Alternate American Civil War Scenarios

On the subject of different wins, there are plenty to choose from the Overland-Petersburg Campaign:
  1. Buford as Army of the Potomac’s Cavalry Corps commander: With Buford (a far superior cavalryman to the likes of Sheridan) in command of Grant’s cavalry, Grant stands a better chance of winning the Race to Spotsylvania Court House. Winning the race means that the high ground that served the Confederates so well in repulsing Warren’s V Corps is in Union hands and Grant’s odds of inflicting heavy damage onto Lee’s army increases drastically.
  2. IX Corps strikes hard: On May 10, the IX Corps had the opportunity to crack open the back door of Lee’s defensive line. Lee had seriously stripped his right to reinforce his left and Burnside, just as he had at Antietam, dropped the ball when there was an opportunity to achieve a decisive victory over Lee.
  3. Hancock strikes Petersburg: After crossing the James River Baldy Smith had allowed himself to be bluffed by Beauregard and the formidable appearance of the Petersburg entrenchments into not pressing his advantage, as the city was next to defenseless in terms of troops to man the entrenchments. Hancock took command as the senior officer when he arrived, and could have renewed the attack and won the war in Virginia for the Union right then and there.
 
My read on Burnside is that he got promoted above his ability. He was effective in North Carolina, but the AotP was an entirely different beast. Given his performance at Fredericksburg and the Mud March (more so the latter) I doubt he would be a substantial improvement on lil mac

It would be hard not to be a substantial improvement on George McClellan.

Burnside was unlucky, weak on logistics, and lost all flexibility when things went wrong, but he was a better general than McClellan.

* Burnside realized the Pinkerton estimates of Confederate troop numbers were wildly inflated and that he actually outnumbered Lee. That makes him braver and smarter than McClellan.
* Burnside was better at maneuver and faster than McClellan. Burnside got to Fredericksburg a couple days before Lee knew he was moving. Burnside squandered that lead, but McClellan couldn’t steal a march on Lee even with a copy of the man’s own marching orders.
* Burnside provided better leadership. He performed poorly at Fredericksburg, but at least he had a plan that his subordinates understood. If McClellan had a plan at Antietam, he never communicated it to his subordinates. At Seven Days, McClellan had no plan at all, nor did he communicate with his subordinates. His corps commanders were left to sort things out with no leadership from McClellan.
* Burnside was more decisive. He made the wrong decision by waiting for the bridging equipment instead of crossing the ford at Fredericksburg; once he was across the river, Burnside made the wrong decision on where to attack; but at least Burnside didn't dither. McClellan wasted a day after finding the Lost Orders and another day-and-a-half once he got to Antietam.
* Burnside was better at troop dispositions. At Antietam, McClellan placed the bulk of his cavalry in the center where they could not be used for covering Union flanks, scouting Confederate positions, or flanking the enemy, plus this made it harder to coordinate Union infantry.
* Burnside was willing to listen to others, for example the idea of laying explosives under the Confederate lines. McClellan was too convinced of his own genius to listen to anyone, let alone the Secretary of War or the Commander in Chief.
* Burnside never undermined anyone to advance his career. McClellan backstabbed Scott, removing a far better general, then ignored direct orders to support Pope, contributing heavily to the latter's defeat.
* McClellan tried to lecture Lincoln on policy, and act of gross insubordination. Burnside was smart enough know his position in the chain of command.
* Burnside took responsibility for his errors at Fredericksburg and had to be dissuaded from charging to the front to become another of the Union bodies lying in front of the Confederate lines. McClellan never acknowledged any of his mistakes and tried to blame his failures on everyone but himself.
* Burnside was smart enough to know he couldn't handle as big of an army as the Army of the Potomac. McClellan, who clearly couldn't handle it either, wanted to abandon the Anaconda Plan, strip every other front of men and march on Richmond with 270,000 men.
* Burnside's record in independent command with smaller armies was good. Early in the war, in cooperation with the Union Navy, Burnside shut down 90% of the shipping in North Carolina. Late in the war, Burnside beat Longstreet, one of the Confederacy's best.
 
What is interesting about the American Civil war was that it needed a '"General of the Armies". The Confederates states had the "General in Chief of the Armies of the Confederate States". Any President who had any common sense should recognise that the front between the union and confederate states is just enormous. Lincoln instead of creating this post created an overall union military strategy and expanded his powers as Commander-in-Chief, which says a lot about his genius qualities. In comparison, Davis was worried about electing a person to such a position because a general could "command an army or armies without the will of the President." However, Davis did not have Lincoln's Command-in-Chief qualities and wouldn't recognise it. If Lee had been given the position earlier it would have helped him win the war. Despite this on January 31, 1865, the 2nd Confederate States Congress provided “for the appointment of a General in Chief of the Armies of the Confederate States" to Robert E. Lee.

Take that Davis.
 
What is interesting about the American Civil war was that it needed a '"General of the Armies". The Confederates states had the "General in Chief of the Armies of the Confederate States". Any President who had any common sense should recognise that the front between the union and confederate states is just enormous. Lincoln instead of creating this post created an overall union military strategy and expanded his powers as Commander-in-Chief, which says a lot about his genius qualities. In comparison, Davis was worried about electing a person to such a position because a general could "command an army or armies without the will of the President." However, Davis did not have Lincoln's Command-in-Chief qualities and wouldn't recognise it. If Lee had been given the position earlier it would have helped him win the war. Despite this on January 31, 1865, the 2nd Confederate States Congress provided “for the appointment of a General in Chief of the Armies of the Confederate States" to Robert E. Lee.

Take that Davis.

Lincoln started with a '"General of the Armies", Winfield Scott, but in what was probably Lincoln's greatest mistake, he was persuaded to replace Scott with McClellan, who was both insubordinate an ineffective. Replacing McClellan with Halleck seemed like a good idea at the time, but Halleck was poor at strategy and unwilling to command. McClellan's and Halleck's failing forced Lincoln into acting as his own '"General of the Armies" until he was able to find a general both willing and able to do the job.

If Lee had been made "General in Chief of the Armies of the Confederate States" sooner, he certainly would have provided better leadership than Davis. He would have provided better strategy as well, since Davis seemed to have no strategy. OTOH, Lee never seemde to think on the strategic level, only the theatre level. Lee also strongly favored taking the offensive, going into Union territory, and fighting major battles; something that he repeatedly failed at. Lee also tended to write vague and sometimes self-contradictory orders, which could undermine any strategy he did attempt. If Lee did attempt his theatre level operations on a strategic level, he might have bled the Confederacy dry of troops sooner than in OTL, leading to an earlier Union victory.
 
Lincoln started with a '"General of the Armies", Winfield Scott, but in what was probably Lincoln's greatest mistake, he was persuaded to replace Scott with McClellan, who was both insubordinate an ineffective. Replacing McClellan with Halleck seemed like a good idea at the time, but Halleck was poor at strategy and unwilling to command. McClellan's and Halleck's failing forced Lincoln into acting as his own '"General of the Armies" until he was able to find a general both willing and able to do the job.

If Lee had been made "General in Chief of the Armies of the Confederate States" sooner, he certainly would have provided better leadership than Davis. He would have provided better strategy as well, since Davis seemed to have no strategy. OTOH, Lee never seemde to think on the strategic level, only the theatre level. Lee also strongly favored taking the offensive, going into Union territory, and fighting major battles; something that he repeatedly failed at. Lee also tended to write vague and sometimes self-contradictory orders, which could undermine any strategy he did attempt. If Lee did attempt his theatre level operations on a strategic level, he might have bled the Confederacy dry of troops sooner than in OTL, leading to an earlier Union victory.

That gives a much more wider perspective. In that case I’d say the balance was good but it was the relationship between Davis and Lee. Which puts more emphasis on having a different CSA President candidate.

I did not know the commanding general of the United States Army was General of Armies. That was bad advice put to Lincoln.

Thank you. I know the rough edges of the civil war but not in depth.
 
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