Alternate Operation Barbarossa

What if instead of invade Ukraine, Army Group South transferred most of its mobile divisions to Army Group Centre, and leaving some divisions to protect the romanian oilfields.
Army Group Centre with adittional divisions will attack in the direction of Moscow, and before reaching Moscow swing south towards Rostov-on-Don and perhaps to the Kuban to close Crimea
making Ukraine a big pocket.

was this possible?

europe.jpg
 
Um, this is the OTL Barbarossa. Army Group Center was the strongest of the three Army Groups. No plan for Barbarossa will focus on the cities, not with Nazi Germany planning it. That would mean, after all, that the Germans, who defeated France in six weeks, can't smash an army that failed to beat Finland. An army their ideology dictates isn't even made up of human beings. Instead it's made up of subhumans who must, can, and will shatter on the delusion that Germans really *were* a superior category of human beings.

Nazi Germany cannot plan Barbarossa any differently. This would make it not-Nazi-Germany.
 

Hkelukka

Banned
What if instead of invade Ukraine, Army Group South transferred most of its mobile divisions to Army Group Centre, and leaving some divisions to protect the romanian oilfields.
Army Group Centre with adittional divisions will attack in the direction of Moscow, and before reaching Moscow swing south towards Rostov-on-Don and perhaps to the Kuban to close Crimea
making Ukraine a big pocket.

was this possible?

Too ambitious with not enough logistics, cant close off a country the size of ukraine if you have to travel through hostile territory all the way through poland and byuelorussia.

SU would simply rotate withdrawing armies from the ukraine through defensive roles ahead of your spearhead and still have thousands of miles at the back to evacuate wounded and such from. You would absolutely not pull this off unless you commit the entire army to this alone and entirely.

Though that might be an interesitng plan, a single offensive army that punched up towards moscow in a one giant push forcing all SU response to focus around that and turns south before hitting the capital in an effort to encircle the ukraine.

Though that is so nuts that i doubt even hitler would do it.
 
Too ambitious with not enough logistics, cant close off a country the size of ukraine if you have to travel through hostile territory all the way through poland and byuelorussia.

Except that this is what happened IOTL in Barbarossa: Army Group Center annihilated the Western Front, then was ground into Smolensk and the long attrition battle there, finally winning it after eight weeks, failing to capture the Soviets after two months. At which point Hitler said "Fuck that shit" and went on to besiege Leningrad, *after* which point he reinforced Army Group South to strike at Kiev and captured the USSR's strategic reserve at one go.

It didn't do Germany a bit of good, but this is the OTL war. The interesting question is what happens if the Germans and Soviets *both* put their strongest offensive power in the South at the same time.
 

Hkelukka

Banned
What about this.

What if,

Assuming you had the army that the germans had at 1941 op bar start date.

How would you direct them if you could only give the opening day instructions.

*seeing as how, topic fits.

My strategy would be this.

Avoid cities.

Advance until very very early winter.

Pull back to maximum safe logistic range for winter.

Rince, repeate.
 
Except that this is what happened IOTL in Barbarossa: Army Group Center annihilated the Western Front, then was ground into Smolensk and the long attrition battle there, finally winning it after eight weeks, failing to capture the Soviets after two months. At which point Hitler said "Fuck that shit" and went on to besiege Leningrad, *after* which point he reinforced Army Group South to strike at Kiev and captured the USSR's strategic reserve at one go.

It didn't do Germany a bit of good, but this is the OTL war. The interesting question is what happens if the Germans and Soviets *both* put their strongest offensive power in the South at the same time.

army group center crushed the western front 3x in 1941... smolensk was only attrition in the sense of time; the germans still inflicted losses of 10 to 1; a battle where you lose critical territory and take 10 to 1 losses cannot have any silver lining by defnition

the germans had the most divisions in the south at the start of barbarossa; 52... the soviets had their strongest divisions in the south; the germans crushed the southwestern front at brody, uman and penned in and eventually captured the big odessa garrison; their only failure was the 2nd army getting stuck at gomel against the central front; which was resolved in the kiev encirclement
 
What about this.

What if,

Assuming you had the army that the germans had at 1941 op bar start date.

How would you direct them if you could only give the opening day instructions.

*seeing as how, topic fits.

My strategy would be this.

Avoid cities.

Advance until very very early winter.

Pull back to maximum safe logistic range for winter.

Rince, repeate.

As opposed to the German strategy of OTL which was "Crush the Red Army, and next to this Moscow is of no great importance?". I'm not seeing any AH here.

army group center crushed the western front 3x in 1941... smolensk was only attrition in the sense of time; the germans still inflicted losses of 10 to 1; a battle where you lose critical territory and take 10 to 1 losses cannot have any silver lining by defnition

the germans had the most divisions in the south at the start of barbarossa; 52... the soviets had their strongest divisions in the south; the germans crushed the southwestern front at brody, uman and penned in and eventually captured the big odessa garrison; their only failure was the 2nd army getting stuck at gomel against the central front; which was resolved in the kiev encirclement

It was eight weeks that cost them the highest rate of casualties they ever had experienced at the time, but it was the Soviets who accomplished this so it doesn't count. What you say applies to most-all the German battles from 1943 onward after Third Kharkov but you see people all the time trying to make the USSR stupid enough the Wehrmacht can work miracles.

On the contrary, all reputable modern, honest intellectually and otherwise historians note the Wehrmacht's offensive power was concentrated north of the Priepus where Soviet power was concentrated at its strongest. Both the histories of the German and Soviet sides note this.
 

Hkelukka

Banned
As opposed to the German strategy of OTL which was "Crush the Red Army, and next to this Moscow is of no great importance?". I'm not seeing any AH here.

Then you are not reading!

The difference is this.

Instead of group A attacking group B and targetting group B's cities in entrenched steet battles in a large war with no objectives other than "kick the door in and watch them collapse"

you would have

a strategic goal (defeat in 3 years)

a operational goal (specific territory size to aim for)

a strategic depth (retreat from even large areas is preferred if it saves strategic resources)

You ask me, i see a lot of differenece between 1 year no goal and no retreat and 3 years border of brest livotsk (about) and preferring reatreat to pitched defensive battles and not dying outside of the supply range of the axis logistics.

But thats just my view :D
 
Nor are you. This is what Germany wanted IOTL. What they got was something completely different and after spending eight weeks to inflict 10:1 casualties and capture Smolensk and *still* failing a significant encirclement they had reality sink in starting in progressive stages. Of course to hear Blair say it, the Germans were supermen immune to exhaustion or surprise, omniscient and omnipotent and thus had no surprises at any point in 1941. Presumably this is why they overextended themselves at Moscow.
 
As opposed to the German strategy of OTL which was "Crush the Red Army, and next to this Moscow is of no great importance?". I'm not seeing any AH here.



It was eight weeks that cost them the highest rate of casualties they ever had experienced at the time, but it was the Soviets who accomplished this so it doesn't count. What you say applies to most-all the German battles from 1943 onward after Third Kharkov but you see people all the time trying to make the USSR stupid enough the Wehrmacht can work miracles.

On the contrary, all reputable modern, honest intellectually and otherwise historians note the Wehrmacht's offensive power was concentrated north of the Priepus where Soviet power was concentrated at its strongest. Both the histories of the German and Soviet sides note this.


snake; the battle of smolensk was 4 weeks; and it was concluded 8 weeks after barbarossa started; however the first 4 weeks involved the battles of bayilstock and other encirclements in eastern poland

germanys rate of advance and body count favorability ratio was about equal to case red if you index for the different railway gauge and lack of roads... are we going to call case red a french strategic victory :p

germany took 30k casualties and inflicted 350k losses and occupied extremely valuable agriculural, industrial and population center lands;

the battle should be rated as strait german victory
 
Blair:

Given the Germans, according to Halder, believed that "it is no great exaggeration to say the objectives of the operation have been met in two weeks", do you really expect me to believe that an additional four weeks to capture Smolensk had no impact on them whatsoever? Do you really think that?

I'm not denying it was a victory for the Germans, bar the sub-action at Yelnya, my comments about it have always focused on its psychological impact, something I have yet to ever see you so much as address in all the times I've pointed it out, instead focusing on the tactical details that have nothing to do with my actual point.
 
Blair:

Given the Germans, according to Halder, believed that "it is no great exaggeration to say the objectives of the operation have been met in two weeks", do you really expect me to believe that an additional four weeks to capture Smolensk had no impact on them whatsoever? Do you really think that?

I'm not denying it was a victory for the Germans, bar the sub-action at Yelnya, my comments about it have always focused on its psychological impact, something I have yet to ever see you so much as address in all the times I've pointed it out, instead focusing on the tactical details that have nothing to do with my actual point.

what psycological impact?

what evidence was there of a decline in german morale; they won; they won the next several series of battles

the western front was completely disorganized and wrecked; with those who survived being ripe pickings again for guderian 6 weeks later

the germans won at yelnya for what it's worth; guderian exaggerates it's importance as part of his web of lies surrounding the thought process between making the effort in the center or south... the Germans inflicted 8 to 1 casualties in the total accounting of the battle and captured all the russians in the yelna saliant; the russians just made repeated head on attacks, got worn down, and when Guderian returned with the mobile troops, encircled and captured the exhausted and worn out russians

calling smolensk anything other than a strait german victory is taking too much from the stalinist revisionaries

what halder was speaking to; was that the panzers had closed in the forces within two weeks; however, it took another two weeks for the infantry to catch up and replace the panzers and pound the pockets into submission; however the outcome was decided in the first two weeks; the rest was marching and mop up
 
Sigh, what part of "this campaign has been won in two weeks" turns into "Well, we took the city after four more weeks than we expected" don't you understand? I keep pointing out to you that the Germans sincerely believed that the campaign was over after 14 days and that Smolensk marks the point at which they came to believe in the myth of endless Russian hordes, but you seem entirely deaf to this particular point.

Yes, they won. Yes, they won the next series of battles. But it went from "it is no great exaggeration to say this campaign has been won in two weeks" to Halder's very pessimistic overall outlook on the entire campaign, reflecting the entire German view. Blair, the Wehrmacht was made of human beings, not unthinking God Mode Sues.
 
People,

If we go back to the original thinking, it does pose a difference.

The focus is suddenly on Bock to capture Moscow and then turn south from a position EAST of Moscow.

Not investing Moscow will not make too much sense.

Leaving Leningrad with its industries alone might not be a good idea, which suddenly turns the whole thing back to Barbarossa OTL, so let's try something else.

OBJECTIVE: Carve out Ukraine, Donbas and the oil from the Soviet empire.

Strategy:
Attack south of the swamps, knock out Moscow (industry and rail) and establish a new front East of Moscow.
Leave Leningrad and Baltics alone (UHH)

So, it will be a "pincer" from the North: right arm holding soviet forces far to the west, while left arm encircling fromn the East? That is ambition.

Problems with this:
LOGISTICS: Rail and roads in the South are not up to it
Can it even be possible to feed such big armies required in the South?
Extended left flank. If Baltics left alone, everything North of the swamps are exposed

Ivan
 
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