Deleted member 1487
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Race_to_the_Sea
http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/wars_race_to_sea.html
http://www.historyofwar.org/scripts...res&submit=Site+Search&d=/battles_ypres1.html
What if the Race to the Sea and the subsequent 1st Battle of Ypres played out differently? I mean that the conception of the campaign is different in that von Falkenhayn, the newly appointed Commander of the German army doesn't decide to gamble on his newly formed, underequipped and trained reserve corps to break the British near Ypres.
Falkenhayn was a gambler; he risked big numerously during the war to win big and unfortunately for Germany these gambles did not always work out and cost a number of lives.
The 1st Ypres was one of these gambles. He threw in these unprepared troops to potentially end the war, but instead wasted a number of lives. Some benefits were achieved, such as finishing the BEF as a formation, but the cost wasn't worth the gain.
So what I'm suggesting is that Falkenhayn instead is more cautious and doesn't like the odds for throwing these new troops into the meat grinder near Ypres. Instead the Germans just focus on defending their flank by extending their line to the coast from the Aisne line.
The corps saved then are used in the East.
What does that mean for the West Front? The BEF is saved from complete destruction, but its already been gutted by previous battles. Could it be used on the offensive to break the German lines instead? Do the French try to bash away at the Germans? What is the Entente response?
Meanwhile in the East. The only deployment that makes sense for these new corps, four of them, the XXII, XXIII, XXVI, and XXVII reserve corps, would/should be used in place of the 2nd Austro-Hungarian army in South Poland (see map below), which already had 3-5 German divisions. These, combined with the new German corps, would have about 11-13 divisions and would be the 10th army under Woyrsch, who had been running a reinforced corps with the Austrians since the start of the war and had the most experience for the role. This would leave the new German 10th army 2 corps, 4 divisions, stronger than the historical Central Powers force.
Not only that, but the AHs would have two more corps to fight in the Carpathians than OTL, which they did very well at OTL during this period. With these extra forces they could well best the Russians and push them out of the Carpathians and hold the Bukowina.
To the North the extra German corps, which OTL did well on the Eastern Front versus the Western Front, would be able to stand up to the Russians much better than OTL, as the AHs were short of munitions and men, so the fresh corps, more numerous than their OTL alternatives, would perform significantly better. The Russians would be overloaded by the extra troops and would probably incur more losses as a result, especially then their main opponent, the Russian 5th army, has to rush to Lodz to help out the overloaded Russian 2nd army as per OTL. This could well prevent the subsequent German losses after the Battle of Lodz, where OTL the Russians managed to build up a secure defensive line and check Ludendorff and the German 9th army, while inflicting nearly 100,000 casualties on the Germans from December to January.
So all told the Germans avoid at least about 100,000 casualties of OTL, while hurting the Russians worse. Still the Entente in the West is left without the casualties of OTL, which leaves them obviously in the stronger position, probably also without having to hold the firesack that Ypres turned into, meaning even fewer losses in future battles for the British. So while the Germans have a net gain and the Russians a net loss, the Western Entente is also better off. Does this balance out, or does one side gain an advantage?
http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/wars_race_to_sea.html
http://www.historyofwar.org/scripts...res&submit=Site+Search&d=/battles_ypres1.html
What if the Race to the Sea and the subsequent 1st Battle of Ypres played out differently? I mean that the conception of the campaign is different in that von Falkenhayn, the newly appointed Commander of the German army doesn't decide to gamble on his newly formed, underequipped and trained reserve corps to break the British near Ypres.
Falkenhayn was a gambler; he risked big numerously during the war to win big and unfortunately for Germany these gambles did not always work out and cost a number of lives.
The 1st Ypres was one of these gambles. He threw in these unprepared troops to potentially end the war, but instead wasted a number of lives. Some benefits were achieved, such as finishing the BEF as a formation, but the cost wasn't worth the gain.
So what I'm suggesting is that Falkenhayn instead is more cautious and doesn't like the odds for throwing these new troops into the meat grinder near Ypres. Instead the Germans just focus on defending their flank by extending their line to the coast from the Aisne line.
The corps saved then are used in the East.
What does that mean for the West Front? The BEF is saved from complete destruction, but its already been gutted by previous battles. Could it be used on the offensive to break the German lines instead? Do the French try to bash away at the Germans? What is the Entente response?
Meanwhile in the East. The only deployment that makes sense for these new corps, four of them, the XXII, XXIII, XXVI, and XXVII reserve corps, would/should be used in place of the 2nd Austro-Hungarian army in South Poland (see map below), which already had 3-5 German divisions. These, combined with the new German corps, would have about 11-13 divisions and would be the 10th army under Woyrsch, who had been running a reinforced corps with the Austrians since the start of the war and had the most experience for the role. This would leave the new German 10th army 2 corps, 4 divisions, stronger than the historical Central Powers force.
Not only that, but the AHs would have two more corps to fight in the Carpathians than OTL, which they did very well at OTL during this period. With these extra forces they could well best the Russians and push them out of the Carpathians and hold the Bukowina.
To the North the extra German corps, which OTL did well on the Eastern Front versus the Western Front, would be able to stand up to the Russians much better than OTL, as the AHs were short of munitions and men, so the fresh corps, more numerous than their OTL alternatives, would perform significantly better. The Russians would be overloaded by the extra troops and would probably incur more losses as a result, especially then their main opponent, the Russian 5th army, has to rush to Lodz to help out the overloaded Russian 2nd army as per OTL. This could well prevent the subsequent German losses after the Battle of Lodz, where OTL the Russians managed to build up a secure defensive line and check Ludendorff and the German 9th army, while inflicting nearly 100,000 casualties on the Germans from December to January.
So all told the Germans avoid at least about 100,000 casualties of OTL, while hurting the Russians worse. Still the Entente in the West is left without the casualties of OTL, which leaves them obviously in the stronger position, probably also without having to hold the firesack that Ypres turned into, meaning even fewer losses in future battles for the British. So while the Germans have a net gain and the Russians a net loss, the Western Entente is also better off. Does this balance out, or does one side gain an advantage?