Allies focus on attacking Italy, postponing D-Day

While looking at the displays in the FDR museum, I read something about one of the Allied leaders (I don't know if it was FDR, Churchill, or Stalin) advocating in December 1943 for a postponement of D-Day past June 1944 -- instead, focusing on coming in throughly. This man was overruled by his other two colleagues and the D-Day invasion continued on schedule.

Suppose he is able to convince the other Allies to go along with this plan. What happens?
 
That would have been the British. Specifically Churchill & his CIGS Brooke. At the November 1943 Terhan conference Churchill, using info provided by Brooke, tried to persuade the cominded Alled leaders there operations in Italy, the Balkans, and elsewhere would be more productive than in France. He claimed the US, French, and Commonwealth armies would be stalled on the edge of France for a year or more, or possibly defeated. Easy victories were to be had in the mountains of Italy, Greece, Serbia, Norway, ect... in Churchills argument.

Stalin and Roosevelt were having none of it. In the first main conference, after a hour or two of letting Churchill talk Stalin cut him off with a veiled ultimatum. when Churchill attempted to argue on Roosevelt cut in as well, making it crystal clear the US was invading France & marching straight to Germany in 1944, with or without Churchills permission. Brooke, who had also offered alternatives in the preliminary meetings of the staff group saw which way the wind blew and more or less shut up, leaving Chuchill alone at the table. Roosevelt & his Chief of Staff Marshall offered a nominal date of 1 May 1944 as target for a invasion of France and named Eisenhower as the future commander. This along with some other points satisfied Stalin. Churchills staff offered nothing of substance against this, and tho Churchill made attempts to change the decision during the remainder of the conference it was clear to observes and post war historians his ideas no longer counted in this decision.

Churchill did continue efforts after the Terhan conference. On the way back to Britain he stopped at Alexanders HQ and began pressure on him to execute the SHINGLE Operation, @ Anzio. Later he opposed by every means the ANVIL and DRAGOON operations. He made claims the invasion of south France would be utter disaster and probably fail. At best with less success than the Anzio lodgment. He and Brooke managed to keep all but token Commonwealth forces out of Op DRAGOON. Only a Commando and Para brigades participated. Ironically this US/French operation was one of the most successful Allied invasions.

What happens if Churchills view prevailed? The usual consensus is the Read army reaches the Rhine before the west Allies can successfully get a army ashore. Europe is Soviet dominated at least to the Rhine and perhaps France too. Maybe Just Norway, Sweden, Italy and Iberia remain free of the Red Army. Alternately some think the Germans can delay the Red Army east of Poland into 1945 or 46 absent a Allied invasion of France.
 
My understanding is Stalin was against this because he didn’t want any, or minimal, non-Soviet forces in the Balkans, or worse, Eastern Europe. The landing of a Normandy size force would drive Stalin’s paranoia to new heights, especially if it achieved successful advances. What I don’t understand is why FDR was against it.

Ric350
 
There was the Balkans factor, keeping Commonwealth armies out of there. But, Stalin also understood the task of defeating the Germans would cost the Red Army less were there a viable second front. The African campaigns, and Italy were a disappointment for the Soviet leaders. in relative terms the ground forces engaged were negligible to those in the east, and the situation in the air was not really apparent from Moscow. Stalin wanted to see millions of Allied soldiers in a hundred or more ground combat divisions smashing the German armies in the west. He was very aware of how much smaller the German armies there were, how they were composed of mostly static, or convalescing units. Few in 1943 were capable of full field service, or sustained combat. That looked like a weak shield between the UK and the heart of German industry, the Ruhr, only 500 km distant from London. All that encouraged the Soviet leaders to see procrastination on the Second Front as British duplicity.
 

Ian_W

Banned
My understanding is Stalin was against this because he didn’t want any, or minimal, non-Soviet forces in the Balkans, or worse, Eastern Europe. The landing of a Normandy size force would drive Stalin’s paranoia to new heights, especially if it achieved successful advances. What I don’t understand is why FDR was against it.

Ric350

Because at the top of Italy are the Alps.

Because the roads and the ports in the Balkans are terrible.

Because it's a damn long way from Albania to the Ruhr.

That pretty much sums it up.
 
The Germans didn’t seem to have too much trouble going the other direction in 1941. Plus the allies would have a lot of partisan support.

Ric350
 

Ian_W

Banned
The Germans didn’t seem to have too much trouble going the other direction in 1941. Plus the allies would have a lot of partisan support.

Ric350

*shrug*

Then write up a scenario. Make sure you detail what is being unloaded where, and how it gets to where in the front.

If you're insistent on the Wallies in the Balkans, then consider Stalin's likely response.
 
Roosevelt & his Chief of Staff Marshall offered a nominal date of 1 May 1944 as target for a invasion of France and named Eisenhower as the future commander.

This partially supports Churchill's position - up to this point the US position was ambiguous on the invasion of Europe. The US had pushed hard in the summer of 1942 for a landing in 1942, then unilaterally cutback on Bolero and stopped transferring ground forces to the UK, before resuming at a low rate in the summer of 1943 - at the end of October 1943 there were only 117k US ground troops in the UK.

If the US is not carrying out the logistics build-up necessary for the invasion of France and has not named a commander for the operation, how seriously should it be taken by the British?
 
This partially supports Churchill's position - up to this point the US position was ambiguous on the invasion of Europe. The US had pushed hard in the summer of 1942 for a landing in 1942, then unilaterally cutback on Bolero and stopped transferring ground forces to the UK, before resuming at a low rate in the summer of 1943 - at the end of October 1943 there were only 117k US ground troops in the UK. ...

...might have something to do with first agreeing to delay until 1943 to execute Op TORCH, then at the SYMBOL conference of January 1943 agreeing to postpone a NW Europe attack again until 1944. Kind of pointless to send ground combat units and support to the UK when the priorities are for other actions. Not like there was a surplus of cargo ships.


... If the US is not carrying out the logistics build-up necessary for the invasion of France and has not named a commander for the operation, how seriously should it be taken by the British?

The US could not do this unilaterally on UK territory. 'Ok, we are sending one million soldiers to your nation and using cargo shipping you need for food, and reduce the material wanted for the bomber offensive. Bugger all if you don't like it. & BTW our boy is in charge.' Hows that going to work? I suppose Roosevelt could have supported Marshal at the SYMBOL Conference and continued arguing for the 1943 attack. I'm not going to predict at this point how that would have worked.

Roosevelt & his staff came to Casablanca thinking the 1943 attack into France had been settled the previous summer. Brooke's arguments against and Churchills adamant opposition rather surprised them, not understanding the actual British thinking.
 
That would have been the British. Specifically Churchill & his CIGS Brooke. At the November 1943 Terhan conference Churchill, using info provided by Brooke, tried to persuade the cominded Alled leaders there operations in Italy, the Balkans, and elsewhere would be more productive than in France. He claimed the US, French, and Commonwealth armies would be stalled on the edge of France for a year or more, or possibly defeated. Easy victories were to be had in the mountains of Italy, Greece, Serbia, Norway, ect... in Churchills argument.

Churchill did continue efforts after the Terhan conference. On the way back to Britain he stopped at Alexanders HQ and began pressure on him to execute the SHINGLE Operation, @ Anzio. Later he opposed by every means the ANVIL and DRAGOON operations. He made claims the invasion of south France would be utter disaster and probably fail. At best with less success than the Anzio lodgment. He and Brooke managed to keep all but token Commonwealth forces out of Op DRAGOON. Only a Commando and Para brigades participated. Ironically this US/French operation was one of the most successful Allied invasions.

What happens if Churchills view prevailed? The usual consensus is the Read army reaches the Rhine before the west Allies can successfully get a army ashore. Europe is Soviet dominated at least to the Rhine and perhaps France too. Maybe Just Norway, Sweden, Italy and Iberia remain free of the Red Army. Alternately some think the Germans can delay the Red Army east of Poland into 1945 or 46 absent a Allied invasion of France.

what do you think the effects would be if SHINGLE had failed? and how much would it set back OVERLORD? have read various estimates on landing craft, thus confused on what was actually available to Allies had SHINGLE gone bad.

(guess my thinking was if the smaller sub attacks had been effective as that could have been replicated rather than the unlikely circumstances of German rail guns having position overlooking Anzio, which would not have been replicated elsewhere. if you are wondering about a POD)
 
If Op SHINGLE failed, then Clark, Patton, & several others would be justified in their judgement on it, and Churchill wrong. I can't see severe losses in landing craft given the German capabilities. Their strength was in ground forces & not naval or air in 1944. Their ground forces don't have much ability to destroy landing craft or amphib ships.

If the landing force is wrecked or destroyed it does affect future ground operations in the Med.
 
Anzio failed.
It was meant to force a collapse of the main German line and all it did was to divide allied strength allowing the Germans to maintain two defense lines that gave them a lot less logistic problems than they did the allies.
Then the allies had to breakthrough the old fashioned way, only to hit another solid line a few hundred Km south.
The time for a stronger bet on the Med would have been earlier, allowing for a OTL D-Day from the start (in June 44, not planned for earlier and postponed) and using enough ressources to take Corsica and Sardinia along with, or instead of Sicily.
This would leave the whole of Italy exposed and probably sent the Germans back to the Alps while preventing the split of Italian forces into two factions.
This would help the bombing offensive enormously, facilitate the defeat of the LW and still leave time to move all that needed to be moved to England in time for a June 44 D Day.
 
Roosevelt & his staff came to Casablanca thinking the 1943 attack into France had been settled the previous summer.

I don't agree with this interpretation, as Marshall included the following in CCS94 which decided on Torch:

That it be understood that a commitment to this operation renders ROUNDUP, in all probability impracticable of successful execution in 1943 and therefore that we have definitely accepted a defensive, encircling line of action for the CONTINENTAL EUROPEAN THEATER, except as to air operation.

As to the build up in the UK under Bolero, as late as November 1942, the British were expecting 427k men by May 1943. But by the end of February 1943 there were only 256k, with arrivals in the last 4 months of 32k. The US stopped the build-up without formally notifying the British (all figures from Ruppenthal).
 
The Germans didn’t seem to have too much trouble going the other direction in 1941. Plus the allies would have a lot of partisan support.

Ric350

The Germans didn't have to worry about the logistical difficulties of oversea supply, could invade across an extremely broad front from not just Germany but also Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, and the Yugoslav and Greek armies lacked significant mechanized elements.

Alternately some think the Germans can delay the Red Army east of Poland into 1945 or 46 absent a Allied invasion of France.

Those people never really offer an explanation as to how, mind you.
 
Might have worked, with someone other than Lucas as Corps Commander.
It was a bold strike, with poor follow up that doomed it.

Patton visited Lucas a few days before the attack. They were old Polo buddies, and Gorgeous George stopped by to pay his respects when on his way to the UK. Lucas reviewed the SHINGLE operation with his friend, whereupon Patton declared it a "suicide mission". Too weak to accomplish any of its goals. Weeks earlier when given the mission Clark also protested to Alexander, stating the size of the landing force would be too small. Orders had already been given sending the bulk of the amphib fleet to Britain & by the target date of January the fleet remaining would be sufficient for a single corps. Further reductions were to follow in February causing doubts about the ability to build the beach head to the necessary size.

A second problem Clark, or Patton may have been aware of was that after the arrival of another corps group and the 85th & 88th Inf Div no more US forces would be arriving in the Med. Even if they weren't Alexander & Wilson must have known the reinforcement schedule. They also knew the ANVIL operation was still on the table in Dec-Jan, with a target date of April. If executed Op ANVIL would be drawing forces from the Med. Thus there would be fewer ground and air forces for any Italian operations in the Spring of 1944.

WGF Jackson summed up the situation in the Mediterranean best in his chapter title "The Tyranny of Overlord". His point in the chapter being that the ambitious plans for Italy, made in the summer or autumn of 1943 were rendered obsolete with OVERLORD set in motion. SHAEF from December 1943 had priority over everyone else, Churchills wishes or Brookes arguments notwithstanding. SHINGLE as originally outlined in October 1943 could have been a multi corps operation, against a overextended German defense. by the time the directive landed in Clarks lap in late November he hardly could count on transport for a single corps, no real reinforcements, and the near certainty his 5th Army would be drawn down for operations in south France. In retrospect he was right on all three counts.

In every military operation the enemy has a vote. In this case Kesselrings situation had changed between October and January as well. He had gained control over all Axis forces in Italy, Rommel having been sent on to France. The German ground forces had been well reorganized, and sizable reinforcements arrived. By new years eve Kesselring had two uncommitted armies in northern Italy, and the 10th Army in the south had plentiful local reserves. Kesselrings contingent plan for a Allied landing on the Italian leg was to active a entire Army against the incursion. His goal was to bring a nominal strength of 100,000 to this counter force in as little as a week. Clark was hard pressed to provide amphib lift for four divisions to Lucas in the first week, & a undersized corps support group.

Earlier in 1943 the Allies had kept up a swift pace of amphib ops, landing a Army Group on Sicilly in mid July, then two separate armies in early September at Salerno & Reggio di Calabria, and a French corps and massive air force base group to both Sardinia then Corsica in latter September/October. Perhaps had this pace been kept up & a new coastal attack on the Italian mainland bee made in November or early December the necessary multi corps size group could have been accommodated. Kesselring was less ready then, and Hitler may have reverted to his original preference for abandoning Rome and central Italy.
 
I don't agree with this interpretation, as Marshall included the following in CCS94 which decided on Torch:

Which is contradicted in that he & Roosevelt came to the SYMBOL conference expecting to complete agreement on a 1943 invasion of France.

As to the build up in the UK under Bolero, as late as November 1942, the British were expecting 427k men by May 1943. But by the end of February 1943 there were only 256k, with arrivals in the last 4 months of 32k. The US stopped the build-up without formally notifying the British (all figures from Ruppenthal).

Another example of bad communications. Beyond that committing shipping from a overcommitted fleet to also invading Africa with three oversized corps and building that to a army group rather changes plans elsewhere. That much would have been clear from a good look at the availability lists and schedules outlined by the Brits. Brooke used that info in January when protesting the impracticality of a cross Channel attack during the Symbol conference. I suspect here the surprise was greatest at the top, with Churchill was having trouble understanding that the US entry into the war did not mean he could have it all.
 

The Germans didn’t seem to have too much trouble going the other direction in 1941. Plus the allies would have a lot of partisan support.

Ric350

*shrug*

Then write up a scenario. Make sure you detail what is being unloaded where, and how it gets to where in the front.

If you're insistent on the Wallies in the Balkans, then consider Stalin's likely response.

In 1941 the Germans attacked with a veteran Army, against a half mobilized army of reservists with stale training. They had Allys attacking into the flanks and rear of the Yugoslavs and Greeks. In 1943 or 44 the situation is reversed with a trained and veteran army defending, and the attackers with a less experienced army.

In 1941 and 44 communications favored the Germans, with a good rail and road net extending from Austria, and Hungary to Belgrade and somewhat beyond. The worst communications are along the Dalmatian coast, & south through Albania, or Greece, and the interior like Macedonia. Much like the Allies attacking into the Appinnes from south Italy, only without the port of Napoli or its railways into the interior.
 
The Germans didn’t seem to have too much trouble going the other direction in 1941. Plus the allies would have a lot of partisan support.

Ric350

I will quote my own answer to a similar question in another thread:
Because the opponent of the Germans was a Greek army already weaken by fighting with the Italians and the Germans was going from the mountains to the sea side. The Greek army was caught out of position and German logisitic improved as the German move closer to greek coast and enjoyed local air and sea superiority.
 
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