Alternate British WW1 Grand Strategy: The Baltic Project
- Thread starter Disraeli's Ghost
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Millions of pounds being spent on the Army so they can have an expeditionary force to go and save France.
We both know (and I am sure the professionals knew) the way the Navy saves France is a distant blockade. But that doesn't excite voters or politicians. A classic naval incursion pointed at the heart of the Hun on the other hand...
And look what a Baltic Project needs? Cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and monitors. All very useful for making the North Sea untenable. Even something like the Outrageous-class makes sense when you look at R&R-class. Both classes were designed as rapidly built war time expedients to be rapidly disposed of afterwards. That kind of thinking seems crazy now, but remember how quickly the RN had been churning though classes for the preceding 20 years.
Of course the conspiracy theory that Baltic Project is a political ploy to keep the Army in its place and fund the tools to seal the North Sea lacks in written evidence. That is the point. RN war planning at the time didn't go beyond a fleet commander's notes, and there is Fisher with his wheels within wheels at the the head of it all. But it makes more sense than a plan that the Army is never going to give you the troops to execute anyway.
The Haldane Reforms. I can't remember where I read it. It was Massie's Dreadnaught or something like that.
Grey commits the UK to helping France some time around 1906 (Wiki is not helping with the exact dates). Government has to decide how it is going to to help the French. Army or Navy. The Army has been heading in this direction for a few years already. It has fancy new things like General Staffs planning just for this, so looks professional and competent when the politicians come calling. The Navy waffles. So the way to help France is a BEF.
So my assumption is the early Baltic Project is a clumsy first riposte before Admiralty gets the equivalent planning organs. Most of the same players in place in 1914
Grey commits the UK to helping France some time around 1906 (Wiki is not helping with the exact dates). Government has to decide how it is going to to help the French. Army or Navy. The Army has been heading in this direction for a few years already. It has fancy new things like General Staffs planning just for this, so looks professional and competent when the politicians come calling. The Navy waffles. So the way to help France is a BEF.
So my assumption is the early Baltic Project is a clumsy first riposte before Admiralty gets the equivalent planning organs. Most of the same players in place in 1914
I found a previous thread on the topic: https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/fishers-baltic-project.247469/
A bit of head-scratching and 'what was Fisher thinking?' in that thread, too.
A bit of head-scratching and 'what was Fisher thinking?' in that thread, too.
Yes apologies if you think I'm repeating questions. I asked it again because from what Lambert was saying, the Baltic Plan was far more complex than previous posts on the subject suggest (i.e. it was not simply: violate Danish neutrality, send the Grand Fleet through to fight the HSF in their own territory, hope for the best and immediately follow up with an invasion of the Baltic Coast).
Yes the Army had timings down even to where the troops would drink their coffee in France. From what I remember Lambert saying, he argued that the Army won out because at a joint meeting in August only Louis Battenberg was there to represent the navy, and he basically went along with whatever the Army suggested. Lambert says if Fisher had been there he would have represented the plans of the navy more effectively (in this case, do not tie the BEF to the French Army).
How would they make the North Sea untenable? As I've said, I defer to anyone with the slightest bit of naval knowledge, as mine is woeful. However, I don't see why building the specific ships needed for the Baltic Project would mean the North Sea would be lost?
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As previous commenters have pointed out, its possible Germany wasn't as heavily reliant on Sweden in WW1 as Lambert imagines, in which case I can't even see there being medium benefits to the plan, apart from perhaps forcing the HSF fleet to battle. However, if the trade with Sweden was crucial to Germany's war economy like Lambert suggests (I suppose I should buy his book when it comes out later in the year, and see how he comes to such a conclusion) surely the benefits are war winning?
I used to be a huge defender of the concept of the Dardanelles campaign (perhaps I have a penchant for doomed yet possibly war winning naval operations), however I've been steadily convinced over the last few years that Britain had neither the resources nor the ability to breakthrough such a heavily fortified area. Had the Greeks offered the troops for a joint campaign then maybe, but not Britain on its own in 1915.
Again to play something of the Devil's Advocate, Lambert argues that Fisher, who had seen the Turkish defences first hand, knew it was never going to work. Opposingly, the Baltic Plan allowed British troops to be deployed to the relative safety of Zealand where the Danes were supposedly building huge new fortifications the British could hold. From there it also offered the specially made ships and submarines easy passage into the Baltic to cause havoc with German trade.
To be clear the Outrageous-class wouldn't. No one really knows what the idea for them was. I have read a good thesis that the intention was to get a couple of big fast hulls in the water for raider hunting. The guns were optional and by the time they were ready the raiders were dead.
As for the rest of the fleet. The North Sea is small and enclosed. Perfect for destroyer actions, submarine traps, and minefields. The tech wasn't quite there but in a generation or so those small ships would have made the North Sea untenable for larger craft. We know Fisher was thinking in that direction, but saner heads made sure battleships were still being built.
The Baltic naval war plans had old roots, and the last time the Royal Navy sailed the Baltic in full force was in 1905: https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...-century-history.272417/page-20#post-13186503
edit: As Fisher focused on the potential of submarines during his later years in office, this plan is not as wacky as it first seems. But a lot depends on the Danes themselves, who were a subject of intense Great Power diplomacy in 1905, when Britain ultimately opted to stick with Paris and write the Danes off with the new North Sea Accord.
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The Danish Straits lost most of their strategic importance to the Royal Navy after Tshushima and the following Anglo-Russian detente. Before that the area was a subject of keen interest, especially since the Russians were fortifying Liepaja as a major naval base from where they planned to conduct offensive mine warfare and use their own submarines.
The most influential of the military at the key August 5 meeting, Lord Kitchener, was not in favour of the current plan and his philosopy that 'it will take years' would fit well with a Naval buildup of the necessary landing and support craft to force a coastal landing.
Ham, Paul. 1914: The Year the World Ended . Penguin Random House Australia. Kindle Edition.
For what it's worth, an interesting article on the Navy's response to be frozen out of the strategy by the army:
‘The special service squadron of the Royal Marines’: The Royal Navy and organic amphibious warfare capability before 1914
Matthew S. Seligmann
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2020.1816972
At their first meeting, on 5 August, Kitchener, then at the height of his powers, proceeded to condemn the British war plan as utterly inadequate to the demands of the coming campaign, and to demolish their expectations of a short war. ‘We must be prepared,’ he told his shocked colleagues, ‘to put armies of millions in the field and maintain them for several years.’ To defeat Germany, Britain must raise an army of 70 divisions, more than a million men, he advised; they would take years to train and deploy. He condemned the dispatch of the small Regular Army to France, where it would serve no useful purpose, as a mere bolted-on gesture of near-criminal neglect. It denuded Britain of a properly trained force, and of the officers who knew how to raise one. It was too late, however, to change the existing plan, which had been in place for years under Sir Henry Wilson’s guiding hand. Outwardly compelled to accept it, privately Kitchener believed it risked the complete destruction of Britain’s only standing army. The one consoling thought was that the Old Contemptibles, as they would soon call themselves, in a mock-echo of the Kaiser, were the best-trained soldiers in Europe.
Ham, Paul. 1914: The Year the World Ended . Penguin Random House Australia. Kindle Edition.
For what it's worth, an interesting article on the Navy's response to be frozen out of the strategy by the army:
‘The special service squadron of the Royal Marines’: The Royal Navy and organic amphibious warfare capability before 1914
Matthew S. Seligmann
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2020.1816972
At lot of this 'plan' comes down to politics. The Royal Navy ("the Senior Service") was desperately trying to become the war-winning element of the British military in the face of the unpleasant reality that they were of minor importance.
I saw the same lecture. Very much enjoyed. I think I even posted it in another thread here. I considered starting a thread discussing it but I was fairly sure I knew where consensus would fall and didn’t think I had the energy to argue it alone. but since you have taken on that burden I might as well get into it.
Before I start a note on Andrew Lambert. He is considered one of the foremost historians on the RN in this period. And he is very good. Almost every modern thesis and book on RN strategy or Jacky Fisher will mention his work, either as a valued source, a doctoral advisor, or the source of arguments to be refuted. Often a combination of all three. He also tends toward the controversial. To be honest I think he enjoys going against the grain and arguing for things most other people have already dismissed. That does not mean he is wrong, (far from it), just that there are often other possible interpretations.
A second thing to mention is on Fisher himself. Fisher was an extremely polarizing figure in his time and a century has not been enough to remove that ability to divide opinion. He can be considered anything from a senile fool who didn’t know what he was doing (how Churchill described him later in his book justifying his own role in Gallipoli) to a misunderstood genius who had everything figured out and was only held back by the shortsightedness of those around him. For myself, I will say that those I know who study Fisher the closest, particularly through primary sources, tend to improve their opinion of his ability both as a strategist and as a technocrat. Personally I think he is very much worth considering if you can figure out what he was actually planning.
Because that is the other side of Fisher. Partly by choice and partly by nature he was an absolutely horrible communicator. He was extremely intelligent but generally incapable of explaining his thought process. Definitely not to a laymen and often not to a professional. He talked quickly, in technical terms, and often jumped to what seemed to be a new topic as he thought of connections that he often could not explain to his audience. On top of that he progressed through his career partly due to a natural ability in charm and duplicity. He was often happy to give people the wrong impression if he thought it would get him what he wanted. All this adds up to a man who I regard as possibly the best technical naval mind of the period and a keen strategist but a pretty horrible leader. He utterly failed, and often didn’t try, to clearly communicate his vision to his organization and build consensus around it. He held grudges and often belittled or tried to marginalized those he saw as being opposed to him or unable to keep up with him.
All that to say that if you can determine what Fisher was actually trying to do, it is at the very least worth carefully considering.
Now, to the plan itself. I have to disagree with previous posts who have characterized the Baltic plan as a last minute attempt to look like the Navy was doing something. The Baltic had been central to any plan involving conflict with Germany going right back to at least 1904 and possibly as early as 1902. These plans were built from principles earlier determined when the consideration was fighting France and Russia as far back as the late 1880's. These were not created by Fisher, but by the Naval Intelligence Division. These were basically the Naval Staff before the Navy had a General Staff. Fisher's views in the time period that these were fleshed out usually aligned with the NID's but it was the NID that devised the plans. Fishers later plans for the Baltic should be seen in the context of the plans, continually revised with the changes in technology and geopolitical situation, that he built them from.
As early as 1900 members of the NID were beginning to turn their attention to Germany as a possible naval threat. As early as 1903 the naval exercises took Germany into account, though at that point it was more as an addition to France and Russia, and plans for the North Sea could be applied equally to the Russian Baltic Fleet or the German Navy. At this stage they usually included:
- a method of blocking the Elbe to force the German fleet to engage the British near or in the Baltic. Originally this was a line of sunken trawlers across the entrance to the Elbe. However a hydrographic survey showed that this was impractical. The idea was revisited as a mine blockade after the Russo-Japanese war showed the viability of the mine in this context.
- Consideration for advanced bases for supporting destroyers and cruisers engaged in an observational blockade of the German North Sea ports. Heligoland was the obvious choice but it was generally considered to be too strongly defended. This was not considered critical, as though it was certainly farther than preferred from British ports to German ones, the loss of strength from this could be accounted for. The Three Admirals report from the 1880's determined that a blockading force needs a superiority over the blockaded of 5 to 3, or 4 to 3 if advance bases can be utilized to account for losses and the need for ships to be withdrawn for resupply and maintenance. At this stage the RN could practically expect a 5 to 3 ratio over the German North Sea ports.
- The British either using torpedo boat and cruiser screens to attrite the German navy as it transited the Belts (the distance would require the German fleet to anchor for a night before any engagement, giving opportunity for night torpedo attacks) then engaging them with a fleet based close to the Skaw, or forcing the Belts themselves to engage the German fleet in the Baltic. The Second option depended on the the reaction of the Scandinavian States.
During the Moroccan Crisis in 1905 the latest version of these plans were put before the C-in-C Channel Fleet, under whose discretion the completion of these plans would be. He thought that the emphasis on economic warfare was too great and that the way to support France would be to undertake amphibious operations at the mouths of the Elbe and Weser through combined operations with the Army. This would force Germany to reorient troops to the North and away from France. In hindsight, considering the overstretched nature of the Schlieffen plan in 1914, never mind 1905, that actually could have been pretty significant in helping France. In what should be familiar to anyone who has studied Gallipoli, this plan involved the recommissioning of small craft withdrawn from foreign stations, the preparation of obsolete Battleships (at this time the Admiral and Royal Sovereign Classes) for shore bombardment and the collection of flat-bottomed, light draught vessels for operations in the North Sea littoral.
Also during the Crisis, the fleet undertook a planned Baltic Cruise. They stopped off at Graa Diep, off the coast near Esbjerg in Denmark. This was considered to be a good location to support operations against the Elbe or off the Skaw. It was both a familiarization of the fleet of an area they may be called to fight in and a threat to Germany that the British could begin undertaking operations immediately if war were declared. This, combined with the Germans own exercises that determined that the British forcing their way into and controlling the Elbe was possible, created a persistent fear in the Kaiser and his naval advisors of being "Copenhagened". Fisher did all he could to encourage this thinking as a method of deterrence.
However, this is where the combined operations idea started to break down. A joint subcommittee of the Committee of Imperial Defense (CID) was created for the NID and the War Office to coordinate strategy. It never met. Though initial discussions between the Director of the NID and the Assistant Director of the General Staff's Directorate of Military Operations (DMO) were supportive of amphibious operations they later retracted that support, It is possible that they only played along to get a sense of the Navy plan so that they could point to weak points and build up their own strategy. Regardless, they refused to be involved with the subcommittee. With that dead the CID was used (technically beyond its brief at the time) to determine between the Navy and Army strategies. They eventually recommended further discussion on the Army plan because the Navy one required the destruction of the German fleet before any landing could take place. This meant a delay in help coming to France. The CID then pushed the Navy to share their planning details with the French. This was beyond their remit and contrary to Fishers ideas. He was focused on First strike capability at the time which required secrecy. He therefore reacted by withdrawing the Navy from cooperation with the Army and the CID. This might even have been justified to some degree but its effect was to isolate Naval strategic planning from the Army and the CID, thus ensuring that the Army narrative was the more dominant. Personally I think this is probably one of Fishers greatest political failures. At this stage the Navy's plans were the more detailed and advanced in concept. But the withdrawal rendered them impracticable by ensuring that the Army plan would be the one proceeded with.
The first NID operational war plans to be given the label of "Official" were the 1907 Ballard Committee's war plans. They were created in the context of a diplomatic crisis. For some time the Germans had been trying to close the Baltic to the British. When Norway gained independence in 1905 it asked for recognition of its independence, neutrality and integrity from the Great Powers. However, they also wanted the qualification that they would be allowed to aid Sweden and Denmark if either were attacked. This would effectively extend a recognition of Norwegian neutrality to Denmark and Norway and their territorial waters. This put the status of the Belts and the Sound in doubt in wartime.
This situation forced a redesign of the plans. They were drafted by a committee led by George Ballard, the RN's foremost operational planner and Captain Maurice Hankey, RMA, their foremost expert on coastal defense and amphibious operations. Despite often being attributed to him, Julian Corbett had little impact on the planning, being included to provide academic insights. He was brought in at the end of the project and elaborated on the strategic tenants underlying the plans, though his ideas contradict the plans in some places. His work (Some Principles of Naval Warfare) formed the introduction to the plan. A further section by Captain Slade, the Captain of the War course at the Naval College was similarly added to the already created plans. These first two parts were generally added in recognition of the support that these men had provided, rather than an indication of the plans being based entirely on their ideals.
The 8 plans that follow ( 4 "staged plans" with a variant of each including the French Navy) were each to be left to the discretion of the government as to whether they would be implemented and how far they would go. They contain many elements of the earlier plans but updated for new technology:
- The focus was to be economic, specifically Germany's merchant marine and commercial ports.
- The High Seas Fleet was not the objective but its destruction would be considered a desirable step to later phases in the plan.
- Plan A/A1 involved a distant North Sea blockade maintained by cruisers, destroyers and submarines. This would cripple German overseas trade and force the German navy out where it could be destroyed. In the meantime cruisers would be dispatched to hunt down German shipping that slipped through the blockade. The Battlefleet would be concentrated at the Humber and could support either side of the cordon and counter the HSF 's movements. The HSF would be forced to sortie to protect their trade and would be engaged after its line of retreat was cut off. This is pretty close to what happened in OTL WW1, with adjustments for the situation and technology of the time. Thanks to Tirpitz's doctrine the Germans were not as willing as hoped to sortie to protect their shipping, but the rest of the plan is pretty familiar. A1 included the French taking over the Med to allow British ships in the Med to reinforce the Humber fleet and cordons. This plan aimed, and could be said to have succeeded, in creating an alternative to the previously dominant Baltic plans in the event that the British were diplomatically closed out of the Baltic.
- Plan B/B1 was not meant to be implemented. It was mostly there to build up the other plans by showing the difficulty of engaging in close blockade. It was built from pieces of earlier plans. It called for the Elbe to be blocked off by either mines or sunken hulks. Hulks were preferred as they did not require further forces to keep mines from being cleared. Either Heligoland or Borkum (preference for the latter as the former was heavily defended) would be seized by the Royal Marines (presumably the force would be built up in the near future) and these would form advanced bases for a close observational blockade of the North Sea ports. This would force the HSF to transit the Belts to force the British to cease their blockade. This force would be engaged by the British fleet near the Skaw. Groups of light forces would then be sent through the Belts and would be based in the Eastern Baltic. They would blockade German commercial Baltic ports during the day but withdraw at night to avoid German torpedo boats. This would then effect the complete economic blockade of Germany. The plan has a number of flaws, but as mentioned, it was not meant to be implemented.
- Plan C/C1 kept the close blockade of the North Sea ports and the closure of the Elbe as preliminaries, with Sylt or Borkum being suggested for seizure to support the blockade. However, in this case assaults on the Kiel canal, Cuxhaven, Kiel, or Wilhelmshaven were all ruled out as a waste of ships due to the strength of the defenses. Instead the British Fleet would transit the Belts (assumed to not be closed due to neutrality in this case) and seize the Baltic German islands of Rugen and Fehmarn to support an observational blockade of Kiel, with the main fleet to the east of the Fehmarn Belt to support it. If the German fleet had sortied earlier it was assumed to have been destroyed or rendered mostly inert by the battle near the Skaw. If not then submarine and torpedo boat attacks on the ships in Kiel were considered possibilities. Older Battleships equipped for bombardment would then move into the Baltic and bombard the German Baltic Ports. Since these were much less well defended and tidal issues are non-existent in the Baltic the plan was to destroy the defenses, and then the port infrastructure. At this flotilla attacks against the fleet at Kiel or the Canal's Locks were considered. It was also considered possible to mount large scale raids against the Baltic coastline with up to 40,000 men.
- D/D1 was influenced by the possibility of being closed out of the Baltic by diplomacy, similarly to A/A1. It basically assumed that the North Sea portion of the plan and the fleet near the Skaw would facilitate Germany invading Denmark. If the Danes supported the Germans, then Zealand would be blockaded to stop all food imports and starve out the German garrison. If the Danes were resisting the Germans then troops would be landed on the north of Zealand (between Ise Fiord and Seiro Bay, giving plenty of space, a secure line of advance and clear fire support from the fleet) to defeat the German occupation in connection with the Danes. Sprongo and Omo Islands in the Great Belt and the Albue Peninsula would also need to be seized to keep German artillery from impeding the fleets passage into the Baltic. This gave the British an offensive alternative if the Belt was ever closed to them by diplomacy or force.
In many ways plan A/A1 gives the framework for the strategy pursued by the Navy in WW1, and I think if Fisher was considering Baltic operations it is likely that he was adapting D/D1 to the situation at hand.
These plans were tested in several exercises in 1907. The results were inconclusive but did cast doubt on the ability of the British to maintain an observational blockade of the German coast from Britain, and possibly even when operating from an advanced base. thus the Admiralty's planning generally revolved around Plan A/A1, but planning for flotillas to operate off the North Sea German coast did continue. Plans for the seizure of Borkum and Sylt and the movement of supply ships to supply the flotillas based there also still existed.
There were further revisions to the overall plan but as far as I know those were the most detailed in regards to Denmark. Fisher was likely using the tools he had, or could get a hold of to meet the challenges of the day.
EDIT: Sorry for the text wall.
Please don't be, that was a hugely informative and interesting read. Whilst I have enjoyed reading the criticisms of the plan, to see a more balanced take of it is fascinating. I have done a fairly bad job of defending the plan here (partly because I am not wholly convinced about the logic of abandoning the Western Front) as I am nowhere near well read enough to argue about the economic or naval side of the war in any great detail.
Yes, I pretty much knew what the consensus would be as well. But I thought it was worth posting, since I was a bit frustrated that every other discussion or timeline seemed to think the plan was to simply have the Grand Fleet sit in the Baltic.
To play Devil's Advocate, even if Fisher could bait the Germans into an invasion of Denmark, would it not still have been likely that the raiding fleet Britain sent into the Baltic would be destroyed piecemeal by the High Seas Fleet and German Submarines?
Probably not by the HSF. Or at least not unless things went very wrong, which is always a possibility. The plan was that wherever the HSF was likely to be, the British Battlefleet (it wasn't called the Grand Fleet yet, but basically that) would also be. The order would go something like this:
1. Plan A would be implemented, cutting off German overseas trade.
This part was technically optional if Plan C or D was being proceeded with. But if it was implemented it was hoped that the German fleet would sortie to protect their trade and could be engaged and destroyed. These plans generally assumed an aggressive German posture. In actuality Tirpitz's doctrine was to stand on the defensive in the Heligoland Bight and let the generally aggressive British come to them.
2. The North Sea ports would be blockaded.
This was not going to be a close "sealing up" blockade as is sometimes presented. That had basically been rejected by the British in the 1880's. It was instead to be an "observational blockade" which involved destroyer flotillas, backed up by scout cruisers( In 1914 these would be light cruisers or battlecruisers) keeping watch on the German ports. basically strong enough to deal with torpedo craft, destroyers and some cruisers, but fast enough to generally escape anything bigger. These would give word of a breakout and allow the supporting fleet to engage and hopefully destroy the escaping force. This was easier if the light forces had advanced bases nearby to base supply and repair ships or shore facilities. This led to the discussions on seizing islands in the North Sea, with various opinions on plausibility. Once again, it was hoped that this step would lead to a fleet battle and the destruction of the HSF.
3. The Elbe would be blocked.
This was a critical step in the process. The Elbe contains one of Germany's major fleet bases and the entrance to the Kiel Canal. If the Elbe is not blocked, then the HSF can outflank the British fleet, attacking from the North Sea when the British are engaged in the Baltic. It is also one of the biggest problems with the plan. The preferred method of blocking the Elbe was to sink hulks across it and physically block it. This meant that few forces would need to be maintained to watch it. However, a hydrographic report in 1904 had already shown that the tidal and seabed conditions in the area made this impossible. This meant that the only option left was mining. This required that forces be maintained to refresh the mine fields and keep the Germans from sweeping it. I expect that if this step were completed in WW1 then Courageous class large light cruisers would be very useful here. They would basically ensure that the only thing that the Germans could attack the mining forces with would be major fleet units and it could outrun those. They were also very well protected against torpedo's. Based on German doctrine at the time and the sheer importance of the Elbe I expect that this step almost certainly would have lead to some kind of fleet action.
4. The fleet is moved to the Skaw.
With the Elbe sealed the HSF basically needs to go around Denmark, and the British are still figuring on aggressive posture from the Germans. In fact, earlier German doctrine would have seen the German fleet in Kiel moving around Denmark and trying to disrupt a British attack on the Elbe. The German exercises generally did not show promising results for this strategy. But it would still be a possible response, so the British would need to prepare for it. In step 2, the British would have maintained watching forces at the entrance to the Baltic as well, so they would know that the Germans were coming. Based on the distances the Germans would have to spend a night at sea. This would give the British the opportunity to conduct nighttime torpedo attacks. Then they could engage the HSF the next day near the Skaw (the northern tip of Denmark).
5. The Baltic would be entered.
How this looked depended on the diplomatic situation at the time. If Denmark was neutral the idea was that they would simply sail through the Belts. This was plan C. Plan D worked on the assumption that the Germans had invaded Denmark to block the British from the Baltic. In this case, the invasion or blockade of Zealand would commence, and the main fleet would be on hand to counter the HSF. What this plan does not take into account is a situation where Denmark is neutral but the Belts are still closed to them. This is what happened IOTL with the Danes mining the Belts under pressure from the Germans. Now under the position of the British in 1907 closing the Belts was, in itself considered an act of war, similarly to closing the Dardanelles. The British did not really protest IOTL since they were not really looking to get into the Baltic at the time. If they were, they would likely fall back on that position and basically force the Danes to choose a side, and proceed accordingly. Either the Danes allow them entry, which will cause the Germans to see them as enemies and probably invade, or they bar the British fleet and are considered allied to Germany, and the British attempt to blockade Zealand. Not a great position for the Danes. However, based on the actions and plans of the Germans it seems pretty likely that the earlier steps would have led to an invasion of Denmark anyway by this point which makes the British position simpler at least. The Courageous class would probably again be useful here both in navigating the shallow waters and supporting an invasion.
6. Kiel would be blockaded.
Several islands would again be seized as advanced bases for the blockading light forces and the main fleet would move to the east to act as a covering force in case the HSF came out of Kiel. Attacks on the harbour with torpedo boats and submarines was considered at this point.
7. The raiding forces would move into the Baltic.
Only now would the bombardment forces, mostly made up of obsolete battleships, move to bombard the German Baltic ports.
So, at least in theory, the HSF should either be bottled up or destroyed or a combination thereof at this point. It is certainly possible the plan could have gone awry at some point but in that case the raiding forces shouldn't be in the Baltic yet anyway.
Submarines are a different matter. Submarines in 1907 were not the same as those in 1914. For one, the first diesel submarines had not yet appeared, meaning subs range was much reduced. Their wireless capability was also much less, and they were often deployed with a surface control ship which was vulnerable. While I don't think the increase in submarine capability would have rendered the plan completely impractical, it definitely would have had to have been updated to account for them.
This depends on the bases they have at their disposal. In OTL the Russians blew up their port facilities at Libau Liepaja, and forced the British submarines (E.1 and E.11) at the Baltic to rebase all the way up to modern-day Finland. With Libau operational, the short range of early boats is less of an issue.
I was more thinking of the dangers to the British fleet from German submarines. Particularly in the Belts
Its true though, the same improvements could open new avenues for the British to cut German trade and attack the German fleet more effectively as well.
Suppose Lord Beresford had a career-ending dramatic accident before 1907, and Fisher had a chance to implement his ideas of flotilla defence? Combined with the envisioned (The Submarine Question, 1908) offensive use of most modern submarine types, D-class and onwards, a Royal Navy Baltic strategy would work well with the plans the Russians themselves had.
The new Novik-class destroyers and Russian submarines were to be used aggressively for offensive naval mining from Liepaja, which was the only ice-free military harbour Russia had at the Baltic. From there, the submarines and light units were in good position to interdict the German Baltic coastal trade.
This is actually a POD I have considered since it could actually solve a few issues. And it could possibly be pretty simple. Sometime prior to 1907 Beresford's personality seems to have taken a turn for the worse. This is commented on by several contemporaries and later historians. A popular, though completely unproven, theory is that he may have had a mild stroke sometime prior to that date. If we assume that this is true then either avoiding it or having it be debilitating enough to force his retirement from the Navy and public life would do the trick.
This actually solves a few issues. One is that it could allow the career of Percy Scott to continue upwards. I am not sure if this is plausible as Scott was a bit of a prickly maverick who often went against the Admiralty, but if he could get into either the DNO or Third Sea Lord Chair I think he could be very useful. At the least Director firing would be pushed and shell redesign may well go ahead as well.
A second actually relates to the war plans I posted above, or rather their successors. In 1908 Fisher was under fire from Beresford and others, and it was leaking out of the Admiralty and into the public. In order to keep strategy under his own control, he used a familiar tactic of his and created a committee that he could either pack with his people or control the flow of information into and out of. In this case both. His strategy committee gave him a level of legitimacy but as president he ran it as an informal think-tank to advise him on the plans he already had. He also gave priority in it to thinkers from the Royal Navy War College like Edmond Slade. These guys were strong theoretical thinkers but they had no experience with operational planning. The "W" plans they produced were therefore of little real benefit. The 1907 plans had been mostly a partnership between the NID under George Ballard and the Naval Record Society as the unofficial Research branch. The War College was then used to test out some of their ideas. Without the pressure from Beresford it is possible that the NID is allowed to continually update their work as the situation changes. This would have been helpful as the NID was effectively the only Naval General Staff there was. The decision to take strategic analysis away from them hampered them from becoming that in truth.
AIUI the general ideas of flotilla defense were not totally new, though Fisher was likely to have seen an expanded use for them. It does seem likely that with less organized resistance to his plans he would have explored more. That said, Beresford was the focus for discontent, but he was not the only such voice. It is possible that Fisher's critics would have found someone else to gather around.
Even in 1907 submarines were included in an offensive role. It seems likely they would become even more so as their range and freedom of action increased. I think if the Baltic were actually open to the British they would still use surface vessels to attack the commercial ports but if they can support an aggressive submarine campaign before hand or as well as the attacks they likely would.