Skimming back through the literature I 'm back to a conclusion introduced to me years ago. That is the optimal probable air power use of the Allies could not have 'cut'the Axis retreat. The movement options were too wide & the Allied air capability of 1943 a bit to limited. Air forces would have been very useful, essential even, in aiding naval forces entering the strait. Aside from the mine fields mentioned by assorted historians, there were coastal artillery batteries, and the residual capability of the Axis air forces.
Naval forces could have prevented the evacuation, if they had started preparation early enough, and had unequivocal air support. Keeping a squadron of destroyers or two & some light cruisers continually fighting in the straits would have required effort and acceptance of losses, but the evacuation would have been stillborn.
Naval forces could have prevented the evacuation, if they had started preparation early enough, and had unequivocal air support. Keeping a squadron of destroyers or two & some light cruisers continually fighting in the straits would have required effort and acceptance of losses, but the evacuation would have been stillborn.