marathag
Banned
But this ATL, there is no flank to worry about, Belgium is quiet. What's to cause Joffre not to attack?
Timidity?
That's not a Joffre issue.
Alternate Battle of Lorraine 1914
Timidity?
That's not a Joffre issue.
Joffre attacked when he saw benefit to it and had a firm strategy in mind, not because he was addicted to attacking. He had 3rd and 4th Army sit and wait for 3 days until August 20, when he felt he had a good grasp of the situation. Joffre would certainly have 1st and 2nd Army press the Germans in mid-August in order to reveal their deployment and seize advantageous ground, but most of his reserves (Including 4th and 5th Army) would remain back to counter any German blows and, in Joffre’s ideal world, advance through Belgium/Luxembourg to outflank the German Army.
So if he gets permission to advance into Belgium he’ll attack there. Or perhaps the Mulhouse direction will go favorably, as it did IOTL, and Joffre will use the railways to shift his reserves to his right wing for a dash across the Rhine and around the German left before they can redeploy forces to react. The man was strategically flexible and good at maneuvering forces around to deploy them to maximum advantage. In this he’ll be far better prepared than his German opponents in the West, who will be fighting as distinctly separate armies without unified command as they did IOTL.
Joffre’s goal will be a breakout into space where he can put his superior numbers to decisive effect. That involves identifying, fixing, and outmaneuvering his opponents, not a headlong rush into a bear trap.
Not at all, I think scholarship over the past couple decades has done a lot to rehabilitate Joffre’s reputation. Doughty has a nice essay on his command decisions in August which emphasizes that the failure of Joffre’s opening strategy was based on understandable mistakes and misperceptions (As well as political constraints), not a blind commitment to attacking.
Well, with respect, some scholars have tried - and mostly failed. It's revisionism in service of building academic careers.
Barnett Singer's assessment still rings true to me: "A selfish, self-promoting, credit-appropriating fraud." But he always had a fine lunch.
Fort de Manonviller, built 1879-1882, was one of the most armored French fortress in 1914. Nevertheless, after 4 days of siege, this fortress had to surrender already on 27 August.
Longwy Fortress, designed by Vauban in 1679-1690, survived for a few weeks in 1914. Apparently the Germans didn't put much effort into it...
Surrendering unsupported after the French Army decided to dip from the area without a fight because they were outnumbered and outflanked is a very different ballgame than serving as a fortified basis for 15-20 divisions to regroup in good order. Fort Souville also wouldn’t have lasted long if left to the German’s tender mercies, but we know how that story went.
If you want to offer your own sources and counterarguments, we’re all ears. “Every historian who disagrees with me is a careerist revisionist” is unfalsifiable.
Moltke understood - to be polite - very few of the railway logistics, the railway department and its works and abilitities. He also said to have hjad rather few faith into them as several german general having worked this field during Moltke the Minors reign have stated, ie. Groener but also (esp. ?) Hermann v. Staabs.
Your efforts in calculating from principly wished-for requirements stated by the german railway department is are honorable.
But ... excuse me if I trust more into the statements of someone who has for been chief of the reilway department of the Great General Staff for 3 years and after the usual 'active troop command' for another 3 years Chief of the 'Armee-Verwaltungs-Departement' (Army administration department) which at the war ministry was reposnsible for ... preparation of mobilisation until 1913.
He rendered it possible to place in East Prussia a :
1. Army at a Tilsit-Gumbinnen sector :
Guards Corps, I.Corps, II.Corps, Guards Reserve Corps
Guards Cav.Div., 2. Cav.Div.
8. Army at a Gumbinnen-Marggrabowa sector :
X.Corps, XVIII.Corps, I.Reserve Corps, X.Reserve Corps
3. Cav.Div, 1. Cav.Div
2. Army at a Lyck-Rudzanny sector
III.Corps, IV.Corps, III.Reserve Corps, IV.Reserve Corps
4. Cav.Div.
3. Army at a Ortelsburg-Soldau sector
XII.Corps, XIX.Corps, V.Reserve Corps and XII.Reserve Corps at Thorn
And ALL of these ready to rumble on day M 15 ! of mobilisation.These are 16 army corps - active and reserve - and 5 cavalry divisions instead of the 9 army corps and 4 cavalry divisions you calculated for M 15 at best and only hardly.
If someone might ask v.Staabs also envisaged on M 15 an additional
4. Army in midth Silesia
V.Corps, VI.Corps, VI.Reserve Corp, Landwehr Corps
5.Cav.Div, 8.Cav.Div.
as ready to rumble.I render it that you assign Joffre - and the russians as well - perhaps a wee bit too much of freedom of action :
to contemplate and only then decide what to do
Actually their strategies were already rather 'fixed' by the latest iteration of 1913 of their oh-so-defensive Military Agreement of 1892 as the precursor of their official alliance of 1894 (the 'commentraies' represent the agreed upon and signed actual interpretations of the treaty).
Some excerps :
Preamble
"The two chiefs of the general staffs declared by common agreement that the words "defensive war" do not mean a war conducted defensively. They assert the contrary, that it is absolutely necessary for the French and Russian armies to take vigorous offensives and as far as possible simultaneously, according to the text of Article 3 of the Convention."
Article 2
"The French and Russian governments having agreed in 1911 and 1912 that German mobilization would oblige Russia and France to mobilize immediately and simultaneously all their forces at the first news of the event and without previous consultation, ..."
Article 3
"The available forces which must be employed against Germany are, from France, thirteen hundred thousand men and, from Russia, seven to eight hundred thousand. These forces will be committed completely and with all dispatch so that Germany must fight on East and West at the same time. ...
... French forces will exceed the stated number by two hundred thousand, that most will be on the eastern frontier by the tenth day of mobilization and that operations will begin on the eleventh day, in the morning. Jilinsky declared that his forces would equal or exceed the number stated, that most would be on the frontier by the fifteenth day of mobilization and that operations would immediately follow. By the end of 1914, mobilization would be two days quicker."
Joffre as well as the russians had a written agreement/contract of how many troops at exactly what point of time counted from the german mobilisation had to begin their operations against Germany.
... the link above that's the treaty you're asking for.
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I’m no Moltke partisan, but after the war everyone and their mother in the German Army claimed that they could’ve won the war with “one weird trick” if Moltke had just listened to them. Groener and Staabs included. I’m going to trust the numbers on this one.
We know how many rail lines ran over the Vistula and their capacity. Groener himself gives it in Das deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen. These served as the main bottleneck for Aufmarsch II Ost. It was a universal rule that double track lines never ran at more than 50 trains per day, even the highest capacity trunk lines. The Marienburg double track was the only high capacity line running into East Prussia capable of this level of intensity, and indeed it reached that capacity of 50 trains per day IOTL. The rest of the lines combined could handle another 50. Thus that's a maximum of 100 trains per day.
We also know the transportation requirements of regular corps, reserve corps, and cavalry divisions - 140 trains, 85 trains, and 31 trains, respectively. This excludes other HQs, supplies, foodstuffs, etc. which would add additional strain.
For the sake of fairness let's assume the underdeveloped and undermaintained East Prussian railways can operate on their maximum capacity, something which even their better prepared and less burdened trans-Rhine siblings couldn't do. For the forces you mentioned - 9 regular corps, 6 reserve corps, 5 cavalry divisions - that's 20.1 days to deploy. Adding in additional requirements mentioned above, it might end up closer to 25 days. Even before these numbers come together there are 3-5 days of preparation between the time mobilization is declared and when the troops start moving on the rails!
So for the forces you mentioned, even working at maximum capacity readiness would be reached at M+25-30, not 15. That's not even getting into the insufficiency of the railway network East of the Vistula itself! It was estimated in the 1912-13 deployment directive that 2nd Army would need to detrain just East of the Vistula and spend a week marching to Ortelsburg, so sparse was the railway capacity! Under Staabs' scenario Germany would be deploying a force 42% of that which attacked France in 1914 but would only have 15% of the railway capacity the West had. Common sense tells us the result.
All due respect to Staabs, but as far as I'm aware his books offer no details about his planned deployment schemes, timetable, rail capacity, etc. Both he and Groener were defending a "proof of concept" in order to protect the railway department's reputation against claims that the disastrous attack in the West had to happen as it did because the railway administration of the GGS was too inflexible. Moltke himself originated this claim on August 1st.
When Aufmarsch II Ost was crafted in response to the 1908 Bosnian Crisis and implemented in 1909 this railway problem was in the text of the deployment directive and associated orders/exercises. To quote Zuber on this point:
In Aufmarsch II Ost for 1912-1913 (The last one before it was removed) the same railway problem remained:
And:
While Moltke's knowledge of the technical specifics of the railway planning process may have been limited, he was very aware of how the railways related to planned force deployments and what their capabilities were. East Prussia is no exception to this. Moreover, we know via intelligence assessments attached to Moltke's deployment directives that the GGS believed Russia could deploy the bulk of its forces for an attack at M+20. That is, under Aufmarsch II Ost or Staabs' variant the Russian Army might well get the jump on Germany's deployment.
Staabs and Groener were correct that Moltke erred in asserting that a redeployment to the East would fatally disrupt the war effort because it was technically impossible, though even Groener acknowledged that there would be disruptions and delays caused by such a radical redeployment late in the game. But Moltke did understand that the East Prussian railways were unprepared to handle the troops envisaged for an offensive against Russia in a timely manner - he had written and gamed out these same assessments! Either he lied, he misspoke, or he forgot what he had previously known. Regardless, to claim that Moltke was unfamiliar with the risks associated with Aufmarsch II Ost is baseless.
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Aphrodite
Banned
That's nice but doesn't address the point at all. Russia also had Case "g" which they would implement if the Germans came East. That plan called for a rearward deployment and no early offensive. It was the traditional Russian strategy of trading space for time.
The French plans you cite are based on what they considered the most likely scenario- a western German offensive. They never developed a plan for Germany going East because there was no indication that the Germans ever considered it.
Nothing in your citation claims that when faced with a totally unforeseen German move, the French wouldn't change their plans.
This is rather strange. The Russians planned to trade space for time. They aren't being "destroyed in Poland" because they aren't in Poland. They are well to the rear completing their mobilization, bringing up their Caucasian and Siberian divisions for a brutal counterattack.
The Russians want the Germans and Austrians deep in Poland far from their lines of supply
Aphrodite
Banned
Your source doesn't contradict anything I pointed out. At the time, Grey is still pushing France to accept his Western neutrality plan. He merely states that Britain retains it's freedom of action, which is true. When France rejects Grey's neutrality plan, Grey is forced to choose between abandoning France and War. He chooses war.
Luxembourg is unimportant OTL because Grey wins the August 2 cabinet showdown and the liberal cabinet decides on war.
Luxembourg is important in the scenario you laid out:. The war party loses the showdown and Grey, Churchill, Haldane, Asquith and their backers resign Then it becomes who can get the 336 votes needed to form a coalition.
If just a quarter of the liberal party votes for war, you would need the unanimous opposition of Labour (very doubtful as they sack Macdonald and voted for war credits) and the Irish(who deserve their own thread) plus a few defections from the unionists (possible). Luxembourg means you'll need to find another 25-50 defections from the Unionists-which is very doubtful
Aphrodite
Banned
And Belgium might fight Anglo-French advance. Moltke can't know the answer because we don't know the answer.
That Moltke war games the scenario means he considered it plausible. In that case, he would need a plan to deal with it. An Eastern deployment gives him none
Aphrodite
Banned
No sir, nothing in there obliges the French to launch an attack on M6. It calls for simultaneous mobilization. As pointed out, the Russians had a clearly written plan that called for a rearward deployment and they would adopt it if the Germans came East.
The statements you refer to are their intentions on the far more likely Western deployment. Nothing in there says they will commit suicide by not adapting to a new scenario.
Your East first threads "work" only because you insist that the French and Russians don't make the few simple and obvious adjustments that any Master Sergeant would know. Given that the Russians actually had such plans, your contention is worse than dubious.
The Russians don't mind burning Poland and the French would be delighted to see the German army getting stuck in Polish mud.
In four years, you have failed to give any military or diplomatic reason for the French to attack before the Russians are ready. That would be between M30 and M45.
You need something more than"the plan" because plans change
marathag
Banned
The idea that both Russia and France, despite years of agreements to attack Germany as soon as possible, that Mobilization actually meant, 'wait and see what the Germans were going to do first' is a strange one to me.
Yes, even Plan XVII was set to deal with an expected German thrust along the Meuse, or in the South from A-L
VII Corps, commanded by General Bonneau, was one of five Corps that comprised the French First Army, notified Joffre that there were German Forces present, and requested to delay for all Mobilization to finish, but Joffre ordered him to advance in southern Alsace on the 7th and take Mulhouse, and did so on the 8th of August
OTL
July 29, Russians General Mobilization order signed by the Tsar, they did not have a usable partial plan for Mobilization since 1904, but Partial Mobilization Orders were Telegraphed out to Moscow, Kazan, Kiev and Odessa, plus Fleet in Black Sea. More telegrams between Tsar and Kaiser, with German warnings.
July 30, Moltke presses for general mobilization. French Army withdraws 6 miles along entire border with Belgium, Luxembourg, and Germany. Evening of July 30, Reacting to the Austrian Navy bombarding Belgrade, Russia posts General mobilization orders for its troops and Fleet to begin on July 31
July 31, Germany demands that Russia stop Mobilization within 24 hours and declares martial law, and closes Border with France and Belgium. Belgium orders General Mobilization, as does A-H with ordering General Mobilization for men up to 50 years old. Russian Reserves are called up.
August 1, UK orders the Fleet to mobilize. France begin full mobilization to begin August 2nd, with French Order posted at 3:40pm on the 1st.
Germany order Full Mobilization at 5PM, declares war on Russia. (See story below on what some Germans did with Luxembourg on the 1st)
August 2, Russia declares War on Germany, Russian patrols advance into German territory, Germany occupies Luxembourg, German ultimatum to Belgian Government at 8 PM.
So the way I see this ATL WWI going on, Germans still advance into Luxembourg,
--------------
Luxembourg's history: The Accidental Invasion: Luxembourg’s little-known role in the outbreak of World War I
today.rtl.lu
It’s a tale you might not have heard before. Germany’s first engagement of the Great War came not in France or Russia, but in the small town of Troisvierges in northern Luxembourg.
The invasion did not quite go to plan, however. Within half an hour of their arrival, the German troops had withdrawn back over the border after destroying a telegraph and some 150 metres of railroad. What happened?
On August 1st, 1914, German troops were primed to attack, but as the Kaiser attempted to secure Britain’s neutrality in the upcoming conflict, the order to advance was delayed for a few hours.
Unfortunately, it appears that no one had told the soldiers of the German 69th Infantry Regiment.
At 7pm in the evening of August 1st, five vehicles carrying a total of 16 German troops arrived at the train station of Troisvierges in the very north of Luxembourg.
They immediately entered the station’s telegraph office and ordered the operator to destroy the telegraph, before proceeding to tear up about 150 metres of railroad track.
Incidentally, this was a rather counter-productive act given the centrality of railways to the Schlieffen Plan, and to this day it remains unknown why they decided to damage the track.
________________
I come to believe that it was done to prevent the French from gaining use of that RR line in case of an early French attack
Germans hold on the Belgian Frontier, probably sending out the demand that they remain neutral and do not allow French troops on their territory on the 2nd.
But on the 3rd of August, the French had crossed over the frontier in the far South
Yes, even Plan XVII was set to deal with an expected German thrust along the Meuse, or in the South from A-L
VII Corps, commanded by General Bonneau, was one of five Corps that comprised the French First Army, notified Joffre that there were German Forces present, and requested to delay for all Mobilization to finish, but Joffre ordered him to advance in southern Alsace on the 7th and take Mulhouse, and did so on the 8th of August
OTL
July 29, Russians General Mobilization order signed by the Tsar, they did not have a usable partial plan for Mobilization since 1904, but Partial Mobilization Orders were Telegraphed out to Moscow, Kazan, Kiev and Odessa, plus Fleet in Black Sea. More telegrams between Tsar and Kaiser, with German warnings.
July 30, Moltke presses for general mobilization. French Army withdraws 6 miles along entire border with Belgium, Luxembourg, and Germany. Evening of July 30, Reacting to the Austrian Navy bombarding Belgrade, Russia posts General mobilization orders for its troops and Fleet to begin on July 31
July 31, Germany demands that Russia stop Mobilization within 24 hours and declares martial law, and closes Border with France and Belgium. Belgium orders General Mobilization, as does A-H with ordering General Mobilization for men up to 50 years old. Russian Reserves are called up.
August 1, UK orders the Fleet to mobilize. France begin full mobilization to begin August 2nd, with French Order posted at 3:40pm on the 1st.
Germany order Full Mobilization at 5PM, declares war on Russia. (See story below on what some Germans did with Luxembourg on the 1st)
August 2, Russia declares War on Germany, Russian patrols advance into German territory, Germany occupies Luxembourg, German ultimatum to Belgian Government at 8 PM.
So the way I see this ATL WWI going on, Germans still advance into Luxembourg,
--------------
Luxembourg's history: The Accidental Invasion: Luxembourg’s little-known role in the outbreak of World War I
today.rtl.lu
It’s a tale you might not have heard before. Germany’s first engagement of the Great War came not in France or Russia, but in the small town of Troisvierges in northern Luxembourg.
The invasion did not quite go to plan, however. Within half an hour of their arrival, the German troops had withdrawn back over the border after destroying a telegraph and some 150 metres of railroad. What happened?
On August 1st, 1914, German troops were primed to attack, but as the Kaiser attempted to secure Britain’s neutrality in the upcoming conflict, the order to advance was delayed for a few hours.
Unfortunately, it appears that no one had told the soldiers of the German 69th Infantry Regiment.
At 7pm in the evening of August 1st, five vehicles carrying a total of 16 German troops arrived at the train station of Troisvierges in the very north of Luxembourg.
They immediately entered the station’s telegraph office and ordered the operator to destroy the telegraph, before proceeding to tear up about 150 metres of railroad track.
Incidentally, this was a rather counter-productive act given the centrality of railways to the Schlieffen Plan, and to this day it remains unknown why they decided to damage the track.
________________
I come to believe that it was done to prevent the French from gaining use of that RR line in case of an early French attack
Germans hold on the Belgian Frontier, probably sending out the demand that they remain neutral and do not allow French troops on their territory on the 2nd.
But on the 3rd of August, the French had crossed over the frontier in the far South
Luxembourg became unimportant because the Germans resolved to invade Belgium, which was the specific casus belli required by the British cabinet on August 2.
marathag
Banned
So what would they had done if the French moved into Luxemburg instead of the Germans?