow of the Dido class ships was designated as "Q" turret, not "C" turret. The full set of designations, starting from the bow, went A, B, Q, X and Y. Most eight-gun cruisers, including the follow-on Spartan class, had turrets in A, B, X and Y positions. Somewhat unusually, HMS Bonaventure was completed with turrets in A, B, Q and Y positions, X not being installed. She was lost in March 1941 before her fifth turret could be installed. In the opinion of Captain Jack Egerton of HMS Bonaventure in his report of her action with the German cruiser Hipper: "I have always held that it is better for the four turret ships of the Dido class to have three turrets forward and one aft, as in Bonaventure, than two and two in Dido and Phoebe." Captain Egerton held his ship bow-on to Hipper as much as possible during the engagement as this allowed him to bring three-quarters of his armament to bear while maintaining a small target to Hipper. During this battle, Bonaventure fired 438 rounds during 24 minutes of firing, mainly from the forward armament. No hits were obtained on Hipper, which during the beginning of this time was firing at merchant vessels and later mainly at HMS Berwick which she struck with a few 20.3 cm (8") shells, one of which knocked out "X" turret.
    11. Following the Bismarck battles, King George V and Prince of Wales had their 5.25" (13.4 cm) mountings modified to improve the watertightness of their mantlet plates. These changes were incorporated into the rest of the class as they were being built. Following the loss of Prince of Wales, mountings on the surviving class members had duplicated power leads installed and additional protection worked in to protect the cable entries into the mountings.
    12. Armor thickness as given in "The Design and Construction of British Warships 1939-1945: Major Surface Warships" and "British Battleships of World War Two":
      Mark I Face: 1.5 in (3.81 cm) (60 lbs.)
      Mark II Face: 1.0 in (2.54 cm) (40 lbs.)
      Mark I* Face: 2.5 in (6.35 cm) (100 lbs.)
      Mark I and Mark II Sides: 1.0 in (2.54 cm) (40 lbs.)
      Mark I* Sides: 2.5 in (6.35 cm) (100 lbs.)
      Mark I and Mark II Rear: 1.0 in (2.54 cm) (40 lbs.)
      Mark I* Rear: 2.5 in (6.35 cm) (100 lbs.)
      Mark I and Mark II Roof: 1.0 in (2.54 cm) (40 lbs.)
      Mark I* Roof: 1.5 in (3.81 cm) (60 lbs.)
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  4. McPherson McPherson; a guy who needs a shave.

    Oct 29, 2017
    Somewhere where rockets fly.

    The characteristics of a gun system (and I apologize, because I should have been clear about this) is that the serving ergonomics is as much a part of the gun as the ballistics. For an extended gun action, I think the US 5/38 makes up in volume fire over time what it lacks in individual shell burst charge and SMASH.

    I think that a super-Fletcher 1939 (a kind of light cruiser with five dual 5/38 turrets, of 6,000 m. tons displacement, with a central AAA arrangement worked around the funnels of 4 quad 1.1 inch in a quad lozenge arrangement and the usual US 3 x 4 torpedo mounts, (with working torpedoes) would have been a marked improvement over the Atlantas. I suppose the final defense of quad 50s should be the pedestal weapons of last AAA resort.

    Of course the kicker is that the US torpedoes would have to work to make up for the lack of gunpower. The Dido's torpedoes are RTL their main saving grace when their 5.25s fail due to ergonomics in anti-ship actions. AAA, the Didos could use a stronger secondary battery.
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  5. jsb Well-Known Member

    Jun 30, 2013
    I agree with this and overall agree that the 5.25 is let down by its mount especially against the 5/38.

    But I don't think its that clear in all situations as all DP gun are a massive compromise, some very much at different ends of the spectrum of AA v Surface. At long range pre radar shells will have to be fired by salvo's to try and range and the 5/38 will be at a massive disadvantage due to worse arcs and overall range combined with far smaller shell splashes due to the weight. (probably almost as much difference % as 6" v 8"?)

    I also don't think most CL or DD fights (or really most surface fights in general) where decided by slow adding up damage even a few shells will start to do something bad to ships that really are not sufficiently protected from them once you add that the 5.25 will probably hit significantly earlier to its far better penetration and its likely to hit something important (engine/guns/magazines) well before the fight is decided by shell numbers from the 5/38".

    The 5.25" is basically a mostly surface/anti-DD gun forced into the AA role and that will tell in any especially early war surface fight.

    If building in 39 (not this is to late for anybody apart from USN/IJN) I would go with something lighter,

    8x (4 twin A,B,Y,X) 5/38"
    8x (4 twin Bofors 40 mm)
    10 × 21 inch (533 mm) torpedo tubes (2 × 5 each side) Mark 15 torpedoes (swapped late war on some for more 40mm)
    and a few 20mm where they will fit.

    I just think that this should beat any DD and cost less than your 6000t that will still lose to most cruisers in a surface fight and therefore can be built in larger numbers so less is lost when its lost. It cant anyway be protected well against a large bomb or torpedo so don't both trying to hard ie I would only protect the magazines (to try and save crew casualties) and simply have unit machinery (for getting home slowly after the larger USN wins the battle anyway).
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  6. McPherson McPherson; a guy who needs a shave.

    Oct 29, 2017
    Somewhere where rockets fly.
    I have to fight in the Pacific. I need those extra 2 barrels MA for AAA against Rikkos and the extra float bubble when it is torpedoed or bombed, and the larger hull seagoing qualities for Halsey when he typhoons the fleet and FUEL because it is NTG to be caught by the IJN in the middle of refueling. Every 2 days is ridiculous. More like every 4 days is better, so then my carrier losses are cut in half because my escorts will be escorting, and not off fueling somewhere.
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  7. jsb Well-Known Member

    Jun 30, 2013
    Exactly but once you go down to that level of detail then many different situations will have different best answers, even just for USN what would be best in 42 in the islands of SWP is very different from of Okinawa in 45......
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  8. McPherson McPherson; a guy who needs a shave.

    Oct 29, 2017
    Somewhere where rockets fly.
    And now for a biggie.


    Referent WPA color: Indigo.


    Indigo is a multicultural civilization that appears constituted from a four wave migration sea-raiders pattern similar to the one which formed current Red.

    Find background of this history in Appendix A.

    Weather and climate:

    Best described as an interruptor to ocean currents and wind patterns similar to the Philippine Islands but still north of the hurricane tracks, Indigo's influence on operational conditions can best be described as extreme, in that it acts as a windshield and a current splitter creating a huge eddy and permanent high pressure zone west, northwest of Europe. Dangerous aviation conditions to the immediate NW of the British Isles are exacerbated. Seafaring by sail during the "age of sail" between Iceland and Indigo would have been "interesting" and may explain all the shipwrecks along Iceland's southern and Indigo's northern coasts. The normal weather to be expected is almost Aleutians fierce. Hence easiest sea approach is like Alaska from the southeast. This cuts across the split Gulf Stream and makes port approach along the Indigo southeast coast almost as exciting, as navigating the Newfoundland Narrows. See implications for naval and air operations in Appendix B.

    Current economic situation.

    Unlike Red, often cited as a close model, which has a fairly contiguous and quite expected economic development based on its population distribution, mineral and fungible resource distribution and communications avenues distributed across land, sea, and air, Indigo makes no economic sense from its currently defined geographical resource and population distribution and its land and sea avenues.

    HOW did heavy industry not develop along the same modality as the rest of humanity? Not even the Japanese (Orange) escaped the iron age or its attendant transmorgification of society into seaports and supporting hinterland urban industrial concentrations, though their industry is apparently distributed in a similar cottage industry format as Indigo.. See Technology Implications in Appendix C.

    (Note this Appendix A is lifted directly from Not James Stockwell's excellent ATL history to be found here> [linky]. All I have done is run a BLUE analysis on his creation and fleshed out what BLUE should expect from these guys. I hope it gives a sense of rationality to what has mostly been speculations about what Manticore is up to or perhaps I might suggest SHOULD be up to as it operates in a politico-economic environment of formidable clashing sea-airpower interests. McP.)

    Appendix B.

    Trade environment. (See Map Inserts n Appendix E.)

    Indigo’s geographic position and accessions acquired during her colonial period marks it as a sea-air power with a similar and decisive geographical position to Red as Red is to Europe, or Orange is to East Asia. Due to its position, competition with a neighboring sea-airpower is almost certain and we can expect the kind of interaction with Red and Gold that ed and Gold had/hav with each other. For Blue’s case, our interests lie primarily in how Indigo interferes with our own essential defense spheres in war and what impact Indigo’s hostility could present to Blue’s interest in times of tension.

    It should be obvious, that as Indigo lies athwart just in the path of the wind and current bands to the North Atlantic sea routes that Indigo will be first ports of call. Indigo will try in peace and war to act as gatekeeper to continental Europe and either through persuasion or force seek to siphon off Blue trade to itself. It is in direct competition with Red for this dubious honor and this situation will cause considerable friction among Blue, Red and Indigo, with shifting alliance patterns as each color seeks advantage. Expect Gold to try to play spoiler, but s Gold is bottled twice over, its influence will be marginal.

    As far as Blue is concerned, in the case of Indigo, it is Blue’s interest to degrade Indigo’s economic impact as much as possible and to mitigate its goalkeeper effect on European trade. This will be difficult as natural economic laws dictate that trade flows smoothest along the least path of resistance and Indigo’s current geo-political situation has greased those rails thoroughly to its advantage.

    Should war occur:

    It will be difficult for Blue. Almost immediately as in case of Red, it is a case of Blue hitting them where Indigo cannot sustain themselves. That means Newfoudland and Fossaway. Unfortunately, due to the triangular balance of power dynamic among Red, Blue and Indigo, it is almost certain that Red will join Indigo. CRIMSON will be the consequence. Nasty.

    Appendix C.

    What one should expect from Indigo as to operating forces.

    1. Due to geography and weather patterns, its reliance on trade for prosperity as well as its current economic situation, Indigo will of course build the strongest air force and navy it thinks it can afford. Within current global aviation technology trends it is almost certain, that Indigo will mimic and make the same air-power mistakes, Red and Orange does, over-centralizing its air effort to a bastion offense and defense based on homeland basing. There will be forward-presence basing in Newfoundland and Fossoway initially dangerous to Blue which will necessitate Blue’s investment in a metropolitan strike capacity of its own to eliminate the threat. There will be a pair of ground campaigns to eliminate Indigo’s forward based presence. Think HUSKY twice in arctic conditions. Such air-land operations should be mounted in deep winter to avoid the Atlantic storm seasons and deny Indigo air good weather for them for battle.

    2. Navally, the situation Indigo faces in the North Atlantic makes it almost an academic exercise to predict its fleet characteristics. Short-ranged by Blue standards and because of home port geographical advantage almost no fleet train, the fleet, like Red’s home fleet, will be of necessity almost exclusively designed to meet Bay of Biscay and Greenland, Iceland, Indigo coastal, and generally southern Arctic local operational conditions. Seaborne aviation in those waters is “difficult”, radar conditions very unreliable, and normal sea-states 5 or worse. Blue can compete, but think Operation Iceberg with force on force meeting engagements between surface action groups. Blue’s best operational NAVAL opening move is a flow strategy and a submarine campaign. Indigo knows this is the case, and in cooperation with Red, will develop a formidable if short ranged at sea ASW capability. In sum, a lot of coastal escorts, strong coastal medium range and fewer long range maritime patrol aircraft to patrol the northern, southern and western approaches. The offensive naval forces (battle fleet) will be sortie based from home ports based on the surface action group and backed by shore based naval air power. Aircraft carriers, an expensive necessity for Blue as a power projection naval asset, will be an Indigo naval luxury that comes behind trade defense, sea defense and air defense of the homeland. The Indigo fleet will be designed to operate within those minimal parameters.

    Suggested Indigo force composition based on possible economic limits suggested (Comparable model; Red)


    1. Three surface action groups, steaming radius and stay at sea limited to 10-14 days, (about 10,000 kilometers maximum), 3-4 (capital unit) battleship equivalents or strike cruisers, as core, with 3-4 AAW ASW bodyguard ships in company. Ship qualities for the capital units emphasized are heaviest possible gun/missile armament on a 25-30 ktonne hull (Best equivalent is a working KGV sensibly armed with 8 x 35.5cm/45 MA/ 16 x 115 cm/53 DP and 16 quad 4cm/70 AAA or in modern terms a strike Tico or a Kirov), good speed in rough sea state, best onboard sensors possible to Indigo and a good 2 way commo suite for air to surface cooperation with the assigned LRMP support (20 patroller recon bombers similar to an Emily or in modern terms a Bison or Atlantique to each SAG). Each SAG is stationed to cover the north, west and south sea frontiers respectively and will only combine to face a major threat axis identified Indigo Homeland invasion. Bodyguard SuW/ASW/AAA ships will be “cruisers” of formidable combat power, (Think Brooklyn/ Rurik in 1900 or later Baltimore, or modern Arleigh Burke flight II)

    2. East sea frontier is covered by SRMP air power and what can best be described as strong coast guard forces as the cruise sortie range to the critical sea areas is 1- 3 days (~5000 kilometers.) Refer to 3, for ship characteristics.

    3. Escort forces and convoy defense. There will be at least 8 minimum and possibly as many as 15 convoy escort groups, CEGs, of 8-10 vsserls. Assuming minimums, this will be a two tier composition or offshore patrol vessels and ocean patrollers. The OPVs (5-8 groups) that can pass between Gold and Red, should be very numerous, of small size (about 1,000 metric tonnes) and designed to be cheap, mass produced, and expendable. Ship characteristics, DP AAA/ASW gun/missile with only 3-5 days at sea (~3000 kilometers endurance, very like a Flower or a Nanutchka corvette). Ocean going characteristics can be expected to be appalling as these are attrition units, though they will form the bulk of Indigo’s navy. The ocean patrolers (3-7 groups) will be of a more robust category, equivalent in mission role to destroyer escort or light frigate. Expect a ½ reduced version of the fleet bodyguard ship, (In role similar to a Samuel D. Roberts then or now.)

    4. Submarine assets are mainly anti-fleet and correspond roughly to Red’s current d/e capability, about 80 units divided 40/40 between coastal (sortie,~500 hours, about 2 weeks ~ 5000 kilometers) and blue water patrollers (sortie ~1000 hours, about 4 weeks ~ 10,000 kilometers) both types 4 bow and 2 stern tubes, max crush depth 250 m/ exclusively d/e types. IOW dead meat to Blue ASW forces which include GUPPIES and nukes.

    5. Naval establishment manning afloat (150,000 men). Ashore (300,000 men)

    Air Force.

    1. Indigo has more incentive than Red to develop shore based naval aviation and strategic bomber forces. Rough outline.

    a. (10 wings of 500-600 aircraft) Four engine bombers and/or seaplanes carrying 3-4 tonnes payload, in air endurance of 8-12 hours radius at ~ 2,400-3000 kilometers action out and back

    b. (20 wings of 1,000-1200 aircraft) Two engine bombers and/or seaplanes carrying 1-2 tonnes payload, in air endurance of 4-8 hours radius at ~ 1,800-2,400 kilometers action out and back.

    c. (10 wings of ~1000-1,500 aircraft) Area defense interceptors, of 1-1 ½ hour radius at 500-750 kilometers action out and back.

    d. (20 wings of 2,000-3,000 aircaft) Target defense interceptors of ½ to 1 hour radius at 300-500 kilometers action out and back.

    Support establishment is 100 air bases, mostly coastal and with a manning level of 80% Blue standard, roughly equivalent to Red, of 80 men per aircraft. (~300,000 men)

    Suggested airbase distribution

    Indigo Homeland ~ 50,

    Iceland 3

    Greenland 2

    Newfoundland 5

    Fossaway 10

    Tarantry 10

    Guiana 5

    The Silver Coast 5

    The Indigo Army

    Unlike Red which has an expeditionary necessity and a largely professional army on that basis, Indigo as it is geographically distributed and organized needs mixed forces; territorials, defensive formations for its Homeland and closest territories and professionals for its exposed colonies. Its most precious out of Indigo mainland holdings are South American and this is where the bulk of its professional military is. Assessintg the South American threat to Indigo’s holding a field force of no more than 1 light infantry division with associated air support can be expected in Guiana. The Silver Coast can be expected to be garrisoned against Brazil more robustly at 5 divisions, 1 motorized and 4 infantry with associated air support.

    Tarantry is almost akin to the Indigo homeland and is presumed defended on the same basis.

    Newfoundland, Iceland and Fossaway are mainly air-sea defended and are garrisoned on the Indigo territorials model. In the case of Crimson, the three immediately become Blue objectives and it is believed that the Indigo military would regard their defense as problematic as Blue regards Alaska; extremely difficult under the best of circumstances. Indigo would fight, but expect to lose in the opening phases and would have to get those back at the peace table after they win the war against Blue.

    The Territorials

    The territorials are akin to Blue’s national guard and reserve forces. These formations, mostly infantry and mostly local levy on the Red Model are not considered to be equal in equipment or training to Blue’s own federal troops, but would be expected to be equal to a European Class II or Class III formation such as constitute the bulk of Gold’s reserve levee en masse. This assessment is based on the limited exposure of Indigo’s base population to massive popular front wars. These guys should not be pushovers on their home ground, but if Blue catches them forward of the Indigo Homeland terrain and local logistics and population base, Blue’s own mostly expeditionary forces will tear them apart.

    Blue Conclusions:


    The best instrument for Blue’s interest vis a vis Indigo is diplomatic re-approachment and a quasi-permanent alliance with co-equal sharing of the North Atlantic markets. Maybe a trinary sharing with Red vis a vis Europe is a future option. Obviously, however, strategic rocket and bomber threats to Blue’s Homeland should be opening negotiating issues before the core issues of trade and re-approachment occur.


    Plan Indigo, to be implemented only in the event of Indigo’s attack on Blue’s interests; contrary to Indigo’s presumed expectations; do not involve immediate execution of Crimson. Despite Indigo’s claims to understand sea and air power, Blue’s opening moves would not be against Canada unless Red becomes an active belligerent. Indigo will instead find itself handicapped by Red neutrality in the employment of its Iceland and Newfoundland bases and forces. Blue is then left with Fassoway as the main preemptive strike target. While out of Blue land based IRBM ranges, it lies well within range of Blue sea-based air-power of ship-borne and water take off capability for conventionally armed bombers and for ship launched and submarine launched conventionally armed missiles to neutralize Indigo’s offensive capability from that island. This is a risky option A. Option B, more prudent and possibly more effective to force negotiations is a commerce war upon Indigo trade, even if Indigo attacks Blue Homeland directly with conventional means. This event carried out by Indigo would be a natural rung on the Kahn escalation ladder that would be extremely dangerous.

    An exchange of special munitions packages between Indigo and Blue Homelands should be avoided at all costs, but a great deal depends on whether Indigo is stupid enough to attack Blue’s Homeland. Blue’s political leadership is neither rational or emotionally stable, a factor, that Blue planners should keep foremost in mind whenever presenting Blue options to Indigo actions and capabilities.

    Blue Options Packages:

    I. Confine the war to economic embargo, diplomatic isolation and limited offensive/defensive actions to punish aggression commensurate with Indigo damage inflicted on Blue interests.

    II. Confine the war to sea. Interrupt Indigo commerce where practical, either economicaly embargo or via active measures restrict trade and access to markets (Example: sink their merchant marine and navy.).

    III. Seize “safe” bargaining chips. Indigo’s Carribean and South American holdings are natural forfeits to Blue and Blue’s allies without much risk of a central force on force exchange.

    IV. Seize Fassoway by invasion. Highly risky option as it could be considered as the Indigo Homeland shield against Blue’s direct encroachment. Might spark force on force central exchange.

    V. Decapitation. As Indigo is a stressed culture with distinct subcultures at cross purposes to each other; a conventional attack on leadership might induce political fragmentation and a willingness by successors to negotiate a peace rather than escalate. The risk to central force on force exchange is obvious, however. Blue Planners have to assume Indigo leadership is insane to even make Plan Indigo necessary in the first place.

    Last edited: May 10, 2019
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  9. McPherson McPherson; a guy who needs a shave.

    Oct 29, 2017
    Somewhere where rockets fly.
    :pBUT... that is what I need to fight in the SWP, JSB. The US destroyers are too small and the cruisers are TOO big. It is a very intensive air threat environment, and a submarine nightmare. I need frigates that can dance and shoot. Guess what happens off Okinawa and amongst the Rykukus? Same blasted thing. Steel is cheap up to a size of mission. Too small and can't do the mission. Too big and can't do the mission. Dido was just about right. The Med and the Solomons are a lot more alike than different. 6000 tonnes is the "sweet spot".
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  10. jsb Well-Known Member

    Jun 30, 2013
    I question that a bit,
    off Okinawa you basically need AA and more AA and a stable large platform to use it and lots of range 6000 makes sense IMO.

    In SWP the threat is much higher with higher losses and I don't think you can avoid losing ships to torpedo hits (subs or surface LL) as USN is simply far weaker v the IJN threat than later in war. This means that I would want to spread my loses (or even just ships that have to go back to US for repair) over more units and thus cut down ship size.
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  11. McPherson McPherson; a guy who needs a shave.

    Oct 29, 2017
    Somewhere where rockets fly.
    I get two Super Fletchers ($$$) for every Cleveland and Northampton I lose and I get torpedoes with which to shoot back (SAVO ISLAND), and I get twice the AAA for the Slot which is a future IJN RIKKO aerial shooting gallery for torpedo carrying Betties scooting down from Rabaul and Choiseul with USN cruisers being their sitting ducks. USS Chicago (and Rennell Island) is an example of what I am trying to avoid. Tassafaronga and Empress Augusta Bay are bolos, too. Nothing changes a dumb rear admiral's battleplan like the characteristics of his fighting platforms. If everybody USN is on the same sheet of music, you don't get Tanaka Raizo standing on his bridge with a stopwatch counting down seconds to when the US destroyers charge and the cruiser gun line wheels to present their fat broadsides to the Tokyo Express' 8 minute runners. Like the British cruiser tanks charging into a Rommel 88 ambush, you'd think they'd learn? If you have to fight with a different platform and think torpedoes, then you learn to dance and shoot or at least set up an ambush of your own instead of conform to Tanaka's torpedo tango.
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  12. Draconis Emperor of the North Pole.

    Jan 15, 2014
    @McPherson Weren't the Atlanta class CLAA ships sufficient for the uses you are describing?
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  13. Cryhavoc101 Well-Known Member

    Jun 27, 2014
    1123 6536 5321

    The reason that 6 of the 8 turrets became difficult to aim was because the dynamo that powered them was on the prop that was damaged by the torpedo hit! They actually restarted the prop after the original hit because of this very issue and before the full extent of the damage was realised and this created even more damage / flooding.

    The loss of power that was experienced by both the POW and the Ark Royal resulted in multiple Aux Power generators fitted to capital ships going forwards to allow for alternative power supply in the case of Dynamo failure for whatever reason.

    The best lessons are learned by the survivors.

    The real tragedy is when it has to be relearned

    5.25" makes perfect sense pre Radar / Prox fuse what with Destroyers getting bigger, Torpedoes longer ranged and Bombers getting bigger and flying higher with bigger/more bombs.

    A bigger gun firing a bigger shell making a bigger bang to a higher alt / greater range was obvious in the late 30s

    That a better 4.5 was probably the answer only makes sense with hindsight.
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  14. jsb Well-Known Member

    Jun 30, 2013
    Not sure that's totally true as (a split loaded) 4.5" would also be very useful on lighter ships (or even a working earlier DP 4.7") and it would also be available earlier ie from the QE rebuilds, so simply a more rushed RN rearmament with tighter control of priorities stopping multiple new designs to save the very limited designers might also work.
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  15. jsb Well-Known Member

    Jun 30, 2013
    Since you like discussing USN ship (OK you might not the only person ;))....

    My question would be what would be the most likley/best USN 2WNT pre escalator battleship assuming it was rushed like the KVGs so,
    laid down - 1 JAN 37
    Commissioned - 1 October 1940
    35,000t - a bit tighter than OTL NCs
    14" guns - ordered pre escalator and to far to change

    What would they look like (presumably not far off NCs) and what would be the effect of two of them or even 5-6 to match RN or as USN liked 6 ship classes?
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  16. McPherson McPherson; a guy who needs a shave.

    Oct 29, 2017
    Somewhere where rockets fly.
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  17. jsb Well-Known Member

    Jun 30, 2013
    Ok for RN ship I would cut the Dido "C" mount and fit 40mm light AA (ok and Vanguard sized mounts) remove its engine room wing spaces and I would be happy...
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  18. McPherson McPherson; a guy who needs a shave.

    Oct 29, 2017
    Somewhere where rockets fly.
    1. I think the USN was unhappy with its 35.6cm/50s that it planned for the North Carolinas

    2. upload_2019-5-10_17-57-41.png

    I think it would have had the same garbage armor scheme as RTL only with a more inclined belt armor over a greater % length, of that short hull and very likely would have suffered the same MA dispersion problems as the Nevada and the Richelieu despite the 1943 USN fixes.
    Last edited: May 10, 2019
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  19. jsb Well-Known Member

    Jun 30, 2013
    Even if its garbage I still think that USN would have been far better off with more (5-6) of them ready on Dec 6 41 than the OTL?
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  20. edgeworthy Well-Known Member

    Oct 1, 2013
    Has anyone ever suggested skipping the 4.7"/50 (12 cm) QF Mark XI and arming new destroyers with (4) single 5.25" mounts?

    (Admittedly this means designing a new single turret, although considering the circumstances as many twin 4"/45 Mark XIX mountings as possible would have been a better choice)
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