Alternate cold war if the USSR liberated all of europe during WW2

No, it's not at all as any rational observer would realize. The entire crux of your argument is that I said "Panzer forces"......exactly as my source stated. When you brought up AFVs I corrected you by posting the source.

Now your being flagrantly dishonest. Your force did not say panzer forces, it said tanks. Anyone can go back over to the last page and read that.

Then cite sources. This is a debate, that's how this works.

Nailing this down once and for all: in terms of the deployment of panzer divisions George Tessin's Verbände und Truppen der deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS 1939-1945. It seems the numbers I recalled were for May. For June 15th, 1944 it gives 17 panzer divisions in the east (1st, 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th, 12th 13rd, 14th, 16th, 17th, 20th 23rd, 24th, 3rd SS, 5th SS, and 9th SS), 8 in the West (2nd, 9th, 11th, 19th, 21st, and 1st SS, 2nd SS, and 12th SS), 2 in Italy (26th, the Hermann-Goering), 1 in Germany (the 6th), and 1 in Denmark (25th), for a total of 29. Looking into the history of those last two, neither the 25th or the 6th was deployed to the Western Front. So in final analysis, the proportion of panzer divisions on the eastern front represents ~62% of the total, a pretty clear majority, and is inline with the proportion of AFVs deployed on the Eastern Front. To increase that back up to the levels of mid-1943 would entail the redeployment of 6-7 divisions. The 6th and 25th were two that were OTL redeployed back to the east as was the Hermann-Goering Division, so that leaves 3-4 which would be sent eastward from France (unless the Germans decide to keep the Hermann-Goering in Italy and send an additional division from France in it's place, which is plausible).

The first example from the work in question I saw:

That's... nice? But Nazis delusions over Wunderwaffen do not make for coherent strategic plans.

As for planning specifically devoted to the matter at hand, from Bagration 1944:

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That's nice? Unfortunately, it does not have anything which says that the Germans expected to then turn around and increase their proportion armor devoted to the Eastern Front beyond that of even what they had in the summer of 1943, like you are claiming.

Also, again, the admittance that more then half of German tank strength was on the Eastern Front, in contradiction to your claim that it was under half.

No, they were well aware of the requirements to do a major oceanic landing and would quickly realize the losses suffered as well as Ike's likely resignation that this was the main effort of 1944.

Assertions not in evidence. The Germans showed such ignorance in the knowledge of what was required for major oceanic landings that they didn't believe Normandy was the main landing for weeks after it had established itself and even after that showed concern about further landings. Additionally, the WAllies did show the ability for follow up landings even after OTL's Normandy, so the German's are going to have to be on guard for those as well. So while undoubtedly a healthy portion of those 8 panzer divisions will go east, not every last one of them will. Hell, in 1942 and '43 not every last panzer divisions (even discounting the ones in North Africa) went east despite the Germans prioritizing the east, so the claim is wrong on the face of it.

No, they do not come out to six unless you're unable to tell the difference between a Panzer and Panzergrenadier division.

Given the strengths by this time, the difference is minute. Their both major mechanized formations that contain large numbers of panzers.

The only way the landings could fail is if Ike moved it back to the 18th. The sheer firepower advantages of the landings combined with Rommel not around to order immediate counter-attacks in force means the IOTL landing could not be defeated.

Again, it's not the only way it could fail, although the alternative would require the German's to see through Operation Fortitude and not redeploy the panzers until the last moment which... is unlikely, to say the least. Your proposed alternate PoD is more simple and probably more plausible. I figure that's down to the OP though.

And thus undermines your argument, yes. Seriously, please have some consistent to your points.

Huh? How does it undermine it? If the Germans don't have enough of a supply for fuel and infantry in December 1944 for the Ardennes Offensive and what supplies they do have of these are constantly falling, why would they suddenly have it later for Spring Awakening? As I said, it was lack of supply. I've been plenty consistent on that.

If by some "few weeks" you mean nearly three months later, sure.

Huh? The Ardennes Offensive wasn't cancelled and the 6th Panzer Army withdrawn until January 25th, with the last of it's formations arriving in Hungary by February 11th. In what world is January 25th-February 11th three months?

As my source stated, you were seeing collapses by August; citations are now needed from you.

Adam Tooze in Wages of Destruction goes into extensive detail on the disintegration of German and observes that the final peak of German industrial output occurred at the end of 1944.

Additionally, your own source attributes the August disruptions not to any campaigns launched in August, but to the prior destruction of the French railnet… which pre-dates D-Day.

In any case, it really doesn't matter. The Germans can't hope to make use, or even maintain, additional production without fuel and men. Even as it was, the Germans were able to increase their inventories of planes and tanks and guns... but they lacked the fuel and manpower to actually deploy them so most of those planes and tanks just sat around gathering dust. What's more, as Adam Tooze pointed out in Wages, German industrial collapse was bound to happen in early/mid-'45 regardless of external factors:

"By the last years of the war, the devastating blows delivered by the Allies were rocking the German war economy to it's foundations. However, to assign sole responsibility for Germany's final collapse to such 'external shocks' would again be to collude with Speer's mythic narrative. In fact, by 1944 what could no longer be obscured was that the German war economy was disintegrating from within. Barring truly drastic countermeasures, it was clear by the summer of 1944 that German would soon face an inflation no less severe than that which had dissolved the structure of the Wilhelmine state between 1914 and 1923. And this points to one more blind spot in the heroic narractive of the Speer Ministry. Up to the summer of 1944 it would hardly be unfair to say that the Reich Ministry had been oblivious to money as an essential instrument of macroeconomic management. As we have seen, in the interests of maximizing armaments production, Speer in 1942 had opposed the efforts of the price commissioner and Finance Ministry to cream off excess profits. The Armaments Ministry's entire system of economic management had been based on extending and perfecting a mechanism of physical controls overGermany industry. By 1944, however, theproblem of inflation was catching up with Speer. Money could no longer be ignored, even by the most fervent advocates of direct physical control." -Adam Tooze, Wages of Destruction

The Germans own mobilization was going to strangle itself, regardless of what happens on the fronts and with the bombers. It may be minutely delayed (or maybe not: you still haven't explained why the WAllies can't just substitute in more heavy bombers smashing railyards to do the same job), but it'll still happen.

Then you clearly lack logical reasoning. The planning is irrelevant in of itself, no one has disputed that it's already been made, just that it is meaningless. The Soviets already had Bagration ready, yes; however, now the circumstances it is waged can and will be massively different than it was IOTL. For example, a Hitler distracted by the situation in the West might be a Hitler less inclined to countermand orders in the East to initiate withdraws.

Again, I'm seeing no actual casual relations are being shown here between D-Day failing and Hitler suddenly completely inverting behavior that well pre-dates D-Day in terms of permitting withdrawals before Soviet offensives. In terms of permitting withdrawal following Soviet offensives, as pointed out in the same thread you tried to cite(and which even the OP who created the thread proceeded to acknowledge), Hitler's countermanding of the orders to initiate withdrawal was meaningless: in pretty much every case, the Soviets were already behind the German lines and encircling them by the time such orders were issued. So even if Hitler doesn't countermand those orders, they get encircled and destroyed anyways because the Soviets are simply too strong and outpacing them too much.

Of course, even pulling back to the D'niepr or Berezina prior to the offensive would not have made much difference. To quote "Explaining Defeat":

"The plan was for fairly substantial defensive works, but Hitler (and Busch) interfered with their construction so consistently that by June 1944 even the Panther line was largely unbuilt and consisted of only about 5,000–6,000 bunkers, mostly for 2–3 men apiece (or, in other words, positions for approximately two full strength divisions). If the Panther Line was a disappointment, the Bear Line and the Berezina (also designated as a secondary line) were disasters, as the plans for the Bear line were never carried out and there were no plans at all to actually fortify the Berezina.22 If Army Group Center had pulled back to either of these lines in May or early June 1944, as it in fact requested (and Hitler denied) and as Niepold and Groeben suggested would have saved the day, there would have been no time to finish construction of the major defensive posts or to improve the river lines as defensive strong points before the Soviets launched “Bagration.” The troops would have had to surrender relatively well-prepared positions that they had occupied for many months and pull back to river lines, which were completely unfortified and offered little natural impediment to the enemy. As precarious as their positions along the balcony may have been, to abandon them offered no safety and indeed exposed them to further dangers. All that would have been accomplished was that the Germans would have been 25–50 miles further west when “Bagration” was launched. This would have been at best a tactical victory (the first blows would have fallen on empty positions) and the shortening of the lines may have permitted the formation of a small reserve, but the strategic situation would have remained unchanged. The Germans would still have been facing a powerful enemy, but this time along a less defensible line. Withdrawal from the balcony would thus not have altered the strategic realities at the front, but rather, given the chronic German failure to prepare adequate defensive lines to the rear, would have placed the units in extremely dangerous and unfortified positions. This is not to suggest that the river lines were less advantageous than the balcony, as clearly they would have been powerful positions had the Germans the time and inclination to develop them, but the rivers did not offer a strategic solution to the immense difficulties facing Army Group Center. The hope of a withdrawal before “Bagration” was a chimera which would not have given the Germans the ability to effectively counter the Soviet attack and most likely would not have resulted in a significantly different outcome." - Page 135 (Emphasis added)

If we don't believe that happens and Bagration stays exactly like OTL, come August 1st Belorussian gets a big surprise when an entire Panzer Army slams into them.

Sure, and that's going to result in a massive fight. It is not, however, going to result in anything the Soviets can't handle.

Sure if you leave out the proviso they didn't do major river crossings; they utilized pre-established bridgeheads across the river to do offensives. You really love to ignore inconvenient details when it suits you.

Sure they did. Repeatedly in 1943 and 1944 and 1945 the Soviets did major river crossings... which is how they got those bridgeheads in the first place, an inconvenient detail which you like to ignore. In the autumn of 1943, after an advance of 400 kilometers they crossed the defended D'niepr river and repulsed every German attempt to crush the bridgeheads, instead doubling the number of bridgeheads over the next month through more river crossings.

Of course, I can't help but notice a element of hypocrisy here: in order to seriously smash 1st Belorussian to the degree that the Soviets actually feel it with an attack beginning at the start of August, the Germans themselves have to conduct not one but two river-crossings: first they have to smash through the Soviet defenses of their bridgeheads on the west bank of the Vistula, cross the Vistula against the Soviet forces arrayed on the eastern bank, fight another roughly ~100 kilometers to the Bug river, and then cross the Bug, all the while defending their right flank against the very armor-heavy 1st Ukrainian which will be sure to be launching massive armored counter-counter-attacks with it's multiple tank armies into the Germans right flank. I can see the reinforced Germans achieving the first and second task, but the third task and on is simply beyond their capacity to fulfill even with the additional formations brought in from the west. By the time the German counter-offensive is spent, the Soviets are still going to be holding a large swathe of territory between the Bug and the Vistula and their losses are not going to be anything their own reserves of material and manpower can't replenish.

TIL old men and young boys untrained and unequipped are the same as two Panzer Armies and a Infantry Army.

2 panzer armies and a infantry army describe the forces which opposed the Soviets at the start of such operations as Bagration and Lvov-Sandomierz. The end result was total and swift annihilation of the German defenders.

TIL the Soviet supermen don't need logistics

The Soviets had plenty of logistics. They were a hell of a lot better at it then the Germans were and were supplying their forces out to the Vistula quite adequately to put up some very stiff resistance.

TIL again old men and young boys doing a last ditch defense on a small area are the same as Panzer armies defending a fortified river line.

The Panzer Armies are liable to have been destroyed east of the Oder and even east of the Vistula during the offensives prior. They'll impose a month or two's delay during the Soviets breakout from their Bug bridgeheads, but they'll do so at the cost of being destroyed. As a result, it's gonna be old men and boys (well, really old men and really young boys, as the Germans were already relying on old men and boys by mid-’44) defending Silesia and Pomerania when the next Soviet offensive breaks there and that means it's gonna be practically no one defending the Oder when the Soviets reach it.

The reason they overran them IOTL was because the Germans were largely smashed up along the Vistula due to improper positioning and then they didn't have time to re-position forces. Here, that won't happen.

I've already supplied a source which goes so far as to note that even the official German history states that the positioning of German forces along the Vistula was irrelevant. Even the positioning at the Oder made no difference and would have been even less consequential had the Soviet execution of the assault not been flawed.

Namely because Hossbach didn't have the fresh forces on hand to lay the skewer on them. There's a pretty big difference between what he had IOTL and suddenly getting reinforced with nearly 10 divisions of Panzers and Panzergrendiers.

Not big enough. He may be able to push deeper into their defensive network and inflict additional casualties, which will chew up much of his own forces as well, but 1st Belorussian is too strong for him to have any hope of actually breaking the Front.

It's notable you said absolutely nothing that refutes my points and instead just mindlessly quoted TOE. Let's recap, shall we?

1) All Soviet forces are exhausted, they've been in constant combat and advance for nearly two months.
2) Their logistics net is at the breaking point.
3) By July 5th, they had less than 700 tanks; by your own numbers, the Germans divisions pulled from the West will have over twice as many tanks.
4) Their rifle divisions are 63-85% understrength.

According to the tables from the very book you are citing on pages 419-422, 1st Belorussian had a total of 2,334 AFV's on July 18th. That's around 100 more (minimum) AFV's then the Germans even had in Normandy. It seems your claim stems (again) from bad reading comprehension: the tables show that the 680 AFV figure is just for the 1st Belorussian's right-wing, with the left-wing adding the rest, but the Germans won't have the luxury of engaging just 1st Belorussians right-wing if they want to do what your claiming their gonna do. Then there's 1st Ukrainian, with it's multiple tank armies, which will be backing up 1st Belorussian and the Germans are also gonna have to deal with as the battle develops. When it comes to manpower strength, those tables also show that the addition of the left-wing actually increased the amount of strength being brought to bear by 300,000 men.

As to the claim of the logistics net being at the breaking point, the book certainly lists plenty of difficulties experienced by Soviet forces as they advanced which read as little different from those encountered by the WAllies in September of 1944 following their own pell-mell advance across France (and a lot better then the difficulties the Germans experienced in 1941 after their own similarly deep advance), but at no point does it say it was at risk of a breakdown like you are claiming or that it even risked undermining the fighting capability of the frontlines. In fact, the book states that supply throughput increased in August on page 509-510 as the railnet in Belarus was restored... which is obviously rather the opposite of a breakdown.

In sum, your own source contradicts the first three claims. As for your uncited claim: exhaustion after months of advance did not prevent the Soviet forces from mounting stiff defenses that would cause German armored counterattacks to stall out after some initial gains in 1943-1945. I do not see why that would suddenly cease to be the case here.

As I said, remind me when you post a thread so I can post in it and thus claim your entire thesis is wrong because that's exactly the logic here. It also says a lot about your ability to debate that you've consistently thrown out underhanded insults through this debate without addressing the point at hand. Not only is that now how you debate, it basically screams you have no ability to refute the points at hand.

Unless you have means to refute the points made in that thread and which even the thread's OP acknowledged were valid, which I see you do not, all your doing at this point is deflecting at the fact you've been called out on.

My assertion has never been he changes his entire method of fighting.

Yes, yes you are. Permitting German withdrawals prior to Soviet offensives represents a radical departure from Hitler's operational approach as it had been since 1943 and would continue to be until the end of the war. That's a fundamental change to his method of fighting.

Because it's irrelevant. The German 6th Army was caught out in the open and destroyed; such won't happen if they've pulled back into well fortified positions.

And you've failed to show why they've suddenly been allowed to pull back into well fortified positions.

Take in note, dear audience, when challenged he has to deflect because we both know he can't prove what he claimed when called out for it.

Take note, dear audience, that when called out he has to lie despite knowing full well that anyone can go back and read what he has already written.

TIL Flak can't shoot down planes for some reason.

Which beautifully misses the point. FlaK on it's own never was able to affect WAllied strategic bombing tempos. There's also a distinct lack of explanation on how the Germans are supposed to mass produce this shell (and the radar systems you keep harping on about) in the required quantities to even noticeable impact WAllied loss rates in the midst of the industrial collapse which will still be occurring at about this time.
 
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If it came down to it, the Nazis will leave the entirety of Western Europe up to Berlin open and Hitler will be couped if need be.

Wishful thinking. As it was, the army’s coup plot was half-hearted and lacked support, which is why it failed. Within the Nazis themselves? Nobody remotely entertained the notion. Their willingness to oppose Hitler - to the level of deposing him no less - was totally non-existent.

After the failed 20 July putsch, Hitler tightened his control on the reigns of power, and rendered another such attempt unthinkable. Even as the Reich's destruction closed in around it in the first months of 1945, the Wehrmacht's senior leadership remained completely loyal to Hitler. "[The Army leadershp's] reaction to the worsening crisis was, first of all, to back up Hitler's demands for absolute obedience and discipline." (Geoffrey Megargee, "Inside Hitler's High Command," p.222). As Megargee recounts, the military leadership passed on Hitler's increasingly extreme directives against any form of surrender without question, and did not just do so passively, but also actively took steps to ensure they were followed... usually involving frequent use of the death penalty. Although there was widespread dissatisfaction among the senior military leaders at the course of the war, the important point is that none of them resigned, and none of them plotted rebellion or sought a separate peace. Megargee cites a combination of delusion, fatalism, military discipline, and honour as the main reasons for this undying obedience. Whatever the reasons, this loyalty would have created a serious barrier to any attempts by any others of the Nazi hierarchy to replace the Fuhrer.

And among the Nazi hierarchy that would have been a very short list, beginning and ending with Himmler. Although Hitler became convinced that Goering was a traitor in his final days, in fact Goering was just following the letter of a secret directive written by Hitler himself in 1941, where Hitler had stated that in the event that he was incapacitated or cut off from command, Goering was to act as his deputy with all necessary authority. As the Soviets closed in around Berlin, Goering sent a very carefully worded telegram to Hitler reminding him of this directive, pointing out that Hitler would soon be cut off, and requesting permission to take charge of the Reich. Hitler, at the urging of Bormann, his personal secretary, saw this as an attempt by Goering to launch a coup and flew into a rage, demanding Goering's immediate resignation, on pain of death. Goering acquiesced and was immediately placed under house arrest by the SS. So Goering would have posed no serious challenge to Hitler, lacking the loyalty of the Army (whose leadership considered him a buffoon), or indeed sufficient forces of his own to oppose either the Army or the SS.

Himmler was the only real danger, with his own private army and web of power. But Himmler was "as loyal as a dog" to Hitler, and they only parted ways after it became clear to Himmler that the Fuhrer intended to die in Berlin. Himmler had no such intentions and began to look to his own survival, starting up secret negotiations with the Allies. While Himmler had the power to oppose Hitler, there is no evidence he ever had the intent. Certainly not while Hitler was alive and intent on wielding power himself. Even Himmler's last minute "betrayal" was quite tame compared to the potential actions he could have taken, what with his control of the Nazi apparatus and the SS. It certainly in no way approached an actual coup or seizure of power, and at worst involved attempting to favourably position himself with the Allies in preparation for Hitler's inevitable death.

Other members of the senior leadership can be quickly discounted. Speer had authority, but lacked the military power base necessary for a coup; Donitz was even more loyal than Himmler; Bormann was manipulative, but derived his authority entirely from Hitler himself and would probably have been the first up against the wall after any coup against Hitler. Although the senior Nazis squabbled like children among themselves (one of the worst feuds in the final days was between Bormann and Goering, who detested each other), none of them showed any evidence that they were prepared to move against Hitler while he remained capable of exercising the least bit of power.

So after 20 July I don't see any realistic scenario that sees Hitler overthrown before his death. Your just not gonna see the West be thrown open until Hitler kicks it himself. The only question is if he’ll go down in Berlin like OTL or somewhere off the west or south, like in Hamburg. I doubt he would try to make his final stand west of the Rhine or south of the Alps.
 
Now your being flagrantly dishonest. Your force did not say panzer forces, it said tanks. Anyone can go back over to the last page and read that.

Would you like to try again or go ahead and admit you're wrong?

If D-Day fails, there's no chance in hell the Soviets overrun Europe; you've just freed up over 50% of the Panzer force for duty in the East and prevented Allied tac air from getting French bases they used to shut down the German transportation network in late 1944.

"As Germany prepared for this offensive, events in the West were also influencing Germany's capabilities. The expected summer Allied invasion of France had had dramatic consequences in terms of draining units out of the East. By June 1944 seven of the of the precious Panzer divisions were committed to France, and additional units were held back from the Eastern Front so they could be moved either East or West as the circumstance demanded. In the Summer of 1943 about 80 percent of German tank strength had been concentrated in the East; in 1944 this proportion was only a little more than half."

Bagration 1944, Pg 13 by Steven Zaloga, Osprey Campaign Series.

Nailing this down once and for all: in terms of the deployment of panzer divisions George Tessin's Verbände und Truppen der deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS 1939-1945. Rechecking the posts I saw by people citing it, it seems the numbers I recalled were for May. For June 15th, 1944 it gives 17 panzer divisions in the east (1st, 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th, 12th 13rd, 14th, 16th, 17th, 20th 23rd, 24th, 3rd SS, 5th SS, and 9th SS), 8 in the West (2nd, 9th, 11th, 19th, 21st, and 1st SS, 2nd SS, and 12th SS), 2 in Italy (26th, the Hermann-Goering), 1 in Germany (the 6th), and 1 in Denmark (25th), for a total of 29. Looking into the history of those last two, neither the 25th or the 6th was deployed to the Western Front. So in final analysis, the proportion of panzer divisions on the eastern front represents ~62% of the total, a pretty clear majority, and is inline with the proportion of AFVs deployed on the Eastern Front. To increase that back up to the levels of mid-1943 would entail the redeployment of 6-7 divisions. The 6th and 25th were two that were OTL redeployed back to the east as was the Hermann-Goering Division, so that leaves 3-4 which would be sent eastward from France (unless the Germans decide to keep the Hermann-Goering in Italy and send an additional division from France in it's place, which is plausible).

So your citation is a book you don't own and posts from other people you can't verify relaying the information second hand? What?

That's... nice? But Nazis delusions over Wunderwaffen do not make for coherent strategic plans.

For someone who has spent excessive amounts of time claiming goal post shifting on my behalf, you certainly have no problem engaging in it yourself. Whether or not their planning was sounded is irrelevant to the fact you claimed that no planning existed. This just further shows you are engaging in blatant lying in this debate, given you claimed the citation in question showed no planning occurred at all either.

That's nice? Unfortunately, it does not have anything which says that the Germans expected to then turn around and increase their proportion armor devoted to the Eastern Front beyond that of even what they had in the summer of 1943, like you are claiming.

For someone who has repeatedly insulted my reading ability, this is rich. I don't know if English is your first language or not but:

"Hitler was convinced of the need to defeat the Allied invasion decisively, as at Dieppe two years previously, so that Germany could then concentrate its might against the Soviet onslaught. Since November 1943 the Western Front had been given priority for reinforcement."

Now, once again, you're either lying or engaging in some rampant hypocrisy to criticize my reading comprehension.

Also, again, the admittance that more then half of German tank strength was on the Eastern Front, in contradiction to your claim that it was under half.

Prior to D-Day yes, more reinforcements were later detached for duty on the Eastern Front.

Assertions not in evidence. The Germans showed such ignorance in the knowledge of what was required for major oceanic landings that they didn't believe Normandy was the main landing for weeks after it had established itself and even after that showed concern about further landings.

Assertions backed up by any review of the Normandy Landings. The Germans expected the main landings elsewhere and initially thought Normandy was diversion; this was the root of their concern and the later Dragoon landings pretty well bare it out as a valid thinking. However, in a situation where the Normandy landings have decisively failed, it's going to become rapidly apparent this was the main push for 1944, going by Ike's likely resignation and the fact the Allies just lost their paratrooper capability.

Additionally, the WAllies did show the ability for follow up landings even after OTL's Normandy, so the German's are going to have to be on guard for those as well.

No they did not. Dragoon was two months late because they lacked sufficient shipping to both it and Normandy on time and, in a situation where Normandy has felled, they're not going to do Dragoon.

So while undoubtedly a healthy portion of those 8 panzer divisions will go east, not every last one of them will. Hell, in 1942 and '43 not every last panzer divisions (even discounting the ones in North Africa) went east despite the Germans prioritizing the east, so the claim is wrong on the face of it.

This is a strawman as I've never claimed all Western Front Panzer Divisions go East; the seven and the grenadier division pulled East can and will be, however.

Given the strengths by this time, the difference is minute. Their both major mechanized formations that contain large numbers of panzers.

Again, this is blatant hypocrisy after your fit over me saying Panzers.

Again, it's not the only way it could fail, although the alternative would require the German's to see through Operation Fortitude and not redeploy the panzers until the last moment which... is unlikely, to say the least. Your proposed alternate PoD is more simple and probably more plausible. I figure that's down to the OP though.

There is no way the Germans could defeat the Normandy landings conventionally. Naval Gunfire and Air dominance is just too great for it to do so.

Huh? How does it undermine it? If the Germans don't have enough of a supply for fuel and infantry in December 1944 for the Ardennes Offensive and what supplies they do have of these are constantly falling, why would they suddenly have it later for Spring Awakening? As I said, it was lack of supply. I've been plenty consistent on that.

No you have not because the point was never that Spring Awakening failed, the point quite clearly is that its existence disproves the notion it was a lack of manpower that hindered the operations in Hungary in January of 1945; the real issue was transportation problem.

Huh? The Ardennes Offensive wasn't cancelled and the 6th Panzer Army withdrawn until January 25th, with the last of it's formations arriving in Hungary by February 11th. In what world is January 25th-February 11th three months?

Elements of 6th Panzer were used for the Konrad Operations at the start of January, Spring Awakening wasn't done until the end of March.

Adam Tooze in Wages of Destruction goes into extensive detail on the disintegration of German and observes that the final peak of German industrial output occurred at the end of 1944.

Additionally, your own source attributes the August disruptions not to any campaigns launched in August, but to the prior destruction of the French railnet… which pre-dates D-Day.

Again, it probably isn't wise for you to attack my reading comprehension:

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In what world is July and August before June 6th?

In any case, it really doesn't matter. The Germans can't hope to make use, or even maintain, additional production without fuel and men. Even as it was, the Germans were able to increase their inventories of planes and tanks and guns... but they lacked the fuel and manpower to actually deploy them so most of those planes and tanks just sat around gathering dust. What's more, as Adam Tooze pointed out in Wages, German industrial collapse was bound to happen in early/mid-'45 regardless of external factors:

I don't really agree with Tooze on this bit in so far as completely ignoring the role of external shocks and even you note this by talking about the oil issue. From April of 1944 to December, the Germans lost Turkish and Yugoslavia metals/ores, Swedish Iron Ore, Romanian oils, Estonian oil sands, and so on. Undoubtedly inflation will become an issue but to act like the loss of the above materials was irrelevant to matters of production isn't sound.

The Germans own mobilization was going to strangle itself, regardless of what happens on the fronts and with the bombers. It may be minutely delayed (or maybe not: you still haven't explained why the WAllies can't just substitute in more heavy bombers smashing railyards to do the same job), but it'll still happen.

For the same reason they couldn't for six months at the end of 1943 to early 1944; production and manpower is not limitless in the short term.

Again, I'm seeing no actual casual relations are being shown here between D-Day failing and Hitler suddenly completely inverting behavior that well pre-dates D-Day in terms of permitting withdrawals before Soviet offensives. In terms of permitting withdrawal following Soviet offensives, as pointed out in the same thread you tried to cite(and which even the OP who created the thread proceeded to acknowledge)

This is a strawman as I've never suggested a withdrawal before a Soviet offensive beyond the one concerning the 6th Army in Romania.

Hitler's countermanding of the orders to initiate withdrawal was meaningless: in pretty much every case, the Soviets were already behind the German lines and encircling them by the time such orders were issued. So even if Hitler doesn't countermand those orders, they get encircled and destroyed anyways because the Soviets are simply too strong and outpacing them too much.

Which is false. On scene commanders would initiate withdraws, Hitler would countermand them and then change his mind but by that point it was too late.

Of course, even pulling back to the D'niepr or Berezina prior to the offensive would not have made much difference. To quote "Explaining Defeat":

"The plan was for fairly substantial defensive works, but Hitler (and Busch) interfered with their construction so consistently that by June 1944 even the Panther line was largely unbuilt and consisted of only about 5,000–6,000 bunkers, mostly for 2–3 men apiece (or, in other words, positions for approximately two full strength divisions). If the Panther Line was a disappointment, the Bear Line and the Berezina (also designated as a secondary line) were disasters, as the plans for the Bear line were never carried out and there were no plans at all to actually fortify the Berezina.22 If Army Group Center had pulled back to either of these lines in May or early June 1944, as it in fact requested (and Hitler denied) and as Niepold and Groeben suggested would have saved the day, there would have been no time to finish construction of the major defensive posts or to improve the river lines as defensive strong points before the Soviets launched “Bagration.” The troops would have had to surrender relatively well-prepared positions that they had occupied for many months and pull back to river lines, which were completely unfortified and offered little natural impediment to the enemy. As precarious as their positions along the balcony may have been, to abandon them offered no safety and indeed exposed them to further dangers. All that would have been accomplished was that the Germans would have been 25–50 miles further west when “Bagration” was launched. This would have been at best a tactical victory (the first blows would have fallen on empty positions) and the shortening of the lines may have permitted the formation of a small reserve, but the strategic situation would have remained unchanged. The Germans would still have been facing a powerful enemy, but this time along a less defensible line. Withdrawal from the balcony would thus not have altered the strategic realities at the front, but rather, given the chronic German failure to prepare adequate defensive lines to the rear, would have placed the units in extremely dangerous and unfortified positions. This is not to suggest that the river lines were less advantageous than the balcony, as clearly they would have been powerful positions had the Germans the time and inclination to develop them, but the rivers did not offer a strategic solution to the immense difficulties facing Army Group Center. The hope of a withdrawal before “Bagration” was a chimera which would not have given the Germans the ability to effectively counter the Soviet attack and most likely would not have resulted in a significantly different outcome." - Page 135 (Emphasis added)

Again, you're doing a strawman as I've never claimed anywhere the Germans could effectively defeat Bagration; only mitigate the damage. Even then I've stated I'm content to accept Bagration proceeds exactly as IOTL.

Sure, and that's going to result in a massive fight. It is not, however, going to result in anything the Soviets can't handle.

The Soviet superman doesn't need logistics, sleep or even men in his units to defeat Germans evidently.

Sure they did. Repeatedly in 1943 and 1944 and 1945 the Soviets did major river crossings... which is how they got those bridgeheads in the first place, an inconvenient detail which you like to ignore. In the autumn of 1943, after an advance of 400 kilometers they crossed the defended D'niepr river and repulsed every German attempt to crush the bridgeheads, instead doubling the number of bridgeheads over the next month through more river crossings.

The general Soviet river strategy consisted of prior smaller operations securing a bridgehead before the main offensive was then launched from the bridgeheads. If you have any examples of the Soviets doing mass crossing offensives in one swoop, I'm most interested.

Also, if we're going to talk Second Kiev, you forgot the inconvenient detail that Hitler withheld both 40th and 48th Panzer Army. When he did later relent and release one of them, they retake significant ground and came close to destroying multiple Soviet armies.

Of course, I can't help but notice a element of hypocrisy here: in order to seriously smash 1st Belorussian to the degree that the Soviets actually feel it with an attack beginning at the start of August, the Germans themselves have to conduct not one but two river-crossings: first they have to smash through the Soviet defenses of their bridgeheads on the west bank of the Vistula, cross the Vistula against the Soviet forces arrayed on the eastern bank, fight another roughly ~100 kilometers to the Bug river, and then cross the Bug, all the while defending their right flank against the very armor-heavy 1st Ukrainian which will be sure to be launching massive armored counter-counter-attacks with it's multiple tank armies into the Germans right flank. I can see the reinforced Germans achieving the first and second task, but the third task and on is simply beyond their capacity to fulfill even with the additional formations brought in from the west. By the time the German counter-offensive is spent, the Soviets are still going to be holding a large swathe of territory between the Bug and the Vistula and their losses are not going to be anything their own reserves of material and manpower can't replenish.

I'm very interested to hear why they have to cross the Bug when the 1st Belorussian is only past the Vistula.

2 panzer armies and a infantry army describe the forces which opposed the Soviets at the start of such operations as Bagration and Lvov-Sandomierz. The end result was total and swift annihilation of the German defenders.

If you leave out the details Army Group Center was largely deprived of Panzer Divisions and was not behind a fortified river line, sure.

The Soviets had plenty of logistics. They were a hell of a lot better at it then the Germans were and were supplying their forces out to the Vistula quite adequately to put up some very stiff resistance.

No they weren't and even more source notes they were having trouble keeping supplied. The stiff resistance you refer to was Hossbach using the remains of AGC to do counter-attacks, not an entire Panzer Army suddenly appearing to hit them.

The Panzer Armies are liable to have been destroyed east of the Oder and even east of the Vistula during the offensives prior. They'll impose a month or two's delay during the Soviets breakout from their Bug bridgeheads, but they'll do so at the cost of being destroyed. As a result, it's gonna be old men and boys (well, really old men and really young boys, as the Germans were already relying on old men and boys by mid-’44) defending Silesia and Pomerania when the next Soviet offensive breaks there and that means it's gonna be practically no one defending the Oder when the Soviets reach it.

Not if they conduct a proper positioning campaign and the simple fact of the matter is they have more than sufficient Panzer forces to keep things going. There is no Ardennes or Spring Awakening here, after all.

I've already supplied a source which goes so far as to note that even the official German history states that the positioning of German forces along the Vistula was irrelevant. Even the positioning at the Oder made no difference and would have been even less consequential had the Soviet execution of the assault not been flawed.

Where?

Not big enough. He may be able to push deeper into their defensive network and inflict additional casualties, which will chew up much of his own forces as well, but 1st Belorussian is too strong for him to have any hope of actually breaking the Front.

As I said, apparently the Soviet supermen can win battles without logistics, without sleep, without equipment and despite their rifle divisions being depleted 60-85%.

According to the tables from the very book you are citing on pages 419-422, 1st Belorussian had a total of 2,334 AFV's on July 18th. That's around 100 more (minimum) AFV's then the Germans even had in Normandy. It seems your claim stems (again) from bad reading comprehension: the tables show that the 680 AFV figure is just for the 1st Belorussian's right-wing, with the left-wing adding the rest, but the Germans won't have the luxury of engaging just 1st Belorussians right-wing if they want to do what your claiming their gonna do.

Do me a favor and provide a screenshot of Pages 419-422 because Google Book preview stops at 414.

Also TIL the Germans cannot hit one wing of a Soviet Army. Would come as a hell of shock to everyone involved since 1941.

Then there's 1st Ukrainian, with it's multiple tank armies, which will be backing up 1st Belorussian and the Germans are also gonna have to deal with as the battle develops. When it comes to manpower strength, those tables also show that the addition of the left-wing actually increased the amount of strength being brought to bear by 300,000 men.

1st Belorussian is further forward than 1st Ukrainian, which has its own sector of the front to cover, and is just as exhausted, depleted and logistically strained.

As to the claim of the logistics net being at the breaking point, the book certainly lists plenty of difficulties experienced by Soviet forces as they advanced which read as little different from those encountered by the WAllies in September of 1944 following their own pell-mell advance across France (and a lot better then the difficulties the Germans experienced in 1941 after their own similarly deep advance), but at no point does it say it was at risk of a breakdown like you are claiming or that it even risked undermining the fighting capability of the frontlines. In fact, the book states that supply throughput increased in August on page 509-510 as the railnet in Belarus was restored... which is obviously rather the opposite of a breakdown.

The book specifically notes they were having trouble getting supplies the further they advance, to the point they weren't receiving items on a regular basis.

Further it doesn't take a genius to figure out why things got better over the course of August; the offensive came to a close and fighting largely died off resulting in the complete end of the need to continuously extend the lines as well as reducing the need for such things as ammunition.

In sum, your own source contradicts the first three claims. As for your uncited claim: exhaustion after months of advance did not prevent the Soviet forces from mounting stiff defenses that would cause German armored counterattacks to stall out after some initial gains in 1943-1945. I do not see why that would suddenly cease to be the case here.

TIL situations on the Eastern Front were always the exact same in specific requirements.

Be serious.

Unless you have means to refute the points made in that thread and which even the thread's OP acknowledged were valid, which I see you do not, all your doing at this point is deflecting at the fact you've been called out on.

I've pretty decisively refuted them through the course of our dialogue here. As I've said now repeatedly however, remind me when you make a thread because "This wouldn't work" posts with no citations now count as valid evidence.

Yes, yes you are. Permitting German withdrawals prior to Soviet offensives represents a radical departure from Hitler's operational approach as it had been since 1943 and would continue to be until the end of the war. That's a fundamental change to his method of fighting.

The only difference I've postulated is he allows 6th Army to do so in Romania.

Take note, dear audience, that when called out he has to lie despite knowing full well that anyone can go back and read what he has already written.

Given what I've shown in this post, having them go back and read what I've said isn't in your best interests.

Which beautifully misses the point. FlaK on it's own never was able to affect WAllied strategic bombing tempos. There's also a distinct lack of explanation on how the Germans are supposed to mass produce this shell (and the radar systems you keep harping on about) in the required quantities to even noticeable impact WAllied loss rates in the midst of the industrial collapse which will still be occurring at about this time.

And this completely misses logical reasoning and is also rampant in hypocrisy; fighters on their own never were able to affect strategic bombing given flak was always in use.

Over the course of 1944 for Flak 88s, they averaged about 8,000-12,000 rounds for a shootdown. The new shells and methods brought this down to, as Wiking noted, somewhere around 1,000 to 1,500. This massively increased efficiency in shootdowns is what could prove meaningful in restricting strategic bombing.
 
FLAK had the benefit over fighters in that its operator didn't have to be one of those small minority of people cabable of being decent fighter pilots after months of training.

The number of people cabable of being part of a Flak crew is substantially larger and the amount of training needed is a fraction of that recieved by fighter pilots.

Besides directly downing enemy aircraft Flak also forced the bombers to fly higher resulting in reduced accuracy.
 
Would you like to try again or go ahead and admit you're wrong?

Since apparently your reading comprehension is so bad, I'll highlight it for you.

You: "you've just freed up over 50% of the Panzer force for duty in the East."

So you claim that over 50% of the panzer force, which means total AFVs, are freed up for the eastern front. Now looking at the very quotes your citing: "In the Summer of 1943 about 80 percent of German tank strength had been concentrated in the East; in 1944 this proportion was only a little more than half."

So not only does your source say "tank strength" and not "panzer forces", it also says that over 50% was still on the Eastern Front, in direct contradiction to your claim which indicates that under 50% was. I think that illustrates how dishonest your being quite well.

So your citation is a book you don't own and posts from other people you can't verify relaying the information second hand? What?

It's in German and I haven't been able to find an English version though. The information citing it is consistent across the web though and it seems to be the go-to source for German OOBs by other historians. On the other hand, I find it interesting Zaloga doesn't provide a citation for his own claims in the Osprey book...

For someone who has spent excessive amounts of time claiming goal post shifting on my behalf, you certainly have no problem engaging in it yourself. Whether or not their planning was sounded is irrelevant to the fact you claimed that no planning existed. This just further shows you are engaging in blatant lying in this debate, given you claimed the citation in question showed no planning occurred at all either.

Generally, the result of planning is a plan. That's why it's called planning. So until you produce a plan, your claim of the Germans doing coherent strategic planning for post-D-Day has no foundation.

"Hitler was convinced of the need to defeat the Allied invasion decisively, as at Dieppe two years previously, so that Germany could then concentrate its might against the Soviet onslaught. Since November 1943 the Western Front had been given priority for reinforcement."

Yes. Hitler hoped to reprioritize the Eastern Front after D-Day. That does not represent a coherent strategic plan though.

Prior to D-Day yes, more reinforcements were later detached for duty on the Eastern Front.

Given the information provided so far indicates 62% of German panzer forces were on duty on the Eastern Front even before the reinforcements dispatched to it in July, obviously this is untrue.

Assertions backed up by any review of the Normandy Landings. The Germans expected the main landings elsewhere and initially thought Normandy was diversion; this was the root of their concern and the later Dragoon landings pretty well bare it out as a valid thinking. However, in a situation where the Normandy landings have decisively failed, it's going to become rapidly apparent this was the main push for 1944, going by Ike's likely resignation and the fact the Allies just lost their paratrooper capability.

In other words: most of the same signs as at Normandy, which the Germans also knew involved the commitment of paratroopers yet still believed was only diversionary. The later Dragoon landings also prove that the Allies would be able to mount follow-up landings of the sort the Germans would have to be on guard for here.

No they did not. Dragoon was two months late because they lacked sufficient shipping to both it and Normandy on time and, in a situation where Normandy has felled, they're not going to do Dragoon.

Not OTL Dragoon, sure. The planning will have to be changed around to account for it's massive reinforcement and some delays will be imposed. With D-Day felled, however, the shipping will be available (as you so nicely pointed out up above) and it's a great way to get around the Atlantic Wall. It'll probably go off in the autumn.

This is a strawman as I've never claimed all Western Front Panzer Divisions go East; the seven and the grenadier division pulled East can and will be, however.

I'd say I've never seen anyone manage to contradict themselves in the same sentence before, but that would be untrue. In any case, you've pretty clearly managed to do it here...

There is no way the Germans could defeat the Normandy landings conventionally. Naval Gunfire and Air dominance is just too great for it to do so.

NGS and air power are not unbeatable and while the Germans would certainly take plenty of damage driving off the invasion, they physically could do it if their western panzer forces were concentrated on the beachheads. It's not a sure-fire thing though.

No you have not because the point was never that Spring Awakening failed, the point quite clearly is that its existence disproves the notion it was a lack of manpower that hindered the operations in Hungary in January of 1945; the real issue was transportation problem.

Except it doesn't? I mean, lack of manpower did hinder the operations in Hungary. You've provided no citation that say otherwise.

Elements of 6th Panzer were used for the Konrad Operations at the start of January, Spring Awakening wasn't done until the end of March.

What are you talking about? The Konrad Operations were conducted by the 6th Army (the not-Panzer, not-SS one), mostly that of the 4th Panzer Corps which had been transferred in during December. 6th Army itself had been there from the start: getting annihilated in Romania, then reconstituted in Hungary using the formations shipped in there during September. The first elements of 6th SS Panzer Army don't come in until the week of January 28th, with the arrival of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps.

Again, it probably isn't wise for you to attack my reading comprehension:

Wu4ucil5_o.png


In what world is July and August before June 6th?

As anyone reading that section can tell you, the book talks about the Allies and then immediately moves on to talking about the local industrial decline, opening with the lines "the chaotic situation created by attacks on the railroads in France and Belgium was already spreading to the Saar". Again, reading comprehension, I'd learn it.

I don't really agree with Tooze on this bit in so far as completely ignoring the role of external shocks and even you note this by talking about the oil issue. From April of 1944 to December, the Germans lost Turkish and Yugoslavia metals/ores, Swedish Iron Ore, Romanian oils, Estonian oil sands, and so on. Undoubtedly inflation will become an issue but to act like the loss of the above materials was irrelevant to matters of production isn't sound.

Still going to lose the Turkish and Yugoslavian metals, Romanian oils, Estonian oils, and many others. Even with those, however, Tooze notes that German metal production, to use just one example, would collapse by the summer of 1945 at the latest from lack of supply following the loss of vital ore mines in Ukraine during the winter of 1943-44.

For the same reason they couldn't for six months at the end of 1943 to early 1944; production and manpower is not limitless in the short term.

The Luftwaffe was why they couldn't, but it was no longer an issue by mid-1944. So too wasn't the production or manpower: those had vastly increased. So I see no reason why it would not go forth anyways.

This is a strawman as I've never suggested a withdrawal before a Soviet offensive beyond the one concerning the 6th Army in Romania.

You linked to a thread whose OP suggests doing just that in a line stating that the Germans "could do numerous things" to change the course of Bagration. If that isn't the implication we were supposed to take away from it, then what the hell was?

Which is false. On scene commanders would initiate withdraws, Hitler would countermand them and then change his mind but by that point it was too late.

Except as pointed out in that thread, this is not false: by the time on scene commanders attempted to initiate withdrawals, it was already too late. This isn't even me saying this: it was pointed out by someone else. As the already linked too Explaining Defeat noted, formations like the 4th Army which ignored both orders to holdfast and attempts at countermanding those orders suffered the same fate as those formations which obeyed orders: encirclement and destruction.

Again, you're doing a strawman as I've never claimed anywhere the Germans could effectively defeat Bagration; only mitigate the damage.

You haven't even proven they could do that.

The Soviet superman doesn't need logistics, sleep or even men in his units to defeat Germans evidently.

The Soviets have logistics, sleep, and men. You have not proven otherwise.

The general Soviet river strategy consisted of prior smaller operations securing a bridgehead before the main offensive was then launched from the bridgeheads. If you have any examples of the Soviets doing mass crossing offensives in one swoop, I'm most interested.

General Soviet river strategy was to seize and defend bridgeheads. This wasn't universal, though, and the Soviets did major crossing offensives against enemy forces defending the opposite bank during such times as the crossing of the D'niepr, during the Berlin offensive, during Bagration, and innumerable other times. There's also the fact that by January of '45, the Vistula and the Bug will have frozen solid, rendering them of no more use as a barrier then the terrain inbetween.

Also, if we're going to talk Second Kiev, you forgot the inconvenient detail that Hitler withheld both 40th and 48th Panzer Army. When he did later relent and release one of them, they retake significant ground and came close to destroying multiple Soviet armies.

Remarkable: Hitler held armies that didn't exist? A search for the "40th Panzer Army" and "48th Panzer Army" turned up nothing and they do not appear in German OOBs. While German counter-offensives which retook land in the aftermath of 2nd Kiev did take place, there are no records about the risk of losing multiple armies and instead record fighting those German attacks to a standstill after some of their initial gains, followed by many of the same fronts then going over to the offensive for the winter which is rather the opposite of what they'd be able to do had they been hit so hard they were almost destroyed.

I'm very interested to hear why they have to cross the Bug when the 1st Belorussian is only past the Vistula.

Because that's where the rear-most units of 1st Belorussian are.

No they weren't and even more source notes they were having trouble keeping supplied. The stiff resistance you refer to was Hossbach using the remains of AGC to do counter-attacks, not an entire Panzer Army suddenly appearing to hit them.

None of the units used by Hossbach were part of AGC prior to August 1944. The Hermann Goering was from Italy, the 6th Panzer from Germany, the 25th from Denmark, and the rest were pulled in from other parts of the Eastern Front. They were fresh and put together they pretty much did amount to a 1944 German Panzer Army. Further to the north, in the Baltics, the Germans launched a counter-attack against the Baltic Fronts using no less then 6 panzer divisions. Of the objectives set for them, the only one they were actually able to achieve was opening up the escape route into Courland for Army Group North, an advance of just a few dozen kilometers. Their other objectives, the retaking of Siaulia and destruction of the 6th Guards Armies, they never came close to achieving. This despite being launched against fronts that had advanced as far and as fast as 1st Belorussian. Frankly, examples from both 1943 and 1944 show a singular inability of major German armored counterattacks, even of the ones similar to the size you are postulating, of destroying whole Soviet Army Fronts… or even Soviet armies. At times, you can find them destroying Soviet corps and mauling individual armies and regaining some territory they've previously lost... but they never achieve anything which fundamentally alters the strategic situation like you are basically claiming they will.

Not if they conduct a proper positioning campaign and the simple fact of the matter is they have more than sufficient Panzer forces to keep things going. There is no Ardennes or Spring Awakening here, after all.

Your claims about far stronger German panzer forces . And they didn't have the fuel to support even the Ardennes/Spring Awakening forces going OTL, how are they suddenly going to accrus the fuel IATL?


Post 31, the quote about Schliffenfahrt, which was essentially the sort of "proper positioning plan" you have been describing.

As I said, apparently the Soviet supermen can win battles without logistics, without sleep, without equipment and despite their rifle divisions being depleted 60-85%.

Except as I've already shown: the Soviets do have logistics, equipment, and their manpower figures indicate the opposite of depletion.

Do me a favor and provide a screenshot of Pages 419-422 because Google Book preview stops at 414.

Page 420:
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Page 421-422:
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Page 423:
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Also TIL the Germans cannot hit one wing of a Soviet Army. Would come as a hell of shock to everyone involved since 1941.

Unless they want to be attacked in the flank by the other wing before they achieve anything meaningful against the 1st Belorussian, they really don't have a choice. The width of the front 1st Belorussian has pushed up to is relatively small... it's actually shorter then it was back at the start of Bagration, mainly because it's straighter, which allows them to increase their densities, depth, or both.

1st Belorussian is further forward than 1st Ukrainian, which has its own sector of the front to cover, and is just as exhausted, depleted and logistically strained.

What are you talking about?

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First Ukrainian is quite clearly alongside 1st Belorussian by the time Bagration ends (and even before that: it took Lublin on July 24, six days after 1st Belorussian took Brest and crossed the Bug river). The fact that 2nd Tank Army was able to move over into 1st Belorussian's command was a result of 1st Ukrainian having pulled up along side it. If anything, some of it's elements are even further west then 1st Belorussians by the end of Bagration there. The shorter distance of it's advance and more favorable terrain for mechanized offensives have, if anything, left it rather less exhausted then 1st Belorussian.

The book specifically notes they were having trouble getting supplies the further they advance, to the point they weren't receiving items on a regular basis.

Yes. That likewise describes the Anglo-American experience in late-1944 following the dash across France. Not unusual after a push of some 400 kilometers. It is not, however, indicative of a imminent logistical breakdown.

Further it doesn't take a genius to figure out why things got better over the course of August; the offensive came to a close and fighting largely died off resulting in the complete end of the need to continuously extend the lines as well as reducing the need for such things as ammunition.

Except that is untrue: the Germans mounted major counterattacks that took up most of August and the Soviets were engaged in intense fighting to hold and expand the bridgeheads over the Vistula as well as establish additional ones. The book notes that fighting didn't die down to a lower level until September and attributes the improvements in supply to conversion of the rail-lines.

TIL situations on the Eastern Front were always the exact same in specific requirements.

Be serious.

Their situations which fit pretty much exactly what your claiming: Soviet forces conducting 400 kilometer+ advances, often after even more extensive and exhausting breakthrough operations, being counter-attacked by up to a panzer armies+ worth of forces. The results were pretty much the same every time.

I've pretty decisively refuted them through the course of our dialogue here. As I've said now repeatedly however, remind me when you make a thread because "This wouldn't work" posts with no citations now count as valid evidence.

You actually haven't even started to address them...

The only difference I've postulated is he allows 6th Army to do so in Romania.

Leaving aside this is untrue, it is for pretty much no reason.

Given what I've shown in this post, having them go back and read what I've said isn't in your best interests.

Given what I've shown in this post, it quite clearly is.

And this completely misses logical reasoning and is also rampant in hypocrisy; fighters on their own never were able to affect strategic bombing given flak was always in use.

Right. Which also means FlaK was never able to affect strategic bombers on their own. Now suddenly this is gonna change? Get real.
 
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I'm not quite seeing the Soviets getting further west then the Rhine region regardless of the PoD. D-Day failing still leaves the WAllies in the fight, in Italy, and likely to mount an invasion of southern France and drive the Germans out of there and much of the low countries by the time the Soviets reach the Rhine. Even if we assume a early PoD where Barbarossa strangles itself at Smolensk-Kiev for whatever reason, thereby allowing the Soviets to bounce back bigger and harder in 1942 and roll into Berlin by the end of '43 or start of '44, that still results in German resistance unravelling afterwards which means the Western Allies can just walk into Italy, France, and the bulk of the Low Countries in the face of pretty much no opposition.

Only if there is a subsequent war between the WAllies and the Soviets (which would require either someone far more ambitious then Stalin on the Soviet end or ASB-levels of stupidity on the WAllied end) could the Soviets possibly then march the rest of the way to the channel, but that isn't very likely.

Your arguments are quite convincing. Though the soviets could theoreticly have advanced beyond the Rhine if they re-organized and slowed down a bit, the WAllies wouldn't let this happen and could easily take over the sparsely defended, nazi occupied western europe. The soviets advancing further than the Rhine with post 1941 POD is unlikely (they may archieve small river crossings and liberate a bit of north eastern France, but thats not very relevant. Aditional major soviet gains with this POD would require serious mismanagement from the WAllies).

But I wouldn't say that it is unlikely with any POD. What if the germans starve Britain into surrender or white peace (in this case, there wouldn't be WAllies at all)? What if the US never entered the war (no pearl harbour, or Hitler never declears war on the US)? What if Spain joined the axis, and the western front is larger? What if Britain was fascist (alá 'A very british civil war')?

There could be a lot of scenarios with PODs stretching further back. In my opinion, its often a bit too easy to say, that izs impossible. It may not be likely under specific circumstances. But what if these circumstances were different? Way crazier stuff has happened in human history.
 
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Technically a better fate then the one the Nazis had planned for them. One could say the Poles were "liberated" from extinction (in the form of the Nazis) by tyranny (in the form of the Soviets). Of course, that is merely a question of degrees and is of debatable quality as far as liberations go...


The old man was in Poland up until 1943 and he always told me they didn't know who they feared more...the Nazi or the Russians. They were drafted into the Wehrmacht and sent to France because the Nazi believed the average Pole would defect to the Russians given half a chance. Such stupidly! He got a way out. He went to Paris and took millions of photos of all the churches...and then defected to the Americans after they landed in France in the summer of 44..... who took a keen interest of his photos since his unit was always in the photos..... After the war his dad told him not to come back to Poland because things under Soviet occupation were even worse than they ever feared.
 

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The old man was in Poland up until 1943 and he always told me they didn't know who they feared more...the Nazi or the Russians. They were drafted into the Wehrmacht and sent to France because the Nazi believed the average Pole would defect to the Russians given half a chance. Such stupidly!
I mean there was a Polish unit fighting for the Soviets, so there was a place for them to defect to. Despite the average Poles lack of warm feelings for the Soviets, at this point in the war the Germans were the proximate threat to Poland's (and individual Poles') survival, so would more likely that not defect if given a chance. I mean the Polish airborne brigade with the Allies wanted to jump into Poland ahead of the Soviet forces to aid their countrymen against the Germans in Warsaw even if it meant a suicide mission; the major reason it didn't happen was Stalin categorically refusing to allow it. So I'm willing to bet that the Poles would have defected to the Soviets if given a chance, even if they would even more readily do so to the Wallies.
 
The old man was in Poland up until 1943 and he always told me they didn't know who they feared more...the Nazi or the Russians. They were drafted into the Wehrmacht and sent to France because the Nazi believed the average Pole would defect to the Russians given half a chance. Such stupidly! He got a way out. He went to Paris and took millions of photos of all the churches...and then defected to the Americans after they landed in France in the summer of 44..... who took a keen interest of his photos since his unit was always in the photos..... After the war his dad told him not to come back to Poland because things under Soviet occupation were even worse than they ever feared.

Where did he end up immigrating to?

I didn't realize they conscripted ethnic poles. I thought they just conscripted people they considered Volkdeuch.
 
He ended up in British secret service since he was also fluent in 5 languages -so he listen to Nazi radio transmissions for the rest of the war. He hated the commies but smuggled bread into the POW camps [with Russian] earlier in the war. He knew the Germans were arrogant and Hitler was a loonie rushing to attack Stalin so quickly, but they realised that once Hitler declared war on America - the AXIS was really doomed.

He ended up in Britain after the war was horrified how ignorant the British were of the war and how lucky they were that Uncle Sam and Uncle Joe put there hatred aside long enough to defeat the Nazi.

Catholic Poles would never fight for the commies, however once your were conscripted , the kids didn't have much choice.

They might have considered them Volksdeutsche , but he was from Krakow and by that time every one was being conscripted. It was either work in armaments industry or join the Wehrmacht.
 
He ended up in British secret service since he was also fluent in 5 languages -so he listen to Nazi radio transmissions for the rest of the war. He hated the commies but smuggled bread into the POW camps [with Russian] earlier in the war. He knew the Germans were arrogant and Hitler was a loonie rushing to attack Stalin so quickly, but they realised that once Hitler declared war on America - the AXIS was really doomed.

He ended up in Britain after the war was horrified how ignorant the British were of the war and how lucky they were that Uncle Sam and Uncle Joe put there hatred aside long enough to defeat the Nazi.

Catholic Poles would never fight for the commies, however once your were conscripted , the kids didn't have much choice.

They might have considered them Volksdeutsche , but he was from Krakow and by that time every one was being conscripted. It was either work in armaments industry or join the Wehrmacht.

Do you know what unit he was in with the Germans?
 
A proposal that could explain why Normandy invasion failed, as well why there are no Anglo-americans in Italy. Spain joined Axis and seized Gibraltar, thus forcing Ike to except Churchills proposal of invading Spain in 1943, instead of Italy, which would come later, in 1944. This also means giving enough time for orderly withdrawal of Africa corps into Italy. Maybe, just maybe Wallies invade Southern France in 1944.
This would allow Soviets to except German capitulation without significant allied forces in Western/Southern Europe, which would just started coming in after the capitulation.

Second possible divergence:
If USA President was prosoviet Henry A. Wallace (vicepresident 1941-1945), instead of Truman, he could have excepted continued partnershipwith "Uncle Joe". Imagine no Marshall plan, no Bizonia, Trizonia, no Deutchmark, no Bundesrepublik in 1949. No NATO. Maybe even withdrawal of US-CANZUK forces from France and Italy leaving them in "Finland style" situation. Yugoslavia and Albania would remain fully communist allies of USSR.

There was a realistic option for inclusion of French and Italian communist parties into governments after the elections of 1945, as well as creation of united Germany (in 1990 borders), run by German communist and Socialdemocrats with politics similar to those of neutral Austria.

Events in Europe would certainly influenced elections in USA (Dewey 1948) and in UK (Churchill 1949). Instead of "Truman lost China" there would be "Wallace lost Europe" slogan. And that would probably mean active USA-UK aid to Chinese Kuo Min Tang, enough to win Civil war or at least keep Southern half of mainland China. This would probably mean no chinese intervention in Korean war and reunification of Korea under Seul government.

I would agree with opinion that USA and UK would be more agressive against prosoviet anticolonialism. Espetially against United Arab Republic (Egypt, Syria, Yemen). Non aligned movement is probably butterflied away.
 
Do you know what unit he was in with the Germans?
He never liked to talk about it too much. All I really got out of him was that he was posted to guard some Messerschmitt plant at one point, spent as much time off visiting the churches in the area and taking lots of photos. His infantry unit was in the path of the American advance in France and they hid in haystacks unit they passed and when the squad leader was shot , most of them surrendered.
 
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