Hi, I am new here and I am working on an ATL for the Battle of Midway but unlike most ATLs about Midway that have the Japanese winning the battle, in this one the US wins even bigger which IMO they should have done. I have been studying the Battle of Midway since I first read Ira Peck’s book when I was ten (I am 42 now) and I have long been frustrated by the tendency of many to view the US victory as “miraculous” where luck on the part of the US and bad decisions by Nagumo cost Japan a sure win. To me the fact that there were over 150 American land and carrier based aircraft headed for the Kido Butai before the Japanese had the slightest inkling that US carriers were in the area is evidence that the only thing that saved the Japanese from an even bigger drubbing was poor tactical execution on the part of the Americans in the form of poor navigation, poor marksmanship, poor deck launching procedures, and poor strike coordination. Overall, in the first wave of strikes that day, the US launched from three carriers and one land base 203 aircraft against the Japanese, 177 of which were strike aircraft (plus 26 fighters). Frankly, I think it is rather sad that out of all of those aircraft, only about 10 dive bombers actually managed to put steel on target that morning and had the US forces done just a little better, they could have (or should have) rolled up all four of Nagumo’s carriers by 1030 that morning. RADM Spruance certainly thought so. He commented in his after action report to Nimitz that had Hornet’s air group performed better, the US may not have lost the Yorktown. My PODs are plausible and based on realistic alternative decisions – the Mark XIII torpedo still does not work, the VT squadrons will still have TBDs and not TBFs, US radio communications capabilities and procedures are still going to be lousy, and the US carrier groups are still going to have trouble launching coordinated deck load strikes. That said, I think there are a few key areas where decisions can be altered in a realistic manner:
First Major POD – Midway’s commanders elect to send VMF-221 as escorts for Midway’s strike aircraft instead of holding them back for air defense. I believe this is a realistic POD because according to the Marines at Midway, http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/Midway/USMC-M-Midway-3.html, Nimitz instructed Midway’s commanders to employ Midway’s aircraft all out against the Japanese carriers and to leave the defense of Midway to its guns. This also tracks with Colonel Shannon’s orders to his garrison regarding the importance of protecting Midway’s strike aircraft so they can hit back at the enemy. I have no doubt that the rookie Marine fighter pilots would have still been given flying lessons by their Japanese counterparts flying CAP over Nagumo’s carriers but would it have kept pressure off of enough of the strike aircraft to make a difference? At different times that morning Nagumo’s carriers were vulnerable. As Parschall and Tully point out in Shattered Sword, there were only nine fighters on CAP when Henderson’s SBDs attacked at about 0810 that morning. Would the presence of 12-14 Marine fighters have made a difference at that moment? Even without fighter escort, eight of Henderson's SBDs still survived the Japanese CAP long enough to release weapons against the Hiryu and they scored enough near misses that the people on the bridge of the Akagi thought that Hiryu had been hit. What would 16 dive bombers free of harassment from the Zeroes and delivering a fairly cohesive attack have accomplished? In my ATL, this course of action is successful and Henderson’s dive bombers manage to score two hits and one damaging near miss on Hiryu that knocks her out of action. With Hiryu damaged, going slow, and unable to maneuver, LtCol Sweeney’s B-17s manage to put one of their 500 pound bombs on Hiryu’s flight deck, which drives the final nail into Hiryu’s coffin. Other attacks such as Midway’s torpedo planes, the SB2U Vindicators, as well as the B-17 attacks on the other carriers do not succeed in putting steel on target but the unwelcome presence of the Marine fighters with the attacking aircraft does lead to attrition against Nagumo’s fighter squadrons, albeit the Marines pay a stiff price for their heroism.
Second Major POD – The Flight to Nowhere, I am also playing with the Hornet’s air group and the whole issue of the "Flight to Nowhere." I am familiar with the literature on this subject and the compelling arguments for a course of 265 True by CDR Ring and the speculation on why and I particularly like John Lundstrom's theory that Mitscher ordered the course because he believed the HAG would find the two carriers that LT Ady did not report if they flew north of the reported location from the PBYs. In my ATL the "The Flight to Nowhere" occurs as usual but when VB-8 peels off at about 0930, LCDR Christopher “Ruff” Johnson plots a different course – one that is based on a calculation of where VT-8 should be at that time based on when VT-8 left the formation at 0820, its course, and the cruising speed of a loaded TBD Devastator (not very fast). Based on my plotting using various accounts this would have taken Johnson and VB-8 south east on a course of about 125 degrees as opposed to the 135 degree course he actually flew in the OTL that took him too far south of Nagumo’s carriers. At 1015 he probably would have been able see ships off to his left more or less due east about 25 miles away (he’s now about 10 minutes behind McCluskey who saw Nagumo’s carriers at 1005). A turn to the east would have put VB-8 on the outskirts of the First Air Fleet just in time for Ruff Johnson to watch his USNA ‘26 classmates Max Leslie and Wade McCluskey go to town on Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu. With no carriers left in visual range and not enough fuel for a search, Johnson would have gone after the next best target, in this case a battleship. In my ATL, Johnson radio’s Ring that three enemy carriers on are on fire and he is diving on a battleship (Kirishima). Preoccupied with the destruction happening around them as well as VT-3’s still developing attack against the Soryu (remember Hiryu is already out of the picture so VT-3 cannot attack Hiryu), Japanese lookouts fail to notice the squadron of dive bombers diving on Kirishima until VB-8’s aircraft are well into their dives. Two 1000 pound bombs hit Kirishima forward of the bridge while a third bomb is dropped down Kirishima’s funnel where it detonates deep inside the ship. Kirishima explodes in a manner similar to HMS Barham and USS Arizona.
First Minor POD – In this POD, LCDR John Waldron’s VT-8 gets fighter support from LT Jim Gray’s VF-6. In the OTL Gray followed VT-8 to the Japanese carriers because he thought it was VT-6 but he then lost the torpedo planes in the clouds and never got the radio call to come down and provide support (he had worked this out with LCDR Gene Lindsey of VT-6). In this ATL, Gray detaches two of his fighters to follow VT-8 down and when they get attacked by the CAP, one of the fighter pilots radios for help. This POD will have no impact on the course of the battle I am simply adding it in for fun. In this POD, due to direct fighter support a few of VT-8’s aircraft survive including LDCR Waldron and this will allow me to write up a really nasty confrontation between Waldron and Mitscher on the bridge of the Hornet after Waldron returns about an hour before Ring give or take a few minutes. Waldron will also claim one definite and one probable hit on Soryu but in reality only Waldron’s torpedo hits and being a Mark XIII it does not explode.
Second Possible Minor POD – Based on my read of a number of sources, LtCol Ira Kimes, the MAG-22 commander really wanted Midway’s aircraft to make a coordinated attack against Nagumo’s carriers. However, due to different cruising speeds of the attack aircraft and the lack of an overall strike leader, the different groups proceeded individually and attacked individually with the USN TBFs and USAAF B-26s not even bothering to gather at “Point Affirm” twenty miles east of Midway where Kimes wanted all of his attack aircraft to gather after launch. In this POD, Kimes – an experienced SBD Dauntless pilot – flies one of Henderson’s SBDs and acts as an airborne strike leader/coordinator/mother hen and manages to cobble together a fairly well coordinated attack. This will not change any results of the battle – Henderson’s SBDs will get a carrier and that will pretty much be it – but it will lead to more of Midway’s attacking aircraft surviving and returning home to fight another day. Another possibility is that Kimes commandeers one of the VT-8 TBFs and sits in the middle seat and acts as a sort of airborne controller although this may be a little too out of the box. I may not do this one, it is not really necessary.
The rest of June 4th will be marked by a significant amount of confusion on the part of the US forces. On the carriers they will not know about the successful strike on Hiryu by Midway’s bombers so a significant debate will take place on whether or not there are one or even two Japanese carriers still out there since Leslie, Johnson, McCluskey, and Thach will all report seeing three not four Japanese carriers on fire (Hiryu will be well to the south at that point). Waldron will claim one definite and one probable on a Soryu class carrier (that won’t be the case but he will not know that) and it will take some time for the afternoon scouting missions to figure out the status of the Japanese fleet, particularly since Fletcher’s VS-5 scouting mission launched at 1130 (consistent with OTL) will search to the northwest and they will find nothing but empty ocean.
I have a time line for June 4th fleshed out that I will post in a couple of days and then I will get to work on June 5th. Right now I am spending a lot of time with maps and plotting boards to make sure certain scenarios are plausible based on where ships were and when.
First Major POD – Midway’s commanders elect to send VMF-221 as escorts for Midway’s strike aircraft instead of holding them back for air defense. I believe this is a realistic POD because according to the Marines at Midway, http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/Midway/USMC-M-Midway-3.html, Nimitz instructed Midway’s commanders to employ Midway’s aircraft all out against the Japanese carriers and to leave the defense of Midway to its guns. This also tracks with Colonel Shannon’s orders to his garrison regarding the importance of protecting Midway’s strike aircraft so they can hit back at the enemy. I have no doubt that the rookie Marine fighter pilots would have still been given flying lessons by their Japanese counterparts flying CAP over Nagumo’s carriers but would it have kept pressure off of enough of the strike aircraft to make a difference? At different times that morning Nagumo’s carriers were vulnerable. As Parschall and Tully point out in Shattered Sword, there were only nine fighters on CAP when Henderson’s SBDs attacked at about 0810 that morning. Would the presence of 12-14 Marine fighters have made a difference at that moment? Even without fighter escort, eight of Henderson's SBDs still survived the Japanese CAP long enough to release weapons against the Hiryu and they scored enough near misses that the people on the bridge of the Akagi thought that Hiryu had been hit. What would 16 dive bombers free of harassment from the Zeroes and delivering a fairly cohesive attack have accomplished? In my ATL, this course of action is successful and Henderson’s dive bombers manage to score two hits and one damaging near miss on Hiryu that knocks her out of action. With Hiryu damaged, going slow, and unable to maneuver, LtCol Sweeney’s B-17s manage to put one of their 500 pound bombs on Hiryu’s flight deck, which drives the final nail into Hiryu’s coffin. Other attacks such as Midway’s torpedo planes, the SB2U Vindicators, as well as the B-17 attacks on the other carriers do not succeed in putting steel on target but the unwelcome presence of the Marine fighters with the attacking aircraft does lead to attrition against Nagumo’s fighter squadrons, albeit the Marines pay a stiff price for their heroism.
Second Major POD – The Flight to Nowhere, I am also playing with the Hornet’s air group and the whole issue of the "Flight to Nowhere." I am familiar with the literature on this subject and the compelling arguments for a course of 265 True by CDR Ring and the speculation on why and I particularly like John Lundstrom's theory that Mitscher ordered the course because he believed the HAG would find the two carriers that LT Ady did not report if they flew north of the reported location from the PBYs. In my ATL the "The Flight to Nowhere" occurs as usual but when VB-8 peels off at about 0930, LCDR Christopher “Ruff” Johnson plots a different course – one that is based on a calculation of where VT-8 should be at that time based on when VT-8 left the formation at 0820, its course, and the cruising speed of a loaded TBD Devastator (not very fast). Based on my plotting using various accounts this would have taken Johnson and VB-8 south east on a course of about 125 degrees as opposed to the 135 degree course he actually flew in the OTL that took him too far south of Nagumo’s carriers. At 1015 he probably would have been able see ships off to his left more or less due east about 25 miles away (he’s now about 10 minutes behind McCluskey who saw Nagumo’s carriers at 1005). A turn to the east would have put VB-8 on the outskirts of the First Air Fleet just in time for Ruff Johnson to watch his USNA ‘26 classmates Max Leslie and Wade McCluskey go to town on Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu. With no carriers left in visual range and not enough fuel for a search, Johnson would have gone after the next best target, in this case a battleship. In my ATL, Johnson radio’s Ring that three enemy carriers on are on fire and he is diving on a battleship (Kirishima). Preoccupied with the destruction happening around them as well as VT-3’s still developing attack against the Soryu (remember Hiryu is already out of the picture so VT-3 cannot attack Hiryu), Japanese lookouts fail to notice the squadron of dive bombers diving on Kirishima until VB-8’s aircraft are well into their dives. Two 1000 pound bombs hit Kirishima forward of the bridge while a third bomb is dropped down Kirishima’s funnel where it detonates deep inside the ship. Kirishima explodes in a manner similar to HMS Barham and USS Arizona.
First Minor POD – In this POD, LCDR John Waldron’s VT-8 gets fighter support from LT Jim Gray’s VF-6. In the OTL Gray followed VT-8 to the Japanese carriers because he thought it was VT-6 but he then lost the torpedo planes in the clouds and never got the radio call to come down and provide support (he had worked this out with LCDR Gene Lindsey of VT-6). In this ATL, Gray detaches two of his fighters to follow VT-8 down and when they get attacked by the CAP, one of the fighter pilots radios for help. This POD will have no impact on the course of the battle I am simply adding it in for fun. In this POD, due to direct fighter support a few of VT-8’s aircraft survive including LDCR Waldron and this will allow me to write up a really nasty confrontation between Waldron and Mitscher on the bridge of the Hornet after Waldron returns about an hour before Ring give or take a few minutes. Waldron will also claim one definite and one probable hit on Soryu but in reality only Waldron’s torpedo hits and being a Mark XIII it does not explode.
Second Possible Minor POD – Based on my read of a number of sources, LtCol Ira Kimes, the MAG-22 commander really wanted Midway’s aircraft to make a coordinated attack against Nagumo’s carriers. However, due to different cruising speeds of the attack aircraft and the lack of an overall strike leader, the different groups proceeded individually and attacked individually with the USN TBFs and USAAF B-26s not even bothering to gather at “Point Affirm” twenty miles east of Midway where Kimes wanted all of his attack aircraft to gather after launch. In this POD, Kimes – an experienced SBD Dauntless pilot – flies one of Henderson’s SBDs and acts as an airborne strike leader/coordinator/mother hen and manages to cobble together a fairly well coordinated attack. This will not change any results of the battle – Henderson’s SBDs will get a carrier and that will pretty much be it – but it will lead to more of Midway’s attacking aircraft surviving and returning home to fight another day. Another possibility is that Kimes commandeers one of the VT-8 TBFs and sits in the middle seat and acts as a sort of airborne controller although this may be a little too out of the box. I may not do this one, it is not really necessary.
The rest of June 4th will be marked by a significant amount of confusion on the part of the US forces. On the carriers they will not know about the successful strike on Hiryu by Midway’s bombers so a significant debate will take place on whether or not there are one or even two Japanese carriers still out there since Leslie, Johnson, McCluskey, and Thach will all report seeing three not four Japanese carriers on fire (Hiryu will be well to the south at that point). Waldron will claim one definite and one probable on a Soryu class carrier (that won’t be the case but he will not know that) and it will take some time for the afternoon scouting missions to figure out the status of the Japanese fleet, particularly since Fletcher’s VS-5 scouting mission launched at 1130 (consistent with OTL) will search to the northwest and they will find nothing but empty ocean.
I have a time line for June 4th fleshed out that I will post in a couple of days and then I will get to work on June 5th. Right now I am spending a lot of time with maps and plotting boards to make sure certain scenarios are plausible based on where ships were and when.
