Alternate Peninsula Campaign

Just what the title says, what if the Peninsula Campaign went differently. Could McClellan have won the Campaign, or what if, as President Lincoln planned, McClellan got released in August 1861 and was replaced with another General. Could it have been won then? I believe that many Corps commanders wanted to march back up the Peninsula and that Lincoln was prepared to send 20,000 reinforcements to aid them.
 
The thing about the Peninsula Campaign is that the Union actually caused more casualties to the Confederates during it than they received, despite being on the strategic offensive. Handled a bit better I think McClellan could have won it. The South desperately could not afford the 30k or so casualties it took during it. Thing is, there were a lot of mistakes of inexperience and poor coordination on both sides during it. There were war winning opportunities for both sides.
 
Just what the title says, what if the Peninsula Campaign went differently. Could McClellan have won the Campaign, or what if, as President Lincoln planned, McClellan got released in August 1861 and was replaced with another General. Could it have been won then? I believe that many Corps commanders wanted to march back up the Peninsula and that Lincoln was prepared to send 20,000 reinforcements to aid them.
There are plenty of events that could have resulted in McClellan’s victory: Lincoln agreeing to send McDowell’s I Corps to McClellan, an actual cavalry force to prevent Stuart’s cavalry from raiding the railroads and so on. The last possible event for a Union victory in the Peninsula Campaign is Halleck’s ascension. While the Army of the Potomac rested around Harrison’s Landing, McClellan wanted to operate against Petersburg instead of pushing back to his original siege lines around Richmond. This was what Grant did in 1864 to pin Lee down: a fall of Petersburg would mean a fall of Northern Virginia. When Henry Halleck took command, he felt that the separation of Pope’s Army of Virginia and McClellan’s Army of the Potomac was in violation of the classic concept of "concentration of force." It was not McClellan that ordered the evacuation but Halleck.

If McClellan got to operate against Petersburg, Lee is trapped in Petersburg, possibly allowing Pope to ravage the Shenandoah Valley, the Breadbasket of Virginia. This accelerates the fall of Virginia and thus the Confederacy.

On another note, why would McClellan get released in August 1861? McClellan was a celebrated hero after Rich Mountain (which was pretty undeserved). Washington needed someone to fix the Army of the Potomac and who better to fix it than the “Little Napoleon?” Or are you perhaps referring to August 1862?
 
On another note, why would McClellan get released in August 1861? McClellan was a celebrated hero after Rich Mountain (which was pretty undeserved). Washington needed someone to fix the Army of the Potomac and who better to fix it than the “Little Napoleon?” Or are you perhaps referring to August 1862?
Yeah my bad I was referring to August 1862. In your opinion was the campaign still winnable if Lincoln releases McClellan then with someone else at the helm marches with the Army back up the Peninsula? I know Lincoln considered the idea but he was still willing to give but I think Burnside he offered it too refused. I also know that most of the corps commanders were willing to march back up the Peninsula.
 
Yeah my bad I was referring to August 1862. In your opinion was the campaign still winnable if Lincoln releases McClellan then with someone else at the helm marches with the Army back up the Peninsula? I know Lincoln considered the idea but he was still willing to give but I think Burnside he offered it too refused. I also know that most of the corps commanders were willing to march back up the Peninsula.
Perhaps. The thing is, for all the casualties Lee has suffered, the Army of Northern Virginia is nowhere near the breaking point like the Army of Tennessee was at Nashville. A reinforced Army of the Potomac could win but the list of commanders does not inspire confidence in me. We have three candidates:

  1. Ambrose Burnside: as I’ve previously written, Burnside is fairly good at operations (movement of troops) but his tactical handling is always lackluster. This is a major downside for him as the peninsula really lacks space for maneuver (Burnside’s main strength) which means that a great slaughter is needed to return to Richmond (Burnside’s main flaw).
  2. Edwin V. Sumner: the senior corps commander of the Army of the Potomac. Sumner is a mixed bag as a commander. His poor performance at Williams led McClellan to assess Sumner as "a greater fool than I supposed." However, over the course of the Peninsular Campaign he earned a more favorable reputation, leading energetically and being wounded twice. However, I don't believe that Sumner could be a good army commander. His performance at Antietam was a disaster at best. By leading at the front, Sumner failed to coordinate the movement of the II Corps into action, dispersing the corps and thus its force. His poor use of staff got his commanders attacking the wrong positions as not even the staff officers knew what enemy Sumner was referring to. Overall, Sumner's performance as corps commander was quite poor and I can't see he would make a good army commander. The only positives I can list for Sumner are: his willingness to obey orders and his aggressiveness. His tactical deficiencies and inexperience in independent command relative to Burnside makes him an inferior candidate to Burnside.
  3. Fitz-John Porter: the best corps commander in the Army of the Potomac at the time and had the best potential for army command. Though he never got to demonstrate whether he could succeed in an offensive role, he did deliver the most punishing attack on Jackson's corps at Second Manassas and was a very able soldier. However, Fitz-John Porter was close friend of McClellan and would likely refuse command if McClellan was sacked (and no one would probably trust him with it).
This leaves just Sumner and Burnside as options and neither are good.
 
Yes but perhaps Lincoln ships in a guy from the west. What if Halleck takes command of the Army himself?
Then Halleck would have recommended an evacuation, which Lincoln was partial to. Henry Halleck was not much of a fighter and was possibly more cautious than McClellan. Halleck's performance in the Corinth Campaign exemplifies what he would do as a commander of a large army. Though there were plenty of weather related delays, Halleck marched towards Corinth at a decent pace until he (Pope's Wing) was nearly ambushed at Farmington. From then on, Halleck dug in and slowly pressed on forward until Beauregard saw the writing that he could not break the siege and withdrew. In this case, Halleck faces an opponent that is a lot more aggressive and has good defensive ground to delay Halleck. In addition, Halleck has never truly led an army into battle. He played an administrative role at Fort Donelson, was in the background at Shiloh, and left the fighting to his commanders. How he'll do as an army commander is uncertainty, but his preference of providing suggestions rather than affirmative orders is worrisome.
 
Then Halleck would have recommended an evacuation, which Lincoln was partial to. Henry Halleck was not much of a fighter and was possibly more cautious than McClellan. Halleck's performance in the Corinth Campaign exemplifies what he would do as a commander of a large army. Though there were plenty of weather related delays, Halleck marched towards Corinth at a decent pace until he (Pope's Wing) was nearly ambushed at Farmington. From then on, Halleck dug in and slowly pressed on forward until Beauregard saw the writing that he could not break the siege and withdrew. In this case, Halleck faces an opponent that is a lot more aggressive and has good defensive ground to delay Halleck. In addition, Halleck has never truly led an army into battle. He played an administrative role at Fort Donelson, was in the background at Shiloh, and left the fighting to his commanders. How he'll do as an army commander is uncertainty, but his preference of providing suggestions rather than affirmative orders is worrisome.
Now the author of the book Lincoln’s Generals said that if Pope was put in command of the Army he could’ve smashed his way to Richmond and won. Do you think this is plausible? The Second Bull Run makes me disagree with this statement because Lee was a smart General.
 
Now the author of the book Lincoln’s Generals said that if Pope was put in command of the Army he could’ve smashed his way to Richmond and won. Do you think this is plausible? The Second Bull Run makes me disagree with this statement because Lee was a smart General.
That is the first positive assessment of Pope by a historian I have seen since Peter Cozzen’s biography of the man. I will admit that Pope’s incompetence is overblown. He was the first Union general to create a fully functioning cavalry force which later saved him from destruction at the hands of Lee.

However, Pope's performance at Second Bull Run was absolutely horrid. Pope’s attacks were piecemeal and he refused to accept reality when he received intelligence that Longstreet was on his flank. How in hell that historian thinks that Pope is capable of winning is beyond me.
 
That is the first positive assessment of Pope by a historian I have seen since Peter Cozzen’s biography of the man. I will admit that Pope’s incompetence is overblown. He was the first Union general to create a fully functioning cavalry force which later saved him from destruction at the hands of Lee.

However, Pope's performance at Second Bull Run was absolutely horrid. Pope’s attacks were piecemeal and he refused to accept reality when he received intelligence that Longstreet was on his flank. How in hell that historian thinks that Pope is capable of winning is beyond me.
If we agree there then do you think there was a General in the union ranks at the time who could’ve won it, but also had the stature at the time? Because Grant wasn’t as popular in late 1862 I don’t think to take command of the Army of the Potomac.
 
If we agree there then do you think there was a General in the union ranks at the time who could’ve won it, but also had the stature at the time? Because Grant wasn’t as popular in late 1862 I don’t think to take command of the Army of the Potomac.
The famed Western Generals certainly aren’t an option:
  • Buell’s record was unimpressive and his politics clashed with the Republicans.
  • Thomas was a Virginian, though he had won an impressive victory at Mills Spring.
  • Grant was still under heavy scrutiny after Shiloh.
  • Sherman was still remembered for his nervous breakdown at Kentucky.
  • Rosecrans won Rich Mountain for McClellan but Stanton hated him.
  • Sam Curtis would be a cool option: the man pulled off his own ‘March to the Sea’ in Arkansas and was tactically capable. But his theater is a backwater front and easily overlooked in Washington.
I’ve stated the generals available in the Eastern Theater and would repeat my recommendation of Fitz-John Porter, but his politics and affiliation with McClellan would be very troublesome.
 
The famed Western Generals certainly aren’t an option:
  • Buell’s record was unimpressive and his politics clashed with the Republicans.
  • Thomas was a Virginian, though he had won an impressive victory at Mills Spring.
  • Grant was still under heavy scrutiny after Shiloh.
  • Sherman was still remembered for his nervous breakdown at Kentucky.
  • Rosecrans won Rich Mountain for McClellan but Stanton hated him.
  • Sam Curtis would be a cool option: the man pulled off his own ‘March to the Sea’ in Arkansas and was tactically capable. But his theater is a backwater front and easily overlooked in Washington.
I’ve stated the generals available in the Eastern Theater and would repeat my recommendation of Fitz-John Porter, but his politics and affiliation with McClellan would be very troublesome.
What about Samuel P. Heintzelman? He was the Commander of the III Corps, rapidly promoted in the early War and his men fought with some distinction in the Campaign. He also advocated for the march back up into the Peninsula as did Sumner and Porter I believe.
 
What about Samuel P. Heintzelman? He was the Commander of the III Corps, rapidly promoted in the early War and his men fought with some distinction in the Campaign. He also advocated for the march back up into the Peninsula as did Sumner and Porter I believe.
Heintzelman had some friends in high places, but it was his corps that was distinguished, not himself. Heintzelman was largely overshadowed by his larger than life subordinates: Joe Hooker and Phil Kearny. He displayed little leadership over his subordinates and thus failed to display any real tactical prowess. His performance at Second Bull Run, or rather lack thereof, sealed his end as a field commander along the with the view that he was too old.
 
Heintzelman had some friends in high places, but it was his corps that was distinguished, not himself. Heintzelman was largely overshadowed by his larger than life subordinates: Joe Hooker and Phil Kearny. He displayed little leadership over his subordinates and thus failed to display any real tactical prowess. His performance at Second Bull Run, or rather lack thereof, sealed his end as a field commander along the with the view that he was too old.
Yes I see what you mean but the Second Bull Run didn’t happen yet so that can change things. And I think there was another Corps commander Erasmus Keyes, what about him? I know his division distinguished itself during the Campaign, maybe Lincoln would promote him to Major General then Commander of the Army. Not to mention he also had connections with Winfield Scott as he was on his staff.
 
Yes I see what you mean but the Second Bull Run didn’t happen yet so that can change things.
My point regarding Heintzelman still stands. Heintzelman’s hand in battle was largely invisible but uninspired throughout the Peninsula Campaign. It always seemed like his subordinates were making the decisions, not him.
And I think there was another Corps commander Erasmus Keyes, what about him? I know his division distinguished itself during the Campaign, maybe Lincoln would promote him to Major General then Commander of the Army. Not to mention he also had connections with Winfield Scott as he was on his staff.
Erasmus Keyes was a Republican with abolishment sentiments, but completely lacking in proven talent. His tenure as brigade commander at Bull Run was unimpressive and his name is almost completely absent from the diaries of his men, suggesting that his leadership was also uninspired. As corps commander, he had few opportunities to show any brilliance. The biggest display of any talent he had was Seven Pines: he displayed incredible bravery in encouraging his troops but acted poorly as an actual corps commander. Reading the Official Report there are only a few instances mentioned of him interacting with his brigade and division commanders. In summary, he did not seem to have interacted with Casey's division command at all, only referring to the reports of Casey and his brigade commanders and stating he had many opportunities to observe their activities. Instead he was personally directing individual regiments and batteries in the action, positioning and repositioning them. He had lowered himself to the position of brigade command at best, focusing on the trees but not the forest. Not effective command and control at all.
 
My point regarding Heintzelman still stands. Heintzelman’s hand in battle was largely invisible but uninspired throughout the Peninsula Campaign. It always seemed like his subordinates were making the decisions, not him.

Erasmus Keyes was a Republican with abolishment sentiments, but completely lacking in proven talent. His tenure as brigade commander at Bull Run was unimpressive and his name is almost completely absent from the diaries of his men, suggesting that his leadership was also uninspired. As corps commander, he had few opportunities to show any brilliance. The biggest display of any talent he had was Seven Pines: he displayed incredible bravery in encouraging his troops but acted poorly as an actual corps commander. Reading the Official Report there are only a few instances mentioned of him interacting with his brigade and division commanders. In summary, he did not seem to have interacted with Casey's division command at all, only referring to the reports of Casey and his brigade commanders and stating he had many opportunities to observe their activities. Instead he was personally directing individual regiments and batteries in the action, positioning and repositioning them. He had lowered himself to the position of brigade command at best, focusing on the trees but not the forest. Not effective command and control at all.
I can see your point I didn’t know as much about Keyes as he was only briefly mentioned in the book for the Seven Pines.
 
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