Allies hold the island of Crete
- Thread starter Sport25ing
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They become considered useful for small actions and raids but their vulnerability against fully equipped troops means no large formations above brigade size are formed. Strangely enough this improves the quality of the regular line units because the best troops are not syphoned off to the airborne units.
You mean besides their revolts in 1770, 1821, 1841, 1858, 1866, 1878, 1889 and 1896 to become a part of Greece? Good luck with that kind of imperial ambitions... and if EOKA required 20-40,000 troops to keep in check in a basically completely peaceful island like Cyprus I wouldn't want to calculate what would be going on in Crete with its fine traditions of arms in every house, armed insurrection and blood feuding. Oh by the way the Greek government had evacuated to Crete in the first place.
But at least one British agent did have that kind of idea during the war. The Cretan resistance packed him up and send him back to Egypt accusing him of being a German double agent who was trying to undermine the allied cause...
I found this looking for something else.
It's from Page 128 of Volume 2 of the Middle East and Mediterranean on the Hyperwar website.
It's from Page 128 of Volume 2 of the Middle East and Mediterranean on the Hyperwar website.
And this one from Page 138.
The Mediterranean Fleet will be able to lay more minefields in the hope of interrupting communications through the Corinth Canal if Crete is held.
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That's a fallacy. All the potential replacement bombers weren't being concentrated in Bomber Command. The fact is that it's expansion was retarded by the transfer of its squadrons to other RAF commands at home and overseas from 1936 until well into 1943.
Also bombing the Corinth Canal is probably less dangerous than bombing the Rhur because it's defences are weaker. AFAIK neither the Germans or the Italians had any night fighters in Greece in 1941 or the ground organisation that was necessary to make them effective.
The first Wellingtons in the Middle East and Mediterranean belonged to No. 1 General Reconnaissance Unit. I don't know when they arrived, but they were there on 10th June 1940.
The first Wellington bombers arrived in the Middle East and Mediterranean in June 1940 when detachments of Bomber Command squadrons were sent to Malta to attack targets in North Africa. According to the RAF Webb website three of these detachments (from Nos. 38, 99 & 115 Squadrons) were amalgamated into a new No. 148 Squadron on 14 December 1940 at Luqa. However, Lake in Flying Units of the RAF says that the Wellington Flight, Malta was formed by merging elements of 49 and 75 Squadrons (at Mildenhall) and 38 & 115 Squadrons (Marham) operating from Luqa, Malta, from 9th November 1940 and that the flight was disbanded on 1st December 1940 to become 148 Squadron. Meanwhile, No. 70 (Bomber Transport) Squadron (which was in Egypt on 10th June 1940 and equipped with Valentias) began converting to Wellingtons in September 1940; the last Valentia had gone by the following month and the squadron was now a pure bomber unit. (Source RAF Web.) Nos. 37 and 38 (Bomber) Squadrons were transferred from Bomber Command to Egypt in November 1940.
Thus there were 4 Wellington bomber squadrons in the Middle East and Mediterranean in mid-December 1940 plus the DWI Wellingtons in No. 1 General Reconnaissance Unit. No. 148 (Bomber) Squadron was at Malta and Nos. 37, 38 & 70 (Bomber) Squadrons were in Egypt. All of the squadrons had an Initial Equipment (I.E.) of 16 Wellingtons and an Immediate Reserve (I.R.) of 8 Wellingtons. A fifth Wellington Squadron formed on 1st August 1941. This was No. 108 (Bomber) Squadron , which according to the RAF Webb website began operations the following month, its main targets being Libya and Greece. Conversion to Liberations began in November 1940, but this was not completed and it had returned to being an all-Wellington unit by June 1942.
The 5 Wellington squadrons that were permanently based in the Middle East and Mediterranean were reinforced by detachments from Bomber Command squadrons. For example Nos. 40 and 104 (Bomber) Squadrons were at Luqa, Malta on detachment in December 1941. Nos. 37, 38, 70, 108 and 104 squadrons were all in Egypt at that time. Wellingtons also equipped the Sea Rescue Flight in the Western Desert, No 1 General Reconnaissance Unit in Egypt and were on the strength of No. 70 Operational Conversion Unit in Egypt.
The Wellington squadrons in Egypt came under the command of under No. 257 (Bomber) Wing when it was formed on Egypt on 20th November 1940. The wing became No. 205 (Bomber) Group on 23rd October 1941.
Furthermore, the RAF did bomb the Corinth Canal in 1941 IOTL. See this quote from Pages 296 and 297 of the Middle East and Mediterranean Volume 2 from the Hyperwar website.
Possessing Crete will make it easier to attack the Corinth Canal by air because it's 1,015 km from Alexandria to Corinth, but only 370 km from Crete to Corinth.
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I was wrong. It was 64 Wellingtons in 4 squadrons from the end of 1940 to August 1941 and 80 Wellingtons in 5 squadrons for the remainder of the year plus detachments from Bomber Command squadrons.
Note that the 64 aircraft from December 1940 to August 1941 and the 80 aircraft for the rest of the year are first-line strengths. They don't include the reserve aircraft that enabled the squadrons to operate at their first-line strengths.
This quote from Pages 106 and 107 of the Middle East and Mediterranean Volume 1 on Hyperwar explains the terms Initial Equipment and Initial Reserve much better than I can.
Squadrons were armed with fighter, bomber, reconnaissance, or transport types of aircraft and, broadly speaking, their functions came within these main classifications. But as the war progressed they were to be given many different roles, which necessitated modifications to aircraft, armament, and equipment, and special training for aircrews.
Squadrons were sub-divided into two, or in certain cases three, flying FLIGHTS and a headquarters flight. The headquarters flight was composed of engine and aircraft repair sections, and signals, armament, photographic, transport and administrative sections. But when two or three fighter or bomber squadrons were controlled by a Station or Wing Headquarters the sections of the head-quarters flight would be established as part of the formation headquarters, in order to economize manpower and material. This was generally satisfactory for squadrons based in the United Kingdom, but was not flexible enough for moving warfare, as in the Western Desert.
The first line strength of a squadron consisted of a number of initial equipment (I.E.) aircraft. An immediate reserve (I.R.) of up to 50 per cent of the I.E. was usually—but not always—held by each squadron. Further reserves were kept at air stores parks and maintenance units. The following are examples of the established strengths of squadrons in the Middle East soon after the fall of France :-
Role of Squadron | Type of aircraft | I.E. | I.R. | Approximate strength, Officers and Airmen |
| Fighter | Gladiator or Hurricane | 16 | 8 | 250 |
| Bomber | Blenheim | 16 | 8 | 400 |
| " | Wellington | 16 | 8 | 490 |
| General Reconnaissance, Flying-Boat | Sunderland | 6 | 2 | 250 |
| Army Co-operation | Lysander | 12 | 6 | 290 |
Errolwi
Monthly Donor
The NZ Official Histories are online. From a NZ perspective of course, and pre-Ultra (and various details about Imperial politics being available) but free!
This is another on-line source, but it was also written pre-Ultra and is from the British point of view.
Ahhhhhh stop distracting me when I should be studying. Seriously though thank you. I'll read them asap.