Alternate Electoral Maps III

And here is the 2012 state map for the Ferguson Scenario:

2012 State Map.png

Henry Ferguson (D-TX)/Amy Klobuchar (D-MN)-54.77%-421 EV
W. Mitt Romney (R-MA)/J. Edward Sununu (R-NH)-44.34%-117 EV
Others-0.89%-0 EV
 
Decided to see how much of a swing would be needed to get Hoover to win the 1932 Presidential election. The minimum swing appears to be 8.9%
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Hoover wins the popular vote by .1%.
 
This is a county map for @Reagent's mini-TL "Change Deferred," where Barack Obama is assassinated during the 2008 primaries and Hillary Clinton becomes President. She loses re-election to Mitt Romney in 2012, and in 2016 Trump runs as a Democrat with a populist style similar to his OTL 2016 run but with liberal stances on issues like healthcare and the environment. In a mirror result of OTL 2016, Trump wins decently in the Electoral College but loses the popular vote to Romney as the result of a strong showing in working class areas but bleeding support among college educated voters in metropolitan areas. The wikibox showing the results by state and popular vote numbers can be seen on Reagent's original post here.

There's no way that mini-TL's version of Trump does worse than a typical Democrat in California's Central Valley. If anything, he'd do significantly better.

EDIT: Just noticed the map has him doing worse than the average Democrat in Imperial County and South Texas too. In this scenario, he'd definitely do way better in those places, even more so than in the Central Valley.
 
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There's no way that mini-TL's version of Trump does worse than a typical Democrat in California's Central Valley. If anything, he'd do significantly better.

EDIT: Just noticed the map has him doing worse than the average Democrat in Imperial County and South Texas too. In this scenario, he'd definitely do way better in those places, even more so than in the Central Valley.
In this scenario Romney gets really strong numbers with Hispanics. The mini-TL focuses on Trump's campaign, not Romney's, so I'm not sure what he does to outreach to them. Reagent used a model to calculate the margins by state- Trump wins California by just 9.7% and New Mexico by 1.9%, while Romney wins Texas by 26% and Arizona by 29.3%.
 
In this scenario Romney gets really strong numbers with Hispanics. The mini-TL focuses on Trump's campaign, not Romney's, so I'm not sure what he does to outreach to them. Reagent used a model to calculate the margins by state- Trump wins California by just 9.7% and New Mexico by 1.9%, while Romney wins Texas by 26% and Arizona by 29.3%.
This is a minor nitpick, but I don't think that Arizona county map reflects a near 30-point GOP win. Maricopa would have to be R>60% and the rurals would have to be redder as well
 
In this scenario Romney gets really strong numbers with Hispanics.

I don't see why though. This scenario's Trump has all the populist rhetorical style of OTL, with none of the anti-Hispanic xenophobia (the post even has him vocally supporting a path to citizenship for DREAMers). That's a recipe for a really good performance among rural Hispanic voters.

The mini-TL focuses on Trump's campaign, not Romney's, so I'm not sure what he does to outreach to them.

Something different than what he did in OTL 2012, that's for sure. Romney actually did worse than McCain in most of the places I'm talking about. In some cases significantly worse.

It seems like this aspect of Reagent's scenario is based on the mistaken idea that rural Hispanics are politically identical to suburbanites in Chicago's collar counties, just because those counties swung similarly in 2016. In reality, anti-elitist, vulgar, "bring the jobs back" populism plays really well in these places, provided that it isn't paired with demonization of Mexican immigrants.
 
Time for another China TL provincial election map!

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Hainan Province, the southernmost of the Republic of China, comprises the entirety of Hainan Island. It was originally part of Guangdong and Guangxi Provinces prior to World War II, and was (ironically given its modern politics) a hotbed for the early Communists in the 1920s and 30s. It came to prominence during the Second World War when it was occupied by the Imperial Japanese forces, and from then until the Japanese surrender in 1945 a guerrilla campaign coordinated between General Xue Yue (inspired by the tactics of Zhang Xueliang) and the indigenous Hlai peoples of Hainan resisted the occupying forces.

Xue, a firm friend of Western generals known by some as the ‘Patton of Asia’ and the ‘God of War’, would continue to be a significant figure in Hainan’s politics once the island became a province of its own. In the immediate aftermath of the war, Xue was able to convince Chiang to grant Hainan the right to form its own independent province, and as its Premier he was unusually progressive in promoting causes such as race relations, in no small part thanks to his support from the Hlai during the war.

Until the democratic era, politics in Hainan was generally very quiet and pro-Kuomintang, mostly due to Xue’s influence stifling the allegiance of non-Han Chinese towards reform. Indeed, Xue would become one of only a handful of Kuomintang provincial leaders to retain control of their province once federal democracy was introduced, as he shrewdly backed the Tiananmen Square Revolution and enjoyed favourable views among the people of Hainan. He led the party to two landslide victories in 1991 and 1996, and despite being 94 and 98 at the time, was a well-liked Premier.

When Xue died in May 1998, the last of the old Kuomintang warhorses to pass away, the province went into mourning; President Jiang Zemin led the address at his funeral, which was watched by almost 120 million Chinese, around 10% of the country. As a result, it was assumed that another victory for the Kuomintang under new Premier Liang Xiang, who had been a key reformist ally of Xue throughout his rule, was assured. However, in December of that year, Liang died too, and Deng Hongxun was promoted to replace him, with the general consensus being that Deng was basically hand-picked by Jiang.

The 2001 election was consequently one of the biggest upsets in Chinese political history. Deng faced an unexpectedly tough campaign by Zhu Mingguo, a Li Progressive who railed against Deng for corruption allegations and other shady dealings by the Kuomintang, particularly his connections with Jiang, and accused him of betraying Xue’s legacy by refusing to support an affirmative action programme for the Li and Datong people in the island’s south. Zhu just about squeezed a minority government, and managed to secure a small majority in 2006 thanks to his personal popularity at the time. He was briefly even floated as a potential future presidential nominee for this success.

In 2011, though, things went badly wrong for the Progressives. Zhu’s Cabinet faced credible allegations of bribery, the economy was tanking, and Lin’s efforts to blame these issues on anti-Li racism were largely dismissed (some Li started speaking in favour of other parties to distance themselves from Zhu, and even Hainan’s sole Progressive Congressman, Yan Zhifang, denounced him). The Progressives suffered the worst defeat of a governing party in a Chinese provincial election until the 2019 Jiangsu election.

Things turned around for the Progressives very quickly, though. The Loyalists, led by the elderly and very right-wing Liu Jianfeng, were the only real opposition to new Premier Luo Baoming, and with Zhu very publicly denounced by the party, people were starting to warm to them again. Consequently, when one of the Kuomintang also-rans who snatched a generally strong Progressive seat in Lingshui in 2011 had to resign due to corruption charges in 2014, Yan Zhifang, who had lost his National Congress seat in the Kuomintang’s 2013 landslide, ran for it and easily won the special election. He would spend the next two years leading up to the 2016 provincial election hammering Luo on populist grounds, and since his complaints about the mistreatment of Li people a) included other ethnicities in Hainan and b) weren’t tarnished by appalling abuses of power like bribery, he managed to massively narrow the gap between the two parties.

Yan’s efforts made a huge dent in the Kuomintang’s hold on the province, as they fell to just 56 of 127 seats in the legislature and were forced to get the support of the Loyalists (who held up quite well thanks to Luo’s greater visibility) and Economic Liberals to make up the numbers.

At first glance, one might think the Progressives only need one more heave to regain control of the province in 2021, but in reality the situation is not quite so favourable to them. Yan, who just barely failed to regain his National Congress seat, is running for it again this year, which has undermined his credentials among left-wing residents of Hainan, and his initially widely panned response to the COVID-19 crisis has been adapted and received a more positive reception over time. Consequently, the Kuomintang are leading in the polls.

Oh, and in case you’re wondering what the city and county at-large seats are, they’re the source of a popular joke among anti-Kuomintang people in Hainan that they’re ‘a counterbalance to the electoral system being too fair’. In actuality, of course, they’re really no more or less democratic than the US Senate’s seats, with the same principle of every city and county getting the same amount of members from the vote for those districts as the more populous cities and towns. As a result, Hainan is occasionally called Shuāngchóng tóupiào shěng (雙重投票省), meaning ‘the double vote province’, since voters get to elect one member to their fairly proportionally-sized district (at least compared to provinces like Guangdong and Fujian where all the members are elected by county) and one from their city or county.

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Chinese provincial/city council election maps
Beijing
Guangdong
Chongqing
Shaanxi
Inner Mongolia
Shanxi
Sichuan
Tibet
Qinghai
Xinjiang/East Turkestan referendum
Fujian
Hubei
Shanghai
 
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And another China TL provincial election map. (Also, fun fact: this is the 15th provincial election I've shown, so technically speaking I'm halfway through!)

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2019 was a striking year in terms of provincial elections, but the most spectacular of these without a doubt was that of Jiangsu. Jiangsu province is, of course, the home of Nanjing, which has in several eras (such as under the Ming dynasty and from when the Kuomintang took power in 1927 until after the Second World War) been the capital of China, and the efforts of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to turn the city into a capital have endeared its residents to the party for decades since. This resolve was only strengthened after the city was ravaged by Imperial Japanese forces during the Second World War, with the puppet government of Wang Jingwei and the Nanking Massacre facing insurgent resistance supported by Chiang’s forces.

Unfortunately for Nanjing, the immense damage caused to the city was not something the postwar Kuomintang government felt could be solved by turning it into the nation’s capital, and so the capital was moved to Beijing despite Chiang’s discomfort with such a move. To pacify Jiangsu’s people, massive spending stimuli were given to Nanjing and the rest of the province that turned Jiangsu into a historical tourism hotspot, with the presidential palace and Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum often being compared to the Imperial Palace of Kyoto and (perhaps less insultingly to its locals) to Windsor Castle.

The major upshot of this is that Jiangsu developing in this way has made the province one of China’s most small-c conservative. Its residents mostly stayed out of the Tiananmen Square Revolution (and the fact they did not outright advocate for the authoritarian Li Peng is often considered one of the major reasons the revolution succeeded), and made little noise about provincial government being established. Consequently, Jiangsu was the last province to hold elections for its provincial legislature, doing so on the 23rd October, 1992. The result was a surprise to nobody- the Kuomintang, led by Taizhou party official Hu Jintao, secured a massive majority.

In many ways, the province’s democratic history has been defined by Hu’s tenure, as he proved a reserved but largely conservative reformist, and under his tenure the province shifted away from neoliberal economics to a degree in order to provide better welfare spending to its residents, as well as surprising observers by switching from a county-based system to an electoral district system for its provincial legislature elections.

Despite this, Hu retained a strongly socially conservative bent, standing up to protests from the province’s small non-Han population (particularly during the 2001 ‘Nanjing incident’, in which protestors surrounded Sun’s memorial on the 90th anniversary of the Wuchan Uprising to condemn ongoing social inequality in China) and rejecting progressive causes like LGBTQ rights and affirmative action. This ensured he secured the continued support of the Kuomintang-supporting Jiangsu public; just two weeks after the ‘Nanjing incident’, he won the Kuomintang a fourth term.

After a decade in power and three provincial election victories, at the end of 2002 Hu stood down as he had pledged to during the 2001 campaign, and was succeeded by Li Yuanchao, a former lecturer at Fudan University who had been a right-hand man of Hu. Li would continue to govern the province in much the same way as Hu had, eventually moderating his rhetoric on social issues as attacking such causes became less politically expedient and only suffering a few seat losses to the Loyalists for his trouble.

Li managed the impressive feat of getting the Kuomintang through the Great Depression unscathed in the province, facing minor surges of the opposition parties in 2007 and 2010 but still comfortably retaining an overall majority, then coasting to victory in 2013 and 2016. A few austerity measures were brought in to keep the province’s GDP up, but all of these were temporary and did not end up incurring the ire of voters that much, particularly as Li was known to rescind such policies as soon as voters started complaining that they were feeling the squeeze.

So, what went wrong? Li and his party only started to get in hot water less than a year before the provincial election, but oh, did they get in hot water. For starters, Li had to resign in ignominy in April of that year after it was announced his doctoral dissertation had been plagiarised, and he made things a lot worse by denying it for almost a month until Zhang Mingeng confirmed Li had plagiarised from him as reported.

The humiliating demise of a leader after almost 17 years in power was, to put it mildly, not a good look for the Kuomintang with the people of Jiangsu, and overnight Li was transformed into the epitome of everything wrong with Jiangsu to the residents of poorer provinces and an embarrassment to the province to its own people. The Kuomintang picked to succeed him the younger and lower-profile Wu Zhenglong over Li Xueyong, a former academic who had formerly been supportive of Li Yuanchao and had turned hard against him.

Soon after this, two things undermined Wu’s premiership very quickly: first, Li (Xueyong) decided to take advantage of the media attention to Wu’s first speech by crossing the floor to sit with the Economic Liberals, distracting from anything on Wu’s agenda and energizing the opposition against him. And secondly, Wu decided to launch a corruption probe into the provincial Kuomintang, which proved fairly disastrous when it leaked that he was suppressing its findings due to the allegations against himself.

As a result of all this, when the election came round the Kuomintang were in a bad way. Li had managed to court a massive amount of former Kuomintang voters and even some of the Assembly members appalled by the corruption cover-up to the Economic Liberals, to the point that the traditionally dominant party of the province were miles behind in the polls. He had also managed to secure huge funding for the election from neighbouring Shanghai’s Keswick family, and cracked down hard on the Kuomintang’s flip-flopping on economic issues.

When election day came, the Economic Liberals had not only made history by kicking the Kuomintang out of power in their strongest province, they had done so by a bigger landslide than any the Kuomintang had managed even at their peaks. On 44% of the vote, they had snatched over 85% of the Jiangsu Provincial Assembly’s seats, not only causing the Kuomintang to lose more than 130 seats but snatching some that had occasionally gone for the Progressives or Loyalists (who took 5 seats between them). Almost every single member of Wu’s Cabinet was defeated, with Wu himself being unseated in Gaochun by 23 points as the Kuomintang were swept from their ancestral home; aside from some bloke in Jiangyan South called Hu Jintao, every Kuomintang representative held or won their seat by less than 20 points.

Speaking of Nanjing, that’s where the most parties were elected of any prefecture in the province; all the Progressives to win seats did so there, as did a single Green and an Independent former student of Guo Quan first elected the year after his mentor took one of Nanjing’s seats in the 2009 National Congress election.

Despite what you might imagine from such a massive landslide, under Li Jiangsu really didn’t change much overnight; it’s occasionally joked that if the Economic Liberals hadn’t won such a dramatic landslide, Li might’ve just used his clout to take over the Kuomintang leadership. This really started to change as 2020 came and the COVID-19 pandemic took hold, with Li establishing himself as more genuinely aligned with the Economic Liberals through behaviour like refusing to endorse President Wang for re-election and implementing tax cuts across the board.

The biggest change, though, was that Li eventually conceded a big point from the party manifesto: the Economic Liberals (and the other minor parties, but especially them) have wanted to switch to PR for decades. Given the enormous majority they’d won in 2019, this was considered likely to go by the wayside, but Li surprised observers in January of 2020, just a few months after the election, by announcing Jiangsu would be switching to a mixed-member system, where the seats would now be half their size but PR lists for each prefecture and city would be elected by voters. This is expected to cut back on the majoritarian nature of the current legislature, but it has been perceived as a shrewd reform very much in keeping with the traditions of political processes in Jiangsu.
 
I don't see why though. This scenario's Trump has all the populist rhetorical style of OTL, with none of the anti-Hispanic xenophobia (the post even has him vocally supporting a path to citizenship for DREAMers). That's a recipe for a really good performance among rural Hispanic voters.



Something different than what he did in OTL 2012, that's for sure. Romney actually did worse than McCain in most of the places I'm talking about. In some cases significantly worse.

It seems like this aspect of Reagent's scenario is based on the mistaken idea that rural Hispanics are politically identical to suburbanites in Chicago's collar counties, just because those counties swung similarly in 2016. In reality, anti-elitist, vulgar, "bring the jobs back" populism plays really well in these places, provided that it isn't paired with demonization of Mexican immigrants.
As I’m not the creator of the timeline I’m not sure what Romney does to get such strong numbers with Hispanics. You may be right that Trump’s populism without the anti immigration parts may do well with them. I’ll ask Reagent about this and see what he says.

EDIT: Reagent says that Romney doesn't get outstandingly strong numbers with Hispanics, but he gets an incumbent boost much like Bush in OTL 2004 and Trump in OTL 2020. Romney's strength in the West mainly comes from strong performances with white voters. Democratic Trump runs as an anti law and order candidate, which also helps Romney appeal to Hispanics.
 
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And finally, here's the revised map of the 2016 election in the Ferguson Scenario, with Ferguson winning reelection against William Pryor:
2016 Election Results by County (Arkana Template).png
 
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Wait a minute? Am I seeing the Deep South and most of West Texas vote for the Marxist party?
Probably not. It looks like the Deep South states (South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana) succeeded from the Union earlier than in real life.

The gray counties of Western Texas are those that I presume haven't been settled enough yet.

All I know is that on the map, the red is for the Republicans, the blue for the Democrats, green for Southern Democrats and yellow for the Constitution Union/what's left of the Whigs.

I wonder who the candidates in this version of the 1860 United States presidential election are.
 
Wait a minute? Am I seeing the Deep South and most of West Texas vote for the Marxist party?
No the Deep South have reverted back to how South Carolina voted until 1860 having no real popular vote, they did this in fear of a growing Southern Republican Party with most of south implementing laws that we’d see in the OTL Jim Crow era.
 
Heres an 1860 election map for a potential TL. POD is simply Marx immigrates to Texas in the early 1840s.
View attachment 635209
Decided to make an electoral map of this. Not as impressive looking but does put a more partisan look of the US at this time.
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I've been trying to figure out what the popular vote and percentages could be, effectively both sides have forgone reconciliation for the most part with the Constitutional Unionist Party doing poorly, while the Republican Party gets several boosts with a larger turnout thanks to labor voters and Northern Democrats abandoning their party in bulk following the anti-democracy turn most of the south took by revoking most of the Jacksonian and Jeffersonian reforms while the Deep South has done away with the vote all together for the Presidency while also outright banning the Republican Party after John Brown.
With such factors Lincoln could have a percentage vote of around 60% but my assumptions could be very off.
 
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