Allies bomb German powerplants

It's arguable that despite the huge casualties inflicted and the quite genuine damage done to German industry by bombing, that the largest impact of Allied bombing of Germany was forcing the Luftwaffe to divert a lot of their efforts away from supporting the Eastern Front and towards warding off bombing raids - which effectively attrited the Luftwaffe down to a token force over the course of 1944.
 
Since you seem to have a good idea of what was capable at the time, would a shift in focus to smashing the German transportation network (and I suppose the transmission portion of the power grid rather than the generation one) have been possible? And would it have actually been effective?
Bombing attacks on the most vulnerable parts, the canals, were few & far between. IMO, the most productive approach, the least destructive, & the least morally reprehensible (for the cost to BC crews) was extensive use of mining. It could also have had comparable effects to bombing powerstations, with none of the attendant difficulties.
Would it be possible to do that with WWII era technology, perhaps by focusing on increasing the Mosquito's range, giving it slightly better armor and bomb capacity, and building a crapton of P-51 equivalents for air superiority purposes? Along with vast numbers of Mosquitos, of course. And if you still have the big planes, they would be used more for airborne radar systems and for transport purposes than for bombing.
Absolutely possible. No need for new gear, just air-laid mines. Even Hampdens could lay them. And on nights bomber missions couldn't fly, due to weather (over target, presumably)... Losses were so low on mining missions, they were used for training.

It seems everybody's missed the most important part:
Think of it as a sort of overland blockade and you'll about have it.
That's exactly the point. It isn't about road or rail, it's about rivers & canals. Shut them, you shut the movement of coal, which was the #1 fuel for power generation. Shut off the power, you shut off production... Even disruptions could shut production: if a tank needs screws to mount its engines, & the factory producing the screws is shut because power is off...
The technology doesn't exist during WW2.
actual smart weapons were basically impossible
:eek::confused:
Presume a POD where it's doctrine at war's start, you'd get weaps able to do it: British equivalents of Fritz-X, Felix, Bat...
 
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It does seem like it would make sense, but World War 2 was humanity's final embrace with the concept of Total War. Air Raids aimed not just for roads and factories, but people as well. You kill the workers, and no one would rebuild the roads or factories.

Plus, what you're saying makes sense if you're out somewhere close to where the battle is going to be. When you're dropping bombs in the center of a major city like Berlin though, chances are that you're bomb is going to hit something important no matter what.

Aiming specifically for people, even in WW2, by the allies was far from their minds. Why? Because even our leaders then weren't trying to create a pure senseless victory. Air superiority and smashing the enemy was in their minds, however so was the thought of lessening unecessary suffering and having minimal civilian casualties. This is why in the USAAF and other military divisions when to great lengths to avoid bombing churches, schools and hospitals.

I swear to god AMBOMB is channeling the ghost of Billy Mitchell

If he is, AMBOMB isn't listening. Billy Mitchell was an aviation genious, innovator and a master tactician. AMBOMB is not.

Scary thought....considering Mitchell is one of My personal Heros...

+2.

The bombing of power plants seems ideal, it would hault production and dampen the morale of the people. However, these powerplants were difficult to get to and heavily fortified, moreso than other insdustrial plants. Personally, the plans that the planners of air war in Europe did it perfectly considering their options. The only thing I would have also considered was specifically targeting roads, bridges and rail to slow the movement of supplies and troops.

HOWEVER, there is one flaw in my own plan. Allied bombing, more or less was like fireing a shotgun at a small target at close range. The allies would have hit the roads, bridges and rail. But they would have also would have got the switching station, the neighborhood next to the bridge, the toll house and the cows grazing near by. Allied bombing didn't have precision guided bombs or missiles to perform such an act. The allies didn't even have rockets on aircraft perfected and mounted on P-51s and P-38s until mid 1944 and by then it was too late for axis to do anything.

I believe this is a situation where there couldn't have been any other solution, thus no "what if" can be applied.
 
As a total non-expert on this subject, I find the postings of experts such as CalBear and Sir Scott very informative. It appears to me that the conclusion which must be reached is that with the technology available in the early and mid 1940s (or even the technology which could reasonably have been developed in that period) strategic bombing was a tool of limited usefulness which had been very oversold.
Until the invention of "smart" weapons and the atomic bomb (the ultimate very, very big bomb) strategic bombing was either ineffecitve with acceptable losses, somehat more effective with unacceptable losses or somewhat effective with acceptable losses if the enemy countermeasures had been largely destroyed (as in the end of the war in both Europe and Japan).
So for me the question is, were the resources the U.K. and the U.S. poured into Bomber Command and the Eighth Airforce (and equivalent units) well spent or could they have been better spent for tactical aircraft, tanks or something else? What do our forum experts say?
 
Aiming specifically for people, even in WW2, by the allies was far from their minds.
RAF Bomber Command's express objective was civilians, in particular, housing, with the aim of undermining German morale. It was never explained how this would be measured, nor actual effects of bombing even examined. Neither was it ever explained why German morale would break, when Britain's didn't, so long as it was possible to strike back (demonstrated as far back as 1937 in China).
I believe this is a situation where there couldn't have been any other solution, thus no "what if" can be applied.
As noted above, I disagree.
strategic bombing was a tool of limited usefulness which had been very oversold.
Very true. It was, interwar, mainly a political ploy by RAF to avoid complete dissolution or reabsorption into the Army.
Until the invention of "smart" weapons
Here, we depart company somewhat. It's my belief, without the over-sell of city bombing, & without the conscious decision by Winston, Lindemann, & Portal to bomb civilian housing, in the name of an unproven, & probably unprovable, theory (based, IMO, in overestimation of the effect from WW1, scaled up to frankly fancifal levels), the technology existed to have 1st-generation British PGMs in service in '40-1. Something comparable to Fritz-X, perhaps even approaching Firebee, did not require anything really new, just new thinking.
So for me the question is, were the resources the U.K. and the U.S. poured into Bomber Command and the Eighth Airforce (and equivalent units) well spent or could they have been better spent for tactical aircraft, tanks or something else? What do our forum experts say?
This is a very common proposal. Unfortunately, from what Terraine (among others) suggests, it's impossible. First, design & production of tanks (say) was a lengthy process, & specialist facilities were needed; it seems increasing production rapidly wasn't possible. Second, it was easier (for reasons I frankly don't know) to increase output of aircraft rapidly, when it wasn't for tanks. Third, increased numbers of tactical aircraft (the Mossie being the usual example) demanded more aircrews, & the training program was at full stretch already, even allowing for retraining of 4-engine pilots/co-pilots. (Cancelling heavies would free a great many highly skilled men out of gunners, radio operators, & so on, for the Army, tho.) Fourth, production of Mossies simply could not have kept up with the demand. Fifth, & my pet peeve, is the suggestion it was bombing or nothing; why (just for instance) can't these aircraft be turned over to ASW patrol? If the objective is to win the war, isn't reducing convoy losses so strength can build up faster so invasion can come sooner as desirable as turning Essen into a crater? Isn't it more desirable than causing 50,000 KIA trying? (I'll leave off my own suggestion of mining as unproven; it would've been worth examining, IMO.)
 
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Aiming specifically for people, even in WW2, by the allies was far from their minds. Why? Because even our leaders then weren't trying to create a pure senseless victory. Air superiority and smashing the enemy was in their minds, however so was the thought of lessening unecessary suffering and having minimal civilian casualties. This is why in the USAAF and other military divisions when to great lengths to avoid bombing churches, schools and hospitals.



If he is, AMBOMB isn't listening. Billy Mitchell was an aviation genious, innovator and a master tactician. AMBOMB is not.



+2.

The bombing of power plants seems ideal, it would hault production and dampen the morale of the people. However, these powerplants were difficult to get to and heavily fortified, moreso than other insdustrial plants. Personally, the plans that the planners of air war in Europe did it perfectly considering their options. The only thing I would have also considered was specifically targeting roads, bridges and rail to slow the movement of supplies and troops.

HOWEVER, there is one flaw in my own plan. Allied bombing, more or less was like fireing a shotgun at a small target at close range. The allies would have hit the roads, bridges and rail. But they would have also would have got the switching station, the neighborhood next to the bridge, the toll house and the cows grazing near by. Allied bombing didn't have precision guided bombs or missiles to perform such an act. The allies didn't even have rockets on aircraft perfected and mounted on P-51s and P-38s until mid 1944 and by then it was too late for axis to do anything.

I believe this is a situation where there couldn't have been any other solution, thus no "what if" can be applied.

At least I can spell genius. :D
 

CalBear

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RAF Bomber Command's express objective was civilians, in particular, housing, with the aim of undermining German morale. It was never explained how this would be measured, nor actual effects of bombing even examined. Neither was it ever explained why German morale would break, when Britain's didn't, so long as it was possible to strike back (demonstrated as far back as 1937 in China).

Sir Arthur "Bomber" Harris was utterly dedicated to killing German civillians, reasoning famously, that it was easier to "get Fritz in his bed than on the job". At best you could say that Harris was committed to the overall strategic campaign, at worst you could say that he SHOULD HAVE BEEN committed over the strategic campaign. It is interesting to note that, even when the bombing was proved to be less than effective in dropping German morale, Harris never adapted and continued to take horrific crew losses throughtout the war (I've seen several sources that indicate that for a large part of the war Bomber Command crews had a shorter life expectancy than junior officers on the Somme, based on loss rates for days in combat). This is in contrast to the USAAF which did, mostly, make a successful switch to oil production facilities and other "area" military targets where pinpoint accuracy was not needed.

Harris was, however, not alone in targeting civilians. All sides did it during the war, none more successfully than the U.S. XXI Bomber Command which spent the last seven months of the war burning down Japanese cities with the acknowledged effect of killing massive numbers of civilians (although the stated goal was to burn down the small home based shops that produced much of Japan's machine parts).

......

This is a very common proposal. Unfortunately, from what Terraine (among others) suggests, it's impossible. First, design & production of tanks (say) was a lengthy process, & specialist facilities were needed; it seems increasing production rapidly wasn't possible. Second, it was easier (for reasons I frankly don't know) to increase output of aircraft rapidly, when it wasn't for tanks. Third, increased numbers of tactical aircraft (the Mossie being the usual example) demanded more aircrews, & the training program was at full stretch already, even allowing for retraining of 4-engine pilots/co-pilots. (Cancelling heavies would free a great many highly skilled men out of gunners, radio operators, & so on, for the Army, tho.) Fourth, production of Mossies simply could not have kept up with the demand. Fifth, & my pet peeve, is the suggestion it was bombing or nothing; why (just for instance) can't these aircraft be turned over to ASW patrol? If the objective is to win the war, isn't reducing convoy losses so strength can build up faster so invasion can come sooner as desirable as turning Essen into a crater? Isn't it more desirable than causing 50,000 KIA trying? (I'll leave off my own suggestion of mining as unproven; it would've been worth examining, IMO.)

A couple points here.

Aircraft production was easier to scale up then some others (like tanks) for several reasons, not the least of which was materials. Steel was a bottleneck even in the U.S. supply pipeline (hence the "steel crisis" that caused a number of major surface combatants construction to be delayed or cancelled so the steel could be diverted to making landing ships and landing craft) Aircraft used a much smaller amount of steel than a tank, being made mostly of Aluminum. Aluminum was not in short supply, at least not compared to high quality steel.

The Bomber Offensive vs. the ASW effort was less of an either/or than this post indicates. Yes, for a short period after the introduction of the B-24, the Coastal Command was unable to get as many of the aircraft as they wanted, but this was for a fairly brief period and was no way detrimental to the defeat of the U-boat. Even the B-24 was unable to cover the whole of the Atlantic; the defeat of the U-boat was by carrier airpower, inproved escort tactics/weapons and signal intel not by heavy bombers acting as patrol aircraft, and would not have been, even if they had been available in massive numbers.

To make a point that has been mentioned briefly by another poster, the OVERALL Bomber Offensive was much more important than the actual success of the strikes themselves might indicate. The Germans were forced to dedicate massive amounts of resources (resources that, unlike the Allies, Germany did not have in abundance) to blunt the bombing. There were literally thousands of 88mm & 120mm guns (along with their crews) diverted from the Eastern Front and Atlantic Wall to act as flak batteries defending German cities. The German also used huge amount of material to construct "flak towers" (possibly the most impressive constructions of the entire war) in Berlin, using material that could have been put to use in building defenses along the Atlantic approaches or on the German frontiers. The Allies made it a point while in talks with Stalin that there was a Second Front against the Germans in Europe, it was just at 25,000 feet.

The Allies both proved AND disproved Strategic bombing as a valid warfighting method. They failed to defeat the Germans by destroying their civilian morale and the country's industrial base, but the effort DID greated diminish the Reich's ability to defend against the ground forces closing in on the Reich from both East and West, by doing so the Offensive did hasten the end of the war and recuce overall Allied casualties..
 
Anybody aware as to how often Sewage Works were targeted in The Second World War?

I'm not taking the piss but nowadays they are targeted because of their use in industry, for example you can't produce steel without clean pure water. I think the same is true for aluminium.
Also there is the obvious effects of denying the populace of a country safe/clean drinking water, which not only would reduce morale but is likely to impact peoples health. The spread of disease is likely, bedding people down, and therefore reducing the workforce. Healthcare is likewise affected because again theres no clean water.

Not only that but sewage plants aren't the easiest things to repair, the water goes through stages of treatment, including biological treatment (possibly not at this point in history), that isn't that easy to replace (it requires cultivation of microscopic organisms).

Plus, Sewage Plants are quite large areas (IIRC theres a big one on a man-made island in Sevastopol(?)) and this place has a huge surface area, much bigger than any of the ships berthed alongside.

And, who wants to clean up shit?

:)
 
Okay lets just go nuts. Let's assume someone maps out the major power-plants for germany and gets those earthquake bombs all loaded up and ready to fly. In theory I suppose using such a weapon could ensure the destruction of power plants, but it is more costly, and in a smaller scale then regular bombardment. Thus more likely to have a single chance at being accepted.
 
Transport Plan

Fellas, you're forgetting bout how the Allied airforces during 1943-44 didb target infrastructure in occupied France in the leadup to D-Day- that was the Transport Plan, which effectively isolated the part of NW France slated for invasion by taking out the bridges, trains, roads, etc
 
Harris was, however, not alone in targeting civilians. All sides did it during the war, none more successfully than the U.S. XXI Bomber Command which spent the last seven months of the war burning down Japanese cities with the acknowledged effect of killing massive numbers of civilians (although the stated goal was to burn down the small home based shops that produced much of Japan's machine parts).
Here, I call off-topic. The question was "German powerplants", not Japanese factories. You're not wrong in either assertion, tho. Neither was it as effective as hoped: at Nagasaki, IIRC, the factories were a) mostly on the outskirts & b) mostly unaffected by the Bomb.
Aircraft production was easier to scale up then some others (like tanks) for several reasons, not the least of which was materials. Steel was a bottleneck even in the U.S. supply pipeline (hence the "steel crisis" that caused a number of major surface combatants construction to be delayed or cancelled so the steel could be diverted to making landing ships and landing craft) Aircraft used a much smaller amount of steel than a tank, being made mostly of Aluminum. Aluminum was not in short supply, at least not compared to high quality steel.
Thanks for helping clear that up. I should have thought of steel.:eek:
The Bomber Offensive vs. the ASW effort was less of an either/or than this post indicates. Yes, for a short period after the introduction of the B-24, the Coastal Command was unable to get as many of the aircraft as they wanted, but this was for a fairly brief period
It's not just B-24s. CC fought Harris for priority on everything for the duration. BC got ASV.II before CC, & it promptly fell into German hands; it wouldn't have, had CC gotten it, & it could've stopped a great many U-boats. Neither were Stirlings turned over, despite BC disparagement of them.
and was no way detrimental to the defeat of the U-boat.
That's just flat wrong. Just 3 squadrons of B-24s or Stirlings in Newfoundland in 1/40 could have dramatically cut convoy losses, at a time when escorts were in desperately short supply. The knock-on effect lasts the duration & increases the longer the war lasts.
Even the B-24 was unable to cover the whole of the Atlantic; the defeat of the U-boat was by carrier airpower, inproved escort tactics/weapons and signal intel not by heavy bombers acting as patrol aircraft, and would not have been, even if they had been available in massive numbers.
I don't claim either B-24s or Stirlings could cover the whole Atlantic, nor decisiveness, just it wasn't "bombing or nothing". As noted, any air cover had impacts, the earlier the better. And I take Winston's view winning the Battle of the Atlantic should have been top priority: survival must take precedence over victory. (As racers say, you can't win if you don't finish.) So, ASW patrol, with radar & Leigh light, could have dramatically improved the delivery of supplies, including aircraft & fuel to BC...not to mention the buildup of troops in Britain for invasion. Furthermore, lost & damaged ships have to be replaced/repaired, & yard space, labor, & material could have been used to build (for instance) LCs.
Sir Arthur "Bomber" Harris was utterly dedicated to killing German civillians, reasoning famously, that it was easier to "get Fritz in his bed than on the job". At best you could say that Harris was committed to the overall strategic campaign, at worst you could say that he SHOULD HAVE BEEN committed over the strategic campaign. It is interesting to note that, even when the bombing was proved to be less than effective in dropping German morale, Harris never adapted and continued to take horrific crew losses throughtout the war (I've seen several sources that indicate that for a large part of the war Bomber Command crews had a shorter life expectancy than junior officers on the Somme, based on loss rates for days in combat). This is in contrast to the USAAF which did, mostly, make a successful switch to oil production facilities and other "area" military targets where pinpoint accuracy was not needed.
No argument. The problem was in not adapting. Also, in taking effectiveness entirely (or almost) on faith.
To make a point that has been mentioned briefly by another poster, the OVERALL Bomber Offensive was much more important than the actual success of the strikes themselves might indicate. The Germans were forced to dedicate massive amounts of resources (resources that, unlike the Allies, Germany did not have in abundance) to blunt the bombing. There were literally thousands of 88mm & 120mm guns (along with their crews) diverted from the Eastern Front and Atlantic Wall to act as flak batteries defending German cities. The German also used huge amount of material to construct "flak towers" (possibly the most impressive constructions of the entire war) in Berlin, using material that could have been put to use in building defenses along the Atlantic approaches or on the German frontiers. The Allies made it a point while in talks with Stalin that there was a Second Front against the Germans in Europe, it was just at 25,000 feet.
...They failed to defeat the Germans by destroying their civilian morale and the country's industrial base, but the effort DID greated diminish the Reich's ability to defend against the ground forces closing in on the Reich from both East and West, by doing so the Offensive did hasten the end of the war and recuce overall Allied casualties..
This is the usual argument, & I'm not convinced. I'd equate the bombing campaign to Haig at Verdun: throwing men against known targets, where the enemy knows you're going to come back, where defenses are going to get increasingly stronger, & ignoring other available options. I call that immoral. Never mind the civilian casualties; there's a war on, & civilians are contributing to the enemy's war potential. It's immoral for the wanton waste of Allied lives.
Anybody aware as to how often Sewage Works were targeted in The Second World War?
...
Not only that but sewage plants aren't the easiest things to repair, the water goes through stages of treatment, including biological treatment (possibly not at this point in history), that isn't that easy to replace (it requires cultivation of microscopic organisms).
That's a very interesting idea...:cool::cool:
Okay lets just go nuts. Let's assume someone maps out the major power-plants for germany and gets those earthquake bombs all loaded up and ready to fly. In theory I suppose using such a weapon could ensure the destruction of power plants, but it is more costly, and in a smaller scale then regular bombardment. Thus more likely to have a single chance at being accepted.
That's pretty interesting, too.:cool: You'd have to hit them, & accuracy wasn't great even in '45. Mossies could maybe do it in '44-5, but couldn't carry the Tallboy; max load was a 4000pdr, which might do it. Getting it approved is probably the hardest part.
 
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