Alpenkorps in Südtirol

[Hörnla]

During the last years, I have been more closely following the course of WW1. And dealing with the developments throughout the summer of 1916, I found a striking development I had not been aware of beforehands.

In May 1916, Austria-Hungary launched an offensive from the Alps towards Venetia
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Asiago) which went surprisingly well considering that we talk of the Italian front. Before any real danger for the Italian possession of Venetia could develop, the Brussilow-offensive forced the Austrians to halt and to give up all gains and return into the save mountains.

Now where is the "what if"?

By the beginning of 1916, the German Alpenkorps
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alpenkorps_(German_Empire) )
was still in Serbia, having helped to finally subdue the Balkan nation. It was transported to France in March in order to be squandered in the Battle of Verdun from June onwards.
(Apparently, this was not only Falkenhayn's fault, the Austrian High Command wasn't keen on sharing the glory either.)

Basically the best formation imaginable to aid the Zweibund-ally to a formidable success was transported through the region when the attack was being prepared.

How much of a difference could these forces have made in the battle?
Where would you deem the best part of the front to deploy it?

 

[rast]

Despite its name, the Alpenkorps only was a division. To really make it an army corps, one would have to add another division and some heavy artillery. - Setting aside the problems this would have caused in Falkenhayn's fragile 'just-in-time' reinforcement system, you would get a nice big cauldron capturing almost the entire Italian army. The Alpenkorps had been deployed to the area in 1915 already, they knew the terrain.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

I've done a couple of What Ifs around the Asiago offensive that didn't get much attention before, so I'll add in my two cents based on the research I've done (plus I've actually traveled in the area): supply was really tough, terrain sucked, the Alpenkorps was needed at Verdun, and Falkenhayn and Conrad hated each other and neither told each other of their planned offensives. Falkenhayn even asked Conrad to sit tight for 1916 and was surprised by Conrad's offensive and the resulting troubles in Ukraine caused by Conrad drawing down the East to fight in Italy (creating the chance for Brusilov to succeed). Effectively without major changes to the war this is impossible. Conrad didn't trust the Germans or want them to help in Italy, it was 'His' front because he had a personal hatred of the Italians (despite having an Italian mistress he was very devoted to), and changing the German CoS isn't going to fix that. In fact removing Conrad early for his eventual replacement, who did actually listen to the Germans and understood he was the junior partner (and was actually a pretty competent CoS overall), means the Asiago offensive never happens and he properly defends the Eastern Front meaning Brusilov doesn't do nearly as well in 1916. I really have no idea how to make this POD happen given the personalities and situations involved.

 

[rast]

Yes, a major POD would be required to make this happen. - Let's say, COS German 5th Army, General Schmidt von Knobelsdorf, suffers a grave accident and is replaced by a less ambitious general (who also can't exert so much influence on Falkenhayn as SvK could). Thus, the unsuccessful Verdun operation is cancelled in March 1916. - Now, the Allied preparations at the Somme see much more French participation, and the OHL starts looking for a new way to draw off enemy reserves. And suddenly, the planned AuH offensive in Southern Tyrolia looks much more interesting. Even if Conrad wouldn't want to have German units participate, Falkenhayn would force them down his throat. (Falkenhayn, by the way, didn't hate Conrad, he simply despised him.) - Judging from Austrian performance opposite the Russians and Serbians - and the fact that they were able to hold well (with numerically inferior forces) against the Italians, the German units deployed should cut through the Italians like a hot knife through butter (see Caporetto).

The Russian front wouldn't figure in Falkenhayn's reckoning. He thought that enemy had long-lasting been disabled in 1915. Catching the major part of the Italian army in a huge cauldron in Venetia would force the western Allies to send the reinforcements he had planned to attrite at Verdun to Italy.

 

[Richter von Manthofen]

As the supply situation - even before Brussilov attcked in the East - was terrible, further attacks were not viable. Another Division/Corps would bnot have made a difference. (Even the Reserve, the 3rd A-H Amry was not not used fully).

Building up more stocks would also have alarmed the Italians. I think OTL offensive was probably the best that could be achieved at the time.

BTW AFAIK in late15/early16 the Austrians even asked for support of the offensive, but Germany declined

 

[lukedalton]

The problem in this scenario it's the logistic part; one of the principal reason the offensive achieved almost total surprise...was that Cadorna and co. believed that nobody was so reckless (more stupid in reality) to launch a strong offensive through the region, due to the terrain, the narrow passage and the difficult to sustain long logistic line; the fact that the Austrian succeeded in this it's nothing short of a minor miracle of organization and preparation.
Adding another division or even worse a corp will only create more stress for the logistic system, will make the general situation more cramped due to the limited number of route, passage and zone available to soldiers and frankly having the Austrian command officer resenting or in any case not really liking that the german decided to force him to accept their presence, will not make great thing regarding coordination.
Frankly in a scenario like this, the planned offensive seem destinated to a very unglorious end.

Not considering that unlike Caporetto, Cadorna had a full grip on the situation and the plan for a strategic retreat and later counteroffensive to stop the Austrian were implemented quickly; plus as said above the logistic will be horrible, basically even in case CP troops invade Veneto they will run out of supply shortly...so they will become entrapped instead of the Italians.

 

[Hörnla]

I agreed with the OP that the major hindrance for such an occurence was the lack of readiness to co-operate on that front.
I also had read that the Alpenkorps was so small in numbers. So it wouldn't be a mighty boost to this offensive in the sense of doubling ist force.

So it would have to be used like a scalpel at an excellent opportunity or position.

Would a divertary attack not directly in the area of Asiago be a better idea? Perhaps a certain focal point at the Isonzo? Or right at the Adige (pretending to be) aimed at Verona?

Would sudden German involvement by itself perhaps send a sense of shock and uncertainty to the Italian general staff?

***

Concerning Brussilow - I might provoke a bit, but I would say that the Initial Russian success was a result of their improved tactics, less of their numerical superiority. More Austro-Hungarians on the Italian front in August 1916 are less Austro-Hungarians in the Ukraine to be overrun and captured.