I think that none of the proposals (including mine) would result in even a minor change to British naval policy between 1934 and 1939.
Between 1919 and 1934 the Royal Navy was planning to fight a war against Japan because that country was the only serious potential enemy. After 1934 the Service still had to plan for a war against Japan (and Italy) as well as Germany.
For example the RN preferred the smallest (and therefore least expensive) ships that were fit for purpose so that they could be build in the large numbers that it required. Hence the Leander and Arethusa class cruisers and the A-I type destroyers. They stopped building them in favour of the Southampton class cruisers and Tribal class destroyers to counter the large cruisers and destroyers that the Japanese were building. However, as usually happens with ships like this never actually went into battle with the ships they were designed to counter.
I haven't checked my copy of Grand Strategy, but from what I remember the British war plan until as late as 1936 was to send nearly all of the Royal Navy to Singapore in the event of a war with Japan. From memory all that would be left in European waters would be 3 (out of 15 battleships), 4 (out of 46 cruisers) and no destroyers.
Even that force was thought inadequate to cope with the Imperial Japanese Navy and the strengthened One Power Standard Fleet approved in the 1934 Deficiency Programme was to provide a fleet powerful enough to "Show a tooth," to the Japanese. There would be no increase in the force left behind in Europe.
The 70 cruiser requirement for the One Power Standard Fleet was made up of 25 ships for fleet work and 45 ships for trade protection. The fleet requirement was based on a ratio of 5 cruisers for every 3 battleships the Royal Navy had. The trade protection requirement was based on the length of the shipping lanes and the amount of traffic on them. Therefore a Kriegsmarine with more surface ships capable of commerce raiding does not necessarily change what the British do.
Similarly the number of ASW craft was based on the number of convoys it had to run, not necessarily the number of submarines that any potential enemy was expected to possess. It is true that the RN didn't have a large ASW force at the start of the war, but it did have mobilisation plans for one in the event of war.
The British didn't start full-scale rearmament until 1936, which included the Cabinet approving a Two-Power Standard Fleet capable of fighting Germany and Japan at the same time.
A larger naval build up by the Germans before 1939 might mean the RN would want to build more warships in retaliation. However, the extra ships could not be built for financial and industrial reasons.
The Government thought Britain would be ruined financially by a general war with even one great power. Therefore British policy in 1934-39 was to build up armed forces strong enough to be used as a bargaining chip in a diplomatic solution with what became the Axis powers. Rearmament was limited by the amount of money the Treasury could raise and it said that only £1,500 million could be made available for 1937-42 by increasing taxes and borrowing. However, that would not pay for everything the Admirals, Air Marshalls and Generals wanted. Therefore there was no way the Admirals were going to get Treasury approval for extra ships to counter any extra ships that Germany might build.
The British arms industry had been run down along with the armed forces so arms production could not be increased any more than it was without putting the British economy on a war footing and British public opinion would not accept that until after Munich. Some of the money spent during the rearmament period was spend on building factories and their plant, rather than military equipment. Large orders also had to be placed abroad. The infamous example was armour plate. In 1930-35 the British had been building 3 cruisers and a handful of lightly armoured tanks per year. Suddenly it found itself having to provide armour for 2 aircraft carriers, 2 battleships and 7 cruisers plus hundreds of armoured fighting vehicles per year. Money had to be spent on increasing the capacity of the plant and armour was ordered from Czechoslovakia to fill the gap created by the huge increase of demand over supply.
Therefore rearmament overheated the economy, creating demand pull inflation and a balance of payments deficit. The British Government had to slow down its rearmament programme in 1938-39, rather than speed it up.
The Royal Navy had planned to order 28 submarines, 8 aircraft carriers, 9 battleships, 28 cruisers and 64 destroyers, plus smaller warships and auxiliaries in the 1936-39 financial years.
However, the overheating of the economy forced the Admiralty to cut 7 submarines, 2 aircraft carriers, 5 cruisers and 16 destroyers from the 1938 and 1939 programmes.
This reduced the number of ships actually ordered to 21 submarines, 6 aircraft carriers, 9 battleships, 23 cruisers and 48 destroyers. 5 of the battleships and all the other ships were actually built, but some took longer to build than intended. Therefore it is probable that the ships cut from the programme would not have been completed until the second half of the war.
However, it did begin its ASW mobilisation before war was declared by ordering the first 20 Hunt class escort destroyers, 56 Flower class corvettes and 20 Bangor class minesweepers in the normal 1939-40 programme.
Therefore if the Kriegsmarine can build up a larger surface fleet for September 1939 the Royal Navy will not be able to build more warships in response.
That won't win the war for Germany in itself. However, the Royal Navy might have to strengthen the Home Fleet by weakening other fronts like the Mediterranean and that would make life easier for the Italians.