In other words, how much of what went wrong for the Russians can be blamed on the material and how much on the personnel- including of course Rozhestvensky himself?
I could certainly see Togo playing it very differently if confronted by the Gangut and Imperatritsiya Mariya classes, much more mine and torpedo work, and the Izmails with nine knots in hand would have been a real potential game changer- but given what actually happened, would material have been enough?
The case that he was wrong is that, like Medina Sidonia, he was so deeply affected by the defeat that he lost all sense of boldness and optimism, becoming a morally defeated man, no longer capable of seeing what could have been possible. Unfortunately that also seems to have been the state he and most of his fleet were in on the morning of 27 May 1905.
The long journey had crushed them, by most accounts, the fact that they were sent off with untrialled new and broken down old ships with precious little in between, conscript crews some of whom had already picked up revolutionary ideals, no support, no friends en route, one improvisation after another, inadequate training-
in similar circumstances, Pierre de Villenueve took a sailing fleet to the other side of the Atlantic and back- expecting the experience to train and toughen his men, and come back better and more battleworthy for some sea time; it didn't work then, either. Far from it, the raw crews were overwhelmed by their problems and actually got worse.
How would the Voyage of the Damned have been improved by having dreadnoughts? Chances are the old junkers would have been sent along anyway, magnifying the supply problems for no gain in speed- see; Third Pacific Squadron- and the dreadnoughts would have been effectively on their shakedown cruise. Around the world with raw crews.
It was nigh unto a miracle that they made it at all; which was part of the problem, Rozhestvensky and the handful of real professionals in the fleet were exhausted getting that far and had no more to give when it came to the fight, and the vast majority of deadweight that made up the wardrooms of the Tsar's navy froze in the headlights.
It wasn't that bad a mismatch on paper anyway; what the Russian navy needed were friends on the world stage, make the voyage easier, and a much more professional and energetic officer and noncommissioned officer corps.