No, it's not at all as any rational observer would realize. The entire crux of your argument is that I said "Panzer forces"......exactly as my source stated. When you brought up AFVs I corrected you by posting the source.
Now your being flagrantly dishonest. Your force did not say panzer forces, it said tanks. Anyone can go back over to the last page and read that.
Then cite sources. This is a debate, that's how this works.
Nailing this down once and for all: in terms of the deployment of panzer divisions George Tessin's Verbände und Truppen der deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS 1939-1945. It seems the numbers I recalled were for May. For June 15th, 1944 it gives 17 panzer divisions in the east (1st, 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th, 12th 13rd, 14th, 16th, 17th, 20th 23rd, 24th, 3rd SS, 5th SS, and 9th SS), 8 in the West (2nd, 9th, 11th, 19th, 21st, and 1st SS, 2nd SS, and 12th SS), 2 in Italy (26th, the Hermann-Goering), 1 in Germany (the 6th), and 1 in Denmark (25th), for a total of 29. Looking into the history of those last two, neither the 25th or the 6th was deployed to the Western Front. So in final analysis, the proportion of panzer divisions on the eastern front represents ~62% of the total, a pretty clear majority, and is inline with the proportion of AFVs deployed on the Eastern Front. To increase that back up to the levels of mid-1943 would entail the redeployment of 6-7 divisions. The 6th and 25th were two that were OTL redeployed back to the east as was the Hermann-Goering Division, so that leaves 3-4 which would be sent eastward from France (unless the Germans decide to keep the Hermann-Goering in Italy and send an additional division from France in it's place, which is plausible).
The first example from the work in question I saw:
That's... nice? But Nazis delusions over Wunderwaffen do not make for coherent strategic plans.
As for planning specifically devoted to the matter at hand, from Bagration 1944:
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That's nice? Unfortunately, it does not have anything which says that the Germans expected to then turn around and increase their proportion armor devoted to the Eastern Front beyond that of even what they had in the summer of 1943, like you are claiming.
Also, again, the admittance that more then half of German tank strength was on the Eastern Front, in contradiction to your claim that it was under half.
No, they were well aware of the requirements to do a major oceanic landing and would quickly realize the losses suffered as well as Ike's likely resignation that this was the main effort of 1944.
Assertions not in evidence. The Germans showed such ignorance in the knowledge of what was required for major oceanic landings that they didn't believe Normandy was the main landing for weeks after it had established itself and even after that showed concern about further landings. Additionally, the WAllies did show the ability for follow up landings even after OTL's Normandy, so the German's are going to have to be on guard for those as well. So while undoubtedly a healthy portion of those 8 panzer divisions will go east, not every last one of them will. Hell, in 1942 and '43 not every last panzer divisions (even discounting the ones in North Africa) went east despite the Germans prioritizing the east, so the claim is wrong on the face of it.
No, they do not come out to six unless you're unable to tell the difference between a Panzer and Panzergrenadier division.
Given the strengths by this time, the difference is minute. Their both major mechanized formations that contain large numbers of panzers.
The only way the landings could fail is if Ike moved it back to the 18th. The sheer firepower advantages of the landings combined with Rommel not around to order immediate counter-attacks in force means the IOTL landing could not be defeated.
Again, it's not the only way it could fail, although the alternative would require the German's to see through Operation Fortitude and not redeploy the panzers until the last moment which... is unlikely, to say the least. Your proposed alternate PoD is more simple and probably more plausible. I figure that's down to the OP though.
And thus undermines your argument, yes. Seriously, please have some consistent to your points.
Huh? How does it undermine it? If the Germans don't have enough of a supply for fuel and infantry in December 1944 for the Ardennes Offensive and what supplies they do have of these are constantly falling, why would they suddenly have it later for Spring Awakening? As I said, it was lack of supply. I've been plenty consistent on that.
If by some "few weeks" you mean nearly three months later, sure.
Huh? The Ardennes Offensive wasn't cancelled and the 6th Panzer Army withdrawn until January 25th, with the last of it's formations arriving in Hungary by February 11th. In what world is January 25th-February 11th three months?
As my source stated, you were seeing collapses by August; citations are now needed from you.
Adam Tooze in Wages of Destruction goes into extensive detail on the disintegration of German and observes that the final peak of German industrial output occurred at the end of 1944.
Additionally, your own source attributes the August disruptions not to any campaigns launched in August, but to the prior destruction of the French railnet… which pre-dates D-Day.
In any case, it really doesn't matter. The Germans can't hope to make use, or even maintain, additional production without fuel and men. Even as it was, the Germans were able to increase their inventories of planes and tanks and guns... but they lacked the fuel and manpower to actually deploy them so most of those planes and tanks just sat around gathering dust. What's more, as Adam Tooze pointed out in Wages, German industrial collapse was bound to happen in early/mid-'45 regardless of external factors:
"By the last years of the war, the devastating blows delivered by the Allies were rocking the German war economy to it's foundations. However, to assign sole responsibility for Germany's final collapse to such 'external shocks' would again be to collude with Speer's mythic narrative. In fact, by 1944 what could no longer be obscured was that the German war economy was disintegrating from within. Barring truly drastic countermeasures, it was clear by the summer of 1944 that German would soon face an inflation no less severe than that which had dissolved the structure of the Wilhelmine state between 1914 and 1923. And this points to one more blind spot in the heroic narractive of the Speer Ministry. Up to the summer of 1944 it would hardly be unfair to say that the Reich Ministry had been oblivious to money as an essential instrument of macroeconomic management. As we have seen, in the interests of maximizing armaments production, Speer in 1942 had opposed the efforts of the price commissioner and Finance Ministry to cream off excess profits. The Armaments Ministry's entire system of economic management had been based on extending and perfecting a mechanism of physical controls overGermany industry. By 1944, however, theproblem of inflation was catching up with Speer. Money could no longer be ignored, even by the most fervent advocates of direct physical control." -Adam Tooze, Wages of Destruction
The Germans own mobilization was going to strangle itself, regardless of what happens on the fronts and with the bombers. It may be minutely delayed (or maybe not: you still haven't explained why the WAllies can't just substitute in more heavy bombers smashing railyards to do the same job), but it'll still happen.
Then you clearly lack logical reasoning. The planning is irrelevant in of itself, no one has disputed that it's already been made, just that it is meaningless. The Soviets already had Bagration ready, yes; however, now the circumstances it is waged can and will be massively different than it was IOTL. For example, a Hitler distracted by the situation in the West might be a Hitler less inclined to countermand orders in the East to initiate withdraws.
Again, I'm seeing no actual casual relations are being shown here between D-Day failing and Hitler suddenly completely inverting behavior that well pre-dates D-Day in terms of permitting withdrawals before Soviet offensives. In terms of permitting withdrawal following Soviet offensives, as pointed out in the same thread you tried to cite(and which even the OP who created the thread proceeded to acknowledge), Hitler's countermanding of the orders to initiate withdrawal was meaningless: in pretty much every case, the Soviets were already behind the German lines and encircling them by the time such orders were issued. So even if Hitler doesn't countermand those orders, they get encircled and destroyed anyways because the Soviets are simply too strong and outpacing them too much.
Of course, even pulling back to the D'niepr or Berezina prior to the offensive would not have made much difference. To quote "Explaining Defeat":
"The plan was for fairly substantial defensive works, but Hitler (and Busch) interfered with their construction so consistently that by June 1944 even the Panther line was largely unbuilt and consisted of only about 5,000–6,000 bunkers, mostly for 2–3 men apiece (or, in other words, positions for approximately two full strength divisions). If the Panther Line was a disappointment, the Bear Line and the Berezina (also designated as a secondary line) were disasters, as the plans for the Bear line were never carried out and there were no plans at all to actually fortify the Berezina.22 If Army Group Center had pulled back to either of these lines in May or early June 1944, as it in fact requested (and Hitler denied) and as Niepold and Groeben suggested would have saved the day, there would have been no time to finish construction of the major defensive posts or to improve the river lines as defensive strong points before the Soviets launched “Bagration.” The troops would have had to surrender relatively well-prepared positions that they had occupied for many months and pull back to river lines, which were completely unfortified and offered little natural impediment to the enemy. As precarious as their positions along the balcony may have been, to abandon them offered no safety and indeed exposed them to further dangers. All that would have been accomplished was that the Germans would have been 25–50 miles further west when “Bagration” was launched. This would have been at best a tactical victory (the first blows would have fallen on empty positions) and the shortening of the lines may have permitted the formation of a small reserve, but the strategic situation would have remained unchanged. The Germans would still have been facing a powerful enemy, but this time along a less defensible line. Withdrawal from the balcony would thus not have altered the strategic realities at the front, but rather, given the chronic German failure to prepare adequate defensive lines to the rear, would have placed the units in extremely dangerous and unfortified positions. This is not to suggest that the river lines were less advantageous than the balcony, as clearly they would have been powerful positions had the Germans the time and inclination to develop them, but the rivers did not offer a strategic solution to the immense difficulties facing Army Group Center. The hope of a withdrawal before “Bagration” was a chimera which would not have given the Germans the ability to effectively counter the Soviet attack and most likely would not have resulted in a significantly different outcome." - Page 135 (Emphasis added)
If we don't believe that happens and Bagration stays exactly like OTL, come August 1st Belorussian gets a big surprise when an entire Panzer Army slams into them.
Sure, and that's going to result in a massive fight. It is not, however, going to result in anything the Soviets can't handle.
Sure if you leave out the proviso they didn't do major river crossings; they utilized pre-established bridgeheads across the river to do offensives. You really love to ignore inconvenient details when it suits you.
Sure they did. Repeatedly in 1943 and 1944 and 1945 the Soviets did major river crossings... which is how they got those bridgeheads in the first place, an inconvenient detail which you like to ignore. In the autumn of 1943, after an advance of 400 kilometers they crossed the defended D'niepr river and repulsed every German attempt to crush the bridgeheads, instead doubling the number of bridgeheads over the next month through more river crossings.
Of course, I can't help but notice a element of hypocrisy here: in order to seriously smash 1st Belorussian to the degree that the Soviets actually feel it with an attack beginning at the start of August, the Germans themselves have to conduct not one but two river-crossings: first they have to smash through the Soviet defenses of their bridgeheads on the west bank of the Vistula, cross the Vistula against the Soviet forces arrayed on the eastern bank, fight another roughly ~100 kilometers to the Bug river, and then cross the Bug, all the while defending their right flank against the very armor-heavy 1st Ukrainian which will be sure to be launching massive armored counter-counter-attacks with it's multiple tank armies into the Germans right flank. I can see the reinforced Germans achieving the first and second task, but the third task and on is simply beyond their capacity to fulfill even with the additional formations brought in from the west. By the time the German counter-offensive is spent, the Soviets are still going to be holding a large swathe of territory between the Bug and the Vistula and their losses are not going to be anything their own reserves of material and manpower can't replenish.
TIL old men and young boys untrained and unequipped are the same as two Panzer Armies and a Infantry Army.
2 panzer armies and a infantry army describe the forces which opposed the Soviets at the start of such operations as Bagration and Lvov-Sandomierz. The end result was total and swift annihilation of the German defenders.
TIL the Soviet supermen don't need logistics
The Soviets had plenty of logistics. They were a hell of a lot better at it then the Germans were and were supplying their forces out to the Vistula quite adequately to put up some very stiff resistance.
TIL again old men and young boys doing a last ditch defense on a small area are the same as Panzer armies defending a fortified river line.
The Panzer Armies are liable to have been destroyed east of the Oder and even east of the Vistula during the offensives prior. They'll impose a month or two's delay during the Soviets breakout from their Bug bridgeheads, but they'll do so at the cost of being destroyed. As a result, it's gonna be old men and boys (well, really old men and really young boys, as the Germans were already relying on old men and boys by mid-’44) defending Silesia and Pomerania when the next Soviet offensive breaks there and that means it's gonna be practically no one defending the Oder when the Soviets reach it.
The reason they overran them IOTL was because the Germans were largely smashed up along the Vistula due to improper positioning and then they didn't have time to re-position forces. Here, that won't happen.
I've already supplied a source which goes so far as to note that even the official German history states that the positioning of German forces along the Vistula was irrelevant. Even the positioning at the Oder made no difference and would have been even less consequential had the Soviet execution of the assault not been flawed.
Namely because Hossbach didn't have the fresh forces on hand to lay the skewer on them. There's a pretty big difference between what he had IOTL and suddenly getting reinforced with nearly 10 divisions of Panzers and Panzergrendiers.
Not big enough. He may be able to push deeper into their defensive network and inflict additional casualties, which will chew up much of his own forces as well, but 1st Belorussian is too strong for him to have any hope of actually breaking the Front.
It's notable you said absolutely nothing that refutes my points and instead just mindlessly quoted TOE. Let's recap, shall we?
1) All Soviet forces are exhausted, they've been in constant combat and advance for nearly two months.
2) Their logistics net is at the breaking point.
3) By July 5th, they had less than 700 tanks; by your own numbers, the Germans divisions pulled from the West will have over twice as many tanks.
4) Their rifle divisions are 63-85% understrength.
According to the tables from the very book you are citing on pages 419-422, 1st Belorussian had a total of 2,334 AFV's on July 18th. That's around 100 more (minimum) AFV's then the Germans even had in Normandy. It seems your claim stems (again) from bad reading comprehension: the tables show that the 680 AFV figure is just for the 1st Belorussian's right-wing, with the left-wing adding the rest, but the Germans won't have the luxury of engaging just 1st Belorussians right-wing if they want to do what your claiming their gonna do. Then there's 1st Ukrainian, with it's multiple tank armies, which will be backing up 1st Belorussian and the Germans are also gonna have to deal with as the battle develops. When it comes to manpower strength, those tables also show that the addition of the left-wing actually increased the amount of strength being brought to bear by 300,000 men.
As to the claim of the logistics net being at the breaking point, the book certainly lists plenty of difficulties experienced by Soviet forces as they advanced which read as little different from those encountered by the WAllies in September of 1944 following their own pell-mell advance across France (and a lot better then the difficulties the Germans experienced in 1941 after their own similarly deep advance), but at no point does it say it was at risk of a breakdown like you are claiming or that it even risked undermining the fighting capability of the frontlines. In fact, the book states that supply throughput increased in August on page 509-510 as the railnet in Belarus was restored... which is obviously rather the opposite of a breakdown.
In sum, your own source contradicts the first three claims. As for your uncited claim: exhaustion after months of advance did not prevent the Soviet forces from mounting stiff defenses that would cause German armored counterattacks to stall out after some initial gains in 1943-1945. I do not see why that would suddenly cease to be the case here.
As I said, remind me when you post a thread so I can post in it and thus claim your entire thesis is wrong because that's exactly the logic here. It also says a lot about your ability to debate that you've consistently thrown out underhanded insults through this debate without addressing the point at hand. Not only is that now how you debate, it basically screams you have no ability to refute the points at hand.
Unless you have means to refute the points made in that thread and which even the thread's OP acknowledged were valid, which I see you do not, all your doing at this point is deflecting at the fact you've been called out on.
My assertion has never been he changes his entire method of fighting.
Yes, yes you are. Permitting German withdrawals prior to Soviet offensives represents a radical departure from Hitler's operational approach as it had been since 1943 and would continue to be until the end of the war. That's a fundamental change to his method of fighting.
Because it's irrelevant. The German 6th Army was caught out in the open and destroyed; such won't happen if they've pulled back into well fortified positions.
And you've failed to show why they've suddenly been allowed to pull back into well fortified positions.
Take in note, dear audience, when challenged he has to deflect because we both know he can't prove what he claimed when called out for it.
Take note, dear audience, that when called out he has to lie despite knowing full well that anyone can go back and read what he has already written.
TIL Flak can't shoot down planes for some reason.
Which beautifully misses the point. FlaK on it's own never was able to affect WAllied strategic bombing tempos. There's also a distinct lack of explanation on how the Germans are supposed to mass produce this shell (and the radar systems you keep harping on about) in the required quantities to even noticeable impact WAllied loss rates in the midst of the industrial collapse which will still be occurring at about this time.
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