Alternate pre WW1 german navy

(Note: since this primarily effects the Naval laws of 1900+ I put it in the after 1900 forum)

Looking for way that Germany could build a much cheaper but still useful Navy, but still keep Kaiser Wilhelm and German industry happy. The money saved would be used for such things as enough extra army corps (or baring that more artillery for the reserve corps etc...), things that would allow Germany to win a WW1 type conflict on land.

Here is my shot:

"Tirpitz wanting to realize the Kaiser's dream of a big Navy (and to further his own career) needs to come up with a rationale to convince the Reichstag to spend money on warships.

In 1897 OTL Tirpitz was summoned home from China to replace Hollmann and offered the post of Secretary of the Imperial Navy office.
He went home part of the way by crossing the USA on rail.
In this time line Tirpitz when crossing the USA spends some time thinking, looking out his rail car window he sees the potential of the USA,
any colonial ambitions in the western hemisphere at least are going to be opposed by the United States where his new Navy could never project enough power to dominate.

Sailing across the North Atlantic he looks out over the water: He knows he can't build a fleet big enough to beat the British not out here in the North Atlantic, maybe he could build a fleet that could do ok in a North sea fight, maybe build one to build one that will scare Britain a bit, which in the best case, Britain is scared enough to let Germany steal colonies from Spain, Portugal and China etc.

But would the possibility of getting colonies such as Angola, Ferando Po etc...really worth spending huge treasures on a fleet and antagonizing a great power in the process. Germany already had large colonies in such poor and in-hospitable places.

So Tirpitz does what most military leaders have always done, use the last war to justify your future military spending.
OTL Germany won the 1871 war with France. But the war dragged on too long. During the siege of Paris the French were able to buy and import arms from abroad and raise new armies. By the time the French were willing to talk peace, the diplomatic picture had changed and initial world
sympathy to the Germans had turned to the French and the Germans would have restrictions on what kind of peace they could impose.
Also in the initial stages before their sailors were drafted into the army, the French were able to impose a close blockade of German ports, caputuring a number of merchant ships, more emabarassing than really harmful, but a 20th century Germany had a larger mechant fleet and was more dependent on outside trade. Tirpitz therefore thinks he should try to sell to the Reichstag a fleet just big enough that they could prevent the French (or Russians or any seconds rate naval power from a close blockade of Germany's coast).

Obviously the French with their many colonies and geographic position could raid German commerce but a strong fleet could at least allow Germany to bring the vast majority of her merchant ships safely into port and in a pinch arrange protected convoys of critical supplies, either stuff needed by German industry or support for German colonies or
to supply German armies by sea if an when they might need. In the case of a victorious German army this fleet could blockade a French army that has shut itself in Brittany or some such place or reinforce a colonial war at that point.

Germany would also want a fleet that would still be useful in browbeating third rate colonial powers like Spain and Portugal into giving up their colonies if the political situation everallowed it.

Commerce raiding or protection against Confederate syle commerce rading would be out of the question and not considered. Germany had too few bases to raid or protect trade against countries like France or Russia (at peacetime levels of trade).

So Germany will sort of like OTL build Battleships (but more like Britains with greater range and less protection, like the Canopus class that could operate world wide in a pinch) To keeps costs reasonable and to avoid antagonizing Britain, German will build one a year, 2 if an old one needs to be replaced (assume 20 year life), gradually increasing over a very long period of time to 40 battleships, more than enough to handle France or Russia and not too expensive that the Reichstag won't approve. Note: OTL Germany often built 3 or even 4 battleships or battle cruisers per year.

The Kaiser would have at least one shiny new toy every year and the fleet would be always increasing for many years, providing employment for many and contracts for industry.

Destroyers would be bigger than OTL and have more range, more like Britains, these would be the workhorses in European waters, protecting trade and acting as scouts. Need 6 built per year.

Overseas interests would be protected by cheap reliable gunboats (like the Panther class but improving them over time), not much more speed than a merchant ship, could be used to convoy merchant ships overseas, they have shallow drafts so could be used for shore gunfire support or could flee up rivers like Rufiji. Would build 1 or 2 a year.

No big Moltke style Battlecruisers or Emden style scout cruisers would be built.

A Destroyer few tender type ships would be built to project power overseas if necessary"
 
Well this would make Britain slightly less alarmed and turn down the Dreadnought Race a notch. Not sure of any other butterflies beyond this
 
If the money saved allows Germany to have 2 or 3 extra army corps at the start of the war, its probably a war winner for Germany. There are a lot of places where those would have come in handy. Even if they couldn't have been supplied in the west due to limited road capability, the east front is a whole lot different with those.

A less alarmed Britain that waits a week or two before jumping in and deploying the B.E.F certainly helps Germany on the western front.

Even if Britain jumped in just the same Germany wouldn't still be too much worse off than OTL in naval terms because Britain would have built less too.
 
Geography

Take a look at the map....see where the German naval bases are? OK, now we can drop this silliness about a colonial-centered navy. There are no colonies that the Germans can EVER acquire that the British cannot cut off and destroy at their leisure. Bismark understood this all too well, which is why he was never a proponent of a large navy. Germany is, for better or for worse, a continental power, and its naval designs reflected this reality. The ONLY way that the Germans are going to build a true 'world fleet' is to first destroy the RN (lotsa luck) and acquire naval bases not entirely under the thumb of that same RN.
 
Fleet without light cruisers... no, no, no. They are necessary. Destroyers won't be able to replace them - not enough sea-worthiness, can't withstand enough hits (no armor!), not stable enough for big enough guns...
 
The Army was restricted in size not by cash but by an unwillingness to fill the officer corps with middle class men, there were only so many nobles to go around so the army was sized so they could supervise it. Instead Germanys considerable cash was spent on the Navy.
 
why not just shiny white cruisers? Who are larger in size than contemporary cruisers, but still are nothing more than cruisers.
After that, when technique proceed, torpedo boats or destroyers also incresed in size and more sea worthiness, and on the same path a bit later submarines.
How ever the last two were untested types of war ships, exept the torpedo boats during the Rusian-Japanese war of 1905.
Furhter a Reichstag who is not convinced of the need for expensive Battleships and a strong Army lobby who also find it a waste of monney,which the army can spend better.
Coastal defence can be done verry well with caostal defense ships and sea mines, much cheaper with the same effect.

The idea of Tirpitz was called Riskflotte, the name says it all, a fleet build for one risky desisive battle, all or nothing. A verry strange concept even for 19th century.
 
The idea of Tirpitz was called Riskflotte, the name says it all, a fleet build for one risky desisive battle, all or nothing. A verry strange concept even for 19th century.
To be fair this corresponded largely with prussian military thinking. As Prussia had been a rather poor country for most of its existence, its commanders aimed for short decisive campaigns and were prepared to take higher risks than other on the way. This had been the case at least since the Great elector and still showed itself in the second world war. Therefore Tirpitz way of thought was not that unusual.
 

Deleted member 1487

The Army was restricted in size not by cash but by an unwillingness to fill the officer corps with middle class men, there were only so many nobles to go around so the army was sized so they could supervise it. Instead Germanys considerable cash was spent on the Navy.

Depending on whether or not the navy has room for enough of the middle class, the extra pressure created by a smaller navy could for the excess manpower into the army. OTL the army did open up in 1912 to the middle class, beyond the technical services that is (artillery, engineers), so with fewer navy slots there could be an army league that pressures the Reichstag to push for an army bill like the ones in 1912 and 1913. Moltke wasn't has tradition bound as Schlieffen, so it is certainly possible, but it may require the Kaiser to choose a different War Minister are certain times. Maybe have Heinrich von Gossler stay on long as War Minister or have Colmar von der Goltz instead of von Einem or Heeringen, both of whom were quite traditional and opposed allowing the middle class into the army officer corps beyond their traditional roles. Goltz on the other had actively pushed for universal conscription, both as a realistic understanding of Germany as a continental power and of wanted to indoctrinate the largest number of German men with army values.
 
Wasn´t the term ´Risikoflotte´ a variant of a ´fleet in being´ and invented by Mahan :confused:

The fleet in being concept was born in the anglo dutch wars in the 18 century, the idea being that simply by existing, a british fleet could force the dutch to stay at a war footing and disrupt their trade without ever having to sail.
Maham idea is that in order to control sea lanes of comunication, you need a battle fleet capable of neutralizing your opponent, thereby gainning freddom of action. Maham noted that the dutch eventually forced the british into battle, and that the French/spanish fleet of the napoleonic wars was incapable of deterring the RN simply by "being" in Cadiz.
So Maham is very much an opponent of the whole fleet in being concept, and both the Kaiser and Tirpitz were big Maham fans...


The whole idea of this thread would lead to the french "jeune ecolle" being the model for the German Navy, rather than the classic Maham battle fleet.
France, of course, has a much better geographic position for naval ops and a Lighter German Navy would be easily blocated in it's ports.
 
(Note: since this primarily effects the Naval laws of 1900+ I put it in the after 1900 forum)

Looking for way that Germany could build a much cheaper but still useful Navy, but still keep Kaiser Wilhelm and German industry happy. The money saved would be used for such things as enough extra army corps (or baring that more artillery for the reserve corps etc...), things that would allow Germany to win a WW1 type conflict on land.

Here is my shot:

"Tirpitz wanting to realize the Kaiser's dream of a big Navy (and to further his own career) needs to come up with a rationale to convince the Reichstag to spend money on warships.

In 1897 OTL Tirpitz was summoned home from China to replace Hollmann and offered the post of Secretary of the Imperial Navy office.
He went home part of the way by crossing the USA on rail.
In this time line Tirpitz when crossing the USA spends some time thinking, looking out his rail car window he sees the potential of the USA,
any colonial ambitions in the western hemisphere at least are going to be opposed by the United States where his new Navy could never project enough power to dominate.

Sailing across the North Atlantic he looks out over the water: He knows he can't build a fleet big enough to beat the British not out here in the North Atlantic, maybe he could build a fleet that could do ok in a North sea fight, maybe build one to build one that will scare Britain a bit, which in the best case, Britain is scared enough to let Germany steal colonies from Spain, Portugal and China etc.

But would the possibility of getting colonies such as Angola, Ferando Po etc...really worth spending huge treasures on a fleet and antagonizing a great power in the process. Germany already had large colonies in such poor and in-hospitable places.

So Tirpitz does what most military leaders have always done, use the last war to justify your future military spending.
OTL Germany won the 1871 war with France. But the war dragged on too long. During the siege of Paris the French were able to buy and import arms from abroad and raise new armies. By the time the French were willing to talk peace, the diplomatic picture had changed and initial world
sympathy to the Germans had turned to the French and the Germans would have restrictions on what kind of peace they could impose.
Also in the initial stages before their sailors were drafted into the army, the French were able to impose a close blockade of German ports, caputuring a number of merchant ships, more emabarassing than really harmful, but a 20th century Germany had a larger mechant fleet and was more dependent on outside trade. Tirpitz therefore thinks he should try to sell to the Reichstag a fleet just big enough that they could prevent the French (or Russians or any seconds rate naval power from a close blockade of Germany's coast).

Obviously the French with their many colonies and geographic position could raid German commerce but a strong fleet could at least allow Germany to bring the vast majority of her merchant ships safely into port and in a pinch arrange protected convoys of critical supplies, either stuff needed by German industry or support for German colonies or
to supply German armies by sea if an when they might need. In the case of a victorious German army this fleet could blockade a French army that has shut itself in Brittany or some such place or reinforce a colonial war at that point.

Germany would also want a fleet that would still be useful in browbeating third rate colonial powers like Spain and Portugal into giving up their colonies if the political situation everallowed it.

Commerce raiding or protection against Confederate syle commerce rading would be out of the question and not considered. Germany had too few bases to raid or protect trade against countries like France or Russia (at peacetime levels of trade).

So Germany will sort of like OTL build Battleships (but more like Britains with greater range and less protection, like the Canopus class that could operate world wide in a pinch) To keeps costs reasonable and to avoid antagonizing Britain, German will build one a year, 2 if an old one needs to be replaced (assume 20 year life), gradually increasing over a very long period of time to 40 battleships, more than enough to handle France or Russia and not too expensive that the Reichstag won't approve. Note: OTL Germany often built 3 or even 4 battleships or battle cruisers per year.

The Kaiser would have at least one shiny new toy every year and the fleet would be always increasing for many years, providing employment for many and contracts for industry.

Destroyers would be bigger than OTL and have more range, more like Britains, these would be the workhorses in European waters, protecting trade and acting as scouts. Need 6 built per year.

Overseas interests would be protected by cheap reliable gunboats (like the Panther class but improving them over time), not much more speed than a merchant ship, could be used to convoy merchant ships overseas, they have shallow drafts so could be used for shore gunfire support or could flee up rivers like Rufiji. Would build 1 or 2 a year.

No big Moltke style Battlecruisers or Emden style scout cruisers would be built.

A Destroyer few tender type ships would be built to project power overseas if necessary"

1. Your math is off. If we start in 1900 and add one every year we will have 15 new battleships by the time it hits the fan in 1914 in addition to the few already in service, not 40.

2. The Emden-style scout cruisers are necessary for scouting purposes; they are also useful for showing the flag in foreign waters, or in situations where the Panthers are not sufficient. Two dozen or so, built at the rate of one or two a year, should be sufficient.

3. IOTL the destroyers were really too small, with poor seakeeping qualities. Building fewer and larger destroyers should help. Say 5 a year, which will give us 75 by the time the fighting starts. In answer to other criticisms, the destroyer's main weapons are not its guns, but its torpedoes.

4. Panther-type gunboats are quite useful on the foreign stations. Two dozen of these would be sufficient for that purppose.

5. U-boat production should be increased to 2 a year, which will give us 30 or so when the fighting starts, after which we can increase production as necessary.

6. No battlecruisers or armored cruisers. The light cruisers can do the scouting and the battleships can do the heavy lifting.

7. For the foreign stations we need fleet supply vessels, able to resupply and perform minor repairs on ships stationed there. Again two dozen or so would be plenty. Here we could convert merchant ships, rather than use new construction.

So each year we are building one battleship, one or two light cruisers, five destroyers, two U-boats, and one or two gunboats, and converting two merchant vessels to fleet tenders. That will provide a fleet sufficient to deal with both the French and the Russians without provoking the British overmuch.

The Army in 1914 numbered twenty six active corps, twenty six reserve corps, twenty four Landwehr brigades, three fortress reserve divisions, eleven cavalry divisions, four heavy artillery brigades, and various engineer and other formations. Increasing this force is going to be difficult; we are already incorporating almost all of the suitable recruits each year.

What we can do is to increase the supporting arms; more artillery to bring the reserve corps to the active corps establishment and to give the Landwehr brigades an artillery component, more engineers and supply units to keep advancing units in supply, more airplane and signal units to keep track of enemy forces and better coordinate our own, and so on.

We can also distribute our forces a little better than IOTL. Hold the fronts in Alsace and Lorraine with reserve corps, Landwehr, and the fortress divisions and forego attacking there. Use the active corps and other formations freed up to form a reserve army, which follows behind the right wing. Put somebody like the Crown Prince in charge of it; he's both ambitious and capable. Ignore pleas from East Prussia for more forces; have them fall back if necessary behind the Oder. We can recover any lost territory later. Advise the Austrians to stand on the defensive in Galicia, falling back to the Carpathians if necessary; again, we can recover the territory later.

With this distribution Paris will be encircled and might well fall immediately, given the paucity of forces available to defend it. Even if not we can seal it off and leave it for later as we continue to drive the main French army east and south away from it. A repeat of 1870-1871 is quite possible in this eventuality. We may have to withdraw some forces to stabilize the Eastern front, but we should wait until Paris is taken to begin offensive activities there.

Alternatively we can stand on the defensive in Alsace and Lorraine, cover the Dutch and Belgian borders and the North Sea coast with Landwehr and reserve formations, and use the bulk of our forces on the eastern front with the object of seizing Poland and holding East Prussia and Galicia. This has the added benefit of delaying or even preventing British entry into the war, which will ease our burdens considerably. Once Russia is driven out of the war, which will take considerable time and effort of course, we can offer peace to the French on the basis of status quo ante bellum. If refused we can attack with our full force without worrying about our rear.

All in all, this revised fleet program gives us a much better chance of a victory than IOTL.
 
The whole idea of this thread would lead to the french "jeune ecolle" being the model for the German Navy, rather than the classic Maham battle fleet.France, of course, has a much better geographic position for naval ops and a Lighter German Navy would be easily blocated in it's ports.

Actually, the pre-Tirpitz navy was following a course that predated the 'jeune ecolle'. There was a distinct difference between the two, the Germans really didn't perfect their variant until the u-boat campaigns of the Great War.
 
The German naval warplans against Britain leading up to WWI were based on a combination of big-battlefleet principles and jeune ecolle principles. The general idea was to use mines, u-boats, and torpedo boats to inflict attrition on the British battle fleet (which they expected to follow a close blockade strategy), then once they'd whittled the British Grand Fleet down to something near numerical parity, the High Seas Fleet would sortie and defeat it.

The plan failed largely because Admirals Fisher and Jellicoe anticipated it and abandoned the close-blockade plan in favor of a distant blockade (destroyer and cruiser patrols of the Channel and of the gap between Scotland and Norway, with the Grand Fleet remaining in port and only sortieing if the High Seas Fleet challenged the blockade in force). The core principle of British naval tactics throughout the war was caution, the idea that Jellicoe was the only man on either side who had the ability to lose the war in an afternoon (if the Grand Fleet were decisively defeated, Germany could blockade the Thames estuary, bombard and land small raiding forces at will along Britain's North Sea coast, and possibly even invade), and that his job was to avoid doing so.

If the Germans didn't build a battle fleet, I'd expect the British to be far more aggressive in their naval tactics against Germany. For instance, Fisher had pre-war plans for breaking through into the Baltic and launching an Anglo-Russian amphibious invasion of Germany's Baltic coast (probably doomed to failure, but Germany would still need to divert resources to defend against the possibility), which was never pursued IOTL because containing the High Seas Fleet was given absolute priority.
 
The German naval warplans against Britain leading up to WWI were based on a combination of big-battlefleet principles and jeune ecolle principles. The general idea was to use mines, u-boats, and torpedo boats to inflict attrition on the British battle fleet (which they expected to follow a close blockade strategy), then once they'd whittled the British Grand Fleet down to something near numerical parity, the High Seas Fleet would sortie and defeat it.

The plan failed largely because Admirals Fisher and Jellicoe anticipated it and abandoned the close-blockade plan in favor of a distant blockade (destroyer and cruiser patrols of the Channel and of the gap between Scotland and Norway, with the Grand Fleet remaining in port and only sortieing if the High Seas Fleet challenged the blockade in force). The core principle of British naval tactics throughout the war was caution, the idea that Jellicoe was the only man on either side who had the ability to lose the war in an afternoon (if the Grand Fleet were decisively defeated, Germany could blockade the Thames estuary, bombard and land small raiding forces at will along Britain's North Sea coast, and possibly even invade), and that his job was to avoid doing so.

If the Germans didn't build a battle fleet, I'd expect the British to be far more aggressive in their naval tactics against Germany. For instance, Fisher had pre-war plans for breaking through into the Baltic and launching an Anglo-Russian amphibious invasion of Germany's Baltic coast (probably doomed to failure, but Germany would still need to divert resources to defend against the possibility), which was never pursued IOTL because containing the High Seas Fleet was given absolute priority.

And the fact that the baltic is so easily mined you would be able to walk across the various straits on top of the mines if they were ever to try. Any attempt to try a close blockade would cost a hell of a lot more than any sort of gain HSF or no. Any attempt at landing would be ASB.
 
And the fact that the baltic is so easily mined you would be able to walk across the various straits on top of the mines if they were ever to try. Any attempt to try a close blockade would cost a hell of a lot more than any sort of gain HSF or no. Any attempt at landing would be ASB.

I'm inclined to agree that a successful invasion of the Baltic coast would be ASB, but there's plenty of examples in history of things being attempted that turn out to be extremely stupid in hindsight. According to Robert Massie in Dreadnought and Castles of Steel, Admiral Fisher was a firm supporter of the idea of a Baltic invasion if the HSF could be neutralized, and I seem to recall reading that Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty was inclined to support it as well.
 
Top