Alternate Vietnam partition, war and 1960s

raharris1973

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The PoD is a different outcome to the Geneva Conference. The French government of Pierre Mendes-France, partly in response to British and Soviet urging, agrees to an ultimate demilitarized zone in Vietnam further south, at the 15th parallel instead of the 17th parallel.

As illustrated in map:

Vietnam partitioned at 15th parallel.gif


In return, the pro-Vietnamese Communist Pathet Lao area for regroupment in the French-leaning Kingdom of Laos is shrunken by 2/3, and the timeline for Vietnamese interzonal reunification elections is delayed by two years, to July 1958 rather than OTL's July 1956.

American dissatisfaction with the Accord is still greater than in OTL, but the differences in the settlement are still not enough to cause America to conduct a unilateral military intervention to upset the settlement in 1954.

The North Vietnamese are pleased to have more territory in their pocket, especially the central cities of Hue and Da Nang. The Chinese are pleased to have added buffer space for southern China and Hainan. The French, while disappointed in having a smaller zone on the map, still retain control over the most economically valuable portions of southern Vietnam by far, and are glad to have more time to settle their affairs in the country. The British and Soviets, neither of whom want a resumed war, are pleased that the lengthened election timeline allows for more delay before the prospect of unification elections raises communist-noncommunist tensions again. They are also happy that the reunification elections are not scheduled for a US Presidential election year, but safely after Eisenhower's anticipated 1956 re-election.

Immediate effects:

1954-1958 Population exchanges take place between the two Vietnamese zones. The Viet Minh set up the DRV in the north. Ngo Dinh Diem is Prime Minister in the south with Bao Dai as President.

A US-Vietnamese Catholic campaign encourages Catholics to migrate from North Vietnam. Among the most prominent refugees are Ngo Dinh Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Thuc, the Archbishop of Hue, which is falling under Communist rule.

However, prominent Buddhist clerics of the city of Hue, notably Thich Tri Quang (who in ATL played an activist role in South Vietnam), see no need to move south out of their stronghold.

1955 - Diem proves his political determination and apparent viability by successfully ousting the French advisors, foiling an Army coup and crushing criminal and sectarian organizations in the south including the Binh Xuyen, Hoa Hao and Cao Dai. This early success ensures Eisenhower support for the Diem regime.

In the meantime, in North Vietnam, the Communists launch reconstruction and state-building and economic development campaigns, including land reform, that gets excessive at times and causes some concerns about internal stability.

After dealing with the sects in Saigon and the Mekong Delta, Diem suppresses those Communists who stayed behind in village areas of South Vietnam. The economy begins to go, even as there is agrarian discontent in areas where peasants feel land reforms are insufficient.
 
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raharris1973

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Part II.

By 1957, surviving Communists in South Vietnam begin an assassination campaign and establish jungle redoubts in retaliation for regime repression. In Hanoi, the Communist Party debates whether to authorize violent action by southern Communist Party members. Initially, Hanoi's appetite for this is low.

In 1958, US covert intervention in Laos helps prevent an electoral victory by a left-leaning coalition, and Lao politics become more violent.

In 1959, Hanoi agrees to permit and step up assistance to the Pathet Lao and southern Vietnamese Communists. They set up infiltration routes in eastern Laos and Cambodia, to send cadre and supplies south into Diem's Vietnam. They also infiltrate at least an equal amount of support by sea, in small boats.

1960 - The southern Communists and sympathizers, whom Diem derisively calls "Viet Cong" set up the National Liberation Front.

The outcome of the 1960 election, Jack Kennedy's victory over Richard Nixon, is protected by a butterly net. So is the survival of the Diem government in the face of an Air Force plot to bomb the Presidential Palace.

In 1961 the NLF/VC step up their recruitment and rate of activity in the south, causing the US and South Vietnam to expand the role of US advisors (and helicopters) in combat and the launching of the strategic hamlets program.

The 1961-1962 Geneva Talks settle on the "neutralization" of Laos. This doesn't work out as formally agreed, and there are violations on both sides.
From '63 on, as the accord unravels, US policy priorities are sustainment of some non-communist power along the Mekong Valley, to buffer Thailand. Since Laos shares no common border with South Vietnam, Vietnam-related concerns are less of a shaper of US policy in the country.

Ultimately, because overt military intervention in Laos, a small, rough, landlocked, low-population country that borders the PRC is undesirable, US administrations in the 1960s have no incentive to recognize the Geneva Accords on Laos as defunct. Even the level of US air activity and covert ground activity in Laos will be less than OTL, except for a few places in the southeast.
 

raharris1973

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1954-1962 - North Vietnam establishes its party state and land reform and attempts limited industrial development, taking alot of aid and advice from the USSR and PRC. The DRV has a larger population and more strategic ports (Da Nang) which is helpful for development plans and military imports. The larger size of the DRV at least marginally strengthens the "northern-first" faction.
However, events in South Vietnam, and reports of the repression southern party members are facing still force eventual support for southern Communists.

As the 50s turn into the 60s the North Vietnamese are also more worried about the dangers of worsening Sino-Soviet ideological polemics weakening each of those patron's ability to help Hanoi.

South Vietnam 1962-1963 - Diem's regime decreases in popularity, especially in the countryside, and somewhat in the cities. The corruption and repression of Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, both helps maintain near term control while also alienating many.

However, differing demographics in this ATL's more compact South Vietnam reduce the level of discontent with the Diem regime and reduce the embarrassment the Kennedy Administration feels about the regime. Catholics, generally more supportive of the Diem family, a higher proportion of the south's smaller than OTL population. Even more importantly, the absence of the Mahayana Buddhist hierarchy of Hue from the country reduces sectarian frictions and forestalls militant Buddhist activism and demonstrations and especially self-immolations to protest regime policies.

While over the course of the Kennedy Administration, the President, many of his advisors and US Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge get more dissatsfied with Diem and especially his brother, Diem's hold over the cities and South Vietnamese political stability seem basically secure. 1962 is largely considered a year of progress against the insurgency, even though the sense of momentum is lost in 1963 and a steady, but still slow deterioration of the South Vietnamese Army's position near Communist strongholds sets in.

By November 1963, President Kennedy is just beginning to contemplate the possibility of an alternate leadership to Ngo Dinh Diem, and the U.S. administration is turning ever more against Ngo Dinh Nhu.

However, President Kennedy is assassinated in Dallas later that month, in an event parallel to OTL that is still protected by a butterfly net. Lyndon Johnson is sworn in as President.

The new President is more pro-Diem than the late President and some of his advisors, and pushes back and chills discussion in US agencies about an alternative leadership. President Johnson replaces Ambassador Lodge, and the more pro-Diem line from the White House soon becomes apparent to Americans and Vietnamese alike in Saigon. This chills and discourages would-be military plotters against Diem.

Even as the regime fails to make headway against the Viet Cong insurgency, its control over urban South Vietnam remains strong and even improves to a degree. Diem and his brother neutralize threats to the regime.

While some in the north argue for stepping up support to the VC and beginning infiltration of NVA troops, there is no North Vietnamese consensus to do this. VC incremental gains in the country side seems to justify a "steady eddie" continuation of existing support for the VC, and the southern regime backed by the Americans does not appear ripe for any major crisis or fall requiring stepped up intervention.

1964 concludes with LBJ winning a landslide victory against Barry Goldwater, while in Vietnam the year ends with the ARVN doing a better job holding its own and maintaining numbers and patrols commensurate with the insurgency problem. Diem has not pressed for an Americanization of the war and instead presses for continuation of existing US aid policy with steadily increased resources. Diem and the US Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) while frustrated at VC stubborness, do not convey a sense of imminent crisis to Washington, nor present a case that stepped up South Vietnamese ground raids and US bombing against the north are required. A knock-on consequence of fewer and smaller "DeSoto" raids is there is no Gulf of Tonkin incident. The non-critical nature of the problem in Vietnam also leaves President Johnson feeling that securing broader war powers in Southeast Asia is unnecessary.

Part III. The Johnson Administration, 1965 to 1968.

President Johnson's priorities are domestic Civil Rights and anti-poverty programs. Gradual "bridge-building" with the Soviet Union and its eastern bloc allies are pursued.

Without OTL's post-Diem destabilization and revolving door governments in the south, and without Hanoi and its allies drastically escalating military intervention in the south (a consequence of a lesser sense of urgency, and some greater influence of "northern-first" ideas and development programs), the Johnson Administration goes through 1965, 1966 and all of calendar year 1967 feeling that increased aid and a combat "Advisory" corps peaked at 75,000 is sufficient to handle the Vietnam situation.
Rather than any "Vietnam War" engaging draftees, American involvement in Vietnam in 1965, 1966 and 1967 is more like the US involvement in Central America in the 1980s on steroids, something that engages mainly the policy and military specialists, members of relevant congressional committees and only the fringes of American public opinion. Since North Vietnam is not being bombed, Soviet and Chinese support is correspondingly lower, and few of their personnel other than normal attache missions are in Indochina.

1965, 1966 and 1967 pass by without either major American escalation or the collapse of the Diem regime.


.......and here is where I will take a little break, and ask for some help in speculating what US domestic politics and policy look like through 1965, 1966 and 1967 look like these circumstances?.....
 
Interesting, I'd like to note down some "interesting points" as a Vietnamese
  • Initially, the DRVN planed to have the zone reached up to 13th parallel (best case scenario) or 16th parallel (worst case scenario). While they were fully capable to reach some numbers in that range, pressure from China (only revealed recently, or re-revealed, the first time was in 1979, I think) forced the number to 17th parallel. With some kinds of mishaps (ranging from a sneezing diplomats to some one forget a paper back home), the 15th parallel given to the DRVN would be a great boon.
  • In OTL, both "State of Vietnam" (three red-stripe yellow flag, later became RVN) and USA did not sign the convention (which required a temporary division and a later election). Assume State of Vietnam signed the convention, what kind of "mishap" would force them to forgo the election?
  • With DaNang laying in "North Vietnam", Paracel islands (not shown in the picture) would be a part of "North Vietnam", making the battle in 1974 not happen (the battle in which the USA practically sold their ally in OTL)
 
Interesting, I'd like to note down some "interesting points" as a Vietnamese

  • In OTL, both "State of Vietnam" (three red-stripe yellow flag, later became RVN) and USA did not sign the convention (which required a temporary division and a later election). Assume State of Vietnam signed the convention, what kind of "mishap" would force them to forgo the election?

All parties at the Conference called for reunification elections, but could not agree on the details. Pham Van Dong proposed elections under the supervision of "local commissions". The US, with the support of Britain and the Associated States of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, suggested UN supervision. This plan was rejected by Molotov, who argued for a commission composed of an equal number of communist and non-communist members, which could determine "important" issues only by unanimous agreement.[15] The negotiators were unable to agree on a date for the elections for reunification. The DRV argued that the elections should be held within 6 months of the ceasefire, while the Western allies sought to have no deadline. Molotov proposed June 1955, then later softened this to any time in 1955 and finally July 1956.[4]:610 The Diem government supported reunification elections, but only with effective international supervision, arguing that genuinely free elections were impossible in the totalitarian North.[16]
America and its allies weren't opposed to elections as long as they were being held by the UN. Neither side could agree on how the elections were going to be held so they weren't going to be held anyway. There is too much riding for both parties to settle it over a simple election.
 
America and its allies weren't opposed to elections as long as they were being held by the UN. Neither side could agree on how the elections were going to be held so they weren't going to be held anyway. There is too much riding for both parties to settle it over a simple election.

I thought US and allies opposed to the (plan-to-happen) election because they knew they'd lose (Ho Chi Minh was projected to win 80% of the vote).

That, and both sides didn't trust the other.
 
Pretty sure that was referring to an election between Ho and Bao Dai. An Eisenhower quote pointing out the lack of support the so called monarch has now.

I am convinced that the French could not win the war because the internal political situation in Vietnam, weak and confused, badly weakened their military position. I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held as of the time of the fighting, possibly 80 per cent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of State Bao Dai. Indeed, the lack of leadership and drive on the part of Bao Dai was a factor in the feeling prevalent among Vietnamese that they had nothing to fight for. As one Frenchman said to me, "What Vietnam needs is another Syngman Rhee, regardless of all the difficulties the presence of such a personality would entail."
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/vietnam/ddeho.htm
 

raharris1973

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Interesting, I'd like to note down some "interesting points" as a Vietnamese
  • Initially, the DRVN planed to have the zone reached up to 13th parallel (best case scenario) or 16th parallel (worst case scenario). While they were fully capable to reach some numbers in that range, pressure from China (only revealed recently, or re-revealed, the first time was in 1979, I think) forced the number to 17th parallel. With some kinds of mishaps (ranging from a sneezing diplomats to some one forget a paper back home), the 15th parallel given to the DRVN would be a great boon.
  • In OTL, both "State of Vietnam" (three red-stripe yellow flag, later became RVN) and USA did not sign the convention (which required a temporary division and a later election). Assume State of Vietnam signed the convention, what kind of "mishap" would force them to forgo the election?
  • With DaNang laying in "North Vietnam", Paracel islands (not shown in the picture) would be a part of "North Vietnam", making the battle in 1974 not happen (the battle in which the USA practically sold their ally in OTL)


-- Very interesting points ComradeH- I'll address them in order.

  • Your information may be more accurate, but as I read the description in Stanley Karnow's "Vietnam: A History" in the 1980s, the opening Viet Minh bid on zones was was for a line at the 13th parallel, or a diagonal line starting at the 14th parallel on the Cambodian border, heading southeast to the coast at the 13th parallel, which would roughly mirror areas of Viet Minh practical domination in Annam at the time. France's opening bid was the the 18th parallel. Under Chinese and Soviet pressure, the Viet Minh soon reverted to the 16th parallel, while the French were still holding out for the 18th. The Chinese (Zhou Enlai) were supportive of a bottom line at the 16th parallel, but then Molotov weighed, wanting to get it over with I guess and said "let's split the difference at the 17th".
  • I don't see the USA or "State of Vietnam" signing the convention in this TL, it's even less likely than in OTL, because the territorial settlement is worse. And they won't want to do the election. If anything, Diem and the US could argue that with even more of a population advantage, the north would definitely outvote the south.
  • I hadn't realized the implications for the Paracel islands, very interesting.
I would add one other point I forgot to mention-

In 1955 Diem, as in OTL, holds the referendum making "the State of Vietnam" into "the Republic of Vietnam", deposing Bao Dai.
 

raharris1973

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Also with the US going through 1965, 1966 and 1967 only spending at a level around what it was spending in 63 or 64 in Vietnam, could the lack of economic stimulus result in a recession?

Could the apollo missions have been sped up, leading to a moon landing in 1967 or 1968?
 
Also with the US going through 1965, 1966 and 1967 only spending at a level around what it was spending in 63 or 64 in Vietnam, could the lack of economic stimulus result in a recession?

Could the apollo missions have been sped up, leading to a moon landing in 1967 or 1968?

I'm shooting from the hip, but I would say "No, and No!"

I think I'm actually on firm ground with Apollo. As things were a whole lot of money (not relative to say the DoD budget, but certainly relative to levels of spending the US government was willing to sustain for space stuff in any decade before or since) was already being thrown at rushing the Moon ship to completion. As things were, Von Braun took the risky step of "all up testing," telescoping what ideally should have been a long series of test launches with each test focused on one of many aspects of the new Saturn V, into just a few tests where several different systems were new in each test. As it was, the Lunar Lander suffered delays; these were definitely not the result of poor funding.

There were a number of studies done of using Gemini technology to try to get to the Moon sooner, a number of ways. All might have worked, but all were risky in the extreme, all would be very skimpy in their "science" content thus putting a glaring spotlight on the aspect of the Moon shots, that they were mere stunts. And the least awful of the options still required a Saturn V rocket to launch on; at best, if all went well, it might have beaten Apollo 11 by perhaps 8 months, and cost nearly as much--much more, if done as a parallel program.

Just throwing yet more money at Apollo, or even these alternate programs, would not greatly speed up the first moon landings.

What a flush budget might have done instead was make Apollo after the moon landings a much more ambitious program, with extended stay missions, and other Apollo Applications schemes including a daredevil and probably harebrained scheme to fly by Venus, Mars, or on an extra long mission--both.

Now to turn to the first question, perhaps a careful student of the mid-1960s economy would gainsay me, but it is my impression that Vietnam did much more harm than good to the US domestic economy. It wasn't visible then, but note that the stagflation of the 1970s hit well before the USA ramped down the Vietnam era war machine.

Had the Americans been able to keep Vietnam simmering on a back burner, there would have been more Great Society funding, and perhaps yet more NASA funding--though I fear that any extra NASA money in the late 60s would mostly go toward projects that would be cut later in the 1970s anyway.

If more NASA spending in the 60s led to entrenching some projects into the pipeline due to heavy investment and the argument of recouping on that investment (that is, had contractors been promised funding in later years for work they were doing now, and used their political clout to continue these programs when the overall budget picture was far less rosy) perhaps this would mitigate the severe crash of the aeronautics industry in the early 70s. But I fear these carryover programs would be all too clearly dinosaurs from the Apollo age and targeted as boondoggles, and terminated anyway.

But just perhaps, NASA might have gotten some bandwagon going with the help of yet more 1960s largesse that could lead to a program that has deep national support behind it. I'm hard pressed to suggest what though!
 

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Continued-

Meanwhile in the Middle East:

In May 1967 steadily escalating Syrian-Israeli tensions ballooned into a full-blown international crisis. Nasser demanded the departure of UN peacekeepers from the Sinai and then blockaded the Straits of Tiran.

For the US this was a tricky situation. It wanted to minimize direct involvement to avoid offending Arab opinion, but hoped war and damage to Israel could be avoided. Mixed signals went to the Israelis. The US and its western European allies found it too difficult/undesirable to directly confront Nasser's blockade. De Gaulle cautioned the Israelis against making any military moves.

The LBJ administration was largely undistracted by Southeast Asian events in May-June 1967, but this did not make it any easier to really resolve the Middle East conundrum.

On June 3rd, the Israelis struck the Egyptian air force, destroying it on the ground, and invaded the Sinai.

The Syrians soon began shelling all Israeli towns/settlements in artillery range from the Golan Heights, but Syrian troops did not advance.

Jordan had just signed on to an alliance with the Egyptians, Syrians and Iraqis and was under tremendous pressure to enter the war.

The outbreak of war galvanized President Johnson's attention. Now that the issue was joined, he hoped for as quick an end to the war as possible, an Israeli victory or non-defeat, and prevention of Soviet involvement. Reports of the escalated shelling on the Syrian-Israeli border, and air battles that soon left the Syrians without an effective Air Force, pointed to the chilling prospect of the Israeli-Egyptian War spreading.

At this stage, there was little the US could do to halt the Israeli-Egyptian fighting before the returns from the initial battles in the Sinai were in. With full-scale air and artillery battles in the Golan Heights, the ability to prevent Syrian-Israeli ground fighting at this stage was doubtful, even though an Israeli attack on the Moscow's Syrian client risked Soviet intervention.

However, in meeting with his National Security Council, especially consulting with National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and DCI Richard Helms, LBJ determined a big risk was Jordan, a pro-western monarchy, would be stampeded into war with Israel, either as a result of internal popular pressure, or by the Israelis themselves.

The administration quickly focused on averting this possibility. Directly by phone from Washington and through local interlocutors including Ambassadors and military Attaches in both countries, President Johnson conveyed America's thorough opposition to Israeli-Jordanian War, involving two-US armed states fighting each other. He reminded both Levi Eshkol and King Hussein of what the US had done in response to the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, an arms embargo on both sides.

Eshkol stressed that if the Jordanians attacked it would be very dangerous for Israel and he would have no choice but to engage and destroy all Jordanian forces west of the Jordan river. He pointed out pressure from the Herut members of his Cabinet to launch operations and there and noted that given the significance of the Holy Sites in the Jordanian West Bank and Old City of Jerusalem, any postwar retreat from those territories would be impossible.

Hussein stressed popular intolerance of standing aside while the Israelis and Egyptians fought, especially as Cairo Radio broadcast claims of victory.

US representatives on the ground and in Washington acted in peak form, conveying critical information between the sides.

President Johnson in speaking with Hussein shared information on Egypt's devastating losses and warned that this time, unlike in 1956, the US would not be able to ensure Israeli withdrawal from territory occupied in the current war. However, he also emphasized Eshkol's desire to head off war on the Jordanian front in the first place, and America's desire to protect the Hashemite monarchy from radical Arab and Soviet influences.

Hussein replied that he could not be seen doing nothing while the Israelis reached the Suez Canal. US attaches and the White House agreed to serve as a backchannel to the Israelis. They emphasized that any Jordanian ground force movement across the green line or into DMZs would bring immediate disaster. When the Jordanians said they at least would need to be seen shelling the Israelis, the attaches agreed to convey to the Israeli side that the Jordanians would shell unoccupied and unpopulated Israeli positions away from the most sensitive sites and areas.

These US reassurances and pressures, and "choreography" of harmless artillery duels enabled Eshkol to resist all internal arguments for the invasion or occupation of Jordanian held Jerusalem or the West Bank. Desultory artillery exchanges of shellfire continued for a couple days.

Meanwhile, Israeli troops defeated the Egyptian army in detail and occupied the Sinai up to the Suez Canal, and then Israeli forces especially Air Forces turned north to deal with the Syrians. Directing anger at the Syrians for precipitating the crisis (from their point of view) Eshkol ordered the military to assault the Golan Heights. The US reluctantly accepted this when the Israelis reassured Washington their move would be limited, well short of Damascus, and of short duration.

In the final US mediated correspondence between Israel and Jordan, the Jordanians announced they would deploy a defensive force to back up the Syrians in 48 hours but would not move any ground forces over the Israeli-Jordanian green line. Washington told the Israelis to suck it up. In any case, despite some bloody combat, the Israelis were able to quickly oust the Syrians and occupy the Heights before the Jordanians could arrive on them.

The Middle East ceasefire began on 10 June with the Israelis in occupation of the Sinai and Golan Heights. The Jerusalem and Jordan borders were unchanged. But the aftereffects of the Six Day War continued to trouble the region for much longer.

One reverberation of the war was an October 1967 uprising by PLO Fedayeen combined with popular demonstrations by Palestinians protesting Jordan's lack of effective aid to the Arab allies. Between US assurances about support and supplies, and Israeli air force maneuvers over the Golan Heights to deter potential Syrian intervention, King Hussein ultimately cracked down on the PLO and demonstrators, ending their challenge and reinforcing regime military control. PLO officials and enrolled fighters largely ended up relocating to Lebanon by 1969.
 

raharris1973

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America - 1965-1967:

President Johnson after his landslide defeat of Barry Goldwater emphasized continuity with the Kennedy Administration's domestic and foreign policies. He achieved landmark Civil Rights legislation, tax reform and then a package of domestic programs he called "the Great Society".

The President made superb use of his own Senate and House experience, and the national reverence for the assassinated President Kennedy, to galvanize legislative support for all of Kennedy's proposed New Frontier legislation, and ultimately, more programs of Johnson's design.

He also supported the highway beautification and the space program.

Assisted by a large Democratic majority in both Houses, Johnson passes Medicare and Medicaid.

First the Watts Riots, followed by other urban riots and increased crime spark the beginnings of conservative backlash, but Democrats still hold a majority in Congress even after the 1966 midterms. Their losses are less than OTL, although Ronald Reagan still wins the California Gubernatorial election.

Despite the beginnings of conservative backlash in political terms, Great Society liberalism is well-nigh unstoppable at the federal level and most states in terms of legislation.

America and the World 1967:

LBJ is pleased with legislative accomplishments in mid-1967, and the summer's Middle East crisis resolved surprisingly well, all things considered.

Although nuclear and conventional arms buildups continue, relations with the Soviet Union, especially in Europe, are fairly placid. While Maoist and Communist Chinese rhetoric reaches ever more violent heights, by 1967 it is clear that China's Cultural Revolution is doing at least as much damage to Communist China as to anyone else. Communist China's real influence or willingness to use force internationally hasn't seemed to increase, even after the bloody purge of the pro-Mao Indonesian Communist Party in late 1965. China has the A-Bomb and H-Bomb, but was not throwing its Army around.

The exception to this relatively benign picture was in Vietnam, where any perceived gains or successes in holding back the Viet Cong seemed to be eroding by fall 1967, the areas under Viet Cong control greatly increased, the ARVN desertion and casualty rates rose beyond replacement levels, and internal dissatisfaction with the Diem brothers grew. The "steady eddie" policy of the previous years was increasingly seen as untenable, and this put pressure on the US government for other diplomatic, or military, solutions.

--In the fall of 1967, LBJ felt conflicted about not only about the future of US policy, but his own future, his own reelection prospects and indeed the desirability of running for reelection itself...
 
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raharris1973

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1968:

LBJ in late 1967 knew that he wasn't healthy and if he ran for reelection he would still be in office by the time he reached the age his father was when he died.

He was proud of what he'd built and the programs he'd passed, but there was always more to do. The Apollo program was progressing but unfortunately it looked like a moon landing would not happen before 1969.

And overseas, a crisis was brewing in Vietnam.

US efforts just were not working. Desertion rates from the South Vietnamese Army were rising, Saigon's morale was sagging and South Vietnamese and Americans alike were casting about for something drastic to turn Saigon's morale and the battlefield situation around.

McNamara and the Chiefs offered ever larger increments of advisors and troops, and a bombing campaign to stem the tide.

President Johnson had some weighty decisions to make. The Presidency would be much more enjoyable if the rest of the world would just leave him alone. Daydreaming and with close confidants, Johnson mused about pushing forth some more domestic legislation, pressing on with the Apollo program, playing for time with aid and diplomacy on Vietnam, and then retiring, declining reelection, spending time with Lady Bird and getting to know his daughters, and leaving the unpleasant choices in Vietnam to his successor, Republican, maybe Ronald Reagan or Democrat, maybe that Bobby Kennedy or Vice President Humphrey. He'd as good as promised Lady Bird that was the plan.

But that was the problem. The plan was too perfect and he felt, too cowardly. Surveying the major party politicians around him he felt none of the contenders were truly ready for the presidency, except maybe Nelson Rockefeller. Also, people had been sugarcoating the Vietnam situation, it could go downhill even *faster* than the experts were saying. That is the drift he was getting from his newly appointed commander in MACV, General Creighton Abrams

Going to war in Vietnam would drain energy and funds from his domestic priorities, an all-out war would risk superpower confrontation, war with China or the Soviet Union. He knew nervous nellies like Senator Fulbright, VP Humphrey and his old friend Clark Clifford thought it was important at all costs to stay out of a Korea style war in Vietnam.

The President didn't have any confidence in many of the popular Republicans, including Ronald Reagan, to keep the economy going, certainly not to support his programs. He also didn't think they could control war once started.

Of course, not going to war and losing Saigon would be all sorts of bad. It could lead to a renewed, worse McCarthyism, a divisive internal debate and anticommunist witch hunt, casting the Democratic majority into the political wilderness and endangering his own political legacy. And retreating (and LBJ early decided that a negotiated solution, South Vietnamese "neutralization" or "coalition government" people like De Gaulle, U Thant and Fulbright brought up were just retreat by another name) would be bad for American leadership, and therefore bad for the world. The Chinese and Soviets could both get the wrong idea and decide they could disregard American commitments.

By Christmas 1968 LBJ had come to some conclusions:
1. South Vietnam could not be held without a major bombing campaign, and at least the credible threat of a major ground force intervention.
2. Losing South Vietnam, or even handing over an inevitable but delayed defeat to a successor would be dishonorable, cowardly, and probably bad for the world.
3. Only he could entrench his own domestic programs and manage the necessary escalation in Vietnam with the right judgement and skill to prevent it from spiralling out of control.
4. He had to stand for reelection and serve another term, even if it killed him.

But jumping into a war is not a great election year idea, so he would have to proceed carefully.

President Johnson quietly began to have his reelection machinery rev up, and soon it was apparent he had no serious Democratic challengers and polling favored him for the November election in head to head match-ups with any specific opponent.

Meanwhile, LBJ authorized stepped up US-assisted South Vietnamese raids on North Vietnam, and looked for an incident that would simultaneously demonstrate his willingness to stand up to the communists and also appear to exhaust all peaceful alternatives.

An incident in the Tonkin Gulf with a US destroyer provided the occasion for President Johnson to order bombing raids on North Vietnam and to seek Congressional endorsement to use force as necessary in Southeast Asia.

His Southeast Asia resolution gained broad bipartisan endorsement, but LBJ also kept up diplomatic and domestic theater about continuing to be ready to let North Vietnam choose the path of peace. Marines were deployed for air base security during the year and the Navy began a major effort against seaborne infiltration into South Vietnam.

In turn, the Chinese and Soviets promised to stand by North Vietnam against US imperialism and boosted aid. North Vietnam started infiltration of People's Army of Vietnam soldiers in the south, and built up their supply zones in the southern sector of the their state from Da Nang south, in Viet Cong controlled areas of South Vietnam's central highlands, southeastern Laos and Cambodia.

With the hawkish rhetoric of the President's challengers, Ronald Reagan and George Wallace, about all-out bombing of North Vietnam (and sometimes China, and sometimes the USSR), even liberals and other constituents queasy about a war in Asia rallied behind Johnson who won a comfortable, though not landslide, reelection in 1968.

Plans and preparations were already underway for 1969 before the election for both a major sustained bombing campaign and a massive, though still gradual, increase to several hundred thousand American troops in Vietnam to blunt and defeat the Viet Cong.
 
Probably to improve situation the ARVN situation, somethings needs to be done about the presence of Communist troops in neighboring Laos and Cambodia. They have a perfect staging grounds to constantly launch attacks all over the country. That puts the ARVN in awkward position of being forced constantly to react to the Communist initiative. No doubt that takes a big toll on the morale as well. Apparently, most of the supplies for the communists actually flowed through the ports of Sihanoukville than the Ho Chi Minh trails directly. Getting that shut down should help with the ARVN somehow.Maybe we get the royal Cambodian government to take an active role by pushing Communist troops away from their territory promising territorial concessions and lands around the Mekong Delta( that used to be Cambodian territory anyway before). In that situation, ROV government would probably want to gain some territory of their own to make up for that territory loss, possibly by wanting to take Hue from the North.
 
That puts the ARVN in awkward position of being forced constantly to react to the Communist initiative.

Perfectly doable , ARVN's (and US) biggest failure was intelligence, pun intended. By 1962 Vietcong was operating in battallion sized regular units and fighting was encounters between conventional units, not guerilla war. Whereas ARVN moved and supplied with trucks and helicopters, Vietcong and NVA moved and supplied on foot.

In order to fight communists had to push men and supplies to battlefield in advance, which they were able to do with support of the local population. Without that support, Vietcong and regular NVA units starve once they leave their Laos and Cambodia sanctuaries, there are no rice or ammunition caches waiting for them and bicycle coolies simply do not have the capacity to haul enough to supply them on the move.
 

raharris1973

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Probably to improve situation the ARVN situation, somethings needs to be done about the presence of Communist troops in neighboring Laos and Cambodia. They have a perfect staging grounds to constantly launch attacks all over the country. That puts the ARVN in awkward position of being forced constantly to react to the Communist initiative. No doubt that takes a big toll on the morale as well. Apparently, most of the supplies for the communists actually flowed through the ports of Sihanoukville than the Ho Chi Minh trails directly. Getting that shut down should help with the ARVN somehow.Maybe we get the royal Cambodian government to take an active role by pushing Communist troops away from their territory promising territorial concessions and lands around the Mekong Delta( that used to be Cambodian territory anyway before). In that situation, ROV government would probably want to gain some territory of their own to make up for that territory loss, possibly by wanting to take Hue from the North.


@AshiusX -Good point - Cambodia is indeed a crucial flank for South Vietnam in this ATL, *the* crucial flank since the direct Laotian-South Vietnamese border is so minuscule (about 20 km long, according to the map scale) compared with the 200 mile length of the OTL border.

@everyone- I stumbled upon another at least potential effect of the altered partition for North Vietnam's politics and its commitment to a war of reunification. In OTL, Le Duan had been Viet Minh party leader in the south for some of the French war (51 to 54) and became an "acting" General Secretary for Ho Chi Minh at points from 1956 on. He was the main advocate in senior most leadership for the southern cause, with Ho Chi Minh usually taking a more cautionary line and Truong Chinh focused on the domestic development of the north. Notably, Le Duan was born in Quang Tri province. That was the northernmost province of South Vietnam in OTL, but in this ATL the entire province would be in North Vietnam. Thus, to the extent that a hankering after his home province and hometown inside it was a driver for his policy preferences and their intensity, this factor could be quite reduced in the ATL where he is not seeing those areas under the imperialist yoke but rather available for socialist development.

Of course there is no guarantee his position would be much different in the ATL, it's just a possibility. Because he had worked during the French war in plenty of places further south than his home province, including CochinChina, which in the ATL most definitely still is in South Vietnam. To the extent attachments to that broader southern area, to his career there and comrades there were a driver in addition to his family roots in Quang Tri, that factor would still have been present.
 
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