Alternate Pearl Harbor Attack?

Instead of ignoring the report from the USS Ward that it had sunk a submarine in the approach to the harbor, the Navy reacts. The Battleships are warmed up and sent out of the harbor into the waters off Pearl Harbor. This leads to the Japanese strike forced to engage them off Oahu. Does this make the Japanese attack more or less successful?

If they can sink the BBs in the deeper water there will be no recovering them like in OTL. Or will fewer ships be lost since they will be maneuvering and alerted.
 

CalBear

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Instead of ignoring the report from the USS Ward that it had sunk a submarine in the approach to the harbor, the Navy reacts. The Battleships are warmed up and sent out of the harbor into the waters off Pearl Harbor. This leads to the Japanese strike forced to engage them off Oahu. Does this make the Japanese attack more or less successful?

If they can sink the BBs in the deeper water there will be no recovering them like in OTL. Or will fewer ships be lost since they will be maneuvering and alerted.


The Battle line, with the exception of the Nevada didn't have enough time to build up steam sufficient to move out. Only one hour and forty five minutes elapased between the time that the Ward confirmed she had attacked a canfirmed submarine and the first bomb falling. It took around three hours to get the big boys ready to sail. What you could have seen was a much more prepared Pearl Harbor, with the ships guns manned, all watertight doors dogged (California would have benefited quit a bit from that), some aircraft in the air and more of the Army AAA batteries manned. You roughly wind up with the level of defenses the second wave found up and ready when it arrived, with probably 25-30 fighters able to intervene.

The Japanese get hurt more, probably three times the losses over the target and the fleet gets ripped up a little less with the torpedo planes getting much less of a free pass. The Kido Butai also would likey have to write off even more aircraft when the got back to the carriers, which combined with the landing accidents caused by the lousy weather when the second wave got back to the boat, would put a dent in the JNAF that might limit it over the coming months.

IOTL the JNAF had low pilot losses and lost about 90 aircraft, counting the ones pushed over the side as beyond repair or written off when the carriers got home. In this sort of best case scenario, the aircraft losses would be in the mid 100 range, with 70-80 aircrew lost. It was difficult for the Japanese to make up for those sorts of losses with their squadron structure and replacement methods. On the REALLY far end of best case events is that Wake holds, with the massive butterflies that causes. Unlikely but barely possible.
 
It was a Sunday morning and Holiday Routine was in effect. A sizable portion of the crews were ashore. Most of the ships in the harbor were in "Cold Iron" status. That is all engines and boilers are secured with no fires lit. The one hour and ten minutes of warning that the Ward had given was insufficient time to go from cold iron to underway, especially with mostly just the duty section on board. A mass sortie of the BB's was virtually impossible. They were going to fight were they were moored. The only major units to get underway IOTL was of course the Nevada (BB-36) and the light cruiser St. Louis (CL-49). A couple more may have managed it, but no mass sortie.

I do agree, however, that any major units that did manage to get underway would have been prime targets and if they were anywhere near the harbor they would have been savaged.

Dave
 
[IOTL] The (British-made) radar installation operating at Opana Point detected the incoming Japanese aircraft at least one hour before the first strike hit the island.
For some reason, this vital information was never acted upon - even if it reached higher command [This is disputed].
IOTL, some twenty American fighters got into the air to secure six kills and damaged other Japanese bombers (although most of the twenty were themselves shot down).
The relative strengths of the combatants were that the defenders had about 390 aircraft and their attackers some 415.
It seems reasonable that, had the Americans heeded the radar warning and scrambled everything that could fly by (say) even as little as fifteen minutes before the attack then they could have caused significant damage to the Japanese air group. Note that the Japanese first wave of 183 aircraft would have been outnumbered by more than two-to-one.
No doubt it would have been a Phyrric victory: the inexperienced Americans might have lost 50-60% of their aircraft; however, combined with the loss of surprise - so that the harbour attack was againt fully alerted AA defences - a credible suggestion for Japaneses first-wave losses could have been 70% or worse.
Given this scenario, it is perhaps debatable that the Japanese would then have committed the second-wave of 171 aircraft: considering their losses and realising they had failed to achieve surprise they might have then expected a countersrike on their carriers and therefore simply recovered their aircraft and withdrawn.

Even so, whilst the Japanese take heavier losses (than IOTL), the Americans are still going to suffer the same level of damage as OTL records...the Japanese would, after all, press home their attack to the death, as always!
Ultimately, I cannot see the effect on history being much different from what actually happened; it still ends at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.


Assuming he JapanesIt seems reasonable Had the Americans scrambled hour before the planes arrived over the harborattack 1 hour before the planes arrived over the harbor
 
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CalBear

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[IOTL] The (British-made) radar installation operating at Opana Point detected the incoming Japanese aircraft at least one hour before the first strike hit the island.
For some reason, this vital information was never acted upon - even if it reached higher command [This is disputed].
IOTL, some twenty American fighters got into the air to secure six kills and damaged other Japanese bombers (although most of the twenty were themselves shot down).
The relative strengths of the combatants were that the defenders had about 390 aircraft and their attackers some 415.
It seems reasonable that, had the Americans heeded the radar warning and scrambled everything that could fly by (say) even as little as fifteen minutes before the attack then they could have caused significant damage to the Japanese air group. Note that the Japanese first wave of 183 aircraft would have been outnumbered by more than two-to-one.
No doubt it would have been a Phyrric victory: the inexperienced Americans might have lost 50-60% of their aircraft; however, combined with the loss of surprise - so that the harbour attack was againt fully alerted AA defences - a credible suggestion for Japaneses first-wave losses could have been 70% or worse.
Given this scenario, it is perhaps debatable that the Japanese would then have committed the second-wave of 171 aircraft: considering their losses and realising they had failed to achieve surprise they might have then expected a countersrike on their carriers and therefore simply recovered their aircraft and withdrawn.

Even so, whilst the Japanese take heavier losses (than IOTL), the Americans are still going to suffer the same level of damage as OTL records...the Japanese would, after all, press home their attack to the death, as always!
Ultimately, I cannot see the effect on history being much different from what actually happened; it still ends at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.


Assuming he JapanesIt seems reasonable Had the Americans scrambled hour before the planes arrived over the harborattack 1 hour before the planes arrived over the harbor


Not quite sure where your aircraft informations came from, but actual USAAF deployment in Hawaii on 12/7/41 is generally accepted as being

At Bellows

6 North American O-47B observation plane
2 Stinson O-49 Vigilant L-1 observation plane
Two P-40s

At Hickam

33 Douglas B-18 Bolo
12 Boeing B-17D
13 Douglas A-20A Havoc
2 Douglas C-33 (DC-2)

At Wheeler

6 Boeing P-26A Peashooter
6 Boeing P-26B Peashooter
39 Curtiss P-36A Mohawk
87 Curtiss P-40B Tomahawk
11 Curtiss P-40C Kittyhawk
3 Martin B-12
3 Grumman OAF-9 Goose
2 Douglas BT-2
2 North American AT-6 Texan
1 Seversky AT-12A Guardsman

At Haleiwa (not attacked by the Japanese)

2 Curtiss P-36 Mohawk pursuit
8 Curtiss P-40 Kittyhawk pursuit

The total is 223 USAAF aircraft. Fighters 87 P-40B, 19 P-40C, 41 P-36 for a total of 147 pursuit planes (the 12 P-26 can not be counted as actual fighters, although there would undoubted have been some brave fool who would have taken off in them if the opprotunity presented itself). Note that this is a total number, it does not account for the number of planes that were not operational on that Sunday morning. Based on normal peacetime availability you can take between 20 & 30% of the total off the top. It is also important to note that the vast majority of these aircraft were not fully fueled or armed. It is unlikely that more than 70 aircraft could get airborne in under an hour (a LOT of the pilots and ground crew would still be half in the bag from Saturday night, although bombs tend to sober you up PDQ)

Interestingly, Navy aircraft numbers were very low, partly due to the ferry missions to Wake, Midway and elsewhere, but also partly because the USN was in the middle of swapping out the F2A (aka Markus' favorite :)) for the F4F-3.

USN/USMC numbers were:

At Ewa Marine Corp Air Station
11 Grumman F4F-3 Wildcat
8 Vought SB2U-3 Vindicator
20 Douglas SBD-1 Dauntless
3 Douglas SBD-2 Dauntless
2 Grumman J2F-4 Duck
1 Lockheed JO-2 Electra Junior
1 Sikorsky JRS-1
2 Douglas R3D-2 (DC-5) 2
1 North American SNJ-3

At Puunene (Lahaina Roads) NAS

4 Beech JRB
4 Northrop BT-1
1 Grumman JRF Goose,
1 Grumman J2F Duck

At Kaneohe NAS

1 Vought OS2U Kingfisher amphibian
36 Consolidated PBY-5 Catalina

At Pearl Harbor (Ford Island) NAS

19 Grumman J2F Duck single engine utility amphibian
9 Sikorsky JRS 18 passenger amphibian flying boat
2 Consolidated PBY-1 Catalina patrol bomber, flying boat, 1936

15 Consolidated PBY-3 Catalina scout bomber, flying boat, 1937
18 Consolidated PBY-5 Catalina

8 Brewster F2A-3 Buffalo fighter, 1939
5 Grumman F4F-3 Wildcat fighter, 1940
5 Grumman F4F-3A Wildcat fighter, 1941
3 Douglas SBD-2 Dauntless scout/dive-bomber, 1941

The total available USN/USMC is also a little deceiving. Most of the USN carrier aircraft had been off loaded from their carriers because they were non Operational and were in pieces as were a number of the Marine aircraft. A lot of the PBY were also "just passing through" with their crews getting a bit of rest before flying on to other locations (these were some REALLY lucky men, save those who became casualties on 12/7, since where they were headed, in many cases, were soon to be overrun by the Japanese).

As you can see, even with the USN/USMC aircraft, you would be hard pressed to get the total American fighter total above 100 even with three hours of lead time.

Also, regarding the Second Wave; it was in the air, under radio silence before the first wave reached Pearl. It is almost inconceivable that Nagumo would have recalled them, the Raid was already underway and to stop while without finishing the Plan as designed would not have been in Nagumo's character.
 
The loss of perhaps a slightly smaller number of ships, but in deep water, means fewer can be recovered. The loss of as many as 10,000 more sailors is much more serious.
 

Markus

Banned
Interestingly, Navy aircraft numbers were very low, partly due to the ferry missions to Wake, Midway and elsewhere, but also partly because the USN was in the middle of swapping out the F2A (aka Markus' favorite :)) for the F4F-3.

Am I hearing critizism of the Buffalo? Better not, ´cause this too can´t be blamed on her. ;) The USN simply had very few fighters per carrier, IIRC less than 18. Without looking it up, I think the number was probably close to 12.

By the way, who needs more than 100 fighters? IIRC the Japanese had 50 or less. 75 or so American fighters could make a nice mess out of the first wave.
 

CalBear

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Am I hearing critizism of the Buffalo? Better not, ´cause this too can´t be blamed on her. ;) The USN simply had very few fighters per carrier, IIRC less than 18. Without looking it up, I think the number was probably close to 12.

By the way, who needs more than 100 fighters? IIRC the Japanese had 50 or less. 75 or so American fighters could make a nice mess out of the first wave.

If they had managed to get 75 planes up to altitude the JNAF would never have recovered. The U.S. still wouldn't have outnumbered the attackers 2-1 (as the post I was replying to indicated)

I think the fighter number was around 18 average for the two deployed carriers, with Lexington really light. The Saratoga was headed to San Diego after her refit to pick up her new Grummans. I don't have my references here at work, but I know I've posted the totals on the forum several times & it was extremely low, even compared to the 1941 "full complement" of 27.
 

Markus

Banned
I think the fighter number was around 18 average for the two deployed carriers, with Lexington really light. The Saratoga was headed to San Diego after her refit to pick up her new Grummans.

You are right, Lex had 18, "E" and Sara had even fewer. 16 and 11, but they were carrying a dozen Marine fighters each.
 

burmafrd

Banned
I wonder how long it would take to rig the Anti Torpedo nets to protect the BB's? That would be the single most effective protection for them.
With the ships at battle stations and all weapons manned and ready, condition 1 set, they would be a lot harder to take out and cause a lot more IJN losses. Even the old US fighters can shoot down the slow bombers and especially the torpedo bombers. With an hour plus of warning you would be surprised at what desperate men can accomplish.
Add to that the ability to get most of the planes off the ground and thus protect them would also count heavily. Nagumo was pretty skittish anyway about the whole attack and I do not think it would take a whole lot for him to recall the 2nd wave (which WAS possible) and start back.
 
2 North American AT-6 Texan
1 Seversky AT-12A Guardsman

(the 12 P-26 can not be counted as actual fighters, although there would undoubted have been some brave fool who would have taken off in them if the opprotunity presented itself).

Hell, I could see some brave fool climb into one of the three trainers if thats all he could find. The Texan had 3, .30-cal machine guns and the Guardsman had 2 .30-cal machine guns. They'd be outmatched but with the way Japanese planes were designed (wood, no self-sealing fuel tanks, etc) if the pilot could somehow get behind a IJN aircraft he would still have SOME chance of shooting the thing down.
 

CalBear

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I wonder how long it would take to rig the Anti Torpedo nets to protect the BB's? That would be the single most effective protection for them.
With the ships at battle stations and all weapons manned and ready, condition 1 set, they would be a lot harder to take out and cause a lot more IJN losses. Even the old US fighters can shoot down the slow bombers and especially the torpedo bombers. With an hour plus of warning you would be surprised at what desperate men can accomplish.
Add to that the ability to get most of the planes off the ground and thus protect them would also count heavily. Nagumo was pretty skittish anyway about the whole attack and I do not think it would take a whole lot for him to recall the 2nd wave (which WAS possible) and start back.

Nagumo was skittish, but he was also going to follow orders. Once the attack began he was going to do his best to cripple the fleet per his orders and even in the face of improved oppostion that was going to be possible, albeit at a much higher cost than IOTL (his orders did not extend to hitting the fuel tanks, etc that are generally thought of when a third wave is discussed).
 

burmafrd

Banned
The one thing that I always was ready to fry Kimmel for was his refusal to increase the readiness of the fleet. As was pointed out, even AFTER the war warning of Nov 30, he still did not have the fleet ready to sorty on a 2 hr notice, which would have meant that all ships keep at least 1/4 of their boilers operating. And more of the crew aboard ship. If that had been the case (Nevada was the only BB that was doing that at the time-and she got under way in less then 45 minutes) given an hour and a half most of the fleet would have been at sea when the first wave hit.
 
Well allowing for an ASB situation in which the big guns can get underway in the time allowed by the midget sub sighting. Wouldn't the radar station's report of incoming aircraft lead to a full scramble of all fighters available at hawaii and thus lead to fighter cover for the deployed battleships? Also you have to allow for the time it takes for the Japanese pilots to get over their surprise of seeing a major portion of the ships they were supposed to see gone and then find those errant ships, they might have even wasted time to try and find the carriers that weren't there even in OTL. I think under those circumstances the USAAF fighters could have gotten airborne in sufficient numbers to inflict heavy casualties on the first wave and even protect most of the pacific fleet who would also have their AA guns at the ready as well.

Then comes the question of whether the USN gives chase and tries to take out the IJN carrier group. Of course without fighter cover from the carriers they would need to rely on land based aircraft to protect the fleet which of course means that they wouldn't be able to sallie out too far.
 
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