Allies cut the Strait of Messina retreat

  • Thread starter Deleted member 1487
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Skimming back through the literature I 'm back to a conclusion introduced to me years ago. That is the optimal probable air power use of the Allies could not have 'cut'the Axis retreat. The movement options were too wide & the Allied air capability of 1943 a bit to limited. Air forces would have been very useful, essential even, in aiding naval forces entering the strait. Aside from the mine fields mentioned by assorted historians, there were coastal artillery batteries, and the residual capability of the Axis air forces.
Naval forces could have prevented the evacuation, if they had started preparation early enough, and had unequivocal air support. Keeping a squadron of destroyers or two & some light cruisers continually fighting in the straits would have required effort and acceptance of losses, but the evacuation would have been stillborn.
 
Skimming back through the literature I 'm back to a conclusion introduced to me years ago. That is the optimal probable air power use of the Allies could not have 'cut'the Axis retreat. The movement options were too wide & the Allied air capability of 1943 a bit to limited. Air forces would have been very useful, essential even, in aiding naval forces entering the strait. Aside from the mine fields mentioned by assorted historians, there were coastal artillery batteries, and the residual capability of the Axis air forces.
Naval forces could have prevented the evacuation, if they had started preparation early enough, and had unequivocal air support. Keeping a squadron of destroyers or two & some light cruisers continually fighting in the straits would have required effort and acceptance of losses, but the evacuation would have been stillborn.
IF the operation had been thought vital enough, I'm sure the RN would have been willing to lose some ships to cut off the German retreat. The old saw applies to attack as well as covering evacuations
"It takes three years to build a warship, three hundred years to build a tradition"

Of course, it seems likely the Allied High Command was a bit complacent and didn't see the prize as worth the cost.
 
Leaving aside the post campaign excuse exercises it does appear they were complacent. The few items from the campaign planning & during suggest the Axis moved way faster than expected. Which takes one back to looking at the Intel summaries read by Ike, Alexander, Dolittle and the others.
 
Not sure if it has been mentioned already but were the Wallies not already in talks with the Italian leadership at this time?

This is after Mussolini being fired / arrested on the 23rd July and 'feelers' sent out to the West resulting in the Armistice of Cassibile on the 3rd Sept

Surely dying the Straits of Messina red with Italian Blood might have negatively impacted those talks - no?
 

Deleted member 1487

Not sure if it has been mentioned already but were the Wallies not already in talks with the Italian leadership at this time?

This is after Mussolini being fired / arrested on the 23rd July and 'feelers' sent out to the West resulting in the Armistice of Cassibile on the 3rd Sept

Surely dying the Straits of Messina red with Italian Blood might have negatively impacted those talks - no?
Yes, they even planned a drop on Rome after Sicily fell, which fell through because the Germans had largely deprived the Italians of supplies with which they could actually resist a German occupation. The Italians wanted out badly, but couldn't figure out a way to deal with the German problem.
 
Flipping thru Jacksons 'The Battle For Italy:

Kesslering made the decision to start evacuation 9 August.

Alexander suspected the evacuations was probable on 3 August and asked Cunningham & Tedder to coordinate plans to take advantage of the situation. Cunningham required extensive air support vs coastal batteries & residual Italian light naval forces. Tedder ordered Coiningham (NWA Tactical AF) & Dolittle (Allied Strategic AF) to support.

Both air commanders conclude they could halt the evacuation during daylight, but could not accomplish anything at night. A effort to create a night bombing campaign was started.

A increased air reconnaissance of the strait and ferry landings wold be started immediately.

11 Aug night bombing of the ferry crossings becomes a problem as evacuation of service units progresses.

12 August Hube ordered the 15th PzGrDiv to withdraw. It moved to the ferries that night & started crossing.

The 7th Army inserting a battalion landing team at Brolo 11/12 August caused the Germans to accelerate the evacuation.

13 Aug Alexander ordered 8th Army to begin preparations for land near the straits of Messina, with a target date of 1 September.

13 Aug Von Leinenstein decided the evacuation was going to slow & ordered daylight ferry crossings attempted. Tactical airfares interdiction was hampered by AAA & the Allied heavy bombers attacked much further north, leaving the ferry sites relatively unmolested in daylight.

14 August Alexanders staff decides the enemy evacuation has started & requests the planned air campaign to begain.

15/16 Aug 7th Army inserts a Regiment Landing Team at Barcelona, arriving after the Germans withdraw to the east.

8th Army makes a similar 'end run' the same night with similar result.

17Aug Hube reports to Kesselring the evacuation of German units complete.

The Facist Grand Council decided to initiate negotiations for a cease fire/armistice in their 31 Aug meeting & dispatched emissaries to the Allies (in Lisbon) 1 Sept.

Note that Jackson only refers to German combat units evacuated. Others like Atkinson describe service units departing Italy before the 9th Aug, & Italian soldiers evacuated.
 
What if the speed and direction of the ground advance was such that the escape route was cut without needing air and sea forces?
 
What if the speed and direction of the ground advance was such that the escape route was cut without needing air and sea forces?
You need Montgomery and the British forces to do much better in their advance, which given their strength, doctrine and Monty's understandable wish to preserve his troops lives, very difficult.

Or for Monty to concede the lead to the US and then Patton to focus on Messina not Palermo.

Neither POD seems very plausible once Husky is launched. The planning stage would be a better POD but throughout the war the Wallies underestimated the speed of German ripostes to invasions or indeed any large-scale attack. It always took longer to achieve their objectives than thought, until the German forces collapsed in Normandy and then after the Rhine Crossings.
 
Kesslrings decision to evacuate had been planned well in advance & approved by OKW (Hitler). The date it would be ordered was based on the circumstances of the Allied advance & a breakthrough any where would have resulted in a earlier evacuation. Unlike the Italian militia & some 2d rate formations the Germans in Sicilly were not going to be overrun and surrender.
 
Or for Monty to concede the lead to the US and then Patton to focus on Messina not Palermo.
The direct route from the landing sites to Messina had the sea on one side, hills on the other, could be intentionally blocked by landslides in places, and passed over a number of bridges - in short almost perfect defensive terrain. I doubt that changing whoever was in charge of that part would have improved things much, especially when you look at how Patton fared when having to deal with defensive positions such as Metz.
 
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