I'm not counting the other five million as to a greater or lesser extent those have to be taken care of, so they won't be directly facing those German divisions.

That's an odd stance too take, given that the USSR can easily transfer a good portion of those forces without seriously hindering its defences elsewhere.
And the Soviets still have plenty of men between the ages of 30 and 50 they can put into uniform...
Why can't they handle 3+ to 2 odds? As in, why can't something be done that would deal with that?
Because it wasn't just the numbers that were no longer in Germany's favor. The Soviets by 1944 had become as good at manuever warfare as the Germany had been in 1941... better in a few respects. In addition, the quality of German troops had declined radically thanks too all the previous losses, while the Red Army troop quality had because those that hadn't (finally) recieved proper training in the latter-half of 1943 were either in Penal Battalions or were veterans of fighting years of fighting in one of the cruellest wars in human history.
Right. I was looking at the Eastern front with my comment, should have been clearer.
Then your asking for a completely different set-up for German intelligence. German military intelligence in regards too the Soviets had pretty much been just as bad as it was against the Western Allies... worse in some cases. In early-1941, they completely missed the Soviet armies forming up behind the Dnepr river. In late-1941, they didn't have the slightest clue about the reserve formations preparing the winter counterstroke. In late-1942, so many of them thought the Soviets had exhausted of all their reserves that even commanders who noticed indications that said otherwise were lulled into complacency. In mid-1943, they utterly missed the Soviet formations being prepared in three different locations: the ones part of the Steppe Front as part of the strategic reserve for the Kursk salient, the ones preparing for the counteroffensive at the Orel salient, and the ones being prepared for the counteroffensive against Kharkov. That track record indicates both Soviet skill and MAJOR German deficincies...
On the other hand, the Soviets had a fantastic intelligence network both inside the occupied territories and in Germany itself. The Germans have the option of either prioritising Army Group Center or the southern Army Groups in the Balkans... they don't have the resources too do both. If they prioritize Army Group Center, the Soviets will notice and alter their plans accordingly.
And enough already.
Could the Germans win in the sense of utterly crushing all opposition? No. But in the sense of how they came close in WWI? Possibly. Especially with significant Allied blunders/failures.
The Soviets had pretty much exhausted their quota of major blunders and failures. From 1944 on, any mistakes they made were minor enough that they never effected the overall outcome of the battle.
The Western Allies less so, but they actually had even more room for failures then the Soviets (who in turn had plenty of room for failures).
Certainly the Third Reich was gambling and certainly it was facing staggering odds, but its not as if the Allies were fighting it one armed either (in the sense that if the Germans produce say, twice as many aircraft, the Allies can't just step up production and the odds will be as bad as before. Not indefinitely, at least.)
Actually, I have heard (second-hand so I don't know how reliable it is) that the US didn't actually reached its full military-production capability. The Germans didn't either, but then their growth was artificially repressed by strategic bombing, a late-start at full mobilization, a lack of raw materials, a lack of skilled manpower, and a host of other issues that were insurmountable...
(I know, I should be ashamed, but if the data is wrong I'll check somewhere else). If the Germans have planes like that, then they can do it.
Well, the Germans don't have a plane like that. And if they were to attempt to build it, they would suck resources away from something else...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel_He_177
They built over a thousand of these, and they have a combat radius of about 1,500 kilometers.
So they'll be stretching an already unreliable aircraft to its limit while flying deep into enemy controlled air space unescorted (since no German fighters possess anything like that kind of range) in a sustained campaign[1] to hit only the small fraction of major Soviet factories that are
closest[2] to them... yeah, I don't see anyway that would end in atrocious losses for little results...
[1]The Western Allies strategic bombing campaign showed that this was necessary. You had too keep hitting factories over-and-over for weeks, even months, at a time.
[2]It's over 1,400 kilometer too the Ural's. The mountains themselves are another 40 kilometers across at their thinnest. That leaves very little room for the bombers to manuever and forces them into rather predictable routes for Soviet interceptors too poach on. Not to mention the strain this would put on an aircraft which was already of dubious mechanical reliability.