I came across this on another forum, and the conversation there intrigued me enough to post it here.
Here's the thread in question.
Let's assume that the IJN men who wanted the battleships and cruisers sent against the carriers won out.
Would it really be a better idea?
What would happen?
Assuming a victory for the IJN (unlikely enough to fall near or in ASB territory, but still), how much does this delay the American war effort?
Would a success here be better or worse then a success against the transport force?
Well there are more than a couple of problems with this plan.
1. The USN carriers were faster than the Japanese BBs
Fuso & Yamashiro were rated at 25 knots, while
Yamato & Musashi were both rated at 27. The SLOWEST combat ship with the Halsey's Fleet Carriers were the
Alabama, Massachusetts, South Dakota and
Washington all rated at 27+ knots
. Tough to hunt what you can't catch.
2. The Japanese heavies were remarkably vulnerable to air attack. The IJN never developed a good AAA set-up for their ships, much less a reasonable doctrine for mutual defense. This is one of the things that really stands out between the IJN & USN, U.S. AAA was extremely strong and well used, causing high numbers of casualties to attacking aircraft. Attacks against Japanese formations losses were generally due to fighter action, with much less damage inflicted by the ship's defenses. The U.S. carriers had over 490 BOMBERS available to them, plus roughly 600 fighters capable of acting as dive bombers. The
Musashi was sunk by a part of these air forces forces, with Kurita avoiding the total destruction of his fleet soley because Halsey believed he was in full retreat and set out after the Japanese carriers.
3. The American carriers were not just bobbing about the Pacific by themselves. There were SIX fast battleships
Alabama, Massachusetts, South Dakota, Washington, Iowa & New Jersey with the carriers, along with 8 CA, 6 CL, 3 CLAA, 63 DD. Note that this DOES NOT include the fairly large group of DD escorting the fleet train. You will note that this gives, completely apart from the main weapon of the carrier force, the U.S. a parity in battleships (counting the
Ise & Hyuga as carriers), a 2-1 advantage in cruisers and a SIX to ONE advantage in destroyers. This is completely apart from the combat effectiveness of the two forces. Each American destroyer is close in total combat power to a Japanese CL, while the Japanese main advantage, the spectacular "Long Lance" torpedo was, outside of the confined waters of the Solomons, surprisingly ineffective, (due to faulty tactical application by IJN commanders trying to repeat the successes of Savo Island more than any fault with the torpedoes themselves) with a lower hit rate than the much maligned U.S. torpedo. U.S. torpedo hit rates for surface launched weapons hovered right around 8%. The 60+ destroyers covering the carriers had more than 600 torpedoes available. The effectiveness of American destroyer torpedoes against major Japanese Fleet units was demonstrated during the Battle of Samar, where ALL the engaged Japanese cruisers were crippled by the torpedoes of Taffy Two's escort.
BTW: The forces IN the Gulf included 18 CVE, 9 cruisers, 83 DD, and 34 DDE
The Japanese surface force was so out gunned that it was doomed, regardless of target. At least by trying for the landing beaches it was given a slender chance of inflicting casualties on the American forces. Trying for TF 38 would have resulted in the loss of the entire force without a single crew member ever seeing an American ship.
Yamato dies off the Philippines instead of in the last great act of defiance off Okinawa, along with the Japanese surface fleet.
As far as what happens if the IJN succeeded in sinking the 33 knot American carriers with 27 knot battleships in open water, I would have to say that Japan wins the war, because it is absolutely clear that God Himself has come down from Heaven and is throwing thunderbolts at the American Navy.