Alternate Electoral Maps III

It's been a long time since I've done an American Federation TL post, but I just made one, so here we go.

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The Republic of Wabash, sometimes described as a key part of the gateway between the North and the South, is also sometimes known as the original home of American socialism, since it was the home of the first socialist party in an AF member state to control the government (and the second one in the world after Australia). For 11 years, Wabashian voters gave three terms in government to Eugene Debs as Prime Minister, a charismatic populist who managed to hold together the disparate socialist-inclined base of the country despite intense factionalism between pro- and anti-immigrant groups, and between trade unionists and anti-capitalists, to accomplish common goals. Even after the party failed to form a government in 1918, Debs was re-elected Prime Minister handily.

(Incidentally, this is a good time to bring up Wabash's odd electoral system, sometimes described as a 'super-separation of powers'. Like in a presidential system, the executive and legislature are elected separately, but the two biggest parties in Parliament advance to a runoff and nominate a member from their caucus, usually their leader, to be candidate for Prime Minister; potentially this can lead to a wrong-winner result of sorts where the PM is from the smaller of the two parties.)

After Debs's death in 1921, however, the Socialists lost their unifying figure and in his absence the Republicans and Liberals (the old two parties that had dominated Wabashian politics before the Socialists came along) took power the following year allied behind a particularly repugnant figure- David Curtiss Stephenson, a Southerner who had moved north and gained support as an advocate of Wabashian nationalism, enacting a program of civil rights suppression towards residents who weren't WASPs (white Anglo-Saxon Protestants) that lasted for decades (another thing that leads to comparisons between Wabashian and Australian politics).

Despite this, after Stephenson's rape and murder convictions, allegations of corruption in the coalition and of course the onset of the Great Depression, the Socialists were able to return to power in 1930 under the leadership of James Oneal, a former personal friend of Debs who enacted numerous public works schemes, though he was unable to ever get enough support to abolish the so-called 'Stephenson Laws'. Around this time, however, developed the big political rivalry of Wabashian politics that lasted until the 1950s, between Oneal and businessman Wendell Willkie, who opposed the expense of Oneal's social programmes and retained considerable personal popularity within the Republican base, though ironically once Willkie came to power he proved a moderate figure until his death in 1944.

In the decades after, Wabashian politics proved to be dominated by colourful socialist and conservative figures who often exchanged between PM and head of the Opposition without their parties trying to get them to resign, both due to personal popularity and since Wabash does not have term limits. The most notable 'rivalries' were between Republican Homer Capehart, who led his party until 1966, and the young 'upstart' Socialist Vance Hartke, under whose administration from 1962-70 Wabash finally abolished its 'Stephenson Laws' and introduced universal healthcare; and between former Mayor of West Fork (Wabash's capital) Richard Lugar's Republicans and Birch Bayh's Socialists, with Bayh taking power in 1974 in a close contest and introducing the Equal Rights Act to reduce sex discrimination and provide affirmative action.

At this point, however, the two-party system of Wabash became more complex: a former Republican, Dan Quayle, managed to capitalize on anti-establishment opposition from both parties to the ERA (which he took to calling 'the error') and the disillusionment of young people to the squabbling nature of Wabashian politics, and established the Wabash National Party (WNP), a right-wing populist group that shocked observers by winning the popular vote and the most seats in the 1982 election and further shocked them when Quayle beat Bayh in the Prime Ministerial runoff election. While the group's momentum faded as far-right entryism became a huge problem for it and Quayle established his incompetence with the voters of Wabash in his two terms (mostly winning in 1986 due to personal popularity despite the Socialists overtaking the WNP in Parliament), it established an anti-establishment undercurrent in Wabash that has never since gone away.

The Republicans would regain power under Robert Orr in 1990, but in 1998 the defining figure of left-wing Wabashian politics since then, Birch Bayh's son Evan, came to power in a landslide. He would go on to win two further terms before being ousted by Republican Dan Coats in the midst of the Great Recession, and many argue that the Socialists have been unable to find a charismatic leader of even close to the same calibre since. A party that has found success in the absence of a big chunk of the voter base for the two strongest parties, however, is the Wabash First Party of another ex-Republican, Mike Pence. Despite being considered quite mockable by the Wabashian left- not least because of the infamous logo for his 2018 Prime Ministerial campaign where it appeared the M of his initials was fellating the P- Pence built up a populist appeal that has been compared to Stephenson a century before, advocating for a burkha ban, withdrawal of contraceptive, abortion and sex education funding, and massive cuts in public spending (beyond even what Coats had been doing for eight years).

The deep divide between right-wing voters in the 2018 election led to a lot of counties (and of course the four of the seven Wabashian constituencies that tend to vote Republican) being very close and the Socialist-inclined areas of the northwestern steel belt cities in Calumet, the White Valley mining regions and cosmopolitan West Fork seeing inflated margins for them, but the Socialists narrowly failed to come through the middle, winning as many seats as the Republicans but being behind both them and Wabash First in the popular vote and thus failing to advance to the runoff.

The runoff itself, of course, proved intensely close in no small part due to the utter disillusionment with both Coats and Pence from left-wing Wabashians, many of whom simply didn't vote; the 2014 runoff between Coats and Socialist Pete Viclosky saw a turnout of 63.8%, but the 2018 runoff saw only 39.5% of voters turn out. Despite (or perhaps because of) Coats proposing a Republican-Socialist coalition if he won, Pence managed to pull ahead by a margin of less than 1%; the Republicans almost instantly ditched Coats as leader and jumped into bed with Wabash First, with the rump of the WNP (which by now is functionally a far-right nationalist grouping) joining him.

This move has badly poisoned the well for the Republicans, with Wabash First reaping most of their strength while the Socialists appear to be solidly in second now, with their party platform devoted to scrapping the 'Pence Laws' and consistent comparisons between Pence and Stephenson to try and encourage voters against the current administration. For his part, Pence has stressed the chasteness of his personal life to try to diffuse the comparison, though policy-wise the disdain for minority groups is something the two administrations do share. Recently, Wabash First's lead has been completely eroded away in the wake of the Wabashian government's incompetent handling of the Coronavirus pandemic, refusing to even force businesses to close or masks to be worn (not to mention its hardline advocates comparing masks to burkhas and the like), with Pence declaring in a speech detailing his response that 'the show must go on'. (Libertarian leader Pete Buttigieg, the leader of the modern successor to the Liberal Party, gained considerable publicity for remarking that 'Mike Pence's 'show' would probably get a 0% on Rotten Tomatoes'.)

It remains to be seen whether the show will go on come 2022- or if Wabash will still have the Coronavirus going on by then and have to postpone elections, for that matter.
 
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1986 Governor Races from No Southern Strategy

Winners:


Alabama: Richard Shelby (D)
Alaska: Wally Hickel (I)
Arizona: Art Hamilton (D)
Arkansas: Bill Clinton (R)
California: Ed Clark (R)

Colorado: Hunter S. Thompson (FP)
Connecticut: Joseph Lieberman (D)
Florida: Jack Eckerd (R)

Georgia: Zell Miller (D)
Hawaii: D. G. Anderson (R)
Idaho: Marvin Thomas Richardson (NC)
Illinois: Adlai Stevenson III (D)
Iowa: Terry Brandstad (R)
Kansas: Wendall Lady (R)

Maine: John Rensenbrink (D)
Maryland: Mary Pat Clarke (D)

Massachusetts: Elliot Richardson (R)
Michigan: William B. Fitzgerald, Jr. (D)
Minnesota: Skip Humphrey (D)
Nebraska: Virginia D. Smith (R)
Nevada: Carl F. Dodge (R)

New Hampshire: John A. Durkin (D)
New Mexico: Max Coll (R)
New York: Hugh Carey (D)
Ohio: Jerry Springer (D)
Oklahoma: Jim Barker (D)
Oregon: Les AuCoin (D)

Pennsylvania: R. Bud Dwyer (R)
Rhode Island: John J. Slocum, Jr. (R)

South Carolina: William J. B. Dorn (D)
South Dakota: Gene N. Lebrun (D)

Texas: Ron Paul (R)
Vermont: Franklin S. Billings Jr. (R)

Wisconsin: Doug La Follette (D)
Wyoming: Clifford P. Hansen (R)
I would love to see a county map for this
 
2016 Confederate States of America Attourny General Election:

Progressive Primaries:


State Attorney General Roy Cooper (NC)
Representative Beto O’Rourke (TX)

Results:

Alabama:

Cooper: 274,330 (68.9%)
O’Rourke: 123,827 (31.1%)

Arizona:
Cooper: 242,908 (52.1%)
O’Rourke: 223,327 (47.9%)

Arkansas:
Cooper: 145,536 (66.3%)

O’Rourke: 75,484 (33.7%)

Florida:
Cooper: 1,028,928 (60.2%)
O’Rourke: 680,255 (39.8%)

Georgia:
Cooper: 499,784 (65.3%)
O’Rourke: 265,582 (34.7%)

Louisiana:
Cooper: 182,701 (58.6%)
O’Rourke: 129,075 (41.4%)

Mississippi:
Cooper: 135,844 (59.8%)
O’Rourke: 91,320 (40.2%)


New Mexico:
Cooper: 79,732 (36.9%)
O’Rourke: 136,343 (63.1%)

North Carolina:
Cooper: 917,762 (80.3%)
O’Rourke: 225,154 (19.7%)

Oklahoma:
Cooper: 178,333 (53.1%)
O’Rourke: 157,510 (46.9%)

South Carolina:
Cooper: 287,080 (77.4%)
O’Rourke: 83,824 (22.6%)


Tennessee:
Cooper: 277,305 (74.5%)
O’Rourke: 94,917 (25.5%)

Texas:
Cooper: 625,050 (43.6%)
O’Rourke: 809,845 (56.4%)

Virginia:
Cooper: 489,081 (62.3%)
O’Rourke: 295,960 (37.7%)

Total:
Cooper: 5,364,374 (61.3%)
O’Rourke: 3,392,423 (38.7%)

State Map:
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County Map:
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2016 Confederate States of America Attourny General Election:

Progressive Primaries:


State Attorney General Roy Cooper (NC)
Representative Beto O’Rourke (TX)

Results:

Alabama:

Cooper: 274,330 (68.9%)
O’Rourke: 123,827 (31.1%)

Arizona:
Cooper: 242,908 (52.1%)
O’Rourke: 223,327 (47.9%)

Arkansas:
Cooper: 145,536 (66.3%)

O’Rourke: 75,484 (33.7%)

Florida:
Cooper: 1,028,928 (60.2%)
O’Rourke: 680,255 (39.8%)

Georgia:
Cooper: 499,784 (65.3%)
O’Rourke: 265,582 (34.7%)

Louisiana:
Cooper: 182,701 (58.6%)
O’Rourke: 129,075 (41.4%)

Mississippi:
Cooper: 135,844 (59.8%)
O’Rourke: 91,320 (40.2%)


New Mexico:
Cooper: 79,732 (36.9%)
O’Rourke: 136,343 (63.1%)

North Carolina:
Cooper: 917,762 (80.3%)
O’Rourke: 225,154 (19.7%)

Oklahoma:
Cooper: 178,333 (53.1%)
O’Rourke: 157,510 (46.9%)

South Carolina:
Cooper: 287,080 (77.4%)
O’Rourke: 83,824 (22.6%)


Tennessee:
Cooper: 277,305 (74.5%)
O’Rourke: 94,917 (25.5%)

Texas:
Cooper: 625,050 (43.6%)
O’Rourke: 809,845 (56.4%)

Virginia:
Cooper: 489,081 (62.3%)
O’Rourke: 295,960 (37.7%)

Total:
Cooper: 5,364,374 (61.3%)
O’Rourke: 3,392,423 (38.7%)

State Map:
View attachment 583717

County Map:
View attachment 583726
Due to the three image a day limit I’ll post the Democrat Primary tomorrow and the national election on Friday
 
A map of the election in this post, showing margins (lean: 0-4.99%, likely: 5-9.99%, safe: 10% and up). In this scenario, Perot doesn't drop out in the 1992 election, and doesn't lose the support that he lost OTL from dropping out and reentering. He ends up performing according to the highest poll from June, with a uniform national swing applied to OTL results (so Clinton gets -18 points compared to OTL, Bush gets -6, and Perot +20)

Of course Perot had other issues in his campaign outside of the "dropping out and reentering" thing, so he'd be far from certain to do this well if he did stay in the race

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This is something a little different I thought of: the county map for a Texas election with a 100% racial voting divide. In other words, non-Hispanic Whites of voting age all vote Republican and everyone of voting age in another demographic votes Democratic. The result is 50.4% of the vote going Democratic and 49.6% going Republican.

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I like how there's a mix of stuff that's obviously absurd (Republican Austin, Democratic Odessa and all the close results in the Llano Estacado region of the northwest) and stuff that doesn't really change (there's only a few counties in South Texas that look all that different to real Texas elections, and Jefferson County is the only area in East Texas that's still Democratic-leaning). All the counties gave 50% of the vote to one side or the other for obvious reasons, but I should note Medina County just west of San Antonio had almost an exact 50-50 split.
 
As a follow-up to the Texas map, here's California with the same voting patterns. The margin is 55.6% Dem, 44.4% Rep, so a bit smaller than Gore's margin in 2000, but the county map is pretty drastically different to what's usual for California- the north is much more Republican, the central areas around Fresno and Bakersfield are far more Democratic and the bay area is mostly quite divided instead of a Democratic stronghold like OTL.

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Here's a random swing map I made for absolutely no reason. I just wanted to see what the 1856 Election would look like if I applied some swings to Fillmore at the expense of Buchanan and Fremont. Fremont didn't contend in the south save for in Maryland and Delaware, as an aside. The map is pretty self-explanatory, but essentially I swung 5% to Fillmore from Fremont and 10% from Buchanan's in each state other than AL, FL, GA, MS and NC, to Fillmore. In Al, FL, GA, MS and NC, I did a 5% swing from Buchanan to Fillmore because... I don't have an answer as to why. Boredom thats why.

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John C. Frémont (Rep.-CA)/William L. Dayton (Rep.-NJ) 125 EVs; 1,191,825 PV (29.72%)
James Buchanan (Dem.-PA)/John C. Breckenridge (Dem.-KY) 95 EVs*; 1,428,845 PV (35.63%)
Millard Fillmore (Ame.-NY)/Samuel Houston (Ame.-TX) 76 EVs; 1,389,492 PV (34.65%)


* Buchanan's EV total includes South Carolina, which is grey on the map since the state did not hold popular votes at the time.
Notes
  • No candidate would have won the required 149 electoral votes meaning a contingent election would have been held in Congress.​
  • For the purposes of having a winner, I have gone with the Dem-heavy Senate choosing Breckenridge over Dayton for VP, and the House ultimately coalescing around Millard Fillmore who is able to convince enough Congressmen on both sides. President Millard Fillmore (Ame.-NY) and Vice-President John C. Breckenridge (Dem.-KY)​
  • I swung a lot more votes from Buchanan to Fillmore than I did Frémont to Fillmore, but it was still interesting to see Frémont win more EVs here than OTL. The reason is that he flips Illinois here. Its the only state to flip for someone other than Fillmore.​
  • Frémont gained one state in this scenario, Fillmore gained eight - all of the states that flipped were won by Buchanan in OTL.​
  • Despite the substantial losses, Buchanan still gets the most votes in the election. That being said, his margin of victory over Fillmore in the popular vote was <1%.​
  • The closest state was Virginia, which flipped for Fillmore here by just 121 votes. Florida was decided by 405 votes.​
  • I used the state-by-state vote totals provided on uselectionatlas.org for this election.​
 
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Here's something a little different for the China TL: one of the few major referenda held since the democratic era began.
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We've previously covered the acrimonious relationship between the Republic of China and Tibet, but the provincial government of Xinjiang has perhaps an even messier relationship with the central government. For starters, even calling it Xinjiang is frowned upon within the province among non-Han residents; while the national constitution calls the province that, and describes its devolved assembly as the 'Xinjiang provincial government', the provincial government solely calls itself the 'government of East Turkestan', and recently other ethnic minorities in China (and, to some degree, left-wing Chinese in general) have taken to calling it East Turkestan too.

However, complicating matters is that unlike Tibet, which has always had an overwhelmingly non-Han Chinese population, Xinjiang/East Turkestan saw considerable state-sponsored immigration of Han people to the province during the 1950s and 60s which has resulted in around 40% of its population being Han (though the Uyghur people remain the biggest ethnic group in the province). Despite this, resentment at their preferential treatment until the Tienanmen Square Revolution has made Xinjiang/East Turkestan's non-Han population generally strongly anti-Kuomintang, and in recent years younger Han voters in the big cities like Urumqi have been drifting away from the Kuomintang due to distaste for its discriminatory policies.

Xinjiang/East Turkestan is also noted for its unusual voting patterns. While these are disguised somewhat by the strongly two-party trend of presidential elections that leads many of its voters to tactically support the Progressives (though even this is pretty heavily racially-based- non-Han voters are significantly more likely to vote for Progressive presidential nominees and Han voters aggressively back the Kuomintang), in National Congress elections the Turkestani Party tends to win the majority non-Han districts of Xinjiang/East Turkestan by towering margins, generally both because the Progressives do not wish to stir up controversy by opposing them and because they tend to firmly side with the Progressives on issues besides those pertaining to social liberalization. In the Han regions, aside from the big cities or areas where other minority communities like Mongols or Kazakhs more inclined towards the Progressives are found, the Kuomintang are fairly dominant.

On top of all this, the Xinjiang/East Turkestan provincial government, where the Turkestani Party has been dominant since the assembly was founded thanks to the backing of leftist parties like the Progressives and Communists, has often had its policies stomped out by the national government, which has consequently been seen as not doing enough to ease racial tensions (though the Kuomintang do point to having allowed the abolition of the use of 're-education through labour' by the first Turkestani government in 1990 after 33 years of central government use in the province). To this end, after three heavily publicized terror attacks in 2014 (the Kunming attack in March and the two attacks on Urumqi in April and then May ), Premier Anwar Yusuf Turani announced an independence referendum to be held in Xinjiang/East Turkestan at the end of November.

The Progressives and Communists that supported the Turkestani government threw their support behind the 'Yes' campaign, but unsurprisingly, within a few hours of the referendum being announced Chinese President Wang Yang declared the Chinese government would not recognize the referendum regardless of its result. The Kuomintang poured considerable money into the 'No' campaign, as well as advising Han voters in Xinjiang to support it and comparing a possible East Turkestan led by Turani to the autocratic state of Turkmenistan under Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, memorably running campaigns accusing Turani of aiming to build up a similar cult of personality to Berdimuhamedow. A famous pro-Kuomintang cartoon published in Reference News showed Turani 'accidentally' putting up a version of the Kökbayraq flag coveted by the Turkestani movement that had a green background and stripe from the Turkmen flag, declaring, "Welcome to East Turkmen- sorry, I mean Turkestan!"; not surprisingly, Uyghurs started a boycott of the newspaper that remains in place to this day.

When the referendum was finally held on the 28th November, the results followed what the polls and analysts were saying in most respects: Han voters overwhelmingly voted No, other ethnicities overwhelmingly Yes, and practically the only close areas were inner city Urumqi and a handful of areas where the ethnic groups were closely balanced. What was a surprise, though, was the actual outcome: by just over 2%, Xinjiang/East Turkestan had voted Yes to independence. Protests immediately sprung up in Urumqi, which escalated into rioting and police brutality before long, with fairly indiscriminate pro- and anti-independence casualties resulting from them.

President Wang remained resolute that Xinjiang would not be allowed to secede, and threatened to send in the National Revolutionary Army if Turani attempted to unilaterally declare independence. Effectively, however, this created a stalemate- either Wang was about to become the man who shattered the illusion of China as a modern democracy, or Turani was to show the accusations of a cult of personality on his part were true. Finally, in early January 2015, negotiations between the two men ended as amiably as such a huge conflict probably could- Wang's government agreed to stop overruling policies from the Xinjiang/East Turkestan government, and the Chinese government would allow it to adopt the official name 'East Turkestan Province' as well as Xinjiang Province and use the Kökbayraq flag instead of the 'sun flag'. The price on Turani's part was having to abandon independence and resign as Premier.

This was a massive coup for both parties. Wang gained immense good publicity for his efforts, and came closer to winning Xinjiang/East Turkestan from the Progressives than any other Kuomintang candidate since the modern constitution was adopted in his landslide re-election that December, and Turani became a political martyr, with the Turkestani Party riding high in the polls for the following 4-year term and his successor, a young former deputy of his named Salith Hudayar, leading it to such a big victory in 2018 it only needed the Communists to continue in government and pushed the Progressives onto the opposition benches for the first time since the modern provincial government was founded.
 
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Alternate 1860, 10% of Lincoln to Bell, 5% of Lincoln to Douglass; 10% of Breckenridge to Douglass, 5% of Breckenridge to Bell:

plus15toJBorSD.png


Stephen Douglas (D-IL)/Herschel V. Jones (D-GA) 116 EVs; 38.50% PV
John Bell (CU-TN)/Edward Everett (CU-MA) 89 EVs; 22.16% PV
Abraham Lincoln (R-IL)/Hannibal Hamlin (R-ME) 67 EVs; 28.30% PV
John Breckenridge (SD-KY)/Joseph Lane (SD-IN) 31 EVs; 11.04% PV

Hung college. Idk who would end up winning in Congress, but I imagine it would probably be Douglas or Bell.
 
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Alternate 1860, 10% of Lincoln to Bell, 5% of Lincoln to Douglass; 10% of Breckenridge to Douglass, 5% of Breckenridge to Bell:

View attachment 586998

Stephen Douglas (D-IL)/Herschel V. Jones (D-GA) 116 EVs; 38.50% PV
John Bell (CU-TN)/Edward Everett (CU-MA) 89 EVs; 22.16% PV
Abraham Lincoln (R-IL)/Hannibal Hamlin (R-ME) 67 EVs; 28.30% PV
John Breckenridge (SD-KY)/Joseph Lane (SD-IN) 31 EVs; 11.04% PV

Hung college. Idk who would end up winning in Congress, but I imagine it would probably be Douglas or Bell.
Makes me wonder if Douglas would even stay in contention. I believe he said that if it was a hung college that he would refuse to be considered. Although I'm sure that would change once it actually happened.
 
Here's something from the South Vietnam TL I posted over on the Wikiboxes thread.

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Technically speaking, the 2017 presidential election marked 50 years of democracy in South Vietnam, but that's a bit like saying the end of the Second World War marks X years of world peace. In its early years, South Vietnam's presidential elections were little more than a rubber stamp for then-ruler Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, and remained so until he gave up power amidst massive unpopularity in 1986 and his replacement, Dương Văn Minh, implemented the 'Bi-Vietnamese Reforms'. Ironically, despite Minh being far more popular than Thiệu due to this, he only won a single term before retiring prior to the 1991 election. The landslide victory of his successor, former dissident and Amnesty International activist Nguyễn Đan Quế of the Nationalist Party (VNQDD), marked the first time a handover of power had occurred in Vietnam due to a free and fair democratic election, and the newly elected President made the cover of Time magazine in October 1991 (with, predictably, the headline 'Quế?')

As President, Quế introduced a number of reforms evening up the powers of the President and House of Representatives, used the VNQDD's majority that it had won on his coattails in the contemporaneous election in 1991 to clear away some corruption, and introduced mild public spending increases. As an endocrinologist he was passionate about reforming the country's healthcare system, and introduced measures that greatly expanded coverage. However, what is most notable from the perspective of South Vietnamese electoral politics is that Quế introduced the two-round system for South Vietnamese elections, stating he 'would not countenance presidential rule by the minority'. He healthily won re-election in 1995 and 1999, helped shepherd the country through the 1997 East Asian financial crisis (though his party lost its majority in that year's midterms), and established the so-called 'three-term precedent' of South Vietnamese politics.

Despite all this, by the time Quế left office there were several major issues he had done little to address: the VNQDD had done little to expand its programmes towards ethnic minorities in South Vietnam, and he had damaged the country's international ties by allowing the repeal of the dual-language status of French to appeal to his party's base. Consequently, his successor Thanh Hải Ngô sought to repair these issues when he brought the SDA (Social Democratic Alliance; despite the name, it is and always has been a big-tent anti-Communist party) back into power in 2003. Reintroducing dual-language status was one of his first policy moves, as he was himself bilingual, and while the Nationalists were angered by the move (VNQDD Representative and House Minority Leader Batong Vu Pham condemned him as 'welcoming imperialism with open arms'), it aided tourism to South Vietnam and allowed for a fruitful relationship between Ngô and French Presidents Jacques Chiraq and later Nicholas Sarkozy.

Probably the most controversial moment of Ngô's premiership, however, came when, a few months before the VNQDD won a landslide victory in the 2009 House of Representatives elections, he had the chamber mandate an extension of the Presidential term by one year, pushing his re-election back to 2012. At first, this was extremely poorly received, but by the time it came around, not only had Ngô managed to improve the economy significantly, but his VNQDD opponent in 2012 Antôniô Lâm proved controversial, as allegations of him being a communist sympathizer came out. The VNQDD was tainted by such allegations, but as it was too late to replace Lâm as the party's nominee, Ngô simply capitalized and beat Lâm in the runoff.

Since 2012, the VNQDD has, to put it mildly, overcompensated for the Lâm fiasco. Its new leader, Van Tran, restructured the party significantly, kicking out leftists, restructuring the party from a big-tent radical party against the big-tent moderate SDA to a right-wing populist one and effectively breaking the existing South Vietnamese political divide. People initially considered him an idiot, but then in the 2015 midterms the VNQDD won a landslide victory in the House of Representatives. Consequently, the party were hopeful of retaking the Presidency once Ngô stood down in 2017.

However, the race was not to be as simple as that. For one thing, the leftists had regrouped and formed their own party, the Socialists (CNXH), and retained a fair bit of ground, particularly with popular Representatives like Pham, their leader. Pham and the VNQDD nominee for President, Van Vo, were miles apart politically, and it seemed probable the SDA's nominee, priest and anti-human trafficking activist Phêrô Nguyễn Văn Hùng, would come through the middle and win with no trouble. But just to make things more complicated, Hùng's attempt to appeal to Catholic voters was stymied by the surge in support for Ánh Quang Cao, nominee of the Personalist Party, a minor and mostly Catholic party with a policy agenda based on taking the theory from Ngô Đình Diệm's party that essentially advocated for an anti-materialist and communitarian form of Christian democracy. The four-horse race for the first round ended with Cao sapping enough votes from Hùng in the heavily Catholic areas (though he took many from Vo in the border city of Huế) that Vo won a small plurality, much to the shock of most analysts.

In the second round, Vo's momentum was almost instantly stifled when Cao endorsed Hùng, and further damaged when footage emerged of Vo campaigning with French far-right nationalist Marine le Pen in her presidential campaign earlier that year, though ironically as much because Nationalists were disgusted by one of their own allying so readily with the French as for le Pen's views. While Vo fought a spirited campaign and was helped by the decision of many CNXH supporters not to vote for either due to Hùng's refusal to commit to many of their policy planks, Hùng still beat Vo by over eight points on election day.

Hùng's term, despite the hopes he outlined in his inaugural speech of 'unifying and reforming the country for the better by reducing tensions between ethnic minorities and groups of various political persuasions', has seen significant roadblocks, most prominently from Tran's VNQDD majority in the House (which was bolstered in the midterms held at the end of 2019), though it has not been helped by the distaste of leftists for Hùng, who has displayed limited sympathy for economic reforms and liberalizing reforms on issues such as LGBTQ rights and sex education due to his Catholicism. He has every intention of running for a second term in 2022, and whether the opposition will find a candidate acceptable to oppose him has yet to be seen, though it is alleged the VNQDD and CNXH have been negotiating to try and form a re-merged opposition akin to the Japanese Democratic Party basically just to get rid of Hùng.
 
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This is more of a proof of concept that could be used for alternate maps/timelines than an actual alternative history.
What if the Wyoming Rule-or in this case, the "Nevada" Rule-had been used to apportion representatives following the 1900 Census.
For those unfamiliar, the Wyoming Rule is a proposed way to change how the House of Representatives apportions its members, dividing the population of State X by the population of the smallest state and then rounding to determine State X's number of representatives. For example, New York's population in the 1900 census was 172x Nevada's 1900 population, so New York receives 172 representatives. The total number of representatives that this would result in after the 1900 census is 1,762. For comparison, if this were used after the 2010 census it would have resulted in a ~555-member House. I chose to make a map of the 1900 enumeration because it's the most extreme example of what could happen if the US switched to this system rather than the fixed number of 435 members it has now.
Remember: this is a map of numbers of representatives, NOT electoral votes.
Wyoming Rule - 1900 Census.png

And a respectable graph of how this would have affected the size of the House over time.
Wyoming Rule vs Actual Graph.png

If anyone would like me to whip up maps of this using data from other census years or maps of representative numbers using other apportionment styles-such as the cube root rule or a fixed number like 500, 600, something like that-just ask, and I would be more than delighted to do so.
 
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