Alternate warships of nations

[AJE]

I should be horse-whipped for these jokes.

That is not pathetic weaponry at all by armored cruiser standards. The armament of 6 20 cm guns in twin centerline turrets gives the ship less broadside large caliber firepower than the Blücher (8 21 cm guns per side), Minotaur class (4 234 mm and 5 191 mm guns per side) cruisers, and Warrior class (4 234 and 2 191 mm guns per side) cruisers, but it has better firepower than almost every other armored cruiser. The Scharnhorst class cruiser (Blücher's immediate predecessor), for example, has 4 21 cm guns in centerline twin turrets and 4 in casemates, giving it 6 21 cm guns per side, about the same as the ship you describe. The Roon class preceding Scharnhorst has no casemate 21 cm guns and therefore only 4 21 cm guns per side, and the Duke of Edinburgh class preceding Warrior has 6 single 234 mm guns with 4 available per side.

In terms of secondary firepower, none of the British or German armored cruisers have more secondary firepower. The most heavily armed British armored cruiser in this area is the Duke of Edinburgh class, with 10 152 mm guns and 20 47 mm guns in casemates or wing mounts. No other British ship has more than 24 secondary guns, with no more than 6 of them being 152 mm guns. The Scharnhorst has 6 15 cm guns and 18 8.8 cm guns, the Blücher 8 15 cm guns and 16 8.8 cm guns. The Roon has 10 15 cm guns and 14 8.8 cm guns, which is about the standard except for Fürst Bismarck which is the only ship to match this ATL ship with 12 15 cm guns and 10 8.8 cm guns.

In terms of torpedoes, the ship has 6 tubes which is more than any German armored cruiser except Fürst Bismarck, which had 6 tubes. All other German armored cruisers had 4, the Minotaur class had 5 tubes, the Powerful class had 4, and all other British armored cruisers had 3 or 2 tubes.

It should also be noted that the ships that match or outclass this ATL ship in any category all displace more than it, making it a very efficient design. It's also faster than any British or German armored cruiser except Blücher, and not inferior to many in terms of armor either.

So in total, the ship has more main gun firepower than all British or German armored cruisers except the last 2 generations of them (Scharnhorst, Blücher, Warrior, and Minotaur), more secondary gun firepower than any British or German armored cruiser of any type, and more torpedoes than any British or German armored cruiser except for Fürst Bismarck (and a better layout of those torpedoes at that). Only the excessive use of low casemate guns is a downside (and it's still not as bad as most armored cruisers), but that's not enough to stop that ship being an excellent design, and any navy in the 1900-1904 period would be happy to have an armored cruiser like this.

 

[AJE]

Provided to show what I am using as sources of inspiration.

The first video is unavailable for me, but the rest look like good videos. The second one was also very useful to me a while ago when I was looking at the modern rotary forge (basically a scaled-up barrel hammer forging machine) and studying how barrels were forged before that was invented- that video pretty much shows it. As a further piece of information, this was in the early 1900's (1908) so centrifugal casting hadn't been applied to large guns yet, and it was never applied to such large guns anyway before they became obsolete. So that forging also had to cast solid and drilled out before the forging operations seen in the video.

 

[McPherson]

The first video is unavailable for me, but the rest look like good videos. The second one was also very useful to me a while ago when I was looking at the modern rotary forge (basically a scaled-up barrel hammer forging machine) and studying how barrels were forged before that was invented- that video pretty much shows it. As a further piece of information, this was in the early 1900's (1908) so centrifugal casting hadn't been applied to large guns yet, and it was never applied to such large guns anyway before they became obsolete. So that forging also had to cast solid and drilled out before the forging operations seen in the video.

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When I suggest pathetic weaponry, I keep in mind that the RTL US weaponry (the large bore /caliber guns larger than 4 inch) that are in use are brown powder weapons and their operating cycles were slower than compared to the smokeless powder British, German and French contemporaries. Also to be noted, the RTL brown powder guns can only shove projectiles at approximately 600-700 m/s at maximum measured performance. The European guns fire faster by a factor of 2 and their muzzle velocities are a good 80 to 100 m/s faster because of their more efficient shell handling equipment and better propellants. A French 12 inch gun will hit 40% harder than its US equivalent on the USS Texas in the RTL. The US guns from the first generation battleships were 13 inch/35 caliber guns due to this because to break through British and French steel plate of the day, a heavier shell was absolutely necessary.

ITTL the combustion chambers are enlarged, the chamber pressures are ramped up and long skinny shells still cannot compensate for that propellant inferiority. The chemistry is so important.

On the other hand, the Americans do have a few advantages. Their electrical technology is first rate and it can be used to advantage even at this early date to compensate for the atrocious direct drives the Americans actually use, which robbed them of cruising efficiency. Need that electricity for the carbon arc lights anyway.

 

[AJE]

youtube…. w27heVUQ8 ..... The hypertext link mistransposes into a smiley.

A radial steam reciprocating engine. I wonder if it has any advantages over regular reciprocating engines.

 

[McPherson]

A radial steam reciprocating engine. I wonder if it has any advantages over regular reciprocating engines.

I think one will find that space-wise it will be more efficient and actually makes long skinny hulls necessary, but because of the complexity of that orbital gear... expect a lot of mechanical failures and breakdowns. I do suggest that the Americans in the RTL go to vertical cylinder triple expansion engines from the horizontal layouts they started with, because they find like everyone else that it is mechanically more reliable, efficient and simpler to 90 off a crankshaft and PTO to the final drive.

I wonder if a working ITTL radial steam engine would derail the steam turbine (which is more efficient by the way) on the west side of the Atlantic. Could be a story point.

 

[AJE]

I do suggest that the Americans in the RTL go to vertical cylinder triple expansion engines from the horizontal layouts they started with, because they find like everyone else that it is mechanically more reliable, efficient and simpler to 90 off a crankshaft and PTO to the final drive.

I think horizontal engines were kept for the same reason that John Ericsson invented them all the way back in 1843 (see USS Princeton's engines here*)- they could be placed entirely below the waterline and out of the line of fire. Ironically that was one of the main developments that convinced navies that steam powered warships were useful and not something whose engine would immediately be shot out (this was back in the days of wooden ships). So if it was one of the things that made steam warships worthwhile in the first place I can see why they wouldn't want to abandon them.

*Yes, the engines really were that complex, as were Ericsson's later monitor engines which were developed from them (though they were a bit simpler). Despite this, the monitor engines were well-designed and reliable.

 

[McPherson]

What I have to consider about ITTL warships; especially in the Age of Steam.

1. Independent Movement of Wind and Current.

When a 19th century steam ship turns full to the rudder at speed, it heels over away from the turn. Its aft end can skid or lose bite in the water causing the turn to flatten or go wide. This is called "the kick". Guess what happens to the novice steam ship operators who don't know what the orthogonal lean limits are? HIJMS Unebi. and theSpanish cruiser Reina Regente might have been lost this way.

Even when the navy does know what it does, or thinks it does, the results can be less than optimal because of the weird way steam ships behave in a cross current and the gonzo expectations of men who grow up with sail, and the fighting instructions and not so much with steam. VADM Sir George Tryon managed to sink a battleship off Tripoli, Lebanon in what can only be described as a comedy of technological experimentation and a tragedy of misapplied "steam" seamanship. Now consider that the HMS Victoria was already a certain peculiarity, which because of her compromised design was bow heavy forward and completely known to kick hard in a turn as her stern would raise out and the rudders failed to bite? Also consider that CAPT Maurice Bourke managed to run her aground in a torpedo exercise off Platea Greece a few months before the collision. Anyway, due to a combination of misunderstandings and befuddlements then this happened on 22 June 1893. The HMS Camperdown, a thoroughly conventional 1892 pre-dreadnought rammed HMS Victoria and VADM Tryon went down with his flagship. It should not have happened. Why it happened has puzzled a lot of historians down to the present, but the miserable handling qualities of the HMS Victoria, the over-adherence to a RIGID CHANGE OF COMMAND, and a flag signals dictionary that did not allow for clear precise orders in the event of an evolving emergency (the officers involved knew for three minutes during the inward corven that the Camperdown and Victoria would hit each other.)

Why am I interested? There was a great international interest in the court martial that followed; CAPT Bourke and several other witnesses managed to corroborate each other and put the blame squarely on VADM Tryon. I have my opinions on the way the hearing was conducted, but as I prefer to stick with lessons learned and applied, I will say that some US warships were nearby and observed the incident and aboard those warships were US officers who would remember what transpired or what was reported as hearsay to them and/or who followed the Admiralty proceedings closely later in the newspapers. When the USS Brooklyn dodged the Infanta Maria Theresa's attempt to ram her and in turn was missed by the USS Texas, it was the captains of those ships that benefited from the USN lessons learned. This education was applied in battle by a navy, that had prior to the Battle of Santiago de Cuba, never fought an enemy fleet in a maneuver battle under steam or even exercised that much as a battle squadron. It was every captain maneuver independently to avoid collision. That requires that each ship handler knows his ship's idiosyncrasies and handling characteristics. For example, full astern, USS Texas liked to steer naturally to port in reverse. USS Brooklyn wallowed like a pig turning to port. She was better to starboard. I have to keep these details in mind when I read Schley's court martial. (Yes, he was court martialed.).

2. Steam Engines Make Blockade Duty A B___h!

One of the things Horatio Nelson could always rely upon was the wind. If there was none, then the French were stuck in port and he could float outside harbor and be certain they were not coming out. The wind kicks up, Nelson's captains sent the men aloft to rig sail to catch it and the English were ready to catch the French as they came out. Now look at the Americans as they mousehole Cervera. He can sit with cold engines and pick and choose his time to sortie. When he does, he has to raise steam and that gives him the sortie initiative because the Americans cannot know when Cervera's ships light off their boilers. Figure 90 minutes to raise steam pressure in the Infanta Maria Teresa and turn over her EXCELLENT French designed engines. The Americans cannot sit outside harbor with cold engines. At least one guard ship has to be at 3/4 steam at all times and the rest have to have half lit boilers so that when the Spanish do come out the Americans have pressure to start to move, themselves. That is why I laugh as I read in Schley's court martial when Sampson always complains that Schley is off coaling somewhere instead of on station. Of course Schley is coaling. He burns 300 tonnes of coal a day just cruising in circles waiting for Cervera to make up his mind when to come out and be sunk.

This is not what you read in the popular histories is it? It also explains why the American guard ships, cutting circles in the water 1500 meters off the harbor mouth, shined their powerful searchlights on that harbor mouth. The Americans fully expected to lose their designated inner guard ship. She was supposed to sacrifice herself to buy time for the rest of the fleet to work up steam and form up for battle. The Americans assumed Cervera would come out at night as that was the best chance to evade and escape for his squadron to Cienfuegos where the Spanish had better forts and a heaping big supply of coal. The guard ship was supposed to block the way and fight to the death to hold Cervera up. Given the realities of 1898, this was the only way to do blockade. To refuel, the blockaders, the Americans, took calculated risks when to send ships off to coal. This was triply nerve racking for Schley because his attached collier, the SS Merrimac, was a debacle rust bucket whose own steam engines kept breaking down and more often than not had to be towed to where she was supposed to rendezvous to coal an American warship. When it came time to nominate a hulk to be sunk to block the exit channel to Santiago de Cuba, guess which one was nominated? And guess why the hulk never made it to the designated sink-ex spot?

Whatever else you might say about the Spaniards, their gunnery aimed at a sitting duck at night was excellent!

Just some more things to remember that I have firmly in mind when someone thinks I'm wanking The Stars and Stripes Forever 2.0.

P.S. ADM Sampson was off station with his flagship, USS New York and the torpedo boat USS Ericsson, when Cervera came out. The reason? Sampson was about to have it out with GEN Schafter over the latest army plan to take Santiago de Cuba, as in never, was messaged to him. It is strongly suspected by some historians that Sampson might have suffered another stress induced stroke and was possibly quite insane when he went storming off to have this meeting of the no-minds because Garcia's spies were reporting that Cervera was getting ready to come out and he KNEW IT. As for 150 kg Schafter? He may have come down with a case of malaria that addled him, too. Both medically unfit men had lost control of events. It shows up in the reports the British observers send to the Admiralty and War Office respectively. They call the Americans at sea and on land... "amateurs".

I think that is quite unfair in retrospect, though, don't you?

 

[AJE]

2. Steam Engines Make Blockade Duty A B___h!

More than that, blockades like that become impossible within 15 (maybe within 10) years of that war. Only distant blockades could be effectively enforced after that.

Figure 90 minutes to raise steam pressure in the Infanta Maria Teresa and turn over her EXCELLENT French designed engines.

It's closer to 24 hours for steam engines.

This is not what you read in the popular histories is it? It also explains why the American guard ships, cutting circles in the water 1500 meters off the harbor mouth, shined their powerful searchlights on that harbor mouth. The Americans fully expected to lose their designated inner guard ship. She was supposed to sacrifice herself to buy time for the rest of the fleet to work up steam and form up for battle. The Americans assumed Cervera would come out at night as that was the best chance to evade and escape for his squadron to Cienfuegos where the Spanish had better forts and a heaping big supply of coal. The guard ship was supposed to block the way and fight to the death to hold Cervera up.

But then couldn't Cervera sortie out to sink the guard ship, retreat back into the harbor before the reinforcements arrived (leaving the guard ship for another time if it's not sunk yet), and then repeat as necessary on other nights? The US couldn't have an infinite supply of guard ships.

 

[McPherson]

More than that, blockades like that become impossible within 15 (maybe within 10) years of that war. Only distant blockades could be effectively enforced after that.

Correct for 1914, but as the airplane had not been invented yet, the submarine was not quite worked out and deep minefields are also a thing of the future, the conditions of the day allowed mouse-holing. Sampson, who created the blockade plan, had to consider the dangers he faced, possible night sortie raids and Spanish shore based artillery. He tested the Spanish shore defenses with experimental gun duels with the Moros guarding the harbor mouth. He quickly concluded that Spanish gunnery could only be accurate to about 2,000 meters in daylight and was nil at night out to sea. Sortie from that narrow harbor mouth (see map.) takes time. About 30 minutes large ship by ship at night. The American guard ship was to buy additional time and dazzle the Spanish pilots with bright light making their jobs to steer even harder. Sampson was using "electronic warfare" 1898 style to make things for Cervera worse at night, to force a daylight sortie.

I remark that Cervera's cruisers, which were huge by the standards of the day at 100 meters long or longer, were trying to clear a 150-200 meter wide channel at one point threading several tight turns around poorly charted islands and they had to do this within shelling range of the American guard ship (at night) which is why Sampson set the guardship 1500 meters off shore with the searchlight shining in the Spaniards' eyes. One ship at a time might mean up to a half hour to thread the needle (at night). That is why Cervera attempted a daylight breakout which reduced his exposure to shelling ranges at 2,500 meters and for only about 15 minutes. The Americans had to move off to about 2,500 meters in daylight and he could maneuver faster in the same daylight and not be dazzled by those ___ ______ searchlights. He also dared not try a surprise night sortie... one ship at a time; the guard ship shooting at his illuminated ships while the practically invisible inner support line of American ships about 1000 meters beyond the guard ship ranged in themselves shooting from behind a bright light? Neither Sampson before he went nuts, Schley, or Cervera were stupid men. They knew exactly what they were doing. What surprises me, from reading the foreign observer reports, was that neither the British, Russian or German observers had a clue as to what the AMERICANS understood. The Japanese observer did. He had experience from the Sino-Chinese war and warned his government that the American navy was incredibly dangerous from what he saw them do.

It's closer to 24 hours for steam engines.

ShinyTop RE:How long did it take to start a Battleship during WW2?? 5/27/2006 9:13:51 PM
No definitive answer here, but the Nevada had steam and was attempting to depart Pearl Harbor in around an hour. They beached it after some hits so it would not sink in the channel. The joker in the deck is I have no idea what status the Nevada was in before the attack began.

Depends on the boiler state and alert status. I picked 90 minutes because that seemed to be Cervera's standby from cold to steam pressure from his accounts.

But then couldn't Cervera sortie out to sink the guard ship, retreat back into the harbor before the reinforcements arrived (leaving the guard ship for another time if it's not sunk yet), and then repeat as necessary on other nights? The US couldn't have an infinite supply of guard ships.

No they did not have an infinite supply. But Sampson planned for that night raid. Cervera would get exactly one shot. From the standing orders, it appears that the guard ship was to engage and if things went against the American supporting line (Not likely.), she was to charge and ram if she could, to scuttle herself and one of the lead Spanish ships to block the channel. It was a suicide mission.

These men were not stupid. It is amazing how complex the chess match they played was. Give a lot of credit to Cervera, who almost got away. Give a lot of credit to Schley who caught him. Dewey gets all the glory, but when you dig into the Naval Battle of Santiago de Cuba, those were two incredible fleets, led by wily officers, equally dealt bad hands, were the ones who apparently made a chaotic outcome look like amateur hour, but it was not. It was most assuredly not. IF and that is a big "if" Cervera's ships had been up to spec with decent ammunition, working artillery, and reliable torpedoes; Schley expected to lose 1/3 to 1/2 his own ships. That was the grim pre-battle assessment he made of his own technical inferiority vis a vis what he presumed was a state of the art French designed and equipped navy. He would annihilate Cervera, but it would be costly. Fortunately, the Spanish ships were not up to spec, their ammunition was shoddy and their artillery was defective and the great Spanish torpedo boat technical expert, Vilaamil was a tyro tactician, the Beatty of the Spanish Navy. The Americans had those surprise advantages handed to them and they exploited to the maximum. But one cannot say that they had not prepared for the worst and when the opportunity they created happened, they seized it with gusto.

You see, the European technical experts were correct on paper. The USN only had the look of a modern navy. Their technology was about European 1885-1888. The Spaniards were rated to have the technical edges in gunnery, ship design, and engine plants and a rough equivalence in armor; maybe 1895 in their most modern up to date ships overall, which their armored cruisers were.

Men matter, The American crews were drilled to the point of exhaustion and while their gear was not state of the art, it was funded, maintained and it worked. The corrupt isaballine governments that misruled Spain shorted their navy in training time, wages, and maintenance funds and apparently pulled a Chinese trick and substituted training rounds for war-shots when Cervera was ordered out. The thing is, from Cervera's captured letters and reports we know that he knew all of these facts and yet he led that fleet to destruction. Why, he never said.

Amazing.

 

[Vanguard45]

Finished a game with Italy.
Only one war (Which the heavy and light cruiser participated in) which I won handily.

 

[Ramontxo]

[QUOTE="McPherson, post: 18574406, member: 10791]
Men matter, The American crews were drilled to the point of exhaustion and while their gear was not state of the art, it was funded, maintained and it worked. The corrupt isaballine governments that misruled Spain shorted their navy in training time, wages, and maintenance funds and apparently pulled a Chinese trick and substituted training rounds for war-shots when Cervera was ordered out. The thing is, from Cervera's captured letters and reports we know that he knew all of these facts and yet he led that fleet to destruction. Why, he never said.

Amazing.[/QUOTE/]

Well what was said, at the time, in Spain was that the Navy couldn't stage a coup. The government hadn't any desire for a long war and need a defeat to sell to the Spaniards the peace treaty renouncing the sovereignty of Cuba Filipinas And Puerto Rico. And the navy was sacrificed...

 

[McPherson]

[QUOTE="McPherson, post: 18574406, member: 10791]
Men matter, The American crews were drilled to the point of exhaustion and while their gear was not state of the art, it was funded, maintained and it worked. The corrupt isaballine governments that misruled Spain shorted their navy in training time, wages, and maintenance funds and apparently pulled a Chinese trick and substituted training rounds for war-shots when Cervera was ordered out. The thing is, from Cervera's captured letters and reports we know that he knew all of these facts and yet he led that fleet to destruction. Why, he never said.

Amazing.[/QUOTE/]

Well what was said, at the time, in Spain was that the Navy couldn't stage a coup. The government hadn't any desire for a long war and need a defeat to sell to the Spaniards the peace treaty renouncing the sovereignty of Cuba Filipinas And Puerto Rico. And the navy was sacrificed...

America offered to buy Cuba for cash in a negotiation before the war. Instead the Spanish government of the day suffered the loss of two field armies, half of what would have been a formidable navy, (They were the 6th ranking naval power on Earth according to Conway in 1898), almost a half billion 1898 dollars in material and investment and lost their Pacific empire. I could add that 17,000 Spanish citizens died from all combat related causes (drownings, burned to death, death from disease induced by blockade and sieges as well as 700 land battle deaths.). The excuse the Isabelline government gave (^^^), if that was the case, should have caused a popular revolution with the members of that government arrested, tried and convicted for malfeasance in office. I cannot understand a group of politicians, no matter how venal, doing such a thing as ruin their nation to save themselves at such a horrendous cost. (Well, McNamara and the Johnson administration comes to mind as an example of venal expediency, but at least Johnson committed public political suicide and the next American administration eventually cut bait in a stupid exercise in political futility.)

 

[McPherson]

The Spanish get to play, too.

Another example of those calamitous mines took place at the beginning of the Battle of Manila Bay. Because the explosion of two mines ahead the USS OLYMPIA has been described, it seems to be very clear that Admiral Montojo had controlled mines. Possibly these two mines were operated from the coast and had dragged from their planned locations or the Spanish defenders did not have a suitable observation post or the visibility was not good enough as to use the mines adequately. In any case, the probability of destroying the OLYMPIA with that kind of material was lower than the probability of destroying her with a pie!

Mine scarcity was a serious problem for Montojo. He asked Madrid for new units but by that time, it was already too late. When the war started, the mines coming from Spain were in Singapore where the British prohibited their delivery to Manila. Because of this, the Spanish armed forces in the Philippines had to rely on poorer solutions, such as reinstalling faulty existing mines. For this purpose, Montojo requested the delivery of nitro-glycerine from Spanish consulate in Hong-Kong, but Montojo received only several kilometres of electric cable.

I might remark that the British were instrumental on more than one occasion in hamstringing the Spanish. This was more a case of them being anti-Spanish than being pro-American, however.

 

[RamscoopRaider]

Bit of Boredom, so a battleship from a TL in planning stages

Italian Battleship Giulio Cesare



Authorized: 1903

Laid Down: 1904

Launched: 1907

Commissioned: 1908

Length: 170m

Beam: 26m

Draft: 8.5m

Displacement: 24,000 tons light

Speed: 24 knots design, 23.5 knots trial, 23 knots in service

Range: 5000 nmi@10 knots

Armament

• 4x2, 4x1 305mm/46 main battery guns, twins fore and aft, port and starboard amidships, singles port and starboard between twins
  
• 24x1 75mm/45 anti torpedo boat guns in casemates
  
• 6 450mm Torpedo Tubes two each port, starboard, aft
  
• Post 1919: 4 90mm/55 AA guns
  
• Post 1919: 4 15mm Machine Guns

Armor

• Belt 100-230mm
  
• Bulkheads 230mm
  
• Deck 30-40mm
  
• Turrets 80-250mm
  
• Barbettes 230mm
  
• Casemates 110mm
  
• Conning Tower 170-250mm

The Giulio Cesare, henceforth referred to as the Caesar, was the first of the so called big gun battleships. It was designed as part of an attempt to address the numerical inferiority of the Royal Italian Navy compared to the Imperial French Navy, it’s primary foe of the time. With Italy unable to afford to build enough battleships to match the French ship to ship, it was considered necessary to outmatch the French qualitatively, to be able to decisively defeat the French in piecemeal chunks. As part of that in 1903 the Italian Naval staff asked their designers to come up with a vessel able to simultaneously engage two French battleships at once and emerge victorious, while at the same time having the speed to avoid action under more unfavorable odds.

Many attempts were made to develop such a ship on conventional lines, with varying amounts of 305mm, 250mm, 205mm, 150mm, 120mm and 75mm guns for engaging at all ranges. However such ships almost ended up too large and expensive for Italy to afford. Then it was noted that with high speed such a ship would not need to be able to engage at all ranges, but could dictate the range of combat, ensuring it could always engage when it had the greatest superiority. Therefore it did not need such a huge variety of armaments, and could make do with one main gun caliber and 75mm anti torpedo boat guns. Given the growing effective range of 305mm caliber weapons due to improvements in sighting, aiming and rangefinding it was decided that this, rather than 250mm or 205mm would be the primary caliber of the next generation of battleship.

Other navies had come to similar conclusions even before this but rejected them. These were the big three of the time, Britain, France and the United States, as well as tiny little Portugal. For the Portuguese this approach was rejected on cost grounds, all 305mm armed ships would be expensive, and drive up the cost of the 3 battleships they were acquiring to the point of compromising the rest of their program. Similar reasoning prevailed for the French and to a degree the British. For the United States they could afford the cost, but were dubious of the prospect that the long ranges regularly achieved in practice would translate into real combat, given their recent experiences in the Dutch-American War, likewise elements of the RN were also dubious of the prospect. For Italy it was acknowledged as a gamble, but one that needed to be made. There was no other hope of challenging the French otherwise.

Design of the vessel soon started. Early on it was determined that a hexagonal arrangement of the 305mm guns would be best, allowing 6 guns end on end and 8 guns broadside while minimizing length of magazine protection. However such a design proved to have structural weaknesses when required to fit within the 26m beam demanded of then current Italian infrastructure. As such the 4x2, 4x1 arrangement was chosen, an arrangement that still allowed 8 guns broadside but merely 4 end on end. This was still double what any extant battleship could do so considered a reasonable compromise.

To be able to effectively dictate the conditions of the engagement, the Italians determined that a 5 knot advantage over the French fleet would be necessary. Given that the newest French battleships were designed for 19 knots the new ship would have to be designed for 24. To do that and fit within existing infrastructure the Italians had to make a leap of faith and adopt turbines, then used primarily on destroyers and scout cruisers to the large battleships.

For protection it was planned for the ships to have a 305mm belt. However the ships could not fit that, and the proposed armament, and 24 knot speeds. As the armament and speed were considered more important, armor had to be reduced to a 230mm belt, with proportional reductions elsewhere. It was hoped that the vessels superiority at long range would be crushing enough to offset the lack of armor, which was still sufficient protection for anything less than 305mm guns. This superiority in addition to coming from the number of 305mm guns would come from the superior design of such guns and their shells, better rate of fire from superior turret design and even superior quality of armor if not quality.

The first ships were authorized in 1903, with an additional pair each to be authorized in 1904 and 1905. The first ship was laid down on July 12th 1904 and named after Julius Caesar, in part as a way of subtly insulting the French. Her sister laid down later in the year was named after Agrippa, who had put down a Gallic revolt. The ships laid down in 1905 were named after Raimundo Montecuccoli and Alberico da Barbiano, also to tweak the French. Plans to lay down the third pair were put aside by the outbreak of the 1906 War.

The 1906 War saw work on the Caesar accelerated while her sisters languished. It was thought that the Caesar could possibly be finished during the war, while her sisters could not be. As it was the war ended before the year was out or the Caesar was ready to launch. No major naval combat had occurred, the course of the war being decided in the Rhineland and Lorraine, rather than at sea. The Italian army advanced with only moderate opposition while the bulk of the French Army died under German bayonets and forced the French Mediterranean fleet to flee from Toulon to Africa. This allowed the Italian Navy to occupy Corsica almost unopposed.

The victory in the 1906 war saw the French Navy neutralized. However it also saw the Italian role in the world expand, and such a role required a large navy, letting the construction program continue to provide it. While her sisters were modified slightly, with a more powerful secondary armament and thicker belt at the cost of some speed, Caesar continued as originally planned. Construction of the ships always under a veil of secrecy, remained under such.

On July 13th 1908 when Caesar was publicly unveiled, the world took notice. The idea that Italy of all nations had come up with such an innovation was a shock to many. It was instantly apparent that every other ship afloat was now obsolete. For the British, this was a shock, but they continued as planned, they had intended to lay down a similar all big gun vessel in the previous year, but had relented for fear of sparking an arms race, before deciding they might as well do it this year, even before they found out about the Caesar. For the French, the intended opponent, they were busy recovering from the war and paying indemnities to do anything. The United States probably faced the rudest awakening, hastily redesigned their newest battleship from a mixed 12” and 10” armament to become the world beating Vandalia class which would set the pattern for the later generations of all big gun battleship. Germany, China and Brazil while shocked were pleased at the revelation, this came at a time when they were just starting to build up large navies, and it reset the status quo vis a vis Britain and the United States. For lesser powers it became a matter of prestige to have a copy of Caesar.

In service Caesar proved something of a disappointment. She never achieved her design speed, nor did her turrets attain their designed rate of fire. Her guns, while excellent pieces, proved to devour their barrels at an obscene rate and were inferior to the newest British and American designs. Her armor alloy, when tested proved less impressive than hoped, being merely average. She was a bad seaboat, wet, cramped and uncomfortable, sufficient for the Med, but not the tougher conditions of the Atlantic.

Still for two years she was contested only by her sisters as the Queen of the Seas. Then HMS Colossus entered service in 1911 and she found her match, Colossus while slower, was better armored and her hexagonal gun layout was superior. Despite this many nations copied her gun arrangement, Germany, Brazil and China most prominent among them, with China keeping the arrangement in new construction for nearly 10 years. However in terms of speed she was unmatched among battleship until the French Tourville or British Arthur Pendragon of 1918, depending on whose reports you believe. Of course Americans always point out that the Battlecruiser Shenandoah had her for speed, armor and effective armament as early as 1913.

Caesar herself had a mostly uneventful career, serving as the flagship of the Italian navy until 1917. Her one bit of big gun action was providing coastal bombardment support during the Tunisian revolt of 1913. Following the Caribbean war of 1915-17 it was clear that her design was outmoded and that her days were numbered. She was placed in reserve in 1921 and remained there for 10 years, before 8 of her 305mm guns were removed as part of her conversion to a gunnery training ship. In this role she saw her last bit of combat, engaging Franco-German air raids during the first phase of the Great War. She was lost on March 15th 1944 to an accidental detonation of her forward magazine during the Armed Truce. Her legacy would live on in a new battleship of the Imperator class, and later the first nuclear attack submarine of the postwar Italian Navy.

 

[McPherson]

From here:

Rear Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete, Commander, Spanish Squadron, to Minister of Marine Segismundo Bermejo y Merelo

[Confidential.]

The Commander in Chief of the Squadron (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

Captaincy-General of the Squadron.

Honored Sir: Through my official letter of the 8th, written on the sea, your excellency knows of the few incidents of our monotonous voyage across the Atlantic, during which I sacrificed everything in order that our frail torpedo-boat destroyers might arrive fresh and in condition to render useful service. But my efforts were in vain, for hardly had the Furor and Terror been made for twenty-four hours to maintain two-thirds of their trial speed, when the boilers of the latter became disabled, putting us to the necessity of losing still further time, and finally leaving the Terror in the neutral port of Fort de France in the island of Martinique.1

The accompanying copy of the official report of her captain, marked “Document No. 1,”Terror nothing but a buoy, and the Furor guarding her, so that she might not be abandoned in the midst of the ocean until she was sure of being seen by the squadron. When we reached her I took her in tow, and we had to proceed even more slowly than at the beginning, as the destroyer no longer had the protection of the swifter with which the commander of the flotilla had provided her.3

I will say nothing further of this accident, since it has occurred to a ship under very efficient command, and with an engineer in chief who enjoys the highest reputation. It only proves the frailness of these ships. They have another defect, almost worse, namely, the temperature which develops in them and which is unbearable for all, but especially for the engineers and firemen, who are frequently overcome by the heat.

The commander of the flotilla, Furor at daybreak of the 11th, and at midnight of the 11th he rejoined the squadron, brimful of news, but all bad, and, among other obstacles encountered, having had to contend with a chase by a hostile cruiser. Harvard and St. Louis, are at Guadeloupe and Martinique, respectively; that the Americans have taken possession of Puerto Plata and, it is believed, also of Samana;8 that the war of insurrection in Cuba is still going on, and the last news is of a fierce battle at Sierra Maestra;9 that Spain is passing through a ministerial crisis;10 that we should not be permitted to take coal in Martinique, but that we could get provisions there; and finally, that there was no special news from the far East.

He also brought me a bundle of press telegrams containing a great deal of news; among others, of the destruction of our poor fleet in the Philippines, which, glorious though it may be, is nevertheless a great disaster.11 In view of the very serious news, and although my opinions on the subject have been manifested (too frankly, perhaps) in my correspondence with the Government, by telegrams as well as official letters, and in my confidential communications to the minister of marine, I considered it my duty to assemble the captains and second in command of the squadron,12 whom I acquainted with the situation and consulted as to what, in their opinion, was best to be done.

After discussing this very serious question, it was decided that there was no advantage in going to Martinique, since we would gain noting thereby and only consume coal. To go to San Juan would be madness, as we would only be preparing an easy triumph for the enemy. And as we have hardly coal enough to reach Santiago de Cuba, with the speed necessary on the sea of operations, and as our destroyers would probably not be able to withstand the trip, it was the unanimous opinion of the officers that we should go to Curaçao in search of the coal which was promised us by telegram of April 26.13 Proceedings were drawn up to that effect, a copy of which, marked “Document No. 2,”14 accompanies this letter. As I was of the same opinion, we proceeded to that island, adopting at first a wrong course15 in the direction of Santo Domingo, until at a distance of 30 miles from Martinique. Permit here to make a few observations to explain and justify my operations.

There is not the least doubt that a sacrifice, such as made by our comrades in the Philippines, is worthy of the highest honor, and I take pleasure in expressing to them from here my enthusiasm and admiration. But is there any practical result in such sacrifice? Evidently not, and from pitting vessels like the Castilía and Christina16 against modern ships no other result than the one obtained can possibly be expected. The result will always be the same where there is great disparity between the opposing forces, whether in the number of ships, their efficiency, or the stores they carry.

This painful result therefore justifies the crude ideas I have expressed in my correspondence above referred to, upon which I insist no further, as I do not want to be a bore, which is always a bad thing, especially when addressing a superior. I therefore proceed with the report of our voyage. The run from the waters of Martinique to those of Curaçao offered nothing worth mentioning. At 7 o’clock a. m. of the 14th, about 5 miles from Little Curaçao, I gave orders to the destroyers to enter the port first; but at 8.30 I saw them off the entrance. The Plutón signaled: “Awaiting permission of governor.” The squadron stopped and soon after the Plutón signaled that only two ships were permitted to go in. This was confirmed by the pilot, who arrived soon after, demanding to know the names of the ships, their complements and armament, and the amount of coal required. I selected the Teresa and Vizcaya, whose coal supply was lower than that of the others. I gave the information asked for, stating that each ship needed 700 tons, and the pilot went back.

I gave instructions that the Furor should be recoaled from the Colón, and that the latter ship, together with the Oquendo and Plutón, should remain outside. The pilot returned, accompanied by the Spanish consul, who told me that the stay in the harbor must be limited to forty-eight hours. At 12.30 we cast anchor inside, after which I had an interview with the governor,17 who told me that this was a necessity imposed upon his Government by both belligerents. I accepted the 600 tons of coal, which was all that could be had in the town, and ordered the purchase of provisions so as to supply each ship for thirty days, from the captain down to the cabin boy.

At 5 o’clock p. m. I dispatched to your excellency the following cipher message, which I hereby confirm: “After consulting with the second in command of the squadron and the captains of the ships, I came here in hopes of finding the coal announced in your telegram of April 26. Collier has not arrived,18 and I have not been able to obtain here the coal I need. There is a controversy about it, and I must see what I can do. Only two ships have been allowed to enter, and their stay has been limited to forty-eight hours.”

I tell your excellency nothing of my plans, as I do not wish to intrust them to paper, and furthermore, when this letter reaches you, you will certainly have received telegraphic news from me. The coaling proceeds slowly owing to lack of means for shipping it, but I intend to go out by any means this evening, no matter what quantity I may have on board, for while the question of coal is of the utmost importance to me, I do not want to spend another night with the squadron divided.

On board Infanta Maria Teresa, St. Ann Harbor, Curaçao, May 15, 1898.

Yours, etc.,

Pascual Cervera.

Some things of note. The three torpedo boats in question were built at the Thompson shipyards in the United Kingdom and were very similar in concept to the large British A-type destroyers also built by that company. Just as the Spanish complained about the shoddy engineering and construction of some of their French and Italian supplied equipment, they had very little good in substance to note about these examples of the British shipbuilding art. I do not know what the Spanish expected, these machines and systems they used were brand spanking new and pushed the limits of what could be expected with the technology of the day.

RTL

Name .........Year launched .........End of service ....... Cause ..................…Comment
Furor ..........1896.........................1898........................sunk........................Battle of Santiago de Cuba
Plutón……….. 1897.........................1898...……………………...sunk...……………………….Battle of Santiago de Cuba
Terror......…..1896...……………………... 1925........................retired.....................scrapped
Audaz..........1897.........................1924.....................….retired..................….scrapped
Osado ......….1898.....................…..1924..................…….retired..................….scrapped
Proserpina....1898..................….....1931........................retired..................….scrapped

ATL

Name .........Year launched .........End of service ....... Cause ..................…Comment
Furor ..........1896.........................1898........................sunk........................Battle of Santiago de Cuba

Plutón……….. 1897.........................1898...……………………...sunk...……………………….Battle of Santiago de Cuba

Terror......…..1896...……………………... 1898........................sunk..................…... Battle of Santiago de Cuba

Audaz..........1897.........................1898.....................….sunk..................……..Battle of Santiago de Cuba

Osado ......….1898.....................…..1924..................…….retired..................….scrapped

Proserpina....1898..................….....1931........................retired..................….scrapped​

Just a hint of a difference for the ATL.

 

[McPherson]

A great error is made when one reads specifications, such as speed on trial or cruising speed. This example indicates a tactical maximum speed of 19 knots as the Spanish measured it, but in practice, such warships faced the sea and various design and operational idiosyncrasies (fouling and fuel shortages) that limited performance to half the stated trial speeds or less. For example, the Spanish squadron, Cervera led to destruction at Santiago de Cuba, should have had the speed advantage on the Americans of 19 knots vs. the Americans at 15 knots. But… the Americans scraped their bottoms and had good Pennsylvania bituminous coal^1 in their bunkers. The Cardiff coal that was supposed to reach Cervera never did as Schley’s cruisers intercepted the contracted British freighters and picked them off as prizes one by one. Cervera was forced to use inferior (French) local supplies, his ships were fouled and it is estimated he was barely able to make a sustained squadron speed of 9 knots after the "good" coal (about 200 tonnes per cruiser) was gone.

^1 The British preferred anthracite for its longer burner times, cleaner stowage, less mass per kilocalorie burn generated and less smoky qualities as it burned. The Americans installed wet scrubbers in their stacks, loaded up on bituminous and used it because; a) they had it in easy to extract abundance, b) bituminous because of the way it burns, generates steam plant pressures faster from a cold start or from half banked fires (standby 1 or 2), and c) it was cheap and easy to get from American suppliers. Of course the downside was that despite the wet scrubbers which did not work all that well, the American ships had to be constantly washed, the stacks belched smoke that could be seen for kilometers before a ship's hull appeared, on blockade duty the smoke hung around American ships like a miasma, sailors got miner's lung, and the smoke fouled cleared sight for gunnery from a sitting ship. And of course the Americans burned 10% more coal per knot than their British cousins; not to mention that they had to clean boilers more often and the steam plants in their ships as well.

That is a lot of trade off for acceleration advantages.

======================================================================

The Carlos V class was a hodgepodge of suppliers and technologies RTL and in the ATL being prepared. The engines were Spanish designed and built. The steer controls, final drives, rudder assemblies, screws and stern section was British. The armor was German, the torpedo systems were German. The large guns were French. The quick fire weapons were British. The fire control (guns aiming systems) were local control and were mainly a French version of Ludzhou telemeter ranging apparatus that was quite inferior to the Bradley Fiske system of central fire control rangefinder and repeaters used in American ships which was RTL brand new to the Americans and gave its own problems as the Americans were not quite trained on it properly, yet. The overall net result of this mixed bag of technologies was less than optimal as embodied in the Carlos V.

 

[McPherson]

 

[McPherson]

The best that can be said for the cruisers that comprised RADM von Diederichs' German East Asia Squadron is that they never had to fight against a serious first class enemy while he was their commander. Otherwise it would have been simple murder on the high seas.

 

[Aber]

Today's challenge:

German Chancellor Angela Merkel is endorsing the idea of developing a joint European aircraft carrier

https://abcnews.go.com/Internationa...raft-carrier-61606163?cid=social_twitter_abcn

 

[McPherson]

Today's challenge:

https://abcnews.go.com/Internationa...raft-carrier-61606163?cid=social_twitter_abcn

Already done.

That shows that Ms. Merkel's understanding of SEA-POWER is zero. An aircraft carrier is a purely offensive weapon launch platform that projects aircraft, which in turn are launch platforms for air to air or air to ground warfare. The ship is adaptable for a lot of ancillary missions, but it's primary purpose is airpower from the sea.

The problem is that in peacetime, the pure aircraft carrier is almost EU useless and would be certainly immediately neutered by any true sea-power. In the EU's use of sea-power, it makes more sense to create an LHA class that can operate VSTOL aircraft as an ancillary capability. This allows the ship to be multi-mission in the UN peacekeeping and disaster relief sense and keeps it productive and cost effective in peacetime. It is what the UK builds in two iterations. There are two that exist to be used. But then the EU BLEW that opportunity. (Opinion.)

A pure case of flattop envy and not good political, military, or geo-strategic policy is what I see. Also... with Macron it is another attempt by France to partner with and get someone else to help fund an aircraft carrier. Not a criticism at all, just an observation of a rather clever means France needs to leverage her limited resources and means to keep a soon to be unaffordable capability available by the MN to use.

Anyway... looking at the only players who really matter anymore on the world ocean: China and the US, the Chinese seem to be embracing the aircraft carrier (past) while the US (reluctantly) is looking to submarines and RfGs. (future) to exercise their sea-power. All offense and very little in mind with peacekeeping for either nation. I am really unhappy about the way sea-power is headed forward. I prefer peacekeeping and humanitarian support (The RN template.). The historical lesson learned: the pre WW I investment in battleships and the arms race that followed, seems to have been forgotten by the two principle sea-powers.