Alt Midway - Japanese victory

Regarding Yorktown's situation, have read that by 06.30 they have launched a CAP of 6 F4F and were recovering the 10 scout SBDs, and immediately after that they started respotting for strike (17 SBD, 12 TBD). So in theory they could have launched not long after TF16 started their launch (depending how long it took to respot) However, the staff considered the IJN position to be well out of range for TBDs and F4Fs at 200 miles, so in OTL Fletcher waited until they got in range. Also in OTL, Yorktown's radio team initially failed to pick Amari's contact reports, whether in this ATL they will miss Chikuma 1's contact report too is matter of speculation, so their reaction might be delayed until positive radar and visual contact with that scout.

If Yorktown is going to launch anything after they realized they were spotted, probably it will be just the VB-5 SBDs alone, but possibly both VS-5 and VB-5, keeping VT-3 and all the fighters still on board. But for the purpose of this ATL (a japanese victory), like i said earlier one can perhaps have Fletcher risk waiting until it's too late.

As to the TF16 launch, indeed their formation would likely be even more disjointed if they realize they have been spotted even before starting their launch, probably the SBDs will depart immediately without waiting the TBDs, all this radically affecting the sequence of US attacks and even whether VS/VB-6, VT-6 and VT-8 will find Kido Butai in the first place. So let's say only Kaga is hit and set aflame by SBDs.

As to the japanese attacks, perhaps it's an unlikely scenario but as Nagumo knew that Midway inbound strikes are on their way towards KB, as soon as he has the TF17 contact report (just one carrier), he might opt for a quick launch of half his strike force which could be quickly spotted and take off before 07.00, namely 9 each D3A from Hiryu and Soryu, 9 B5N from Akagi and say 15 from Kaga with perhaps 9 Zeros. 18 D3A and 24 B5N would be enough to kill Yorktown. As he deals with the Midway strikes, and continues to receive more contact reports of TF16, he could launch the balance of 16 D3A and 19 B5N with another 6 or 9 A6Ms between 08.30 and 09.00 before recovering Tomonaga's men. This strike could kill one of TF16 carriers (say Hornet). So two down, one to go. But they are piecemeal attacks and likely to suffer prohibitive losses against the swarms of F4Fs on CAP. However, once any potential US attacks have been weathered out, surviving KB carriers (let us say Akagi, Hiryu and Soryu) would then launch Tomonaga's men around 11.00-11.30, namely 17 D3A from Akagi and 18 B5N from Hiryu and Soryu plus some Zeros to kill Enterprise.
 
The Yorktown was ready to launch at the same time, historically waited until 0840 to launch and launched more quickly. Which means it was ready to launch and could launch as soon as the enemy is spotted on radar (historically at 32 miles, but a bigger formation would have been spotted earlier, probably at 50 miles). That gives the Yorktown at minimum at least 10 minutes to launch every aircraft it can.

There should be enough time, yes.


More likely would be to focus on Task Force 16, with the objective of coming back for Task Force 17 (which will also turn southeast to launch as soon as the enemy is spotted on radar).

The tendency would be to go after the closest undamaged carrier.

It also should be noted, that according to this log, the Japanese scout plane was spotted by American forces when it spotted them So if spotted earlier, the US will react accordingly

http://www.cv6.org/ship/logs/action19420604-133.htm

The source states,

"1015 - Type 97 enemy twin-float seaplane sighted bearing 180° T., distance 72,000 yards."

Tone 4 dispatched its first sighting report at 0728. It was spotted by TF-16 at 0815, about 45 minutes later.

An earlier inbound attack means that fighters sent to escort the American strike are likely diverted

Doubtful. US squadrons were heading out to the southwest, towards the expected point of contact. Japanese planes travelling towards the US carriers probably pass by to the north.
 
There should be enough time, yes.




The tendency would be to go after the closest undamaged carrier.



http://www.cv6.org/ship/logs/action19420604-133.htm

The source states,

"1015 - Type 97 enemy twin-float seaplane sighted bearing 180° T., distance 72,000 yards."

Tone 4 dispatched its first sighting report at 0728. It was spotted by TF-16 at 0815, about 45 minutes later.



Doubtful. US squadrons were heading out to the southwest, towards the expected point of contact. Japanese planes travelling towards the US carriers probably pass by to the north.

hence Yorktown got hit first in OTL

the map I looked at was a bit vague on flight paths, so I will take your word on that (it was too big a scale)
 

Saphroneth

Banned
So Saphroneth, you want to take out Yorktown before it launches any of it's strike? Imo it's a bit difficult as by the time your ATL attack arrives, Yorktown would have the deck spotted with the strike ready for instant launch, so as soon as they detect the IJN strike on radar, they would start launching.
I'm basing my PoD explicitly on when, according to Shattered Sword, the Japanese would need to launch in order to catch Yorktown before her strike was launched. I agree they'd launch ASAP on detection, but AFAICT in this case it's before the actual warming-up is completed.
This is the thing about my ATL here - it's based on nothing more nor less than the "how things could have gone well" part of Shattered Sword - thus I assume, uh, things go well. (Given the damage a single-carrier strike did, I assume a four-carrier strike can sink two USN CVs.)
 
There are indeed enough scenarios in which the IJN could realistically and reasonably win at Midway (one of my "favourite" ATL subjects), it's a matter of choice i guess. Keeping to your scenario (taking Yorktown out before it launches), i'm still a bit doubtful about Nagumo being able to launch his full reserve strike between contact report at 06.18 and ATL launch at 07.03, in OTL there was at least initially a 10-15 minutes delay before Nagumo received Amari's contact report (07.28 sent, Nagumo had it at 07.40 or 07.45). Plus, would the search plane identify a carrier from the first go? Perhaps it would send a contact report of TF17 at 06.18 for enemy ships distance course speed such and such, then some minutes later he could amplify (one carrier 2 cruisers and x destroyers or whatever). So the split quick launch i suggested earlier should be able to take-off before 07.00 (18 D3A, 24 B5N and some 6-9 Zeros) and be enough to kill Yorktown, while the second wave (16 D3A and 19 B5N and another 6-9 Zeros) could be spotted and launched after the TBF/B-26 attack, before 08.00 (not between 08.30 and 09.00 as i said earlier, i was mistaken) when the second series of attack from Midway arrive. However, this would reduce the number of Zeros available to oppose these Midway attacks, so perhaps some more Midway planes would survive, on another hand Tomonaga's returning Zeros and even some D3As would give a hand with the CAP.

I was contending earlier that such piecemeal attacks might incur prohibitive losses, however thinking more closely it's possible, given the scarcity of Zeros, that it might actually help REDUCE japanese losses, at least for the second strike because if this second wave shown up one hour later above TF16, then many of the CAP fighters would have been low on fuel, low on ammo and some landed back on TF16 carriers. Someone said that a hypothetical attack at 08.30 would be opposed initially by 12 TF17 and 16 TF16 fighters already on CAP. There would be another 13 F4F on Yorktown and another 18 F4F on TF16, some or many of these would launch too (although not clear if Yorktown would have time to do so as Thach's escorts were parked, or to be spotted after VB-3 and VT-3 left the deck), but they would be low and would take a while to reach intercept position. So this could end up like the OTL noon attack, Yorktwon would be defended by perhaps 20 F4Fs from TF16 and 17 (but with many more opposing planes to deal with), while the rest from TF16 would defend that force, but most would not enter combat. Meanhwile as the second wave arrives, many of the TF16 and TF17 fighters, mainly those that were on CAP at first would have landed or would have been about to, so the available CAP would be only about 16-18 (mainly those that scrambled at 08.30 but have not had time to attack the first wave). Also, the TF16 VF pilots might not be as good as those of VF-3, so this might count.

But anyway, i'm probably trying to predict far too minute (and unpredictable) details in an ATL.

On another subject, something i have been thinking myself in recent time, and have seen several stated here as well. If the japanese do much better in 1943, and the americans would have a much harder time to push starting in 1943, would advance slower and would be behind the OTL advancing schedule by a good half year or so, while the japanese military would remain stronger for longer, then this would potentially mean a huge gain for Japan as a whole, namely much fewer civilian casualties and destruction of towns and cities. If by summer 1945 the B-29 attacks just started in force, while they would still cause terrible civillian casualties, by the time the first atomic bombs fell, and USSR entered the war, a surrender in autumn might mean perhaps only half the civillian casualties, and only half the cities destroyed compared to OTL. So for this reason only, it is a pitty that the IJN failed to wipe out the US carrier fleet in 1942 when they certainly had the means and the ability to do so.
 
i'm still a bit doubtful about Nagumo being able to launch his full reserve strike between contact report at 06.18 and ATL launch at 07.03,

Why would Nagumo not get his reserve strike assembled and departed? Just because some Midway strike aircraft show up?

in OTL there was at least initially a 10-15 minutes delay before Nagumo received Amari's contact report (07.28 sent, Nagumo had it at 07.40 or 07.45). Plus, would the search plane identify a carrier from the first go?

AFAIK, that day the only Japanese scout aircraft that was deficient in reports was Tone 4. Different scout, almost certainly better performance.

I was contending earlier that such piecemeal attacks might incur prohibitive losses,

A piecemeal attack seems unlikely. Under Kusaka's doctrine it would be the full reserve wave. It if took 15 minutes or 30 minutes to assemble due to enemy attacks delaying the launch of this carrier or that, then so be it. Each carrier would launch when it could and these planes would wait in orbit for the others, and once all amassed, they'd depart towards the enemy, (Shattered Sword's theory that three carriers would sail around doing nothing with strikes ready to launch just because the fourth was then currently under attack is unconvincing).
 
Hi Glenn,

Thanks for your most valuable input.

Keeping to this scenario, namely a launch at 07.00, i'm trying to figure out a realistic scenario which will reasonably cause the KB strikes the least amount of losses. The main problem is that there wouldn't be many Zeros to escort the strikes, or at least the first one at 07.00, the 36-43 B5N and 34 D3A probably will be escorted by no more than 12 Zeros, and even some of these it's possible might participate in the CAP against the B-26/TBF attack. If this strike will be split (and therefore thinned out) to attack both TF17 and TF16 then it could face no less than up to 50 F4Fs (up to 20 from Yorktown and 30 or so from TF16), stacked at various altitudes. The Zeros would be completely overwhelmed if the american CAP is well deployed, and the attack planes will be shot down in droves.

So one idea is to have this 07.00 strike attack just the Yorktown, the Zeros might just about fend the Yorktown F4Fs for long enough, TF16 would understandably initially keep most of it's CAP overhead, though some might be sent to help Yorktown, but will take a while to get there. Of course, it might be overkill against TF17, Yorktown will probably be clobbered much like Shoho was a month ago, and possibly some cruisers will be hit too. But this strike might suffer only relatively moderate losses, say about 20 strike planes to all causes including some Zeros.
TF16 would be unmolested but for the time being they are no (additional) danger as they have nothing left on board except the CAP after having launched their big strikes.

Now, my question is, do you think there is any reasonable way for Nagumo to recover Tomonaga's men (starting about 08.30), rearm the planes and launch them BEFORE VS/VB-6 arrives (even in the face of TBD attacks), so before 10.00? There would be 17 each D3As on Akagi and Kaga, 10 B5N on Soryu and 8 on Hiryu, and if Kaga would not launch her third chutai of B5Ns at 07.00, another 8 or 9 B5N from it, totaling then 34 D3As and 26-27 B5Ns. Escort would be somewhat easier to provide as the Midway Zeros would be back, so again 12, or in best case scenario maybe 18 Zeros could escort this strike against TF16 (but again, some of these might be pressed against the TBDs), facing upwards of 40 F4Fs, but only part will be at altitude as a part would just have been launched, or possibly not manage to launch all the remaining fighters in time because by this time (after 11.00) some of the TF16 planes have begun to return and they would be in the process of recovery. This japanese attack would suffer more losses compared to the first one (say half, 30 or more planes), but they only have 2 CVs to focus on, all things being equal crippling or at least seriously damaging both.

Back at KB, by 10.00 the first wave launched at 07.00 would probably just returned and would be about to land, so there would be no armed and fueled planes on the japanese CVs at all, though with all those planes circling around, the TBD attacks just fended off and the SBDs now arriving overhead, again will be chaos and mayhem. But with no Yorktown strikes, many of the CAP Zeros could go after the SBDs before their attack, not stop them true, but at least hampering them much more than they were in OTL. Best case scenario only Kaga is hit badly, but with no armed and fueled planes on deck she easily survives to fight another day. Then it's a matter of recovering the remaining first strike on the 3 remaining CV, rearm and refuel them and send them against TF16 again, or alternatively wait for Tomonaga's surviving men too to return, reorganize the airgroups, rearm and refuel them too and send them all out on a last afternoon attack against TF16 and mop any still floating american CVs, as they wouldn't go far if damaged, and CAP would be much reduced or even absent.

So in this very best case scenario, KB loses "only" about 80 planes (and many aircrew, but perhaps not much more than OTL Midway) and only Kaga is seriously damaged, requiring several months in the shipyard. What happens subsequenly (whether they still try to invade or not Midway) is another thing. Regardless, by the summer there would be just 2 american CVs left versus 8 (!) japanese (with two more by autumn, namley repaired Kaga and Hiyo), including five fleet carriers.
 
Keeping to this scenario, namely a launch at 07.00, i'm trying to figure out a realistic scenario which will reasonably cause the KB strikes the least amount of losses. The main problem is that there wouldn't be many Zeros to escort the strikes, or at least the first one at 07.00, the 36-43 B5N and 34 D3A probably will be escorted by no more than 12 Zeros, and even some of these it's possible might participate in the CAP against the B-26/TBF attack. If this strike will be split (and therefore thinned out) to attack both TF17 and TF16 then it could face no less than up to 50 F4Fs (up to 20 from Yorktown and 30 or so from TF16), stacked at various altitudes. The Zeros would be completely overwhelmed if the american CAP is well deployed, and the attack planes will be shot down in droves.

I posted a little formula on the previous page that might help - lethality per fighter = .2* (#Zeros/# Wildcats)^-.661

So, if 12 Zeros accompany, then lethality is .51 per Wildcat, or about 26 Japanese planes shot down, (maybe 22 bombers and 4 fighters). If 18 Zeros accompany, then the number of US kills drops to around 20. So, for your AH, you might write it something like that Nagumo holds 12 fighters back for the counterattack even as the Midway torpedo bombers are inbound, then adds on 6 of the 6th Ku to escort as well to boost the escort to 18. The justification for that is that Kaga may have intended to use 3 of its nine 6th Ku planes for the grand strike escort, because it had launched all its regular squadron fighters by around 10. Hiryu held back six fighters for its counterattack even while it was under attack and the other three carriers were bombed.

Now, my question is, do you think there is any reasonable way for Nagumo to recover Tomonaga's men (starting about 08.30), rearm the planes and launch them BEFORE VS/VB-6 arrives (even in the face of TBD attacks), so before 10.00?

Armed with torpedoes? I'd say no. Armed with bombs and before 1030am? Maybe.

There would be 17 each D3As on Akagi and Kaga, 10 B5N on Soryu and 8 on Hiryu, and if Kaga would not launch her third chutai of B5Ns at 07.00, another 8 or 9 B5N from it, totaling then 34 D3As and 26-27 B5Ns. Escort would be somewhat easier to provide as the Midway Zeros would be back, so again 12, or in best case scenario maybe 18 Zeros could escort this strike against TF16 (but again, some of these might be pressed against the TBDs), facing upwards of 40 F4Fs, but only part will be at altitude as a part would just have been launched, or possibly not manage to launch all the remaining fighters in time because by this time (after 11.00) some of the TF16 planes have begun to return and they would be in the process of recovery. This japanese attack would suffer more losses compared to the first one (say half, 30 or more planes), but they only have 2 CVs to focus on, all things being equal crippling or at least seriously damaging both.

Not a bad scenario, provided the 2nd division Kates are bombed armed. That way they don't have to change the launchers. In terms of fighters, you can probably justify about 12 back from Midway, or tapped from 6th Ku. In terms of the defense, 10 Japanese fighters shot down 5 F4F's, for a lethality of .5. So, if 18 accompany the first wave, call it 9 F4F's shot down. So 40 defenders is probably too many. Maybe 30?

Back at KB, by 10.00 the first wave launched at 07.00 would probably just returned and would be about to land, so there would be no armed and fueled planes on the japanese CVs at all, though with all those planes circling around, the TBD attacks just fended off and the SBDs now arriving overhead, again will be chaos and mayhem. But with no Yorktown strikes, many of the CAP Zeros could go after the SBDs before their attack, not stop them true, but at least hampering them much more than they were in OTL. Best case scenario only Kaga is hit badly, but with no armed and fueled planes on deck she easily survives to fight another day. Then it's a matter of recovering the remaining first strike on the 3 remaining CV, rearm and refuel them and send them against TF16 again, or alternatively wait for Tomonaga's surviving men too to return, reorganize the airgroups, rearm and refuel them too and send them all out on a last afternoon attack against TF16 and mop any still floating american CVs, as they wouldn't go far if damaged, and CAP would be much reduced or even absent.

I think if just Enterprise group, to me you can write it that two Japanese decks are taken out. McClusky had all four enemy carriers in sight, so the two I'd hit would be the big ones, Akagi, and Kaga. You're first wave flew off as 18 Zeros, 36 dive bombers*, 36 torpedo bombers (18 only from Kaga). It comes back something like 9 Zeroes serviceable, 3 shot up, 18 dive bombers serviceable, maybe 12 shot up, 14 torpedo bombers serviceable, another 10 shot up. If you go with the afternoon wave as about 12 Zeros, 18 dive bombers and 14 torpedo bombers, probably ballpark.
(* - Shattered Sword says 34 dive bombers in 2nd Division with two "in reserve" on Kaga. But Kaga at Pearl Harbor carried 75 aircraft while at Midway she carried 72 of her own plus the two Vals from Soryu. This is less than 75, so the two Soryu Vals on Kaga should be operational).

So in this very best case scenario, KB loses "only" about 80 planes (and many aircrew, but perhaps not much more than OTL Midway) and only Kaga is seriously damaged, requiring several months in the shipyard.

I make it about 20 shot down in the first wave, 12 in the second, call it another 8 to anti-aircraft then maybe 12 ditched at the fleet for around 52.

What happens subsequenly (whether they still try to invade or not Midway) is another thing. Regardless, by the summer there would be just 2 american CVs left versus 8 (!) japanese (with two more by autumn, namley repaired Kaga and Hiyo), including five fleet carriers.

The US might decline carrier battles and rely more on land based airpower, using carrier wings from land bases as necessary.
 
Hi Glenn,

Again, many thanks for your detailed input.

About those Zeros, have looked again at the logs in PTSS, as you know they claim that the 6 Ku pilots were carrier capable and thus all could fly CAP, but apart from the 3 Zeros of 6 Ku from Akagi used on CAP in the morning, there is no other mention nor evidence of any more 6 Ku sorties. I have mistakenly believed that i found evidence Kaga used some 6 Ku fighters too (there is mention in the text of 4 Zeros landing then 7 being spotted for launch after 08.00, which i thought meant at least two 6 Ku Zeros were used) but looking at the logs, i was wrong, the text was a bit vague in that it was just that recently landed Zeros were quickly services in about 15 minutes and the same pilots took of again.

As to the OTL situation after 10.00, apart from Hiryu having the 6 Zeros still onboard which later escorted Kobayashi, Soryu had apparently no less that 9 Zeros aboard when bombed. So it appears Cardiv2 were keeping those Zeros back for the grand scale attack (so maybe 12 or 15 were to be used), and Cardiv1 were using almost all theirs for CAP, Kaga had just 2 on board, and Akagi was just about to launch the first Zero of a shotai or more from her remaining 7 still on board (these figures not including the 6 Ku ones).
 
Forgot one thing yesterday. Shattered Sword says that Kido Butai never did mixed deck strikes or combined two deckloads. But it did at Darwin, combining two deck loads from each carrier in a running rendezvous, sort of like what Yorktown did at Midway. With Yamaguchi, apparently the reason why the torpedo bombers did not go in the first wave is because they were not yet ready. That is why I think there was zero chance of getting the Midway torpedo bombers aloft around 10am - they were not ready by even 1030am.

Hi Glenn, About those Zeros, have looked again at the logs in PTSS, as you know they claim that the 6 Ku pilots were carrier capable and thus all could fly CAP, but apart from the 3 Zeros of 6 Ku from Akagi used on CAP in the morning,

References for 6th Ku status are Shattered Sword pg. 133, 543 footnote 45. Miracle at Midway, pg. 373. SS concluded 6th Ku had carrier qualified pilots, many of which appear to have gone to the Aleutians. But how many of the 21 pilots sent to Midway? This is less certain. Note that this identifies sloppy operational planning in 1st Air Fleet and Combined Fleet - under the mission orders Genda and Kusaka should have been able to identify a lack of fighters as a key weakness, and incorporating 6th Ku's 21 planes into KB's operational fighter units would have gone a long way to rectifying this difficulty. .

there is no other mention nor evidence of any more 6 Ku sorties.

SS concluded that Kaga was about to spot, or had just barely started, when bombed after 1020. All Kaga's 18 squadron fighters were at that time aloft (or already shot down) and it was earmarked to send 3 fighters as escort. These were probably to be from Kaga's nine embarked 6th Ku fighter planes. In terms of evidence of other 6th Ku flights, there is one fighter pilot (KIA) of the 12 Zeros used in the Hiryu counterattacks (1st I think) who does not appear in any of the four carriers' fighter squadron rosters. He might have been 6th Ku.

As to the OTL situation after 10.00, apart from Hiryu having the 6 Zeros still onboard which later escorted Kobayashi, Soryu had apparently no less that 9 Zeros aboard when bombed.

I'd lean towards Soryu's nine Zeros probably being from incomplete records, and there being fewer aboard.

So it appears Cardiv2 were keeping those Zeros back for the grand scale attack (so maybe 12 or 15 were to be used), and Cardiv1 were using almost all theirs for CAP, Kaga had just 2 on board, and Akagi was just about to launch the first Zero of a shotai or more from her remaining 7 still on board (these figures not including the 6 Ku ones).

No, that's not my read. According to Kusaka just after the battle, each carrier was to contribute 3 fighters from the Midway strike escort to 12 for the grand strike escort. If you look at the Hiryu squadron records, the three pilots for the strike escort pop right out - they're the ones that flew to Midway and were still aboard Hiryu. The second group of 3 fighters was an 'add on' to boost escort strength from fighters not originally assigned the mission. Soryu and Kaga we covered already. Those aboard Akagi is interesting. Of the nine Akagi fighter pilots assigned to CAP duty during the morning, Tanaka Katsumi, Ohara Hiroshi and Iwashiro Yoshio recovered by 1010 and their fighters would probably be in the hanger at 1024 being rearmed. Takasuga Mitsuyoshi landed at 0951 and his Zero could have been on the flight deck at 1025. The other five morning CAP pilots were either aloft or dead. Of the nine Midway escorts, one had been killed. Six others, (Shirane Ayao, Kikuchi Tetsuo, Kimura Koreo, Omori Shigetaka, Ishii Seiji and Ishida Masashi) reinforced the combat air patrol between 0932 and 0945, leaving two aboard. (I assume Koreo is incorrectly named “Kumura Tadao” for his 0932-0951 flight in Shattered Sword). Kimura Koreo recovered at 0951 such that at 1025 there were three Midway pilots aboard Akagi; Kimura Koreo, Mori Sakae and Kawada Yozo. Koreo was the last take off from Akagi at 1025.
 
Hi Glenn,

Thanks for another comprehensive reply, not much i can comment or add to what you say as you have more sources and a lot more attention to detail that i do! I have to recheck PTSS, but from memory, i believe the authors state that 6 Ku had 25 A-class (carrier capable), and 31 C-class (only able to take-off from a CV, not land) pilots. So even if assuming all Junyo 6 Ku pilots (12) were carrier capable, that leaves another 13 A-class possibly on Kido Butai. We know about Kaneko's shotai, so in theory another 10 pilots could have been A-class and able to participate in KB's CAP or escort operations, but this IF every single A-class 6 Ku pilot was on Junyo and Nagumo's KB.

On another note, since this topic is about Midway, sorry if i'm deviating a bit, but did you ever looked into the issue of A6M Zero radio CAP direction at Midway and have you ever read more detailed info on how actually KB was directing it's CAP? PTSS claims that basically they used smoke signals and blinkers because, among others, Zero radios were useless. However i'm not exactly sure about that as i'm rather suspicious on many claims PTSS makes (i cannot recall for instance seeing Zeros pictures or clips of A6M2s on carriers without the antenna mast, though i could be wrong), i have read a few posts relating to this issue (CAP radio direction) on J-aircraft.com, but haven't actually found a topic dealing with this exact subject yet. So if you know more about the subject, would much apreciate your thoughts.

Back to the subject of ATL Midway, thinking of how KB operated during C-sakusen Tricomalee attack (and also how Cardiv 2 operated off Wake), i was thinking perhaps Nagumo would have avoided the kanko rearming fiasco if, just like back in April and in light of the lessons then, he could have sent all the 79 kankos with 36 Zeros to attack Midway, keeping all the 70 kanbakus as the reserve strike. Since they weren't such a handful in regards to rearming, once Amari spotted the carriers perhaps he could have sent all 70 of them(!), along with some Zeros, possibly well before 09.00, such an attack being able to disable or seriously damage (if not sink outright) all american CVs if they find them, as usually the kanbakus are more survivable compared to the kankos and able to defend themselves, even in the face a combined 3 dozen or more F4Fs on CAP above TF16 and TF17.
Aftre Midway, they did changed their doctrine so that the kanbakus were sent first to disable opposing CVs, with the kankos following afterwards to finish them off. They used this tactic at Eastern Solomons, but reverted to the combined kanko/kanbaku simultaneous attacks at Santa Cruz.
 
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