"Alternate History, Nazi"s win the war" How Plausible?

i just want to know because people keep mentioning it

exactly how does heavy strategic bombing help germany in any theater

and germany simply did not have the industrial capacity to produce heavy bombers in any significant capacity, conduct the greatest land war ever fought in human history AND maintain air superiority over a battlefield stretching from normandy in the west to kiev in the east

Also, I disagree with CalBear that overrunning Stalingrad has even a 1% chance of being decisive unless Stalin derps all over himself and goes Great Purge 2.0. Losing the Caucuses and its oil isn't critical because the WAllies will step up Lend Lease; and while controlling the Volga would hamper Russian logistics, it wouldn't prevent Russian force generation which is a problem that the Wehrmacht can never solve (though to be fair to the Wehrmacht, there wasn't a force on the planet outside *maybe* a fully mobilized USA in total war mode that could have, and then probably only by using nukes).

Stalingrad as a major focus of Operation Blue means that Operation Blue as originally designed itself can only but fail.
 
There's a difference between "they couldn't stop them OTL" and "nothing the Germans do differently after January 1944* can make any difference versus the Soviet forces."

I mean, presumably for discussion's sake we're not assuming Germany made the best possible decisions within the war within the constraints the pre-war situation had put them in. If we are, that's another story.

I don't have 1944 figures handy for the Eastern front, but this:

"In November 9143, General Jodl estimated that 3.9 million Germans (together with a mere 283,000 Axis-allied troops) were trying to hold off 5.5 million Russians on the eastern front." is hardly unstoppably overwhelming.

Jodl's figures are actually an underestimate. The Soviets have another million men facing the GErmans. In addition, there are a further five million Red Army personnnel who are not facing the Germans, but are either keeping an eye on the Soviets other borders or pulling engineering and anti-partisan duty against Ukrainian Partisans.

Enough to definitely make the Germans overstretched, enough to explain how "By the beginning of 1945, on the Belorussian and Ukrainian fronts alone, 'Soviet superiority was both absolute and awesome, fivefold in manpower, fivefold in armor, over sevenfold in artillery, and seventeen times the German strength in the air." - but saying that was absolutely inevitable seems a bit much. Predictable, no. Impossible to prevent, I'm not sure.

The best the Germans can do at this point is slow the Soviets down a little.

Do you have a source for that (on them being mostly no more than regiment strength)?

Not necessarily. The weather can do it easily. If Eisenhower decides in fact too delay until the next opportunity in mid-June, then the invasion fleet would sail into the worst channel storm in a few hundred years (if I recall correctly).

I think any real POD addressing things has to have German production be much higher though.

And more fuel, and more trained pilots, and more raw materials, and...

Heavy bombing versus Russian industry and infrastructure is going to be rather problematic - certainly more so than destroying tanks in the field while Russia just cranks out still more.

How are the Germans going too bomb factories that would still be out of range of their bombers? The Ural's are over 1,400 kilometers from Stalingrad. There's no German aircraft that can make that trip (well, unless they don't mind if the aircraft doesn't come back).

As for stepping up Lend Lease: How much can that be stepped up?

Quite a bit, as it was lend-lease in the 43-45 period was basically the left-overs of US war production... and not even all the left overs at that.
 

CalBear

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Stalingrad isn't critical in and of itself. It is critical that an early capture preserves 6th Army and prevents somewhere in the area of 350,000 "unrecoverable losses" to the Heer along with reducing the material loss to the Wehrmacht substantially while still inflicting massive losses on the Red Army. It creates a situation that will allow the Reich to defeat the Soviet counter-offensives (the counter offensives may never take place since the required conditions will not be present).

Even then the Stalingrad change isn't close to enough to turn the tide. It is part of the whole, a whole that includes keeping the U.S. out of the war and avoiding the insane North African sideshow. Taken as a whole that gives the Wehrmacht around 700,000 additional troops, around 1,500 addtional combat aircraft, and 1,000 or so tanks. Even then there is a 99% chance that the Soviets handle the reversals and the additional 60 Heer divisions and knock off the Reich more or less single handed.

BTW: If the U.S. is completely on the sidelines it is somewhat doubtful that the amount of lend-lease that reaches the Soviet is the same as IOTL (fewer escorts = greater losses to convoys, and if push came to shove the U.S. was going to keep the British going even if it meant the USSR went down).
i just want to know because people keep mentioning it

exactly how does heavy strategic bombing help germany in any theater

and germany simply did not have the industrial capacity to produce heavy bombers in any significant capacity, conduct the greatest land war ever fought in human history AND maintain air superiority over a battlefield stretching from normandy in the west to kiev in the east

Also, I disagree with CalBear that overrunning Stalingrad has even a 1% chance of being decisive unless Stalin derps all over himself and goes Great Purge 2.0. Losing the Caucuses and its oil isn't critical because the WAllies will step up Lend Lease; and while controlling the Volga would hamper Russian logistics, it wouldn't prevent Russian force generation which is a problem that the Wehrmacht can never solve (though to be fair to the Wehrmacht, there wasn't a force on the planet outside *maybe* a fully mobilized USA in total war mode that could have, and then probably only by using nukes).
 
i just want to know because people keep mentioning it

exactly how does heavy strategic bombing help germany in any theater

and germany simply did not have the industrial capacity to produce heavy bombers in any significant capacity, conduct the greatest land war ever fought in human history AND maintain air superiority over a battlefield stretching from normandy in the west to kiev in the east

How are the Germans going too bomb factories that would still be out of range of their bombers? The Ural's are over 1,400 kilometers from Stalingrad. There's no German aircraft that can make that trip (well, unless they don't mind if the aircraft doesn't come back).

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel_He_177
They built over a thousand of these, and they have a combat radius of about 1,500 kilometers.
 
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Jodl's figures are actually an underestimate. The Soviets have another million men facing the GErmans. In addition, there are a further five million Red Army personnnel who are not facing the Germans, but are either keeping an eye on the Soviets other borders or pulling engineering and anti-partisan duty against Ukrainian Partisans.

So that's six million vs. about 4 million Germans & allies. I'm not counting the other five million as to a greater or lesser extent those have to be taken care of, so they won't be directly facing those German divisions.

The best the Germans can do at this point is slow the Soviets down a little.
Why can't they handle 3+ to 2 odds? As in, why can't something be done that would deal with that?

Not necessarily. The weather can do it easily. If Eisenhower decides in fact too delay until the next opportunity in mid-June, then the invasion fleet would sail into the worst channel storm in a few hundred years (if I recall correctly).
Right. I was looking at the Eastern front with my comment, should have been clearer.

And more fuel, and more trained pilots, and more raw materials, and...
And enough already.

Could the Germans win in the sense of utterly crushing all opposition? No. But in the sense of how they came close in WWI? Possibly. Especially with significant Allied blunders/failures.

Certainly the Third Reich was gambling and certainly it was facing staggering odds, but its not as if the Allies were fighting it one armed either (in the sense that if the Germans produce say, twice as many aircraft, the Allies can't just step up production and the odds will be as bad as before. Not indefinitely, at least.).

How are the Germans going too bomb factories that would still be out of range of their bombers? The Ural's are over 1,400 kilometers from Stalingrad. There's no German aircraft that can make that trip (well, unless they don't mind if the aircraft doesn't come back).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B-17_Flying_Fortress#Specifications_.28B-17G.29

(I know, I should be ashamed, but if the data is wrong I'll check somewhere else). If the Germans have planes like that, then they can do it.

If they don't, its not as if strategic bombing is going to come up.

Quite a bit, as it was lend-lease in the 43-45 period was basically the left-overs of US war production... and not even all the left overs at that.
I'm not sure how it being the left-overs indicates there's a significant amount left-over to ship.
 
I'm not counting the other five million as to a greater or lesser extent those have to be taken care of, so they won't be directly facing those German divisions.

:confused: That's an odd stance too take, given that the USSR can easily transfer a good portion of those forces without seriously hindering its defences elsewhere.

And the Soviets still have plenty of men between the ages of 30 and 50 they can put into uniform...

Why can't they handle 3+ to 2 odds? As in, why can't something be done that would deal with that?

Because it wasn't just the numbers that were no longer in Germany's favor. The Soviets by 1944 had become as good at manuever warfare as the Germany had been in 1941... better in a few respects. In addition, the quality of German troops had declined radically thanks too all the previous losses, while the Red Army troop quality had because those that hadn't (finally) recieved proper training in the latter-half of 1943 were either in Penal Battalions or were veterans of fighting years of fighting in one of the cruellest wars in human history.

Right. I was looking at the Eastern front with my comment, should have been clearer.

Then your asking for a completely different set-up for German intelligence. German military intelligence in regards too the Soviets had pretty much been just as bad as it was against the Western Allies... worse in some cases. In early-1941, they completely missed the Soviet armies forming up behind the Dnepr river. In late-1941, they didn't have the slightest clue about the reserve formations preparing the winter counterstroke. In late-1942, so many of them thought the Soviets had exhausted of all their reserves that even commanders who noticed indications that said otherwise were lulled into complacency. In mid-1943, they utterly missed the Soviet formations being prepared in three different locations: the ones part of the Steppe Front as part of the strategic reserve for the Kursk salient, the ones preparing for the counteroffensive at the Orel salient, and the ones being prepared for the counteroffensive against Kharkov. That track record indicates both Soviet skill and MAJOR German deficincies...

On the other hand, the Soviets had a fantastic intelligence network both inside the occupied territories and in Germany itself. The Germans have the option of either prioritising Army Group Center or the southern Army Groups in the Balkans... they don't have the resources too do both. If they prioritize Army Group Center, the Soviets will notice and alter their plans accordingly.

And enough already.

Could the Germans win in the sense of utterly crushing all opposition? No. But in the sense of how they came close in WWI? Possibly. Especially with significant Allied blunders/failures.

The Soviets had pretty much exhausted their quota of major blunders and failures. From 1944 on, any mistakes they made were minor enough that they never effected the overall outcome of the battle.

The Western Allies less so, but they actually had even more room for failures then the Soviets (who in turn had plenty of room for failures).

Certainly the Third Reich was gambling and certainly it was facing staggering odds, but its not as if the Allies were fighting it one armed either (in the sense that if the Germans produce say, twice as many aircraft, the Allies can't just step up production and the odds will be as bad as before. Not indefinitely, at least.)

Actually, I have heard (second-hand so I don't know how reliable it is) that the US didn't actually reached its full military-production capability. The Germans didn't either, but then their growth was artificially repressed by strategic bombing, a late-start at full mobilization, a lack of raw materials, a lack of skilled manpower, and a host of other issues that were insurmountable...

(I know, I should be ashamed, but if the data is wrong I'll check somewhere else). If the Germans have planes like that, then they can do it.

Well, the Germans don't have a plane like that. And if they were to attempt to build it, they would suck resources away from something else...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel_He_177
They built over a thousand of these, and they have a combat radius of about 1,500 kilometers.

So they'll be stretching an already unreliable aircraft to its limit while flying deep into enemy controlled air space unescorted (since no German fighters possess anything like that kind of range) in a sustained campaign[1] to hit only the small fraction of major Soviet factories that are closest[2] to them... yeah, I don't see anyway that would end in atrocious losses for little results...

[1]The Western Allies strategic bombing campaign showed that this was necessary. You had too keep hitting factories over-and-over for weeks, even months, at a time.
[2]It's over 1,400 kilometer too the Ural's. The mountains themselves are another 40 kilometers across at their thinnest. That leaves very little room for the bombers to manuever and forces them into rather predictable routes for Soviet interceptors too poach on. Not to mention the strain this would put on an aircraft which was already of dubious mechanical reliability.
 
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burmafrd

Banned
i just want to know because people keep mentioning it

exactly how does heavy strategic bombing help germany in any theater

and germany simply did not have the industrial capacity to produce heavy bombers in any significant capacity, conduct the greatest land war ever fought in human history AND maintain air superiority over a battlefield stretching from normandy in the west to kiev in the east

Also, I disagree with CalBear that overrunning Stalingrad has even a 1% chance of being decisive unless Stalin derps all over himself and goes Great Purge 2.0. Losing the Caucuses and its oil isn't critical because the WAllies will step up Lend Lease; and while controlling the Volga would hamper Russian logistics, it wouldn't prevent Russian force generation which is a problem that the Wehrmacht can never solve (though to be fair to the Wehrmacht, there wasn't a force on the planet outside *maybe* a fully mobilized USA in total war mode that could have, and then probably only by using nukes).

there were not enough tankers in the world to supply the Russian economy if they lost their own oil. Not to mention how do you get that oil to the parts of RUSSIA that need it. THere were no pipelines from Murmansk or Vlaidvostock.
 
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