Alternate French WW1 strategy...

In 1911,French Chief of staff,Victor Michel,proposed a radical departure from the war strategies of Plan XIV-XVI:all available french reserves would be amalgamated with active French units and the army was to be deployed upon mobilisation along the whole French frontier from Switzerland to the North sea. Michel's plan mirrored Schlieffens and even propsed an offensive into Belgium,which would have met Schlieffens,'strong right wing' head on. So,how would the war have developed if Michel's plan had been adopted instead of the offensive into Alsace-Lorraine of OTL? Would Britain find a way to ally itself with France or would it remain neutral if the French violated Belgian neutrality? Thoughts?
 
Well if France goes into Belgium after Germany then they could say they were merely helping out the Belgians, but if they go in before Germany then that complicates things, if they go in first it could also have affects on other countries that joined the allies like America.
 
The french politicians wouldn't let the army go into belgium without an invitation, for fear of annoying the british. OTL, they had the troops backing away 50 km from the border, to ensure there was no way the Germans could trigger an incident to use to detach Uk from the Entente.
 
Was'nt German mobilisation faster than the French in OTL. So,it seems likely that the Germans would violate Belgian neutrality first even with the altered French war plan Michel proposed.
 
Was'nt German mobilisation faster than the French in OTL. So,it seems likely that the Germans would violate Belgian neutrality first even with the altered French war plan Michel proposed.

dmz23

It was a lot faster in 1870 but not sure about 1914. Think the thing there, at least if you agree with AP Taylor, is that the German plan was to attack France via Belgium, virtually come what may. As such it declared war on France and more importantly mobilised to attack France once it was effectively at war with Russia. As such it had a bit of an head's start.

In terms of the Michel plan being used it depends exactly on the details but could be very good for the French. Provided they don't go obsessively offensive, and their here facing the main German strike and not fighting for national territory, which helps, their losses would be less than from frontal attacks on the A-L fortresses. At the same time the Germans are striking into much heavier forces. Furthermore their entire plan relies on knocking out France before Russia mobilises so they need to keep attack. As such there is the likelihood that when the French realise such attacks are very, very costly and start digging in, the Germans, at least for the moment must keep attacking.

As such it could end up a lot more favourable for the allies. With far less French and Belgium territory, including a lot of wealthy industrial regions, in German hands. Along with a much higher butcher's bill for Germany's initial forces, from which others could be trained. Another factor is their less likely to gain control of the nitrate stockpiles in Antwerp that gave them a valuable buffer while the Haber plants expanded production. Also such a clearly less successful attack in the west would not only affect moral on both sides but, possibly more importantly also the views of neutrals.

Not saying it will be an easy or quick victory for the allies. However it could significantly shorten the war, make it less costly, possibly for everybody and might change some of the participants.

Steve
 

bard32

Banned
In 1911,French Chief of staff,Victor Michel,proposed a radical departure from the war strategies of Plan XIV-XVI:all available french reserves would be amalgamated with active French units and the army was to be deployed upon mobilisation along the whole French frontier from Switzerland to the North sea. Michel's plan mirrored Schlieffens and even propsed an offensive into Belgium,which would have met Schlieffens,'strong right wing' head on. So,how would the war have developed if Michel's plan had been adopted instead of the offensive into Alsace-Lorraine of OTL? Would Britain find a way to ally itself with France or would it remain neutral if the French violated Belgian neutrality? Thoughts?

Belgium would have lost either way. If Michel's plan had succeeded, then Britain wouldn't have gone to war to protect Belgium's neutrality.
 
The french politicians wouldn't let the army go into belgium without an invitation, for fear of annoying the british. OTL, they had the troops backing away 50 km from the border, to ensure there was no way the Germans could trigger an incident to use to detach Uk from the Entente.

Actually, if the French had been set upon moving thru Belgium and had told the British, the British would have pressured the Belgians to let the French thru. The British are not going to back out and leave the French alone. However, the French would have met stiff resistence. The Belgians did not trust the French and viewed them with suspicion alot. They were shocked when it was the Germans they delivered them an ultimatum.
 
As soon as French troops cross the Belgian border, British advocation in WWI is rendered impossible.

The Brits weren't staunch war supporters in 1914. What did drag them into it was the german attack on Belgium. If France now decides to go first, they will have happy times fighting the Kaiser alone.
 
As soon as French troops cross the Belgian border, British advocation in WWI is rendered impossible.

The Brits weren't staunch war supporters in 1914. What did drag them into it was the german attack on Belgium. If France now decides to go first, they will have happy times fighting the Kaiser alone.

If that's true then it'd probably be harder to convince the U.S. to join, late in the war as they were.

What does France and Russia vs. Germany, Austria, and Italy look like? In OTL Germany and Austria were able to take apart the Russian military pretty well, weren't they? It seems that this leads to Central Powers victory.
 
If Germany goes into Belgium first and the Belgians ask for the French to honor their treaty and come to their assistance as in OTL, then the British will also come in as in OTL.
France is not going to invade Belgium because:
1. They don't mobilize as fast as Germany anyway.
2. They want the Belgians fighting on their side and not against them.
3. They will wait for the Russians to mobilize and simultaneously attack.
4. They need the British navy to protect their ability to import by sea.
 
Timeline of the build up partly from Robin Niellands ‘The Great War Generals’

Britain was also concerned to maintain the ‘balance of power’ in Europe and in particular to maintain the neutrality of Belgium something which had been guaranteed by all the major European powers – France, Prussia, Austria, Russia and Britain – by the Treaty of London in 1839. Germany, the heir to Prussia, had accepted that neutrality after 1871 and maintained the guarantee. There were, inevitable, other reasons for the British support of Belgium. Nations are not so altruistic that they fight wars only over matters of principal or to guarantee the territory of other nations. Quire apart from the demands upon national honour made by this commitment to Belgium neutrality, Britain would not permit a large, hostile, and expansionist power like Germany to gain possession of ports in the Channel coast, close to the British shore.

This was undoubtedly a possibility, for Belgium neutrality was under threat. While these various alliances were being established at the end of the nineteenth century, Germany was preparing a war plan to combat the problems of ‘encirclement’, a scheme masterminded by the then Chief of the German Imperial Staff, General Count Alfred von Schlieffen. Schlieffen believed that in the event of war – and he regarded war as inevitable – Germany would have to fight on two fronts, in the West against France and in the east against Russia.

His plan was based on the theory that thanks to her well-developed network of modern rail communications and the fact that she possessed the strategic advantage of interior lines of communication, it would be possible for Germany to fall on France in great force and defeat her before the vast but obsolescent Russian Army could be mobilised and move to help. With France defeated, the full might of the German Army would then turn on Russia to win a second victory. Given the size and professional skill of the German Army, which stood at around 850,000 men by 1914 and could be rapidly expanded by the recall of reserves, and the construction of railways, which spanned Germany from the Ardennes to the Odder, this plan was feasible.

The Schlieffen Plan required that the bulk of the German Army should be massed in the west and on the right wing to sweep into France from the north-east – through Luxembourg and Belgium – and, hooking round west of Paris would hustle the French Army up against its own fixed defences along the Franco-German border. The French had their own plan, the well-honed Plan XVII, which dictated a thrust east into Germany immediately on the outbreak of war with every man horse and gun. The effect of the Schlieffen Plan, however, would be like that of a swinging door, catching the French from behind as they surged east to the Rhine. This strategy would require great speed and mobility – as well as the violation of Belgium neutrality – and contained two snags. The first was that speed and mobility were not adequately available in the marching armies of 1914 with their largely horse-drawn transport. The second snag was that invading Belgium would bring Great Britain and her empire into the war.

The Schlieffen Plan adopted in 1905 dictated that Germany must mobilise and strike first, to defeat France in six weeks, before the Russian armies could take to the field.

With matters so delicately poised in the west and east, it is time to look at the situation developing in Germany’s principal European ally, Austria-Hungary. By the start of the twentieth century, the Austro-Hungarian Empire was beginning to crumble, but although the cracks were there, the structure generally appeared solid. The exception lay in the ever-turbulent Balkans, and in particular with Serbia, an independent state outside the Austro-Hungarian Balkan hegemony.

However, a large number of ethnic Serbs lived within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, especially in the newly annexed provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which Austria-Hungary had taken over in 1908. These ‘ethnic Serbs’ wished to join those provinces with Serbia to create a ‘Greater Serbia’ and were agitating for their freedom with demonstrations and acts of terrorism inside Austria-Hungary. A further complication was that Tsarist Russia, which always regarded herself as the ultimate protector of Slav interests in the Balkans, had offered guarantees of support to Serbia in the event of Austro-Hungarian intervention. If for any reason, Serbia and Austria-Hungary came to blows, Russia would not stay on the sidelines.

That reason was supplied 28 June 1914, by a young Bosnian Serb student, Gavrilo Princip, when he fired two shots at the Austrian heir, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Austria-Hungary issued demands for the prompt investigation of the assignation and punishment of the assassins in a language no sovereign nation could accept to give an excuse for a war in which Austria-Hungary could absorb Serbia and thereby stamp out nascent Balkan independence once and for all. The Serbs duly appealed to the Tsar and Russia warned that she would protect Serbia’s interests in Austria’s demands went to far. This in turn required Austria to call on its German ally and on 5th July, Germany assured Austria of her faithful support in the event of war.

Thus encouraged, on 23 July Austria-Hungary issued her final ultimatum, ordering Serbia to stamp on the people demanding independence for the Austrian Serbs and requiring Serbia to admit Austrian officials to supervise the investigation into the Archdukes murder.

Although it seemed the Serbs reply gave into Austrian demands, the Austrians rejected the response and on 28 July declared war on Serbia.

On that date Russia mobilised its forces on the Austrian border, which at the time was on Russia’s southern frontier. This alerted and alarmed the German General Staff, whose entire strategy was based on the theory that Russia would still be mobilising while her Western ally, France, was crushed. If the Schlieffen Plan was to be implemented successfully, the Russians must not be given time to mobilise. Austria then mobilised her forces along the Russian frontier, and on 31July both she and Russia ordered total mobilisation. On that day Germany ordered Russia to halt the drift to war and demobilise within 12 hours. The Russians ignored this and on 1 August, Germany ordered general mobilisation with the aim of declaring war on Russia at 1700 hours that afternoon and implementing the Schlieffen Plan.

At 2300 hours that night, a telegram form the German Ambassador in London revealed that the British Foreign Secretary had offered to keep France neutral if Germany promised not to go to war with either France or Russia, while a solution was sought to the conflict between Austria and Serbia. It was, however too late for that. The Russians were already mobilising and refused to stop and the telegrams ordering the German Army to advance on Luxembourg and Belgium were going out and the troops staring to march.

On Saturday, 1 august, Germany declared war on Russia, and Belgium mobilised her army. At 0800 on 1 August the French Commander-in-Chief, General Joffre, went to the Minister of War and asked permission to begin a general mobilisation of France’s reserves at midnight.

Britain had not yet declared her intentions, and the French were frantic for some sign of British commitment, believing, or rather choosing to believe, that those military ‘conversations’ between the two staffs amounted to a firm commitment on the part of Britain to deploy a 160,000-stong British Expeditionary Force on the French left flank, immediately on the outbreak of war. Britain had made plans for such a deployment but had made no commitment to do so.

On Sunday 2 August, the German Ambassador in Brussels presented an ultimatum to the Belgium Government demanding unopposed passage though Belgium for the German Army. Belgium rejected this and all eyes now turned to Britain, which was still deciding on a course of action, and was under pressure from both France and Germany.

On 3 August, the day on which Belgium rejected the German ultimatum, Germany declared war on France. The British Government therefore ordered general mobilisation and recalled all reservists before sending an ultimatum to Germany, requiring an assurance that the latter would respect Belgium neutrality. Germany refused to give such an assurance and at 2300 hours 4 August, Britain declared war on Germany.
 
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