Allied WW2 Improvements

[AdA]

France (with Britain) and Poland invade Germany in 1938. The Germans are dragged into vastly premature three front war. Game over.

In 1938 the Allied generals hugely overestimated the strengh of the German Armed Forces and advised their politicians to buy time. It was a big mistake, avoidable with better intel.

 

[Grey Wolf]

France (with Britain) and Poland invade Germany in 1938. The Germans are dragged into vastly premature three front war. Game over.

In 1938 the Allied generals hugely overestimated the strengh of the German Armed Forces and advised their politicians to buy time. It was a big mistake, avoidable with better intel.

Since I was always taught that we needed the extra year to get ready, surely the Allies had severe faults that they rushed to fix in 1938-39? Weren't the shadow factories and air training companies all set up in this period?

Best Regards
Grey Wolf

 

[Incognitia]

Key thing that helps everyone-but-Poland for the war in the west - keep France in the fight.
You can initially do this by stalling the Blitzkrieg, and that is basically hitting the Ardennes hard. It doesn't require different organisation, tactics or equipment (though all of them would help!), it just requires a better use of resources that are available.

Even if the Battle of France is still won by the Germans, the Allies will be in a better position. More people evacuated. More experience of fighting the Germans. More German units trashed.

Assuming France has fallen, mitigate the Invasion Panic - the panicked continuation of out-dated production like the 2-pounder gun led to inadequate equipment being issued far past its time.

Pursuing Op Compass to a successful conclusion rather than turning to Greece - clears the North African theatre, saves the many many Allied troops who were killed or taken prisoner in that campaign. Also frees up resources for:

Improved preparations in the Far East - a few more experienced troops, arriving a little earlier, and the whole campaign in Malaya looks completely different. The Japanese were on a shoe-string and depending on captured supplies anyway.
If you can hold Malaya, the Burma campaign may never kick off (the troops for Burma were initially sent to Malaya IIRC) - even if it does, it's likely to go better for the Allies.
If Malaya and Burma are holding and being reinforced, a lot of the Japanese sea-lift and air support for attacking the Dutch East Indies are unavailable, so the Japanese may never take substantial oil production capacity, and their war effort will come grinding to a halt even with only limited further Allied combat.

That would limit Japanese gains to the Philippines, and perhaps some minor islands - hell, if the battle of France went more slowly, the Japanese may spend the first weeks of war fighting into IndoChina, and never reach Malaya at all.
It would also kick Italy and Germany out of North Africa 2 years earlier than OTL; might well mean the French colonies are supporting the Allied war effort all along, and could even remove Mers-el-Kebir and have the French fleet working with the RN from Sept-39 to VE day continuously.

All in all a faster and less painful victory for the Allies, and all it requires is:
1) A better Allied deployment of troops in 1940. Given the limited logistics of the Ardennes route, a defence there should be possible.
2) No redeployment of troops from Compass to Greece.
The rest should come as knock-on effects of those two.

 

[Incognitia]

Since I was always taught that we needed the extra year to get ready, surely the Allies had severe faults that they rushed to fix in 1938-39? Weren't the shadow factories and air training companies all set up in this period?

Best Regards
Grey Wolf

Yes, but the Germans were struggling to prepare as well. Apart from anything else, they would not have been able to win the Battle of France in a matter of weeks in 1938, so French resources (and finance!) would have been added to Britain's in trying to win the war.

 

[Grey Wolf]

How far was the decision to get involved in Greece predicated upon an assumption that Germany was going to attack the USSR? I suppose, the question is how far did Britain actively plan for the Balkans activity in Spring 1941 to tie down the Germans, and how much was it simply a reaction?

Even so, if they DID just leave Greece to its own devices, might this not actually mean that Barbarossa is launched earlier and with the impetus to take Moscow, perhaps even Leningrad too?

Best Regards
Grey Wolf

 

[AdA]

Since I was always taught that we needed the extra year to get ready, surely the Allies had severe faults that they rushed to fix in 1938-39? Weren't the shadow factories and air training companies all set up in this period?

Best Regards
Grey Wolf

The allies were transitioning to modern fighters slower than the Germans. The Bf109 program was more advanced than the Hurricane and Spitfire programs and way ahead of the French MS406 and MB152. But the LW also managed to convince a visiting French Air Minister (or Air Force Chief) that they had a lot more fighters and that the Bf109 was being replaced by the Heinkel He113 "Superfighter" Apart from that, the German Army in 1938 was essencially a large trainning force that only expected to go to war in 42. German tanks were almost all light tanks only good for recce and trainning, the size of the German forces had expanded enormously very fast and they were still short of everything, from trucks to modern weapons.
They would be hard pressed to beat the Czheckoslovaks quickly if they fought hard and really couldn't do it and stop a determinated french attack at the same time. If we put a Polish attack on top of that they would have no chance.
The RAF would be useful because of its bombers and existing fighters, but the British Army wouldn't even be necessary.
OF course, if the allies estimates of German strengh had been true, the danger of German Air Supremacy and mass bombings could be contructed to justify a one yera delay to get enough Spitfires on the line.
An interesting side note of how efective the german propaganda was is that if we belive the RAF combat Reports writen at the time of BoB, the most efective german fighter of that battle was the fictional He113. RAF pilots had been brieffed on the Heinkel "super fighter" and when shot down would usually claim "I could have beaten a Bf109, but it was one of those damm Heinkels and he got me..."
There was a Cold War cartoon of two russian generals celebrating in Paris and asking "By the way, who won the air war?"
In a 1938 WW2 the Germans might win the airwar, but the Allies would win the war.

 

[phx1138]

Even so, if they DID just leave Greece to its own devices, might this not actually mean that Barbarossa is launched earlier

Nope, that's a persistent myth. The attack had to wait for the rivers to come out of flood (Rasputitsa, I believe it's called).

 

[Catspoke]

Go all in defeating the Italians in North Africa

1) Do Compass Dec 1940, but don't withdraw the 4th Indian Division to east Africa (East Africa can always wait) after the initial stages, don't do Greece later, march to Tripoli. hopefully the logistics are doable, but very small motorized/armor formations can do a bunch (i.e. like at Beda Fomm), maybe the British can land stuff on desert beaches in small amounts.

Once this is done, finish off east Africa, reinforce Malaysia, pick on Vichy colonies, expand Lend Lease to the Soviets a little. In 1942 Invade Northern Norway some place close to the Soviet front so it could be supported easier. Force Finland out, make Murmansk convoys easy.

Invade France in 1943. Victory in 1944.

 

[Mr.J]

Nope, that's a persistent myth. The attack had to wait for the rivers to come out of flood (Rasputitsa, I believe it's called).

Also, wasn't Zhukov sure the Germans were going to attack in May? With that "false alarm" being real, the Red Army would've been on alert and some of the chaos of the first days of the invasion would've been avoided.

As for Allied changes, let's say the French extend the Maginot line past the Ardennes. So we get the big set-piece battle in Belgium they planned on, and the Western Front bogs down.

 

[Simon]

Improved preparations in the Far East - a few more experienced troops, arriving a little earlier, and the whole campaign in Malaya looks completely different.

You might not even need extra troops from other theatres. The whole point of the Indian Army was to defend India and to put out fires in the region including the Middle East and Far East, Burma was annexed precisely to provide a defensive barrier for India. So since the Japanese are looking as the most likely future opponents and that you're probably going to be fighting in South-East Asia is shouldn't of been beyond their capabilities to set up a jungle warfare training cadre somewhere like Burma and rotate Indian Army/British Army in India and some Australian units through to learn at least the basics of jungle fighting and get used to the environment. Another training improvement would be to form or deploy a small core of armoured units to India, IIRC quite a few Indian Army units had never worked with armour or even seen tanks before the fighting started. It doesn't have to be massive, just enough to let everyone train together to pick up the basics of joint infantry-armour operations. Would also allow you to experiment with armour operating in jungle conditions in Burma as well.

For Malaya simply taking the most basic steps of keeping an up to date record and mapping of the conditions on the ground you may have to be fighting in at some point in the future would help tremendously. Rather than just assuming that it's all impassable forest and jungle they'd actually find out that parts of it were developed plantations and that there were roads and trails running between them and around the area before the Japanese started using them.

 

[mrmandias]

So a number of WW2 threads and stories focus mainly on what the Axis could do better in the war; different technology, leadership decisions, leaders, etc. So with a POD from 1930 onward, without changing anything major politically, what could the Allies have done to improve their war effort? Who would be better leaders to have in charge? What bits of luck and chance could change things?

1930ish is too early. With any kind of understanding that war is coming, they will make decisions that probably crush Hitlerism without much fighting at all.

 

[JimTheB]

A small contribution to the Big Picture

Have the US produce the BREN in .30-06 form and issue it in shedloads in place of the BAR to its troops. I suspect the USMC in particular would love this one.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Since I was always taught that we needed the extra year to get ready, surely the Allies had severe faults that they rushed to fix in 1938-39? Weren't the shadow factories and air training companies all set up in this period?

Correct as far as it goes. However:

1. Getting ready for the French meant executing many arms programs that were planned and spinning up anyway. ie: Dewontine 520 interceptors, or B1bis tanks. In terms of actual manpower, combat formations, training, or overall fire power the extra two years did not mean a large difference.

2. The delay allowed far greater gains for the Germans. The large army & airforce the French & Brit Marshals claimed for October 1938 became the reality in 1940. My back of the envelope calaculation suggests the Wehmacht had less than half the combat power in oct 1938 that is possesed in 1940. The French may have gained 15 or 20 %. ie: in 1938 not only was the German Air Force smaller, but a very large portion of the pilots had less than two years experince since they had entered flight school. Conversely the French active service pilot had over three years experience and 2-3 times the flight hours. In the case of ground combat units perhaps a third - the first wave divisions were truly combat ready. The others were formed but ill trained and underequipped. Not only did the French have more of the equivalent of the first wave German divisions, but their second echelon the series A divsions were well equiped and their training was such that a month or two could suffice to bring them near the standard of the first echelon.

ther eare many more examples... the bottom line is the two year gap between Crisis and battle was far more to the Germans advantage in creating combat ready corps & air wings.

 

[phx1138]

let's say the French extend the Maginot line past the Ardennes

That undermines the Belgians, & them feeling screwed was already buggering French planning. Why make it worse?

 

[M79]

I'm not sure this one makes sense - how do you "not let" the head of state of a sovereign country do what he wants? Short of kidnappnig him

Give him reason to believe that the fight will go on, ideally by not having key forts fall so bloody fast. Or make sure that he notifies and coordinates with the rest of hte Allies instead of leaving the entire sector in a debacle

Don't know what you mean by this? What would satisfy Mussolini? Tunisia? Corsica? Epirus? I can't see Britain and France doing that

Give him a bit more of the Dalmatian coast and some vague promises about a freer hand in North/East Africa after Germany falls

Don't understand people's dislike of Montgomery, and sure MacArthur screwed up pre-war defence strategy, but I thought his strategy in the fight-back was generally well thought of?

I think Monty had the ego of Patton, the strategic genius of Voroshilov, and was more a political hack than the best British strategist. And Mac was a distilled version of that. MacArthur should have been reprimanded and removed following the attack on the Phillippines, at least General Smith could blame a surprise attack for why so much of the war material at Pearl was caught on the ground.

I'd send him on a course to go round hospitals and rehabilitation centres so he knows what shell shock etc is. Then MAYBE you'd have him available earlier

Point noted, a Patton with a regard for PTSD would have been interesting, but I am not sure how to do that without having Patton go through it himself at some point which might make him unwilling to return to combat.

A Patton commanding Italy would be interesting, not sure how much more effective it would be (would be an interesting ASB since I think he'd probably be farther enough to warrant getting the Czechs and Hungarians out of the Eastern Bloc). If he gets turned loose in Normandy earlier though...

Best Regards
Grey Wolf

Likewise.

 

[Mr.J]

That undermines the Belgians, & them feeling screwed was already buggering French planning. Why make it worse?

Well, the Belgians can either let us build the Maginot Line through their country or they can take their chances with the Wehrmacht as we build it in the Ardennes.. I refuse to let a bunch of chocolate-chompers ruin the defense plan!

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

A Patton commanding Italy would be interesting, not sure how much more effective it would be .

After receiving his orders to the UK in January 1944 Patton visited his old friend Lucas, and examined the plans for Operation Shingle (Anzio). Patton as the former 7th Armu commander had a clear idea of the overall situation, and the strength of the German forces in italy. After his look Patton told Lucas the whole thing was a "suicide mission" and to save the last bullet for himself.

Based on that I'd think Patton would have told Alexander Op Shingle was impractical and Churchill should stuff it. What he might have offered as a alternative I cant say.

 

[Paul V McNutt]

aAppoint Paul V McNutt Secretary of War in 1937. As head of the Americsn Legion in 1928, he talked about the need to plan for industrial mobilization. hHe would have started to make plans right away. tThe US would have been ready earlier

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

The US certainly needed better mobilization plans. Those in place aside from lacking detail hardly touched on a four million man Army, let alone one of eight million. The actual useful material in place covered the activation of the Reserves, National Guard, and taking in another 1.5 million recruits. That thin goal made it difficult to lay out any sort of industrial plan connected to reality.

IN 1919 the Army CoS Peyton Marsh presented to Congress a plan for a Active Army of 500,000 a slightly larger Army reserve & National Guard, and a industrial "reserve" weapons manufactoring capacity to support between three and four million men. That was rejected as was Pershings request for a similar plan circa 1920-21. The only industrial preparation in the next two decades was the retention of the old arsenal system, which was guised more by pork barrel politics than realistic mobilization plans. R & D was repeatedly cut and came to a near halt in the 1930s.

For various reasons the USN was in better shape, perhaps because War Plan Orange had been written & rewritten so many times in 20+ years. The naval planners had a better understanding of what could realistically be built and the costs. When mobilization started in 1940 the USN had solid plans in place for its new ship designs and quantity for its Pacifc war strategy. The Army was dusting off old weapons designs dating from the 1920s & was debating fundamental concepts for many others. Only a very few aircraft designs were current in any sense of the word and a understanding of industrial requirements for a European war badly flawed.

 

[Torqumada]

From what CalBear has written this actually would be a bad thing; the US fleet would almost cerainly have been sortied from Pearl to engage the Japanese, thus denying them air or AA cover and leaving them out in the open ocean when the carrier aircraft arrive. Many more men and vessels would be lost than IOTL.

Subs instead?

Torqumada