Alternate Eastern Front: The Manstein Strategy

Spring 1943:
The third battle of Kharkov demonstrated the effectiveness of Manstein's mobile defense strategy. What if instead of the disasterous Kursk offensive, Hitler surprisingly enacts Manstein's plan of mobile defense and counterattacks? Hitler hopers to repeat World War 1 as which the Germans defeated Russia by bleeding them dry and making them sick of war.
Scenario 1 (More Likely):
The distribution of mechanized forces throughout the front and this strategy inflicts horrific casualties on the Red Army, perhaps maybe close to double than IOTL, but the Germans eventually lose as US forces storm into the Reichstag. The USSR is weaker and has the iron curtain shifted a couple hundred miles east maybe. Maybe the population imbalance causes the USSR to collapse soon after the war, but probabaly unlikely.
Scenario 2:
In 1944 the situation for both the Germans and Soviets are dire, but the Red Army after fruitless offensives that gain ground but fail to destroy operational abilities of the Wehrmacht causes the Red Army to collapse due to a lack of manpower. Eventually Stalin signs a peace that makes Brest litovsk look like minor territorial concessions. Hitler demands all territory west of the Urals, and with the USSR teetering on collapse Stalin reluctantly accepts, it isn't entirely fatal as much of Soviet industry was East of the Urals. With only partisans a problem of the Germans Europe is held, the allies are driven out of Italy facing the full might of a battle hardened Wehrmacht, and sign an armistice. Germany keeps all European possessions while the allies keep African colonies and Germany must recognize allied peace with Japan. A three way Cold War between the axis, soviet rump state, and the allies occur. May continue on this if feedback looks good.
 
Spring 1943:
The third battle of Kharkov demonstrated the effectiveness of Manstein's mobile defense strategy. What if instead of the disasterous Kursk offensive, Hitler surprisingly enacts Manstein's plan of mobile defense and counterattacks? Hitler hopers to repeat World War 1 as which the Germans defeated Russia by bleeding them dry and making them sick of war.
Scenario 1 (More Likely):
The distribution of mechanized forces throughout the front and this strategy inflicts horrific casualties on the Red Army, perhaps maybe close to double than IOTL, but the Germans eventually lose as US forces storm into the Reichstag. The USSR is weaker and has the iron curtain shifted a couple hundred miles east maybe. Maybe the population imbalance causes the USSR to collapse soon after the war, but probabaly unlikely.
Scenario 2:
In 1944 the situation for both the Germans and Soviets are dire, but the Red Army after fruitless offensives that gain ground but fail to destroy operational abilities of the Wehrmacht causes the Red Army to collapse due to a lack of manpower. Eventually Stalin signs a peace that makes Brest litovsk look like minor territorial concessions. Hitler demands all territory west of the Urals, and with the USSR teetering on collapse Stalin reluctantly accepts, it isn't entirely fatal as much of Soviet industry was East of the Urals. With only partisans a problem of the Germans Europe is held, the allies are driven out of Italy facing the full might of a battle hardened Wehrmacht, and sign an armistice. Germany keeps all European possessions while the allies keep African colonies and Germany must recognize allied peace with Japan. A three way Cold War between the axis, soviet rump state, and the allies occur. May continue on this if feedback looks good.
I suspect neither scenario is probable. The Germans didn't have the mechanized forces to make the strategy work. They could inflict some additional losses on the Red Army but everywhere the Panzer Corps weren't the Red Army would push through the German infantry lines. I tried it in a board war game and the counter does depend on the Soviets (Stalin) not pushing offensives so far they stretched the supply lines and made them as vulnerable to counter attacks as in Third Kharkov. OTL they seemed to have learnt that lesson eventually and simply switched the main axis of attack to send the 'fire brigades' running from trouble spot to trouble spot.

It also begs the question of whether the Germans can manage to fight a mobile battle with most of their army still using horse drawn transport. Or if the infantry divisions can withdraw safely from one line to another a hundred or so miles back, the kind of operational depth needed for Manstein's operational methods to work.
 
What if the Germans withdrew behind the Dneiper after March 1943 and tried the approach from there? It would've been harder for the Soviets to push through weakly held areas if they had the river barrier.
 

Deleted member 97083

Scenario 2:
In 1944 the situation for both the Germans and Soviets are dire, but the Red Army after fruitless offensives that gain ground but fail to destroy operational abilities of the Wehrmacht causes the Red Army to collapse due to a lack of manpower. Eventually Stalin signs a peace that makes Brest litovsk look like minor territorial concessions. Hitler demands all territory west of the Urals, and with the USSR teetering on collapse Stalin reluctantly accepts, it isn't entirely fatal as much of Soviet industry was East of the Urals. With only partisans a problem of the Germans Europe is held, the allies are driven out of Italy facing the full might of a battle hardened Wehrmacht, and sign an armistice. Germany keeps all European possessions while the allies keep African colonies and Germany must recognize allied peace with Japan. A three way Cold War between the axis, soviet rump state, and the allies occur. May continue on this if feedback looks good.
Too late to turn the tide.

I could vaguely see some similar scenario where the Germans hold the Soviets at the Daugava and Dnieper rivers, but this would require several semi-drastic PODs first.

First in 1940 the Germans get some sort of ceasefire with the British after encircling Allied forces at Dunkirk. Barbarossa goes as OTL in 1941 with blitzkrieg and slowdown. Since the Germans are not at war with the British anymore, Japan doesn't attack Pearl Harbor, and Lend-Lease towards the Soviet Union is delayed or even nonexistent.

In 1942 Germans win Stalingrad and take Baku, probably encircling and destroying Soviet forces in the Caucasus, stockpiling as much fuel as possible in Romania and Germany, and also bombing Soviet industrial centers on the Volga, inflicting maximal damage.

Due to logistical concerns, eventually the Germans have to retreat from the Caucasus and from Stalingrad, but not before sacking and pillaging everything they can during the evacuation, especially everything at Baku, while taking everything valuable. When the Soviets re-occupy the Caucasus, the Nazis have successfully evacuated/withdrawn much of their forces, while leaving the region in absolute ruin, cities destroyed and enslaved...

Hitler dies at this point due to a heart attack. The loss of the Caucasus is blamed on Hitler's late insanity, and Goering or <insert other Nazi here> takes over and starts pursuing a defensive strategy.

In 1943, after the full annexation of Vichy France, the Nazis mass-conscript a larger number of French and other occupied countries into the Heer, earlier, to soften the blow of German casualties, a policy which grows in numbers over time.

In late 1943 the Germans pull back steadily to the Daugava and Dnieper Rivers, a slower and more planned withdrawal than OTL, again destroying as many cities as they can during their retreat. With no pretensions of reconquest, and having hatred towards the locals anyway, the Nazis relocate entire nations, such as Estonia, into the industrial centers of Germany and occupied Poland.

Germany goes into full defensive mode. In 1944, Germany is stronger than OTL due to no Allied strategic bombing, no German strategic bombing of Britain, no D-Day, German fuel reserves increased by the temporary occupation of the Caucasus and fewer offensives. The Soviet Union is weaker than OTL due to the pillaging of the Caucasus, strategic bombing of Volga centers, a more controlled withdrawal by the Germans leading to more scorched earth of Soviet territories, restricted Lend-Lease leading to famines.

From 1944 to 1945 having no war with the Allies, the Germans actually have the upper hand in a war of attrition as Soviet offensives across the Dnieper and Daugava are costly, and the Germans have maximized their manpower through conscription of more non-Germans and losing fewer men in failed offensives, while Soviet manpower was minimized by so much destruction inflicted by the Nazis. Without strategic bombing, the OTL increase in Germany industrial potential from 1943-1944, replicates itself in 1944-1945.

So the Germans are able to hold the line at those two rivers during much of 1943-1945.

Then a fresh rebuilt Britain returns to war and along with the USA, nukes and firebombs the hell out of Germany in 1946, while the Soviets still survive and start pushing west slowly and steadily. The Allies win the war in 1946 or 1947.
 
Spring 1943:
The third battle of Kharkov demonstrated the effectiveness of Manstein's mobile defense strategy.

The third battle of Kharkov demonstrated that counteroffensive tactics could work against an enemy that had overextended after strategic success, and that the Germans could carry out one such operation successfully, in one stretch of a very, very long front.
Have a look at what else was happening all along the front while Manstein was achieving that success in February-March of 1943. Germans abandoning territory without being attacked. German pockets being reduced. Not to mention what had happened through the previous month of January.

So yes, the Germans could do that later on, that year - in one area of the front. Suppose they are successful ,even though against an enemy that is not overextended but starts his offensive with suitable preparations. The Germans are successful there. What about everywhere else? Do they have the armor and the fuel to play the same trick everywhere the Soviets give them a run?
 
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Too late to turn the tide.

I could vaguely see some similar scenario where the Germans hold the Soviets at the Daugava and Dnieper rivers, but this would require several semi-drastic PODs first.

First in 1940 the Germans get some sort of ceasefire with the British after encircling Allied forces at Dunkirk. Barbarossa goes as OTL in 1941 with blitzkrieg and slowdown. Since the Germans are not at war with the British anymore, Japan doesn't attack Pearl Harbor, and Lend-Lease towards the Soviet Union is delayed or even nonexistent.

In 1942 Germans win Stalingrad and take Baku, probably encircling and destroying Soviet forces in the Caucasus, stockpiling as much fuel as possible in Romania and Germany, and also bombing Soviet industrial centers on the Volga, inflicting maximal damage.

Due to logistical concerns, eventually the Germans have to retreat from the Caucasus and from Stalingrad, but not before sacking and pillaging everything they can during the evacuation, especially everything at Baku, while taking everything valuable. When the Soviets re-occupy the Caucasus, the Nazis have successfully evacuated/withdrawn much of their forces, while leaving the region in absolute ruin, cities destroyed and enslaved...

Hitler dies at this point due to a heart attack. The loss of the Caucasus is blamed on Hitler's late insanity, and Goering or <insert other Nazi here> takes over and starts pursuing a defensive strategy.

In 1943, after the full annexation of Vichy France, the Nazis mass-conscript a larger number of French and other occupied countries into the Heer, earlier, to soften the blow of German casualties, a policy which grows in numbers over time.

In late 1943 the Germans pull back steadily to the Daugava and Dnieper Rivers, a slower and more planned withdrawal than OTL, again destroying as many cities as they can during their retreat. With no pretensions of reconquest, and having hatred towards the locals anyway, the Nazis relocate entire nations, such as Estonia, into the industrial centers of Germany and occupied Poland.

Germany goes into full defensive mode. In 1944, Germany is stronger than OTL due to no Allied strategic bombing, no German strategic bombing of Britain, no D-Day, German fuel reserves increased by the temporary occupation of the Caucasus and fewer offensives. The Soviet Union is weaker than OTL due to the pillaging of the Caucasus, strategic bombing of Volga centers, a more controlled withdrawal by the Germans leading to more scorched earth of Soviet territories, restricted Lend-Lease leading to famines.

From 1944 to 1945 having no war with the Allies, the Germans actually have the upper hand in a war of attrition as Soviet offensives across the Dnieper and Daugava are costly, and the Germans have maximized their manpower through conscription of more non-Germans and losing fewer men in failed offensives, while Soviet manpower was minimized by so much destruction inflicted by the Nazis. Without strategic bombing, the OTL increase in Germany industrial potential from 1943-1944, replicates itself in 1944-1945.

So the Germans are able to hold the line at those two rivers during much of 1943-1945.

Then a fresh rebuilt Britain returns to war and along with the USA, nukes and firebombs the hell out of Germany in 1946, while the Soviets still survive and start pushing west slowly and steadily. The Allies win the war in 1946 or 1947.
I'm not sure that the UK and US would return to the War in this scenario. I can see why they should, from both self-preservation and morality - but they'd still have needed to find a trigger.
 

Redbeard

Banned
It will require (much) more for Germany to win WWII, but I would not exclude that it could end more favourably for Germany. Like the Soviets being too exhausted to pursue any goals beyond their pre-war borders. If that is 1939 or 1941 borders is of course quite important however and will be decided by how exhausted the Soviets are. That will again much be decided by how much help they can get from the Wallies, but I doubt they will be that keen to support the Soviets expanding their sphere of influence. Where the line is to be drawn between the Reds and the Wallies is of course still a major issue in this ATL's conferences etc. but a Soviet "Reconquista" going much slower than OTL of course will reduce Stalin's position to have the Wallies accept his claims.

In OTL the big disaster for the Germans IMHO was Bagration, but if they in this OTL can avoid the collapse and keep the Red Army at the OTL 22 June 1944 for some extra months post war Germany probably will look different. If they can keep the line for half a year all of Europe will look different.

Neither the Nazi regime nor Hitler can survive under any circumstances, but the borders of post war Germany and Poland might look more like pre war Germany and Poland.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
but the borders of post war Germany and Poland might look more like pre war Germany and Poland.
If you want Germany to avoid large-scale territorial losses, though, you need to have the Soviet Union not go beyond the borders of August 1939.
 

Redbeard

Banned
If you want Germany to avoid large-scale territorial losses, though, you need to have the Soviet Union not go beyond the borders of August 1939.
Exactly and that would require not only a very exhausted SU but also Wallies feeling no obligation to help the Soviets any more - like because they have themselves already entered German territory and will soon be in Berlin. A Wallied support for keeping the 1939 (or 1938 pre Anschluss/Munich?) borders would most certainly require Hitler and the Nazi regime being disposed of beforehand.

In OTL a successful July 1944 coup would not necessarily mean big changes to Germany because nobody really could stop the Red Army from taking Berlin after Armeegruppe Mitte had been annihilated at Bagration in June/July 44 and the Wallies feeling bad about not having engaged the Germans more before.

In an ATL where the Wallies are deep into Germany when the Red Army still is struggling outside German territory this probably would be very different. If Stalin next demand Polish territory and keeping the annexed Baltic states (which he had achieved through the treaty with Hitler) he will be in for some very bad PR and hand the Wallies a perfect starting point for a future cold/warm war.
 
They might have drawn out the war but I feel by then it was too late for Germany. Their best troops were mostly dead, the Soviets had got their act together and were making plenty of tanks and the Luftwaffe no longer had complete aerial domination in the east.
 
Considering that German war production achieved its peak only in 1944, I see see potential in a strategy change - if Germany trades land for lesser losses and inflicting higher losses on the Red Army I see the potential of shifting the power to favoring the Germans (IF they also make the right decision and manage to get a working ally in the Ukraine. Maybe even a much better position with Ukrainean troops further shifting the overal power balance - but that might demand an earlier shift in "occupation strategy).

Assuming that the Germans are bleeding the Red Army, I sense the following possibilities:

Stalin virtually pleaded the Wallies for opening another front (which indicates that he thought the Soviet position to be less rosy as it actually was ;))

If the Germans perform better and the Red army has higher losses (in 1943) this demands might become more intense, so what if

1. the Wallies refuse to make an earlier landing and Stalin tries to get a separate peace (less harsh than you think, but still giving Germany what they need - resources from the east - and enough troops to make a difference in the West

2. The Wallies indeed land earlier than OTL - and get a verry bloody nose?

3. the Wallies refuse, Russians fight on and the landings proceed as planned, - Wallies take Berlin, Germany surrenders - (much of) Poland still in Germans hands is NOT soviet occupied (no pre-dividing Europe at Jalta/Teheran) - much of OTL Warsaw pact remains "western oriented democracies).

I hope for no 3. ;)
 
Considering that German war production achieved its peak only in 1944, I see see potential in a strategy change - if Germany trades land for lesser losses and inflicting higher losses on the Red Army I see the potential of shifting the power to favoring the Germans (IF they also make the right decision and manage to get a working ally in the Ukraine. Maybe even a much better position with Ukrainean troops further shifting the overal power balance - but that might demand an earlier shift in "occupation strategy).

Uh, what Ukraine? How can you in the second line above state that the Germans "trade" land - i.e., give up land to the Soviets - and then go on to assume not only they still have Ukraine but also that incredibly they find an ally in there, among the people they're starving?

In actual history, Kiev returns Soviet in early November, 1943.
If the Germans are "trading land", they've said goodbye to it at least in the summer of 1943.
 
Uh, what Ukraine? How can you in the second line above state that the Germans "trade" land - i.e., give up land to the Soviets - and then go on to assume not only they still have Ukraine but also that incredibly they find an ally in there, among the people they're starving?

In actual history, Kiev returns Soviet in early November, 1943.
If the Germans are "trading land", they've said goodbye to it at least in the summer of 1943.

If you look at OTL (late) 1942/Early 1943 much of Ukraine was still in German hands - and as I said it might demand an EARLIER shift in startegy. Still if an Ukrainean government is fully working WITH the GErmans even a land trade strategy can - in the longer run mean that MORE territory remains in Axis hands (simply by having significan Ukrainean troops fighting WITH them...

OTL Kiev fell "only" November - this gives GErmany a full half year of a different development...

In Germanys situation each little help is improving theri situation...
 
I'mma just quote me quoting others the last time this idea came up:

The Soviets had very much learned their lesson at 3rd Kharkov and as a result Manstein's ideas about counterattacking are based more on fantasy then reality. Firstly, at the time in 1943, and even when he wrote his memoirs in 1958, von Manstein had a poor picture of actual Soviet dispositions and strengths. In particular he grossly underestimated the total forces he was actually facing. When Voronezh Front (whose strength von Manstein also underestimated) finally attacked in Kharkov August of 1943 there was a second entire Front following behind. Secondly, he underestimated the growing skill and aggressiveness of Soviet tank commanders. When the SS divisions hit 1st Guards Tank Army west of Kharkov, the Army did not disintegrate into chaos as had happened against previous German counter-attacks. Instead, 1 GTA absorbed the blow and threw itself back into the fight, fighting on for several days during which it suffered 200% tank losses. In the end 1 GTA lost it's fight, but the Germans were unable to get any offensive momentum of their own going which allowed the massive Soviet follow-on forces to simply pick up where 1 GTA had left off and keep advancing. Similar trends had been seen in Citadel, where Soviet formations continually manuevered and attacked against the flanks of the German penetration, in contrast to their often passive nature in previous attacks.

Von Manstein's plan envisaged a successful counter attack at Kharkov, followed by a sweeping advance of some 350km down to the Sea of Azov. It is very hard to see how he could have accomplished this in the face of furious counter counter attacks by tank armies that would no longer collapse in panic when faced with the unexpected and with an entire second front advancing behind the first (about whose presence it appears he was unaware) to smash into the flank of his penetration, to say nothing about the additional forces of Southwestern and Southern Fronts south of Kharkov in the Donetsk region. IMO, the most likely result of such a plan would have been a massive tank brawl around Kharkov and the early collapse of the German counter-attack as Voronezh Front refused to break, and then Steppe Front plowed into it from the east. Even if the Soviets fucked up at Kharkov and the Germans actually managed to penetrate deeply it is very hard to see how they could have protected the flanks of a 350km long salient when they could not even protect the flanks of a 35km long one during Citadel. The Panzers could not protect the flanks AND push the advance, and German infantry divisions would repeatedly prove woefully incapable of stopping Soviet tank attacks on their own. Only if all the Soviet mobile forces were somehow trapped deep within the pocket could the Germans have done it, but again, with entire Fronts held in the second echelon it seems inevitable that the German penetration would have been cut off long before it reached the sea, and we would now be talking about the disastrous encirclement and destruction of the German panzer armies at Izyum or Sloviansk or suchlike.
 
If you look at OTL (late) 1942/Early 1943 much of Ukraine was still in German hands - and as I said it might demand an EARLIER shift in startegy. Still if an Ukrainean government is fully working WITH the GErmans even a land trade strategy can - in the longer run mean that MORE territory remains in Axis hands (simply by having significan Ukrainean troops fighting WITH them...

OTL Kiev fell "only" November - this gives GErmany a full half year of a different development...

In Germanys situation each little help is improving theri situation...
To make any real difference this shift in strategy would have to eliminate Operation Blau, or at least set it much more limited objectives*. But this shift would recognize that Nazi Germany couldn't knock the USSR out of the war and was condemned to a prolonged campaign with the sole goal getting a stalemate and negotiated settlement. The conundrum is to fight this long war Germany needs the raw materials of the Ukraine for its industry and its food to feed the Ostheer.

So a strategy based on withdrawing from the Ukraine, even if slowly while bleeding the Red Army, is not very attractive. It's also difficult for any Ukrainian collaborationist so to be taken seriously if the Ostheer and occupation authorities are seizing grain, starving urban residents and using scorched earth tactics. And why would they risk being stranded by the withdrawals and exposed to Stalin's revenge? So I'm dubious about the plausibility of a compliant Ukrainian government. Unless the Germans seek to defend whatever territory they've grabbed.

Manstein's mobile defense operations may enable the Germans to recapture some territories after a Soviet offensive has run out of steam but can the Germans then reoccupy all or even most of the land lost? Or rescue isolated infantry formations left in pockets? The basic problem, even if the strategy starts in 1942, is that not all the German army is mobile enough to fight in this manner. Nor obviously is the Red Army but as we go into 1943 both absolutely and proportionately more of it is. And its non-motorized elements are increasingly stronger, in men and material, than the non-motorized forces available to the Nazis.

* Maybe taking the Don basin only or a shorter a line from Rostov to Voronezh?
 
If you look at OTL (late) 1942/Early 1943 much of Ukraine was still in German hands - and as I said it might demand an EARLIER shift in startegy.

An earlier shift to a strategy that includes "trading land" for less casualties should certainly mean that they start giving up land earlier, and only makes it more likely that they've given up Kiev by mid-1943 - or earlier.
 
An earlier shift to a strategy that includes "trading land" for less casualties should certainly mean that they start giving up land earlier, and only makes it more likely that they've given up Kiev by mid-1943 - or earlier.

NO I meant an earlier san treatment of people (like the Ukraineans) who could be your ally instead of another enemy. But that might need to ne the nazis not the nazis ;)
 
NO I meant an earlier san treatment of people (like the Ukraineans) who could be your ally instead of another enemy. But that might need to ne the nazis not the nazis ;)

It would also require that the Germans bring in food along their supply lines - which they cannot do while achieving the same results of OTL 1941 and 1942. Besides, you have now moved away from the strategy defined in the thread title and reached the usual "treat the Ukrainians better" which is an old red herring resurfacing something like every other week.

In any case, if that is what you meant in post #18, then one wonders what you meant by "trade land", which you proposed in post #12. One would think that it means, deliberately let the enemy reconquer territory so as to minimize your own losses.
Naturally, one can then hope to recover some territory with the subsequent counterattack, assuming of course that that is successful. Where, for a definition of "some", one might look up the distance the Germans withdrew from the gates of Grozny (their 1942 high tide), and the distance this victory of Manstein covered back in the other direction.
 
Still anything was better than Hitler's old "hold the line at all costs" which played exactly into the strengths of Soviet deep battle, yet the germans still gave the Ivans incredible fits even through Hitler's irrational and flawed strategy. Imagine the kind of casualties they could inflict on the Red Army if the Wehrmacht had been given full tactical mobility and the freedom Manstein wanted. And without the disastrous Battle of Kursk the panzers and mechanized forces are instead distributed throughout the eastern front. At best the Soviets sustain far more casualties and retake less territory (red army began to run out of men as they reached Berlin IOTL but that was waaayy to late) but inevitably win as the wallies storm the Reichstag.

At best for the Germans the red army simply runs out of men and collapses like the Russian Empire did in Ww1 and Hitler enforces the plan of annexing all of European Russia, which Stalin would be forced to give (not a death sentence to the soviets cause of industry and manpower evacuated east of the urals). While many would have to go and quell resistance, the lack of an organized army means that the allies face the entire bulk of a battle hardened Wehrmacht, and they are forced out of Europe. Bombing raids become unsustainable and the idea of nuking Germany into submission with an intact luftwaffe and incomplete air superiority is an americanwank fantasy. The idea of Untermehen Seelowe and other operations to defeat the allies is yet again still ASB. An armistice is made. Germany keeps all its territorial possessions including all of mainland italy (which would be retaken) while the allies keep africa and force germany to accept whatever peace is made with Japan. A 3 way cold war goes on without end. Still this scenario is quite germanwank, but the Manstein strategy gains the germans a beacon of hope to really bleed the Soviets white and force a favorable peace to the Reich.
 
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