President Frondizi ended his Term...and then what?
It’s worker’s day, May 1st, 1970. The constitutional president, Lt General Pedro E. Aramburu, ends his six year term. Three months before had been the first presidential Elections with Peronism allowed competing since 1955, and for the first time since then, a peronist became President. The “moderate” Jorge Daniel Paladino (1) is elected for 1970-1976 period, a six year term establish by the 1853 National Constitution, re-established in 1957.
His partner is a lifetime anti peronist, who became part in the so called (and failed) Revolution of 1951, against Perón, and the reason he spent 4 years in a prison in Ushuaia; is General Alejandro Agustin Lanusse. Since 1966 President Aramburu’s Secretary of Defence and had close ties with him, not only friendship but ideologically from at least November 1955, when Lanusse, chief of Granaderos, supported Aramburu to succeed Lonardi. Lanusse kept the Army under control, neutralizing nationalists and the most hard liners anti-peronist men, during second half of the ‘60s, and supporting the gradualism in Aramburu’s plan to “reintroduce” peronism into political life.
Aramburu prearranged Lanusse as his successor but the needs of a new civil president, an agreement with Perón, and certain political circumstances sideways with the popular mood and social conflicts, along with Peron’s ability at negotiation table, invert the roles and that was the reason why Paladino was appointed as President.
Eventually, Lanusse was chosen as Paladino’s VP candidate, because of his leading conditions into the Army, and his anti peronist past, vital to kept aside any kind of resistance against Aramburu’s apertures to Peron and his acolytes.
Besides, Aramburu’s last year at the Office saw the beginning of isolated terrorists’ actions, as the attack against some guards in Campo de Mayo, and many violent demonstrations in several provinces. May ’68 in France, leftist turn of many members of Catholic Church after Medellin Conference, and Cuba’s support to Latin American guerrillas, as part of Cold War strategy, made noise in Argentina, and that was found of concern for Armed Forces, business men, elements of Catholic Church and even peronist trade unions. All led the way to appoint to General Lanusse as vice-president.
Moslty Taken From "Que hubiera pasado si...." By Rosendo Fraga - Editorial Vergara - 2008.
Back to the past…1962….
Aramburu came to office due his victory at the 1964 presidential elections, succeeding Arturo Frondizi, who never recovered properly of March, 1962 crisis, when hardly survived to be overthrown by a military coup. Aramburu’s role was key to Frondizi’s surviving, as he was appointed as Minister of Interior, creating a “national unity” cabinet to allow Frondizi to end his presidential term, although in a weak position.
Early in 1963, President Frondizi launched to his Minister, General Aramburu, as presidential candidate to neutralize any kind of tensions or coup attempts assuming “peronism is back” to do so, like in March 1962. That was something that Frondizi contemplated from as earlier as 1960 to shield himself. Also he recognized the role Aramburu had in 1958, when he gave power after elections, despite heavy pressure from the Navy, and antiperonists civilian and army sectors.
Amidst the political crisis due Andres Framini’s victory, a peronist and textile trade unionist, in that March 1962, four provinces took by peronist parties were intervened, even Buenos Aires. Representing the Army, the Secretary of War proposed not to make any intervention of two provinces won by “neoperonists”, Salta and Neuquén, and not to close the Congress as the Navy wanted. Aramburu, as appointed Minister on March, 27, executed this political plan.
Aramburu, as presidential candidate, created some resistance to Frondizi inside his party UCRI. But President Frondizi was able to dominate them when the vice-presidency slot could be filled with UCRI candidates, as well as the term for Governor of Buenos Aires. That province, along with the other three intervened provinces, chose their authorities in February 1964. Oscar Alende returned, that way, as Buenos Aires Governor, pushing UCRI towards Aramburu, who had as a VP partner to Afredo Vitolo, former Minister prior March 1962. Conservatives from other provinces, Christian Democracy, and neoperonists parties from Salta and Neuquén backed Aramburu and UCRI. Vicente Solano Lima’s Popular Conservatism obtained vice governor candidacy at Alberto Fonrouge hands, together with Alende. That’s why Perón released some votes in favour to Aramburu- Vitolo, in Buenos Aires, despite, and officially the posture was VOTE IN WHITE. Nevertheless only one of four peronist heard Peron’s instructions, as happened in 1957 and 1958.
Against this winning formula, Ricardo Balbin from UCR had little chances, as six years before.
Argentinian economy had a sustained growing path, especially during second half of the ‘60s; his Economy minister was Adalberto Krieger Vasena, who was a minor part of his team in economic affairs during Aramburu’s defacto government after anti Perón’s coup. Now as his Economy Minister, had a GDP growth of 6% annual from 1966 a 1970, public debt reduced in almost a 40% and international reserves grew U$S 1 billion (or 1000 millions, if you wanted) (in 1969 dollars) (2)
Before 1966 elections, Aramburu established a dialogue channel with Perón through emissaries, and peronism is allowed to compete in wide range under “Unión Popular” banner, for governor in 19 of 22 provinces and for renewing half of the Congress. Because Buenos Aires province is not into the game, peronist triumphs became not so alarmists, and neoperonist parties became blossoming in other provinces as result.
In 1968 elections, Unión Popular presented as candidate to BsAs, to Jorge Daniel Paladino, Peron’s personal emissary for dialoguing with Aramburu, in chats that are of public domain from a little time before that. Paladino’s victory was not that traumatic as Framini’s one during Frondizi’s days. Antiperonism has lost edge, and peronism had moderated itself in great part.
Paladino’s brief administration in Buenos Aires was equilibrated, and had a good economic moment, faced firmly to radicalized sectors of his party. His presidential candidacy, supported as well as for Aramburu and Frondizi, backed for a prestigious general as VP, as Lanusse, it’s a political synthesis of that Argentina: a civil and a military, peronist and anti peronist.
Despite the gamble, Peron’s reason was about too much about fearing CGT secretary Vandor’s growing prestige, eclipsed him for the control of peronism and could be able to took himself negotiation power in front of Aramburu and Lanusse’s eyes. From that time, Peron had almost 15 years in exile. The gamble was aimed to discipline to his trade union allies as well.
President Paladino 1970 - 1976
Paladino’s presidency was not an easy one, the guerrilla which appeared in Aramburu’s last days, became stronger at early ‘70s. The government reacts with the creation of a Special Trial Forums( 3), which among 1971 and 1975, arrested and put into trial to almost a thousand guerrilla men. In 1973, Juan Domingo Perón returned to the country, and Paladino as president and Lanusse as VP, gave him back his military grade as General. Perón condemned guerrilla and to this minuscule leftist sector of his party. He died a year later, receiving a state honour funeral.
In late 1974, when rumours about next president candidates started, guerrilla was reduced and dominated, like in Brazil and in cost of human lives a lot less comparing to Chile.
The year 1975 was highly marked by discussions into the government; Peronists, now in power, wanted more space for themselves, as usual. Actually they wanted it all. But former anti peronists, now “non peronist”, didn’t want to stretch their portion, acting more like a dam. This affected the national economy a little more, still in aching due oil crisis. Trade unionist toughened their demands, but didn’t launch a “national strike” because the president, after all, was peronist. Provincial elections, marked several peronist formulas in triumph, which helped to persuade everyone that next presidential formula must be 100% peronist. But not any peronist.
Negotiations between Army, led by VP Lanusse and new Army Chief, General Leandro Anaya; along with trade union bosses, Lorenzo Miguel, and CGT’s General Secretary, Jose Ignacio Rucci. From that, consensus formula will be Angel Federico Robledo for President – Italo Luder for VP; both have excellent relationship with syndical power and militar power and industrial managers. Although Lorenzo Miguel would rather prefer Luder, eventually Robledo was appointed because he was Defence Minister from 1970 to 1974, and suggested to that charge by Perón himself.
Robledo – Luder defeated UCR formula Balbín - De La Rúa, but in ballotage, because in first round they didn’t reach 45% and difference between them is no more than 10% and the electors cannot conciliate and aren’t enough to proclaim them winners. That way, peronism made their worst election in history, but eventually they won, again. Robledo, as new president, name UCR people in second and third line of the government, and some socialists, in a facto alliance with radicals, a facto alliance that would no longer exist by 1980..
After 1974-75 economic emergencies, due oil crisis, Argentinian economy had good years from 1976 until 1981, a year before of Robledo’s end of term. Inflation rates, which were at 35% annual in 1975, slowed down to 18% annual in 1978.
That was the country at the time FIFA World Cup Argentina ’78 started.
(1)Paladino was a peronist politician, member of the so called “Resistencia peronista” from late ‘50s and early ‘60s. He was Perón personal deputy but he was not an automat, having great personality and deep personal convictions. Paladino had all access to Perón’s circle and Montoneros and JP (Juventud Peronista), peronism leftist wing, hated Paladino and tried to create a false image of his persona, like a “Lanusse double agent” , but he was far from that, as numerous bibliography corroborate. In OTL, Perón changed Paladino for Cámpora in late 1971, in plan to harden his tactics against General Lanusse, in a time where extremism started to flourish and Perón tried to took advantage from that to his plans. That’s why Cámpora, not because of his figure itself but for the leftist wing that surrounded him. Eventually Cámpora will be presidential candidate in 1973, and due his poor control of left wing, now armed left wing, made Peron to come back to Argentina “to put order” . Paladino wrote Perón, telling him that he was not an anti commie, and adverted him about “marxist infiltration” and how dangerous would be to allow that in order to use them as a political instrument, and how leftist wing is trying to re write history with a “Marxist Evita”, in 1969.
(2) Adalberto Krieger Vasena in OTL was actually a minor part of economic team after anti Perón’s coup in 1956. He was Minister of Economy of De Facto President, General Onganía, from 1967 to early 1970, and his fate was tied to his boss’ fate, who had to resign in june 1970. Actual economic issues saw a GDP growth 4,7% in 1968 and 8% in 1969, inflation rates was less than 10% a year, public debt was reduced in a 31% and international reserves grew U$S600 million, more than 1967 IRs. So, it’s evident, that if in an adverse political context, the economy had that performance, in a much stable one, it would have been even better.
( 3)The "special trial forums " existed from 1971 to 1973, and were a "legal" way to fight guerrillas. They were dropped in Cámpora's government and attorneys who were involved, suddenly became helpless to increasing streght of guerrilla power.
His partner is a lifetime anti peronist, who became part in the so called (and failed) Revolution of 1951, against Perón, and the reason he spent 4 years in a prison in Ushuaia; is General Alejandro Agustin Lanusse. Since 1966 President Aramburu’s Secretary of Defence and had close ties with him, not only friendship but ideologically from at least November 1955, when Lanusse, chief of Granaderos, supported Aramburu to succeed Lonardi. Lanusse kept the Army under control, neutralizing nationalists and the most hard liners anti-peronist men, during second half of the ‘60s, and supporting the gradualism in Aramburu’s plan to “reintroduce” peronism into political life.
Aramburu prearranged Lanusse as his successor but the needs of a new civil president, an agreement with Perón, and certain political circumstances sideways with the popular mood and social conflicts, along with Peron’s ability at negotiation table, invert the roles and that was the reason why Paladino was appointed as President.
Eventually, Lanusse was chosen as Paladino’s VP candidate, because of his leading conditions into the Army, and his anti peronist past, vital to kept aside any kind of resistance against Aramburu’s apertures to Peron and his acolytes.
Besides, Aramburu’s last year at the Office saw the beginning of isolated terrorists’ actions, as the attack against some guards in Campo de Mayo, and many violent demonstrations in several provinces. May ’68 in France, leftist turn of many members of Catholic Church after Medellin Conference, and Cuba’s support to Latin American guerrillas, as part of Cold War strategy, made noise in Argentina, and that was found of concern for Armed Forces, business men, elements of Catholic Church and even peronist trade unions. All led the way to appoint to General Lanusse as vice-president.
Moslty Taken From "Que hubiera pasado si...." By Rosendo Fraga - Editorial Vergara - 2008.
Back to the past…1962….
Aramburu came to office due his victory at the 1964 presidential elections, succeeding Arturo Frondizi, who never recovered properly of March, 1962 crisis, when hardly survived to be overthrown by a military coup. Aramburu’s role was key to Frondizi’s surviving, as he was appointed as Minister of Interior, creating a “national unity” cabinet to allow Frondizi to end his presidential term, although in a weak position.
Early in 1963, President Frondizi launched to his Minister, General Aramburu, as presidential candidate to neutralize any kind of tensions or coup attempts assuming “peronism is back” to do so, like in March 1962. That was something that Frondizi contemplated from as earlier as 1960 to shield himself. Also he recognized the role Aramburu had in 1958, when he gave power after elections, despite heavy pressure from the Navy, and antiperonists civilian and army sectors.
Amidst the political crisis due Andres Framini’s victory, a peronist and textile trade unionist, in that March 1962, four provinces took by peronist parties were intervened, even Buenos Aires. Representing the Army, the Secretary of War proposed not to make any intervention of two provinces won by “neoperonists”, Salta and Neuquén, and not to close the Congress as the Navy wanted. Aramburu, as appointed Minister on March, 27, executed this political plan.
Aramburu, as presidential candidate, created some resistance to Frondizi inside his party UCRI. But President Frondizi was able to dominate them when the vice-presidency slot could be filled with UCRI candidates, as well as the term for Governor of Buenos Aires. That province, along with the other three intervened provinces, chose their authorities in February 1964. Oscar Alende returned, that way, as Buenos Aires Governor, pushing UCRI towards Aramburu, who had as a VP partner to Afredo Vitolo, former Minister prior March 1962. Conservatives from other provinces, Christian Democracy, and neoperonists parties from Salta and Neuquén backed Aramburu and UCRI. Vicente Solano Lima’s Popular Conservatism obtained vice governor candidacy at Alberto Fonrouge hands, together with Alende. That’s why Perón released some votes in favour to Aramburu- Vitolo, in Buenos Aires, despite, and officially the posture was VOTE IN WHITE. Nevertheless only one of four peronist heard Peron’s instructions, as happened in 1957 and 1958.
Against this winning formula, Ricardo Balbin from UCR had little chances, as six years before.
Argentinian economy had a sustained growing path, especially during second half of the ‘60s; his Economy minister was Adalberto Krieger Vasena, who was a minor part of his team in economic affairs during Aramburu’s defacto government after anti Perón’s coup. Now as his Economy Minister, had a GDP growth of 6% annual from 1966 a 1970, public debt reduced in almost a 40% and international reserves grew U$S 1 billion (or 1000 millions, if you wanted) (in 1969 dollars) (2)
Before 1966 elections, Aramburu established a dialogue channel with Perón through emissaries, and peronism is allowed to compete in wide range under “Unión Popular” banner, for governor in 19 of 22 provinces and for renewing half of the Congress. Because Buenos Aires province is not into the game, peronist triumphs became not so alarmists, and neoperonist parties became blossoming in other provinces as result.
In 1968 elections, Unión Popular presented as candidate to BsAs, to Jorge Daniel Paladino, Peron’s personal emissary for dialoguing with Aramburu, in chats that are of public domain from a little time before that. Paladino’s victory was not that traumatic as Framini’s one during Frondizi’s days. Antiperonism has lost edge, and peronism had moderated itself in great part.
Paladino’s brief administration in Buenos Aires was equilibrated, and had a good economic moment, faced firmly to radicalized sectors of his party. His presidential candidacy, supported as well as for Aramburu and Frondizi, backed for a prestigious general as VP, as Lanusse, it’s a political synthesis of that Argentina: a civil and a military, peronist and anti peronist.
Despite the gamble, Peron’s reason was about too much about fearing CGT secretary Vandor’s growing prestige, eclipsed him for the control of peronism and could be able to took himself negotiation power in front of Aramburu and Lanusse’s eyes. From that time, Peron had almost 15 years in exile. The gamble was aimed to discipline to his trade union allies as well.
President Paladino 1970 - 1976
Paladino’s presidency was not an easy one, the guerrilla which appeared in Aramburu’s last days, became stronger at early ‘70s. The government reacts with the creation of a Special Trial Forums( 3), which among 1971 and 1975, arrested and put into trial to almost a thousand guerrilla men. In 1973, Juan Domingo Perón returned to the country, and Paladino as president and Lanusse as VP, gave him back his military grade as General. Perón condemned guerrilla and to this minuscule leftist sector of his party. He died a year later, receiving a state honour funeral.
In late 1974, when rumours about next president candidates started, guerrilla was reduced and dominated, like in Brazil and in cost of human lives a lot less comparing to Chile.
The year 1975 was highly marked by discussions into the government; Peronists, now in power, wanted more space for themselves, as usual. Actually they wanted it all. But former anti peronists, now “non peronist”, didn’t want to stretch their portion, acting more like a dam. This affected the national economy a little more, still in aching due oil crisis. Trade unionist toughened their demands, but didn’t launch a “national strike” because the president, after all, was peronist. Provincial elections, marked several peronist formulas in triumph, which helped to persuade everyone that next presidential formula must be 100% peronist. But not any peronist.
Negotiations between Army, led by VP Lanusse and new Army Chief, General Leandro Anaya; along with trade union bosses, Lorenzo Miguel, and CGT’s General Secretary, Jose Ignacio Rucci. From that, consensus formula will be Angel Federico Robledo for President – Italo Luder for VP; both have excellent relationship with syndical power and militar power and industrial managers. Although Lorenzo Miguel would rather prefer Luder, eventually Robledo was appointed because he was Defence Minister from 1970 to 1974, and suggested to that charge by Perón himself.
Robledo – Luder defeated UCR formula Balbín - De La Rúa, but in ballotage, because in first round they didn’t reach 45% and difference between them is no more than 10% and the electors cannot conciliate and aren’t enough to proclaim them winners. That way, peronism made their worst election in history, but eventually they won, again. Robledo, as new president, name UCR people in second and third line of the government, and some socialists, in a facto alliance with radicals, a facto alliance that would no longer exist by 1980..
After 1974-75 economic emergencies, due oil crisis, Argentinian economy had good years from 1976 until 1981, a year before of Robledo’s end of term. Inflation rates, which were at 35% annual in 1975, slowed down to 18% annual in 1978.
That was the country at the time FIFA World Cup Argentina ’78 started.
(1)Paladino was a peronist politician, member of the so called “Resistencia peronista” from late ‘50s and early ‘60s. He was Perón personal deputy but he was not an automat, having great personality and deep personal convictions. Paladino had all access to Perón’s circle and Montoneros and JP (Juventud Peronista), peronism leftist wing, hated Paladino and tried to create a false image of his persona, like a “Lanusse double agent” , but he was far from that, as numerous bibliography corroborate. In OTL, Perón changed Paladino for Cámpora in late 1971, in plan to harden his tactics against General Lanusse, in a time where extremism started to flourish and Perón tried to took advantage from that to his plans. That’s why Cámpora, not because of his figure itself but for the leftist wing that surrounded him. Eventually Cámpora will be presidential candidate in 1973, and due his poor control of left wing, now armed left wing, made Peron to come back to Argentina “to put order” . Paladino wrote Perón, telling him that he was not an anti commie, and adverted him about “marxist infiltration” and how dangerous would be to allow that in order to use them as a political instrument, and how leftist wing is trying to re write history with a “Marxist Evita”, in 1969.
(2) Adalberto Krieger Vasena in OTL was actually a minor part of economic team after anti Perón’s coup in 1956. He was Minister of Economy of De Facto President, General Onganía, from 1967 to early 1970, and his fate was tied to his boss’ fate, who had to resign in june 1970. Actual economic issues saw a GDP growth 4,7% in 1968 and 8% in 1969, inflation rates was less than 10% a year, public debt was reduced in a 31% and international reserves grew U$S600 million, more than 1967 IRs. So, it’s evident, that if in an adverse political context, the economy had that performance, in a much stable one, it would have been even better.
( 3)The "special trial forums " existed from 1971 to 1973, and were a "legal" way to fight guerrillas. They were dropped in Cámpora's government and attorneys who were involved, suddenly became helpless to increasing streght of guerrilla power.
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