Alternate Electoral Maps III
- Thread starter killertahu22
- Start date
Nevada definitely not, maybe Bentsen being from Texas would have helped him in New Mexico though
Here's a larger version of the map from here, of the 2009 Pakistan election in my United Front Continued TL
Pakistan still sees a reaction against the PML-Q of Musharraf. But unlike in OTL where the PPP and PML-N were the primary opposition parties, there's also a third major opposition party, the Islamic Worker's Party (IWP), in red, with support both in urban areas and in the rural mountainous north/west regions. The PPP, led by Ameen Faheem, form a coalition with the IWP, just narrowly short of a majority with the two parties by themselves and getting support from some additional minor left leaning parties
Pakistan still sees a reaction against the PML-Q of Musharraf. But unlike in OTL where the PPP and PML-N were the primary opposition parties, there's also a third major opposition party, the Islamic Worker's Party (IWP), in red, with support both in urban areas and in the rural mountainous north/west regions. The PPP, led by Ameen Faheem, form a coalition with the IWP, just narrowly short of a majority with the two parties by themselves and getting support from some additional minor left leaning parties
Before Gustavo Gonzalez was elected Governor in 2006, he was a respected academic; though his main focus was economics, and particularly the 'currency question', he also wrote extensively on the politics of his home state. In particular, his 2003 monograph "Bimodal Political Convergence and Electoral Institutions in West Kansas" is still considered a required read for both observers of the politics of the state (renamed "Arapaho" in 2011) and institutionalists within the academic field of government.
In the 1920s, the two main parties of Arapaho were under threat. Both the National Grange and the People's Party feared the rise of special-issue third parties; the Prohibition Party, which combined the Social Gospel, proto-feminism, and a slight hint of anti-immigrant sentiment, and the Christian Party, the political wing of the Apostolic religious movement. Neither party ever managed to get above 10% of the vote in any election, but their strategy of focusing intensively on individual seats (with the Christians outright setting up thousand-resident towns for electoral reasons) meant that they were able to prevent majorities in the House of Representatives on a regular basis. In order to subvert this, the parties combined to reform the electoral laws; parties would be competing for larger, multi-member, constituencies, too large for the smaller parties to effectively 'bust'.
Times changed. West Kansas was invaded and occupied by Mexico during the Great American War, then counter-invaded by the United States. After the disastrous commodities bust of the 1970s, its governorship was held by the modernizing autocrat Stephen Howe, then the liberalizer David Haddad, who founded the Liberal Party and helped build the suburban voting bloc that kept it in power. The Ecological Party rose to a strong third party, then was welded into coalition with the Liberals, on the innovation that parties could allow members of other parties to run on their tickets; the right-of-center dealt with its uncertainties and conflicts over Howe, the expediencies of wartime government, what it owed to the Texian-American alliance that had liberated it, and how to deal with the growing suburbs and decaying mining towns, emerging as a center-right United Republican Party and a far-right Patriots' Alliance, held together in the same way. Soon after, the left-wing Social Democrats emerged from a strike wave, made an alliance of convenience with the Liberals, then underwent their own changes as socially conservative Apostolic churches spread like wildfire through the First Nations and white-allophone communities that formed its base.
Gonzalez' thesis was that the nature of the coalition essentially forced third parties like the Ecological Party into exact coherence with one or the other alliance. In coalition, the Ecological Party could not campaign on policies where it disagreed with the Liberals without undermining their own chances; in government, the party would be bound to its coalition partner by the threat of dialing back or withdrawing the coalition. The same was true of the Liberals, of course, but the Liberals' larger size gave them far more bargaining power. This was borne out, eventually, by statistical data; the median Ecological Party representative voted only slightly less with the Liberal Party line than the median Liberal, and the mean Ecological representative actually voted more consistently along the party line, due to the presence of several longtime members whose personal vote made up for their thorough disagreement with the party platform.
2022, though, saw that theory stretched to its breaking point. The House elected in 2018 had been a powerhouse of environmental legislation; newly-elected Governor Ida Bullock and newly-elected Presiding Officer of the House of Representatives David L. Dahl had pushed through substantial legislation to decarbonize the electric system, improve mass transit, and establish a cap and trade system. But the next term saw agendas diverge and tempers flare on both sides, with major issues like foreign policy and welfare programs revealing fundamental differences between the two parties. In the end, Bullock and about two-thirds of the Ecological caucus walked, with the remainder joining up with dissident Liberals to form the Women's Equality Party.
The Ecologists initially considered going it alone, but polls indicated that they would face similar difficulties in breaking through to their long-ago predecessors. Thus, Bullock took a step that would have been unusual most other places in North America. The Ecologists were not as ardently left-wing as their counterparts in Ohio, let alone Kanawha or Mexico, but they were generally slightly to the left of the Liberals, whose base was among the upwardly mobile and already upper-class, on economics. Nevertheless, the differences between it and the right were not substantial enough to prevent the United Republican-Ecological-Patriot alliance from becoming a real thing.
The rest was pure mathematics. Some voters who had formerly been drawn to the Ecological Party saw its recent issues as petty politics, and others saw Women's Equality as a truer expression of their principles, but enough voters still crossed over to flip forty-five seats, thirty-five of them in the affluent and Ecological-friendly northern suburbs and outer neighborhoods of El Dorado. That was enough to erase the Liberals' solid majority and make Antonio Sarpalio the new Presiding Officer, even as the growing tourism industry and its skepticism of environmental regulations flipped one district on the western border.
According to Google Trends over the last 24 hrs. Bad guys win again.
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Here’s a thing tied into the ATL I was doing in the Wikiboxes thread (I’m still planning the next instalment proper): the 1989 European election in the UK held under PR.
As mentioned in the Roy Jenkins infobox, he changed the European Parliament electoral system to PR during his second term, and the 1989 elections- the first held after new Tory PM Michael Heseltine took over- saw Labour win out with 35 seats to 33 for the Tories, but the real success story of the election was from the still very new Green Party. Taking 14.6% of the vote, easily the highest any party besides the main three had ever won, the PR system allowed it to take 12 seats in the UK delegation to the European Parliament.
This would represent a high point the party has never managed to exceed, but the result was nonetheless a wake-up call to Heseltine, who started to push for motions towards renewable energy to allay the concerns of middle-class voters who had only recently learned about the hole in the Ozone Layer and voted accordingly, as well as being an opportunity to go after an area full of Labour voters his party had little need to avoid upsetting.
As mentioned in the Roy Jenkins infobox, he changed the European Parliament electoral system to PR during his second term, and the 1989 elections- the first held after new Tory PM Michael Heseltine took over- saw Labour win out with 35 seats to 33 for the Tories, but the real success story of the election was from the still very new Green Party. Taking 14.6% of the vote, easily the highest any party besides the main three had ever won, the PR system allowed it to take 12 seats in the UK delegation to the European Parliament.
This would represent a high point the party has never managed to exceed, but the result was nonetheless a wake-up call to Heseltine, who started to push for motions towards renewable energy to allay the concerns of middle-class voters who had only recently learned about the hole in the Ozone Layer and voted accordingly, as well as being an opportunity to go after an area full of Labour voters his party had little need to avoid upsetting.
It's been a really long time since I've done a China TL provincial map, but I finally got round to doing the map and research to write up another one! Here's Guangxi.
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Guangxi, the Chinese province with by far the biggest population of Zhuang, China’s largest ethnic minority group by number (as of 2021 they number 18 million and make up about 32% of Guangxi’s population), has a storied political backdrop heavily influenced by its role in the early republican era. Its initial warlord leaders, the so-called Old Guangxi clique, helped prevent the imperial uprising of Yuan Shikai, but after feuding with Sun Yat-sen was occupied by Cantonese forces and replaced by the New Guangxi clique led by Bai Chongxi and Li Zongren. The New clique proved more successful in war, winning the Yunnan-Guangxi War and making Li a major underling of Sun and then Chiang Kai-shek.
Li was also a fierce anti-communist, playing a prominent role in the Shanghai massacre in 1927 and crushing the Communist-led Baise Uprising in 1929. Ironically, this prompted Bai to become much more progressive, and instigated the Reconstruction of Guangxi during the early to mid-1930s. This would define the nature of the province’s politics for the rest of the authoritarian period- Kuomintang officials, while dominant like just about everywhere else in the nation, were split between the conservative Li faction, led for much of the mid-20th century by Li Pinxian, and the progressive Bai faction, whose leading light after Bai himself died was He Zhuguo.
The province’s fractious Kuomintang would take a bloodier turn after Bai’s death in 1966, as despite being his designated successor, He had been an advocate of peace in the Central Plains War, meaning the conservatives and even some progressives saw him as a stooge of Chiang. Consequently, violent conflict broke out between the pro- and anti-He factions, leading to the Guangxi Massacre in which tens if not hundreds of thousands of people were killed in violent skirmishes, some between civilians and others instigated by troops and secret police to try to quash anti-Chiang dissent.
This conflict allowed He to ascend to co-governor, but the conflicts persisted until at least 1970 due to conflict over Li Pinxian succeeding Li Zongren when the latter died in spring 1969; these conflicts were heavily censored and suppressed by the National Revolutionary Army the whole time, and Beijing turning a blind eye to the conflict for the following 19 years proved integral in the people of Guangxi backing the Tiananmen Square Revolution.
Once the Revolution and the new constitution brought in a new government, Guangxi’s politics has been heavily fractious. One might assume the progressive wing of the Kuomintang would jump ship to, well, the Progressives, but in truth it has retained a foothold in the provincial Kuomintang. Its influence can be seen in things like the province’s fairly strong affirmative action laws, the mixed-member proportional electoral system and the population-based FPTP districts.
The unity behind the wings of the Kuomintang has helped keep it from losing power to the Progressives for much of the province’s democratic history (though it voted in a majority-Progressive National Congress delegation in 2009 and Progressive President Jiang Jielian in 2020), which is perhaps a great surprise given how well the Progressives do with non-Han voters in much of the rest of China.
A major reason for the fractiousness of the province’s politics is of course the racial divide. The Progressives get the vast majority of the Zhuang vote and the left-wing Han vote, the Loyalists do well in Han-majority areas with a sizeable Zhuang population pushing them towards alarmism, the Communists have pockets of support that have been radical since before the party was first crushed, and the Greens have started to make headway in parts of the larger cities like Guillin and Nanning. One local-only feature of the province is the Zhuang National Party (ZNP), which as the name suggests advocates for indigenous rights and nationalism in the province.
The 2021 election was a particularly hard-fought one, as the Kuomintang’s leader Chen Wu had gradually become unpopular since ascending to the Premiership in 2012. Conservatives saw his status as a Zhuang leader as tokenistic and Chen himself as too moderate, and left-wingers were disappointed by his lack of progress in anti-discrimination policies, but his handling of the COVID-19 pandemic was particularly harshly viewed, as the province’s non-Han population suffered notably worse rates of infection and deaths than the Han people who live there.
The opposition parties hammered Chen on all this, and while he clawed back ground by attacking Progressive leader Chen Ji Sheng for supposedly being a ‘radical adherent’ of President Jiang rather than a ‘moderating presence’, it wasn’t enough to come ahead of the Progressives in either the FPTP or PR districts.
With a combined 122 seats to 117 for the Kuomintang, Chen Ji Sheng managed to secure the confidence of the province’s legislature and retake control of Guangxi for the Progressives for the first time in 9 years. Whether the more ideological demands of his government’s allies like the Communists, Greens and ZNP will see it fall before 2024 remains to be seen.
Chinese provincial/city council election maps
Beijing
Guangdong
Chongqing
Shaanxi
Inner Mongolia
Shanxi
Sichuan
Tibet
Qinghai
Xinjiang/East Turkestan referendum
Fujian
Hubei
Shanghai (2015)
Hainan
Jiangsu
Jilin
Shanghai (2021)
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Guangxi, the Chinese province with by far the biggest population of Zhuang, China’s largest ethnic minority group by number (as of 2021 they number 18 million and make up about 32% of Guangxi’s population), has a storied political backdrop heavily influenced by its role in the early republican era. Its initial warlord leaders, the so-called Old Guangxi clique, helped prevent the imperial uprising of Yuan Shikai, but after feuding with Sun Yat-sen was occupied by Cantonese forces and replaced by the New Guangxi clique led by Bai Chongxi and Li Zongren. The New clique proved more successful in war, winning the Yunnan-Guangxi War and making Li a major underling of Sun and then Chiang Kai-shek.
Li was also a fierce anti-communist, playing a prominent role in the Shanghai massacre in 1927 and crushing the Communist-led Baise Uprising in 1929. Ironically, this prompted Bai to become much more progressive, and instigated the Reconstruction of Guangxi during the early to mid-1930s. This would define the nature of the province’s politics for the rest of the authoritarian period- Kuomintang officials, while dominant like just about everywhere else in the nation, were split between the conservative Li faction, led for much of the mid-20th century by Li Pinxian, and the progressive Bai faction, whose leading light after Bai himself died was He Zhuguo.
The province’s fractious Kuomintang would take a bloodier turn after Bai’s death in 1966, as despite being his designated successor, He had been an advocate of peace in the Central Plains War, meaning the conservatives and even some progressives saw him as a stooge of Chiang. Consequently, violent conflict broke out between the pro- and anti-He factions, leading to the Guangxi Massacre in which tens if not hundreds of thousands of people were killed in violent skirmishes, some between civilians and others instigated by troops and secret police to try to quash anti-Chiang dissent.
This conflict allowed He to ascend to co-governor, but the conflicts persisted until at least 1970 due to conflict over Li Pinxian succeeding Li Zongren when the latter died in spring 1969; these conflicts were heavily censored and suppressed by the National Revolutionary Army the whole time, and Beijing turning a blind eye to the conflict for the following 19 years proved integral in the people of Guangxi backing the Tiananmen Square Revolution.
Once the Revolution and the new constitution brought in a new government, Guangxi’s politics has been heavily fractious. One might assume the progressive wing of the Kuomintang would jump ship to, well, the Progressives, but in truth it has retained a foothold in the provincial Kuomintang. Its influence can be seen in things like the province’s fairly strong affirmative action laws, the mixed-member proportional electoral system and the population-based FPTP districts.
The unity behind the wings of the Kuomintang has helped keep it from losing power to the Progressives for much of the province’s democratic history (though it voted in a majority-Progressive National Congress delegation in 2009 and Progressive President Jiang Jielian in 2020), which is perhaps a great surprise given how well the Progressives do with non-Han voters in much of the rest of China.
A major reason for the fractiousness of the province’s politics is of course the racial divide. The Progressives get the vast majority of the Zhuang vote and the left-wing Han vote, the Loyalists do well in Han-majority areas with a sizeable Zhuang population pushing them towards alarmism, the Communists have pockets of support that have been radical since before the party was first crushed, and the Greens have started to make headway in parts of the larger cities like Guillin and Nanning. One local-only feature of the province is the Zhuang National Party (ZNP), which as the name suggests advocates for indigenous rights and nationalism in the province.
The 2021 election was a particularly hard-fought one, as the Kuomintang’s leader Chen Wu had gradually become unpopular since ascending to the Premiership in 2012. Conservatives saw his status as a Zhuang leader as tokenistic and Chen himself as too moderate, and left-wingers were disappointed by his lack of progress in anti-discrimination policies, but his handling of the COVID-19 pandemic was particularly harshly viewed, as the province’s non-Han population suffered notably worse rates of infection and deaths than the Han people who live there.
The opposition parties hammered Chen on all this, and while he clawed back ground by attacking Progressive leader Chen Ji Sheng for supposedly being a ‘radical adherent’ of President Jiang rather than a ‘moderating presence’, it wasn’t enough to come ahead of the Progressives in either the FPTP or PR districts.
With a combined 122 seats to 117 for the Kuomintang, Chen Ji Sheng managed to secure the confidence of the province’s legislature and retake control of Guangxi for the Progressives for the first time in 9 years. Whether the more ideological demands of his government’s allies like the Communists, Greens and ZNP will see it fall before 2024 remains to be seen.
Chinese provincial/city council election maps
Beijing
Guangdong
Chongqing
Shaanxi
Inner Mongolia
Shanxi
Sichuan
Tibet
Qinghai
Xinjiang/East Turkestan referendum
Fujian
Hubei
Shanghai (2015)
Hainan
Jiangsu
Jilin
Shanghai (2021)
I'm guessing Bush tried to reinstate the draft for Afghanistan and/or Iraq?
A preview of a Nelson Rockefeller vs. George Wallace election in 1968 w/o a left-wing third party... as you would expect, Wallace does rather poorly outside the Deep South.
I dare to wonder what the electoral map looks like in this alternate 2004.
How did this happen in 2004?
With that kinda result in West Virginia in 2004 is Jay Rockefeller on the ticket?
How did this happen in 2004?
No, but another Virginian is at the top of the ticket.
Yes, he's the running mate. why do you think the Republican candidate did so poorly overall though?
Update #1 on the alternate 1968 county map I'm working on:
Yet again, Rockefeller is dominant everywhere outside the Deep South. does Wallace end up winning any states other than MS and AL?
Yet again, Rockefeller is dominant everywhere outside the Deep South. does Wallace end up winning any states other than MS and AL?
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