Alternate 'Battle of Midway': RN instead of USN, what's the result?

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Lets just say for some unbelievable reason the RN and the IJN end up squaring off against each other at Midway?

What would be each others order of battle (carriers)?
What would be each others order of battle (aircraft)?
Possible Commanders of each side?
How would the battle pan out, losses, etc?
Probable victor and consequences there after?

Much obliged!
 
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Considering the much smaller aircraft complements and CAPs of most British carriers along with the somewhat iffy nature of a lot of early war British carrier aircraft (versus USN Fleet carriers) the British carriers probably take a lot of pounding but probably get slaughtered in the end.

They might take say a dozen bombs a piece but they still die.
 
The RN carrier fleet cannot prevail against the IJN, at least not in daylight. The Japanese have more carriers available, better aircraft with longer range, many more aircraft and superbly trained aircrew.
 
The RN carrier fleet cannot prevail against the IJN, at least not in daylight. The Japanese have more carriers available, better aircraft with longer range, many more aircraft and superbly trained aircrew.

Doesn't this apply to the USN at Midway too? Admittedly less so than for the RN, though.

The thing about Midway is that it demonstrated that the IJN could not effectively defend its own carrier fleet. It lacked the ability to detect an incoming attack and the command and control to intercept it at a safe distance. It got a warning in the Indian Ocean that there was a problem with its doctrine and technology, but was unable to solve it, so carried on regardless. At Midway, numbers and chance produced a more decisive result, but some of the underlying circumstances were the same.
 
What exactly is the scenario?
Replace US OOB with UK under exact same OTL conditions?
Can the Brits read the Japanese code?
What are the goals for each side? OTL or new?
Brits and Brit planes at Midway?
Does the USS Nautilus influence the battle by having the IJN Arashi lead Brits to their carriers?
War is a funny thing. The US had so many breaks it was crazy (Not saying that’s the only reason the US won the battle. They capitalized on their good fortune). The Japanese made so many mistakes it was crazy.
 
This is a nebulous question that defies a proper answer - my gut feel is that in a pacific environment the IJN and USN carriers were better ships than the Armoured carriers and carried more aircraft (for example Victorious carried about 36 and Indomitable 55 during Mid 42 using the RN practices of the day) so it would be harder battle for the RN assuming the same advantages in intel and positioning etc - my gut feel is they would still win but it would be harder.

Obviously this depended on the aircraft carried as well - more folding wing Martlet's could be carried than say for example non folding wing Sea Hurricanes

And just a few points on aircraft

Albacore outranged both the Kate and Devastator (with a fish) and while it had a slower top speed its cruising speed was not that far below those 2.

And certainly compared to a Devastator it had a greater chance of delivering a torpedo attack given the better fish and more benign attack envelope with the fish more likely to hit and go bang when it did.

The RN carriers had a better fighter direction and experience using radar at this stage of the war (including ASV radar) and while the best way of shooting down enemy planes was another plane they enjoyed better AAA at this stage of the war.

Also a large number of the USN planes never managed to find let alone attack the IJN (Hornets inexperienced air group for example who achieved nothing that day) and so this invalidates the advantage in air group sizes.

The damage inflicted on the 4 flattops was inflicted by a relative handful of the US Aircraft this could very well prove to be the same case with the smaller but more experienced RN air groups.
 
The RN wasn't designed to launch an extended campaign from the central Pacific to the Western Pacific as the USN was. The RN situation and way of fighting was completely different to IJN massed carrier raids and the more advanced USN Carrier Strike Force concept. In a Midway situation the RN would concentrate on night actions as the IJN finds itself tied to protecting the assault forces on Midway.
 
This is a nebulous question that defies a proper answer - my gut feel is that in a pacific environment the IJN and USN carriers were better ships than the Armoured carriers and carried more aircraft (for example Victorious carried about 36 and Indomitable 55 during Mid 42 using the RN practices of the day) so it would be harder battle for the RN assuming the same advantages in intel and positioning etc - my gut feel is they would still win but it would be harder.

Obviously this depended on the aircraft carried as well - more folding wing Martlet's could be carried than say for example non folding wing Sea Hurricanes

And just a few points on aircraft

Albacore outranged both the Kate and Devastator (with a fish) and while it had a slower top speed its cruising speed was not that far below those 2.

And certainly compared to a Devastator it had a greater chance of delivering a torpedo attack given the better fish and more benign attack envelope with the fish more likely to hit and go bang when it did.

The RN carriers had a better fighter direction and experience using radar at this stage of the war (including ASV radar) and while the best way of shooting down enemy planes was another plane they enjoyed better AAA at this stage of the war.

Also a large number of the USN planes never managed to find let alone attack the IJN (Hornets inexperienced air group for example who achieved nothing that day) and so this invalidates the advantage in air group sizes.

The damage inflicted on the 4 flattops was inflicted by a relative handful of the US Aircraft this could very well prove to be the same case with the smaller but more experienced RN air groups.

I mean this would assume the larger air group size is only about strike. But it's also about CAP and defense. The best defense for a carrier from an air attack is more fighters. So if the US carrier has say 15 planes up and can theoretically have another 40 sent up to defend itself while it has say a 15-20 plane strike or recon package on the way is a lot better then having say a 6 plane CAP and theoretically being able to put up another 15 fighters because it already has a 15 plane strike/recon package.

The RN vs. USN "fleet carriers" were designed for entirely different theaters. For the Pacific the USN went with the right call. Better to have more aircraft (And good Damage control) versus much fewer aircraft and a deck that can take a few bombs (Though those bombs might seem to not do much damage at first from what I understand the British armored carriers tended to suffer some indirect massive structural problems).
 
I mean this would assume the larger air group size is only about strike. But it's also about CAP and defense. The best defense for a carrier from an air attack is more fighters.
Not quite. Obviously it helps, but the key is to get those fighters to be in the right place at the right time.

Preferably, diving to intercept the incoming strike 30 miles away from your fleet, rather than chasing dive bombers away as your carrier burns behind you...
 

CalBear

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Same situation? Three RN decks? Say the three Illustrious class (near contemporaries to the USN Yorktown class)

British get destroyed. They have vastly better fighter direction than the Americans did, but they also have Fulmars as their fighter (although their may be some Marlets i.e. Wildcats aboard by mid 1942). As far as fleet defense/raid escort it lasts as long as the F4F are around.

Japanese likely escape with the loss of one, maybe two decks. The RN benefits from a very good air dropped torpedo but the Swordfish and Albacore are 50-60 knots SLOWER than the TBD and the each RN carrier will only have 18 of them and no dive bombers at all (British carrier in 1941 and later didn't carry dive bombers at all). At Midway the American torpedo bomber squadrons were effective wiped out without even getting into position to drop their torpedoes for the most part. In this scenario the attackers are far slower and no more robustly built than the TBD. After those 54 Swordfish/Albacore (two squadrons of 9 aircraft per carrier) are gone, or mostly gone there is no second strike with a 70 dive bombers piling in while the Japanese CAP is haring off to finish the torpedo planes.

The four Japanese carriers had a total of 70 D3A, 78 B5N, and 93 A6M. The RN will have sailed with 54 fighters. Any sent to escort the torpedo planes are likely to be goners, especially if they were Fulmars, the Zeros would have just flat chewed them up. Using the same formula as at Pearl the Japanese will send 35-40 fighters to escort the strike against the British fleet. The biggest question is if the Japanese find all three of the British carriers or if they only find one. Any carrier the find is likely to take between two and four torpedo hits and an equal number of bombs. The bombs won't likely sink the carriers, the torpedoes very much can.

Be a really long day for the British fleet.
 
Same situation? Three RN decks? Say the three Illustrious class (near contemporaries to the USN Yorktown class)

British get destroyed. They have vastly better fighter direction than the Americans did, but they also have Fulmars as their fighter (although their may be some Marlets i.e. Wildcats aboard by mid 1942). As far as fleet defense/raid escort it lasts as long as the F4F are around.

Japanese likely escape with the loss of one, maybe two decks. The RN benefits from a very good air dropped torpedo but the Swordfish and Albacore are 50-60 knots SLOWER than the TBD and the each RN carrier will only have 18 of them and no dive bombers at all (British carrier in 1941 and later didn't carry dive bombers at all). At Midway the American torpedo bomber squadrons were effective wiped out without even getting into position to drop their torpedoes for the most part. In this scenario the attackers are far slower and no more robustly built than the TBD. After those 54 Swordfish/Albacore (two squadrons of 9 aircraft per carrier) are gone, or mostly gone there is no second strike with a 70 dive bombers piling in while the Japanese CAP is haring off to finish the torpedo planes.

The four Japanese carriers had a total of 70 D3A, 78 B5N, and 93 A6M. The RN will have sailed with 54 fighters. Any sent to escort the torpedo planes are likely to be goners, especially if they were Fulmars, the Zeros would have just flat chewed them up. Using the same formula as at Pearl the Japanese will send 35-40 fighters to escort the strike against the British fleet. The biggest question is if the Japanese find all three of the British carriers or if they only find one. Any carrier the find is likely to take between two and four torpedo hits and an equal number of bombs. The bombs won't likely sink the carriers, the torpedoes very much can.

Be a really long day for the British fleet.
The RN did have night-time strike capacity thanks to radar-equipped Albacore though. It would be interesting if somehow the RN managed to pre-empt the IJN on 3 June 1942 by way of a night-time torp strike.
 

Riain

Banned
What about the planes on midway itself, what were the British counterparts and how would they fare at mid 1942 levels expertise?
 
It is a thing of who discovers the enemy 1st, keeps tabs on it, so they can launch early and arrive at and around the target in a coherent manner. We also have a thing on what the aircraft composition at Midway is, and what they can do. Eg. a Spitfire V force escorts Beuforts or Wellingtons or Marylands will make things 'interesting' for the ones at the receiving end. Seasoned air defense crews at Midway making the Japanese pay a higher price?
My point - there is too many variables to take into account, so anyone's guess is valid.
 
I tend to agree with Callbear on this one given what was historically available in the period for both navies and how the operational routines where, the IJN was the more offensive Carrier force compared to a more or less defensive Royal Navy carrier force, where most of the defense was to be done by the ships, not so much the aircraft, given the lack in quality of especially fighter aircraft in mid 1942 in the Royal Navy. Fulmar was too slow to be an effective fighter and the Martlets were too few in numbers as the British airgroups were so much smaller compared to both the IJN and USN at that specific time in history. This lack of aircraft is partly compensated by a much more experienced and effective fighter direction though, but the sheer number of planes was the main problem. (Illustrious class at the time carried an airgroup of around 30 planes in each ship normally, with half of these being fighters and the other half bombers, meaning three CV's would at best have 45 fighters maximum, for both CAP, escort and other jobs, such as recon missions for the Fulmar type regular mission profile. An attackforce of only 45 strike aircraft is the same as a single USN or IJN CV could muster, so this force too was likely heavily outnumbered, even though by some miracle the slower biplanes of the FAA could get through and reach the enemy fleet.

Some credits on AA capability goes to the British in this period of time, as the AA of the Royal Navy ships in the mid of 1942 was well tested already and experienced in how to use it, besides having a more balanced mix of guns than the USN at the time (or IJN as well) Both USN and IJN lacked a medium caliber rapid fire hard hitting weapon, as both the clumsy quad 1.1 inch USN weapon and the slow ROF 25 mm IJN main close range AA weapon were inferior to the British multi-barrel 2pdr power operated mountings on the British naval vessels though this weapon too had some limitations as well, such as a relative short range. The heavy AA was comparable to both USN and IJN as well, but more experienced due to three years of war already.

Conclusion: AA alone will not be enough though meaning the overwhelming numerical superiority of the IJN naval airpower will be decisive most likely.
 
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