Timeline of the build up partly from Robin Niellands ‘The Great War Generals’
Britain was also concerned to maintain the ‘balance of power’ in Europe and in particular to maintain the neutrality of Belgium something which had been guaranteed by all the major European powers – France, Prussia, Austria, Russia and Britain – by the Treaty of London in 1839. Germany, the heir to Prussia, had accepted that neutrality after 1871 and maintained the guarantee. There were, inevitable, other reasons for the British support of Belgium. Nations are not so altruistic that they fight wars only over matters of principal or to guarantee the territory of other nations. Quire apart from the demands upon national honour made by this commitment to Belgium neutrality, Britain would not permit a large, hostile, and expansionist power like Germany to gain possession of ports in the Channel coast, close to the British shore.
This was undoubtedly a possibility, for Belgium neutrality was under threat. While these various alliances were being established at the end of the nineteenth century, Germany was preparing a war plan to combat the problems of ‘encirclement’, a scheme masterminded by the then Chief of the German Imperial Staff, General Count Alfred von Schlieffen. Schlieffen believed that in the event of war – and he regarded war as inevitable – Germany would have to fight on two fronts, in the West against France and in the east against Russia.
His plan was based on the theory that thanks to her well-developed network of modern rail communications and the fact that she possessed the strategic advantage of interior lines of communication, it would be possible for Germany to fall on France in great force and defeat her before the vast but obsolescent Russian Army could be mobilised and move to help. With France defeated, the full might of the German Army would then turn on Russia to win a second victory. Given the size and professional skill of the German Army, which stood at around 850,000 men by 1914 and could be rapidly expanded by the recall of reserves, and the construction of railways, which spanned Germany from the Ardennes to the Odder, this plan was feasible.
The Schlieffen Plan required that the bulk of the German Army should be massed in the west and on the right wing to sweep into France from the north-east – through Luxembourg and Belgium – and, hooking round west of Paris would hustle the French Army up against its own fixed defences along the Franco-German border. The French had their own plan, the well-honed Plan XVII, which dictated a thrust east into Germany immediately on the outbreak of war with every man horse and gun. The effect of the Schlieffen Plan, however, would be like that of a swinging door, catching the French from behind as they surged east to the Rhine. This strategy would require great speed and mobility – as well as the violation of Belgium neutrality – and contained two snags. The first was that speed and mobility were not adequately available in the marching armies of 1914 with their largely horse-drawn transport. The second snag was that invading Belgium would bring Great Britain and her empire into the war.
The Schlieffen Plan adopted in 1905 dictated that Germany must mobilise and strike first, to defeat France in six weeks, before the Russian armies could take to the field.
With matters so delicately poised in the west and east, it is time to look at the situation developing in Germany’s principal European ally, Austria-Hungary. By the start of the twentieth century, the Austro-Hungarian Empire was beginning to crumble, but although the cracks were there, the structure generally appeared solid. The exception lay in the ever-turbulent Balkans, and in particular with Serbia, an independent state outside the Austro-Hungarian Balkan hegemony.
However, a large number of ethnic Serbs lived within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, especially in the newly annexed provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which Austria-Hungary had taken over in 1908. These ‘ethnic Serbs’ wished to join those provinces with Serbia to create a ‘Greater Serbia’ and were agitating for their freedom with demonstrations and acts of terrorism inside Austria-Hungary. A further complication was that Tsarist Russia, which always regarded herself as the ultimate protector of Slav interests in the Balkans, had offered guarantees of support to Serbia in the event of Austro-Hungarian intervention. If for any reason, Serbia and Austria-Hungary came to blows, Russia would not stay on the sidelines.
That reason was supplied 28 June 1914, by a young Bosnian Serb student, Gavrilo Princip, when he fired two shots at the Austrian heir, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Austria-Hungary issued demands for the prompt investigation of the assignation and punishment of the assassins in a language no sovereign nation could accept to give an excuse for a war in which Austria-Hungary could absorb Serbia and thereby stamp out nascent Balkan independence once and for all. The Serbs duly appealed to the Tsar and Russia warned that she would protect Serbia’s interests in Austria’s demands went to far. This in turn required Austria to call on its German ally and on 5th July, Germany assured Austria of her faithful support in the event of war.
Thus encouraged, on 23 July Austria-Hungary issued her final ultimatum, ordering Serbia to stamp on the people demanding independence for the Austrian Serbs and requiring Serbia to admit Austrian officials to supervise the investigation into the Archdukes murder.
Although it seemed the Serbs reply gave into Austrian demands, the Austrians rejected the response and on 28 July declared war on Serbia.
On that date Russia mobilised its forces on the Austrian border, which at the time was on Russia’s southern frontier. This alerted and alarmed the German General Staff, whose entire strategy was based on the theory that Russia would still be mobilising while her Western ally, France, was crushed. If the Schlieffen Plan was to be implemented successfully, the Russians must not be given time to mobilise. Austria then mobilised her forces along the Russian frontier, and on 31July both she and Russia ordered total mobilisation. On that day Germany ordered Russia to halt the drift to war and demobilise within 12 hours. The Russians ignored this and on 1 August, Germany ordered general mobilisation with the aim of declaring war on Russia at 1700 hours that afternoon and implementing the Schlieffen Plan.
At 2300 hours that night, a telegram form the German Ambassador in London revealed that the British Foreign Secretary had offered to keep France neutral if Germany promised not to go to war with either France or Russia, while a solution was sought to the conflict between Austria and Serbia. It was, however too late for that. The Russians were already mobilising and refused to stop and the telegrams ordering the German Army to advance on Luxembourg and Belgium were going out and the troops staring to march.
On Saturday, 1 august, Germany declared war on Russia, and Belgium mobilised her army. At 0800 on 1 August the French Commander-in-Chief, General Joffre, went to the Minister of War and asked permission to begin a general mobilisation of France’s reserves at midnight.
Britain had not yet declared her intentions, and the French were frantic for some sign of British commitment, believing, or rather choosing to believe, that those military ‘conversations’ between the two staffs amounted to a firm commitment on the part of Britain to deploy a 160,000-stong British Expeditionary Force on the French left flank, immediately on the outbreak of war. Britain had made plans for such a deployment but had made no commitment to do so.
On Sunday 2 August, the German Ambassador in Brussels presented an ultimatum to the Belgium Government demanding unopposed passage though Belgium for the German Army. Belgium rejected this and all eyes now turned to Britain, which was still deciding on a course of action, and was under pressure from both France and Germany.
On 3 August, the day on which Belgium rejected the German ultimatum, Germany declared war on France. The British Government therefore ordered general mobilisation and recalled all reservists before sending an ultimatum to Germany, requiring an assurance that the latter would respect Belgium neutrality. Germany refused to give such an assurance and at 2300 hours 4 August, Britain declared war on Germany.