Alt Midway - Japanese victory

[Saphroneth]

I've been reading Shattered Sword, and I think I've put together a fairly simple TL which shows a possible Japanese victory at Midway. It's very barebones, but I thought it would make sense to put it on here simply as a useful future resource.










0430: attack launched on Midway



0618: Chikuma #1 spots TF 17 to the southeast of its current position, transmits sighting report (two carriers).

0623: Spotting and arming begins of reserve strike of Kido Butai. CAP fighters launched as supplement.

0635: Chikuma #1 also spots TF 16.



0703: Reserve strike launched. Light on fighters due to need for CAP.

0712: Early day attacks begin. No more successful than OTL.





0740 onwards: Enterprise's air group departs.

0755: Hornet's air group departs



0805: Tomanaga's group arrives back, to be landed on as soon as the ongoing attacks conclude.



0835: Japanese attack arrives at TF 16 and TF 17. Enterprise, Yorktown hit by torpedoes and dive bombers – both sunk, no Yorktown planes get in the air (spotting operations interrupted by incoming attacks). Japanese strike aircraft take substantial casualties owing to sparseness of fighter cover.



0917: Tomanaga's group struck below. It is clear that another American carrier remains in the offing; CAP reinforced.



1005: McClusky's dive bombers attack from the south. With only one target from one axis, the CAP swarms all over it and cuts it down. No arming or fuelling operations are taking place, any bomb hits are non-critical and do not result in fire.



1020: Japanese strike on Enterprise, Yorktown is landed on and struck below.

1115: Japanese third strike launched against Hornet.




1235: Hornet sunk under a devastating barrage of attack aircraft.With her air group largely lost at sea, Hornet is defended by orphans from the other two carriers. They are unable to prevent her taking both bomb and torpedo hits, and she sinks.





Outcome: Some damage to Japanese carriers from McClusky attack, not as bad as OTL due to heavy fighter attacks and lack of Yorktown flight assistance. Enterprise, Yorktown, Hornet lost. Midway island not captured (invasion goes badly) but operational American carrier force reduced to Saratoga and Wasp until at least May 1943 (and Essex entering commission); Kido Butai reconstituted as six carriers by mid-July 1942.


It doesn't do anything about the massive Essex class coming down the pipe, but it certainly changes the tenor of the middle of the war.

 

[Bmao]

So, the Japanese have won at Midway? Maybe that extends Japan's momentum for a couple more months, but what then? Does it significantly change the strategic situation? I wouldn't think so, but I'd like to see how you think that its possible.

 

[RodentRevolution]

So, the Japanese have won at Midway? Maybe that extends Japan's momentum for a couple more months, but what then? Does it significantly change the strategic situation? I wouldn't think so, but I'd like to see how you think that its possible.

I think that is perhaps the point, not every POD in alt-history had to massively derail things but a single change rapidly snowballs on future events. An America that had a tougher time in the Pacific might have a different attitude to the need to stick with difficult wars for example.

 

[History Learner]

In a previous thread, it was noted that without the defeat at Midway, Japan was likely to do a 1942 version of the Ichigo Offensive. Given it will take sometime for the "Hump" to be established as well as the Allies being in no shape to reclaim the Burma road in a timely manner, it's very likely China is knocked out of the war sometime in 1943 or early 1944. So just as the Essex class starts to come online in order to allow major American offensives, large numbers of Japanese reinforcements can be deployed in the defense of her island conquests. In such a scenario, I could see the war lasting into 1947.

 

[Logan2879]

Okay all three Yorktown class are sunk leaving only the Saratoga and Wasp. Admiral King were order the Ranger and escorts carriers to the Pacific which will be around 4 to 8 escort carriers and provide air support to operation watchtower and other operation. Maybe a early british carrier if Ranger cannot be moved to the pacific.

 

[History Learner]

Okay all three Yorktown class are sunk leaving only the Saratoga and Wasp. Admiral King were order the Ranger and escorts carriers to the Pacific which will be around 4 to 8 escort carriers and provide air support to operation watchtower and other operation. Maybe a early british carrier if Ranger cannot be moved to the pacific.

I don't see Watchtower happening, not with the US Carrier fleet reduced to at most three carriers against no less than six Japanese. Too, fromwhat I understand, Ranger was in a rather poor shape for carrier combat and that was why it was placed in the Atlantic. Removing those escort carriers as well also probably butterflies Operation Torch, since a large portion of its aircover is now in the Pacific.

 

[Bobsalt]

If Japan wins at Midway, losing no CVs and the US loses all three of theirs, it pretty much turns out like this: http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm

Best case scenario for Japan - it extends the war by - maybe - a year.

 

[Saphroneth]

So, the Japanese have won at Midway? Maybe that extends Japan's momentum for a couple more months, but what then? Does it significantly change the strategic situation? I wouldn't think so, but I'd like to see how you think that its possible.

When I say it changes the tenor of the middle of the war, I mean the Japanese first team is still intact and that the USN has several more months until it can roll west. It's a disparity from OTL of six carriers in result terms and means that the Kido Butai has a chance of also sinking a few more US CVs before being sunk - so the mid war is different, though the Vinson Walsh Giant Pez Dispenser brings things back near OTL as time goes on.

ED: also, if Thatch and his boys go down, big if, it delays the Weave a bit.

 

[Rubicon]

The US shifts its vector of attack from multiple (Central pacific, south pacific, south west pacific) to a pure south west approach. Lots of planes and resources are poured into MacArthurs command who begin a systematic attack into New Britain and up the Northern New Guniea coast. This of course eases the logistical burden for the Japanese who can concentrate their forces in one area. But they are slowly ground down in a long-winded war of attrition. US forces land on the Phillippines in late -44/early -45. Formosa six months later. Then 2+ atomic bombs are dropped on Japanese cities and the USSR invades Manchuria.

Japanese losses: less then historical
US losses: greater then historical

Japanese surrender: Autumn 1945.

MacArthur is a warhero and runs for president against Eisenhower and wins the presidential election.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

0855 Hornet picks up its ball and goes home at max revs and is 100+ NMs further east by 1230 and subsequent efforts by the Japanese to find her fail

Honestly - no way she is sitting around for a 4 vs 1

Any AC she cannot carry are shifted to Midway

 

[Saphroneth]

0855 Hornet picks up its ball and goes home at max revs and is 100+ NMs further east by 1230 and subsequent efforts by the Japanese to find her fail

Honestly - no way she is sitting around for a 4 vs 1

Any AC she cannot carry are shifted to Midway

Pretty sure under those circumstances she doesn't have any aircraft left - she can't recover the remnants of the strikes that got chopped to bits, nor can any USN SAR take place.
The result of that move, while probably less bad than the alternative, is that the USN has Hornet and Saratoga but loses just about all the squadrons that took part in the battle. Only those aircraft who recovered to Midway OTL from the Enterprise or Hornet (and of those far fewer DBs) survive.

Note of course that the above TL also does not consider the possibility that the Japanese first-strike sinks or cripples all three US carriers - which is quite frankly a possibility.

 

[galveston bay]

Most likely Japanese victory is pretty simple

The Japanese were literally turning into the wind to launch their strike at the Yorktown when the American SDBs struck. So if McClusky (Enterprise SBDs) doesn't the Japanese and is forced to return to his carrier (or divert to Midway), the Yorktown SBDs (Gallaher found the Japanese force on his own and pretty much went straight to it) take out the Soryu while the Yorktown is lost. Having lost over half the Hornet SBD and Wildcat force (as they got lost and a lot of them ditched), all of the TBDs (essentially), at that point the mission orders come to play


"United States Pacific Fleet
USS Pennsylvania, flagship
Flagship of the Commander-in-Chief
Serial 0114W
May 28, 1942
SECRET
From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet
To: Commander Striking Force (Operation Plan 29-42)
Subject: Letter of Instruction
1. In carrying out the task assigned in Operation Plan 29-42 you will be governedby the principle of calculated risk, which you shall interpret to mean the avoidanceof exposure of your force to attack by superior enemy forces without good prospectof inflicting, as a result of such exposure, greater damage to the enemy. This applies to the landing phase as well as during preliminary air attacks"

Spruance has no choice but to order a retirement as he has lost 1/3rd of his carriers and roughly half his aircraft while still facing 3 Japanese carriers with intact airgroups.

That is a defeat and almost certainly the Japanese make a landing, suffer horrific casualties but probably achieve success.

Much good it does them as Midway because a painful logistical burden for the Japanese Navy

The Japanese will probably try to pursue but the Americans are pretty distant and Task Force 16 has not yet been discovered (and was not during the historical battle). As Nagumo is supposed to cover the landing AND defeat the US Fleet he has conflicting tasks. Task Force 16 can be within land based air cover range of Oahu if they do a high speed run in a bit over 24 hours (1200 miles Midway to Oahu, at 30 knots they can cover 720 miles in 24 hours, and thus can be in port within less than 48 hours). So a Japanese pursuit is pretty risky.

Yamamoto still fails to achieve his "decisive battle' but he trades a carrier for an American carrier.

That is the simple point of departure, but more elaborate ones are possible.

 

[Alanith]

Most likely Japanese victory is pretty simple

The Japanese were literally turning into the wind to launch their strike at the Yorktown when the American SDBs struck.

Shattered Sword is pretty clear that at NO point before disaster were the Japanese remotely ready to even begin spotting a strike against the American Carriers, much less turning into the wind to launch it.

 

[galveston bay]

Shattered Sword is pretty clear that at NO point before disaster were the Japanese remotely ready to even begin spotting a strike against the American Carriers, much less turning into the wind to launch it.

The Japanese had completed bombing up and refueling and had recovered the strike from Midway. If they were not ready to launch (and it appears Fuchida has been relied on too heavily on too many occasions) than they should have been. Certainly they had sufficient time.

I haven't read "Shattered Sword" yet (its on my list but budgets limit adding to the collection) and it hasn't made it to the local library yet (the problems with living in rural America). I was basing my statement on Walter Lord's "Incredible Victory".

But let us assume they are not ready. So let us assume that Gallaher gets the Soryu, as a minimal point of departure and McClusky and the Enterprise strike misses and has to return to base or land at Midway due to fuel constraints. It seems reasonably certain that the other three Japanese carriers are still going to get their strike off their decks before the American carriers can recover their strike forces, refuel, rearm and get off another strike. Certainly the Hiryu launched its strike before the Americans managed to get off another strike.

So ready or not the Japanese are certainly going to overwhelm the Yorktown (as their two understrength strikes were enough to knock her out of action and leave her crippled sufficiently to go under latter by 2 Japanese torpedoes launched from a submarine).

In which case the mission orders still stand.

Outnumbered 3 to 2, and with only half their airgroups remaining Spruance would have been forced to comply with orders (see previous post) and withdraw at high speed back to Hawaii.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Pretty sure under those circumstances she doesn't have any aircraft left - she can't recover the remnants of the strikes that got chopped to bits, nor can any USN SAR take place.
The result of that move, while probably less bad than the alternative, is that the USN has Hornet and Saratoga but loses just about all the squadrons that took part in the battle. Only those aircraft who recovered to Midway OTL from the Enterprise or Hornet (and of those far fewer DBs) survive.

Note of course that the above TL also does not consider the possibility that the Japanese first-strike sinks or cripples all three US carriers - which is quite frankly a possibility.

Certainly - but I was simply responding to the OP in this instance.

No reason for Hornet to Hang around for 3 hours as the battle is well and truly lost and It may sound harsh but a carrier takes longer to build than Aircraft and the men to be trained to fly them - not to mention the recovered crews from Enterprise and Yorktown are a valuable asset in their own right.

It is said that apart from the 4 lost carriers in the OTL it was the loss of trained air group 'ground' crews on the carriers that really hurt IJN aviation - the same would be true of the USN in this scenario.

So in my opinion Hornet upon learning of the loss of her sisters points her nose East and goes to maximum revolutions with a gaggle of DDs and CLs etc carrying the survivors of the two lost carriers.

 

[Glenn239]

Shattered Sword is pretty clear that at NO point before disaster were the Japanese remotely ready to even begin spotting a strike against the American Carriers, much less turning into the wind to launch it.

SS says 15 minutes were needed for warm up. Hiryu was about ready to launch at 1050-1055. Hiryu's first strike was therefore spotted on deck and warming up by about 10:35, correct? And since spotting took about 15 minutes for 18 aircraft (give or take), that would mean it commenced spotting at 1020.

 

[Glenn239]

The Japanese had completed bombing up and refueling and had recovered the strike from Midway. If they were not ready to launch (and it appears Fuchida has been relied on too heavily on too many occasions) than they should have been. Certainly they had sufficient time.

Fuchida never said the entire force was launching at 1025. He said the Akagi was, and his source was himself, sitting on the flight deck as the fatal attack came down. Shattered Sword read one thing then assumed the other. SS claimed that Japanese doctrine had all carriers launching strike elements simultaneously due to doctrine. See Fuchida, For that One Day - until the formation of 1st Air Fleet, it was routine for the various carriers contributing to a strike to launch and rendezvous with large delays between the form-up of various elements. Even during war ops (when launches were synchronised) it was not always the case that elements would launch together. In the Indian Ocean Akagi did one strike where its element launched 15 minutes before Soryu and 10 minutes before Hiryu. At Darwin there was a 30 minute delay between the launch of various squadrons in the strike.

I haven't read "Shattered Sword" yet (its on my list but budgets limit adding to the collection) and it hasn't made it to the local library yet (the problems with living in rural America). I was basing my statement on Walter Lord's "Incredible Victory".

SS presents a strong case that Kaga had few or no torpedo bombers on deck. But Fuchida had never claimed it did, (he mentions no planes on Kaga's deck when outlining her bombing and sinking). With Soryu Fuchida also did not state she was launching - her crews were prepping aircraft for takeoff when the carrier was destroyed, (Fuchida's source for this was probably Egusa, with whom he spent time in hospital after the battle). With Hiryu Shattered Sword states that Fuchida had Yamaguchi launching at 1025 on order of Akagi, but Fuchida had actually stated in his book that Hiryu launched on her own at 1040 on the authority of Yamaguchi.

But let us assume they are not ready. So let us assume that Gallaher gets the Soryu, as a minimal point of departure and McClusky and the Enterprise strike misses and has to return to base or land at Midway due to fuel constraints. It seems reasonably certain that the other three Japanese carriers are still going to get their strike off their decks before the American carriers can recover their strike forces, refuel, rearm and get off another strike. Certainly the Hiryu launched its strike before the Americans managed to get off another strike.

I'd write it that McClusky doesn't miss outbound. He sees KB off his right wing around 0915 and attacks around 0930. He picks out the two big carriers (Akagi and Kaga) and devastates them both. Yamaguchi, now in control of air operations, orders a snap launch from Hiryu and Soryu at 0930, which finishes at 1000. He then orders an immediate torpedo bomber strike of 12 bombers (six from each carrier) that clear the force by 1025. Leslie then shows up and hits the Soryu. Hiryu recovers, say, 20 dive bomber survivors from the first strike, 6 torpedo bombers from the second.

 

[Saphroneth]

Shattered Sword is pretty clear that at NO point before disaster were the Japanese remotely ready to even begin spotting a strike against the American Carriers, much less turning into the wind to launch it.

Not correct. It's clear that at no point between the spotting and the disaster was there a clear point. The Chikuma #1 plane is specifically noted as having the potential to spot the American task forces in sufficient time that the Japanese strike could be prepared, spotted, launched and would catch Yorktown spotting her own planes. (though Enterprise and Hornet were always going to get to launch.)

 

[tomo pauk]

Spotting the strike packge means there is no rotation of defensive fighters that were trying their best to thwart numerous US attack waves before Best & Co arrived. We can also recall that no photos, that were taken from US aircraft, show more than single aircraft on the Japanese CV decks between 9:30 and 10:30.

 

[Saphroneth]

Spotting the strike packge means there is no rotation of defensive fighters that were trying their best to thwart numerous US attack waves before Best & Co arrived. We can also recall that no photos, that were taken from US aircraft, show more than single aircraft on the Japanese CV decks between 9:30 and 10:30.

No, the strike package can get off before the first of the US attack waves arrives. Check the times I've shown.

I wrote this with Shattered Sword loaded up in front of me. Citations:

Graphic 8-3 - state of Japanese search arrangements at 0630. Chikuma plane #1 is pretty much on top of TF 17.

Same chapter: "Chikuma no.1 was the only plane that could have gotten timely information into Nagumo's hands... it almost certainly should have detected the American task force between 0615 and 0630, that is, within the time frame (barely) needed to act decisively".

First American attack 0710 (OTL).



I have the detection at 0618, the spot begins at 0623, the strike launches at 0703, and the first American attack arrives at 0712. This is a forty-minute spot, which is on the quick side but - I think - acceptable, given that the spot time is "forty minutes to an hour" in S.S.

We can also recall that no photos, that were taken from US aircraft, show more than single aircraft on the Japanese CV decks between 9:30 and 10:30.

Talking about events between 0930 and 1030 suggests you've not read the OP, which has the Japanese strike actually on the way home by that point.