Allied WW2 Improvements

[CalBear]

Can any of the Intervene In Czechosolvakia crowd find it on a map? It has no coast line. It borders with Germany/Austria, Hungary (which wanted and indeed grabbed Czech territory), Poland (the same) and the USSR. There was no possible mechanism for getting troops - or even aircraft - into Czechoslovakia with the technology of the 30s/40s. Unless the Czechs had been willing to let the Soviets occupy them - which would have been pretty insane in itself.

The Czechs could have held the Heer off for MONTHS in 1938, if not far longer. They had what was probably the best tank in the world at the time in the T-38 (a vehicle that the Heer used in huge numbers in both Poland and in France at the Pz-38t), an exceptionally well developed fortification system based along the German border where the terrain is quite mountainous and vastly helpful to defensive forces, and a very well trained, lavishly equipped army.

The 1938 deal with the British and French gave the defensive terrain to the Germans without firing a shot, what it left the Czechs was an open plain with no reasonable defensive position to even try to build a defense around.

 

[Rubicon]

The Czechs could have held the Heer off for MONTHS in 1938, if not far longer. They had what was probably the best tank in the world at the time in the T-38 (a vehicle that the Heer used in huge numbers in both Poland and in France at the Pz-38t), an exceptionally well developed fortification system based along the German border where the terrain is quite mountainous and vastly helpful to defensive forces, and a very well trained, lavishly equipped army.

The 1938 deal with the British and French gave the defensive terrain to the Germans without firing a shot, what it left the Czechs was an open plain with no reasonable defensive position to even try to build a defense around.

You mean the LT-35 right? The LT-38 (aka. Panzer 38(t) hadn't been delivered to the Czechoslovakian army when the Germans occupied Czechoslovakia.

 

[CalBear]

The easiest thing for the Allies to do, especially the Americans, is to simply get their butts in gear a year earlier.

In the case of the U.S. a year of serious effort gives them at least one extra carrier; two, maybe even three South Dakota Class BB (IOTL South Dakota was commissioned March 20 1942, Indiana April 30 1942, Massachusetts May 12 1942 and Alabama August 16 1942, adding a 2nd shift and week-end construction to the regular construction schedule, as was done once the war began, could have readily shaved six months off of these dates had it happened in spring of 1940) half a dozen CL, at least 15 DD and a similar number of SS. An earlier serious effort puts the B-17E into series production by Summer of 1941, B-24 series production by late 1941, the Corsair, P-38, P-47 (the R-2800 was available in mass numbers by early 1940) and TBF in squadron service by January -March of 1942 and the F6F by the early summer.

Sherman tank production could be advanced by six months simply by deciding to reduce M3 production in April of 1941 (something that would have been less than dramatic given the rapid withdrawal of the Lee from U.S. formations once the Sherman became available). In mid-1941 the Sherman was probably the best overall medium tank on Earth, far in advance of any German design and at least the overall equal of the early mark T-34.

In the case of the U.S. other changes would require some small changes in outlook (the reason that the U.S. torpedo problems went undetected was purely a matter of false frugality, firing a torpedo with a live warhead at targets expends that every expensive bit of machinery) but nothing earth shattering.

The issues with the British and French are slightly more difficult to manage, mainly because they are all related to either money or deeply held political and military doctrine. The UK had the best fighter airframe of the war in the Spitfire, but the money to build them in large number was simply not forthcoming. The French, well, the issues there are multiple, some related to cash flow and some of deeply held, more or less hide-bound, belief that the coming war would be a replay of the Western Front. Even these can be pushed around a bit, especially if the French instituted a mandatory retirement age of 62 on active duty officers, and if politicians were somehow persuaded to open the purse just a bit.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

US preperations from the 1940 War Powers Acts & mobilization:

Take British experience in ASW seriously. I understand there were severe training and escort deficiencies, but the looking for a solutions that excluded convoy/escort was wrong. Note: the responibility for this went beyond Admiral King. His predecessor and other laid the foundation and built the structure that failed when Operation Drumbeat was started.

Force the US Army to release a couple groups of VLR bombers for ASW patrol to the mid Atlantic in 1941. Not providing the best aircraft for long range ASW patrols, by both the US and Britain, was a significant failure.

Pay more attention to solving the problems of air/ground tactical cooperation during the 1940-41 training. Having the sort of tactical air coordination possible in July 1944 in reach in December 1941 saves a lot of infantry lives in 1942-43.

Send larger 'observer' missions from the US Army to the British and Soviet battlefronts in 1941.

Work harder to develop a understanding with the French. In OTL the US ambassador to France kept up a dialoge with Petains government into 1942. Unfortunatly there was not quite the level of trust and results that were needed to bring the French colonies to the Allies with less pain.

Put a higher priority/pressure/emphasis on developing the integrated radar/air interceptor system for Oahu & Luzon. The USAAF understood what the RAF had done to win the BoB in this regard, but the setting up of similar air defense systems was just weeks from reliable results.

Expand training and equipment development of the signals intellegence. That is set requirements projections higher than actually estimated in 1940-41. This will payoff in 1943 with more robust decryption/translation/analysis manpower in signals intellegence. Actually this could be a given for all aspects of US intelligence.

Organize a better process for estimating and planning military & industrial requirements in 1940 & for implimenting those requirements. The vauge & lacklustre policy & effort Roosevelt let past his desk slowed material production and mobilization far into 1942.

 

[phx1138]

Expand the Brit (& U.S.) DF network. (This enables tracking of U-boats & fleet units even if you can't read the cyphers.)

Expand U.S. intelligence's Japanese language schools. Also increase the manpower/establishment, to allow regular reading of lower-grade cyphers. (This allows the U.S. to read J-19 on a regular basis, & thus uncover the "bomb plot" message.)

Encourage actual intelligence analysis, rather than merely handover of raw decrypts. (This would've revealed something peculiar was going on at the Hawaiian consulate even if the U.S. never broke J-19.)

Change USN sub training to reduce reliance on sonar approaches prewar.

 

[amphibulous]

The Czechs could have held the Heer off for MONTHS in 1938, if not far longer. They had what was probably the best tank in the world at the time in the T-38 (a vehicle that the Heer used in huge numbers in both Poland and in France at the Pz-38t), an exceptionally well developed fortification system based along the German border where the terrain is quite mountainous and vastly helpful to defensive forces, and a very well trained, lavishly equipped army.

The 1938 deal with the British and French gave the defensive terrain to the Germans without firing a shot, what it left the Czechs was an open plain with no reasonable defensive position to even try to build a defense around.

This would might make a degree of sense if not for the Germans having control of an obscure country called Austria. "Austria." Which had/has a nice flat route into Czecholovakia - eg along the Dyje! In fact this area is favoured for cycle touring because it avoids nasty slopes.

Take a look at some of the pictures here:

http://www.czech-bike-tours.com/?artid=8

Notice the absence of mountains, yes? You might also want to use Google Maps with the Terrain feature turned on:

http://maps.google.co.uk/maps?hl=en...=JuDsUJrgMIWV0QWYnoH4Dw&sqi=2&ved=0CAgQ_AUoAA

 

[Bytewave]

Give the French and British a proper understanding of armored and aerial forces, and have them put those doctrines into practice by 1939, and the German attack in the West ends in a debacle. War ends. The Western Allies didn't lose that campaign because their troops or gear sucked, after all.

Pretty much this. Just have to give a guy like DeGaulle (Love him or hate him he knew how to use tanks in the 1930s while most of the French General Staff thought about fortifications and infantry support) proeminence similar to what guys like Manstein and Guderian had in Germany and the French will hold off the Germans, and the Allies will win over the next few years as the Germans cant sustain long term war.

Of course that was Stalin's plan. He hoped to be ready by 1943-44 to sweep over a weakened Europe. So you still have to deal with that.

 

[amphibulous]

The Czechs could have held the Heer off for MONTHS in 1938, if not far longer. They had what was probably the best tank in the world at the time in the T-38 (a vehicle that the Heer used in huge numbers in both Poland and in France at the Pz-38t),

I really doubt the existence of an army of Czech Super Tanks, because this guy sounds like he knows what he is talking about - he's very specific whereas you don't even give rough numbers:


http://www.historum.com/speculative-history/9311-what-if-czechoslovakia-say-no-munich-dictate-2.html

Czech army did not shown much interest in tanks development until mid 30s. Armoured car was a preferred vehicle at that time. Only from mid 30s the tank development gains priority. Many models have been designed and prototypes build but most of them have been rejected by army.

Skoda - CKD (S-II-a) (T-11) LT vz.35 - Czechoslovakian mainstay tank. This tank was inferior to German T-III and T-IV as well as Polish 7TPjw
Due to political tension in Europe,qte[ hurried into service in 1935 without proper testing, this tank was considered a "lemon" by the army. Many were sent back to the factory for modifications and repairs. Gradually the faults were worked out and the tank actually gained a good reputation. An unusual feature of this tank was that the transmission and steering were assisted by compressed air to reduce driver fatigue. This feature worked well until these tanks encountered the famous Russian winter.Romania purchased 126 units and named them the R-2. The Germans took over as many units as possible when they occupied the country. The German designation was Panzerkampfwagen 35(t). A further 219 were built to the specifications of the German army. By 1940, the German army was in such shortage of tanks that the 6th Panzer Division was heavily equipped with the 35(t) just in time for the Battle of France. Most continued in service until 1942 as main battle tanks and were then converted to a host of roles such as mortar tractors (Morserzubmittel) and artillery tractors (Zugkraftwagen). Still other were converted to maintenance vehicles] qte from Wikipedia.

To my best knowledge due to delays caused by numerous defects, only 300 of this tanks reached army prior to Munich. Additional 80 tanks of older design have been also available in 1938.


Skoda LT vzor 38 -German designation Panzerkampfwagen 38(t)
On July 1, 1938, Czechoslovakia ordered 150 of the TNHPS model, although none had entered service by the time of Munich.

Four “fast division” has been planned prior to Munich crisis each one with two battalions of tank. The formation of these divisions was never completed prior to Munich.

So the Czech tank force is about 300 "lemons" at the time of Munich, rather than a WW2 version of Hammers Slammers.

 

[TxCoatl1970]

@ Calbear & CS:
It may've been possible for the US to mobilize faster for WWII, but many folks still had the experiences of WWI misinforming them of how WWII would go- the US wouldn't have three years sitting on the sidelines before deciding to mobilize pretty much from scratch.
While the time to spin up from 1939-1942 was nearly identical but the US ramped up a lot quicker in raw production and knew it had to build up a capable military from 1940 on.

Did they make some bad decisions in what to build when and what to emphasize? See above. War is ruthless about showing whether your assumptions are correct or not.

1942 was brutal for the US Navy as it went up against both the KM and IJN with gusto and had to learn its lessons about what carrier a/c, Long Lance torpedoes and subs could do to ruin their day and how to counter them.
N. Africa was a godawful mess going up against good but weary, undersupplied troops in the Afrika Korps even with overwhelming air and artillery and logistical superiority.

We know now what gear and tactics worked best and adopting them a lot quicker would've been nice ceteris paribus.
The US Army had a major weakness that dogged it throughout WWII and afterward- a rather hostile indifference to properly equipping and training infantry (b/c they were disposable shock troops to filled by draftees, not capable professionals).
OTOH specialty units (Rangers) got everything they wanted in training and gear and were considerably to somewhat more effective than the usual grunts.

We have plenty of folks on the board wanking the German ideas about cultivating prowess in small-unit tactics and officer initiative that would've made the US Army's performance even more awesome.

IF the US Army treated their infantry as the basis for all other branches,
then a proper portable LMG wouldn't have been such an afterthought, nor would the bazooka been such a bust vs the Panzershreckt.
I guarantee you more M3 greaseguns (better, PPsh-44's, or better yet, reworked Stg-44's ) would've been available per platoon.
The US grunts fought hard, and if they survived, used a lot of tricks to make the enemy feel it, but paid a high toll in blood when they couldn't get artillery or CAS to take out enemy hardpoints.
As mentioned earlier, more US military observers learning from the Brits and Soviets what worked and what didn't against the Germans would've saved a bit of fumbling in N Africa and later.

Sure, having the stuff (gear, tactics, and strategy) we know now worked great in 1943 ready in 1941 would've helped.
However, there's a certain amount of fumbling around ANY organization does until it gets the institutional memory and general competence to deal with present threats.
If it has any savvy about what technical, economic, and political trends are in motion, it can deal with anticipated threats.
If it has a decent grounding in history, the repertoire of tactical and strategic possibilities they can develop is remarkable.

Sometimes, as the French found out in 1940, no matter how good a learning curve you have, elan and creativity don't mean shit if you can't move and hit the enemy hard enough in the right places for the situation to change.

 

[Simon]

Have RN realize ATWs would be a good idea.

IIRC they had actually been experimenting with ahead throwing weapons at some point in the 1930s but for various reasons they never carried it through to fruition. Considering the number of missed chances and opportunities the British had I'm still sometimes surprised that they won even with some of the gems that they did develop, but I guess the Germans just managed to screw up even more.

 

[Astrodragon]

For Britain.
Shoot some of the senior officers in charge of Admiralty weapon development, allowing hedgehog to be available before the war. Also dont lose the book on AS warfare written after WW1 and use it.

Getting back control of the FAA would have worked wonders for naval aviation, and the availability of more planes would have mean it would have been practical to have early escort carriers and MAC ships (both were planned, lack of resources, particularly aircraft, stopped them being implemented).

Shoot whichever RAF officer thought a fighter with a quad turret made sense.

Start building new tanks earlier - even a year would have made a huge difference.

France
Dont trust Belgium and keep some reserves behind the Ardennes ready to move in when the Belgians leave.

Accept that tanks need radios.

Shoot most of the Generals over 65

Dont do Munich. Even if the Czechs fight and lose, it takes resources away from germany, combat losses must be replaced, Czech industry is probebly wrecked.

License the 40mm bofors earlier and sort out production in imperial units.

None of these things require vast resources, and probably would lead to a German defeat in 41-2.

 

[Sior]

Shoot Nuffield!
Get the guys who design engines, guns, armour and suspension in the same room with the people who have used the tanks in combat, during the design of new tanks.
give Britain HESH rounds in early 40's for all calibers of British tank/anti-tank guns, including the 3" support howitzer that was fitted to some British tanks like the Matilda II.

 

[Simon]

Another one for the British is to get people to pull their fingers out and get a move on with licensing the Hispano-Suiza HS.404 20mm cannon. I can't remember the exact details but even after deciding that they needed the things it took months before an initial approach was even made and then the process proceeded at an absolutely glacial pace. If people had been doing things properly they should of had debugged modified belt-fed models in service by the time of the Battle of Britain.

For the Royal Navy not disbanding the combined operations unit they'd had running for a while since it 'wouldn't be needed' right at the start of the war might of been a good idea. Especially since they just had to re-form the thing with a new name at the beginning of the following year.

 

[CalBear]

When looking at the Heer 1938 tank force it is worthwhile to consider that this was the Panzer force vehicle at the time:

I really doubt the existence of an army of Czech Super Tanks, because this guy sounds like he knows what he is talking about - he's very specific whereas you don't even give rough numbers:


http://www.historum.com/speculative-history/9311-what-if-czechoslovakia-say-no-munich-dictate-2.html

Czech army did not shown much interest in tanks development until mid 30s. Armoured car was a preferred vehicle at that time. Only from mid 30s the tank development gains priority. Many models have been designed and prototypes build but most of them have been rejected by army.

Skoda - CKD (S-II-a) (T-11) LT vz.35 - Czechoslovakian mainstay tank. This tank was inferior to German T-III and T-IV as well as Polish 7TPjw
Due to political tension in Europe,qte[ hurried into service in 1935 without proper testing, this tank was considered a "lemon" by the army. Many were sent back to the factory for modifications and repairs. Gradually the faults were worked out and the tank actually gained a good reputation. An unusual feature of this tank was that the transmission and steering were assisted by compressed air to reduce driver fatigue. This feature worked well until these tanks encountered the famous Russian winter.Romania purchased 126 units and named them the R-2. The Germans took over as many units as possible when they occupied the country. The German designation was Panzerkampfwagen 35(t). A further 219 were built to the specifications of the German army. By 1940, the German army was in such shortage of tanks that the 6th Panzer Division was heavily equipped with the 35(t) just in time for the Battle of France. Most continued in service until 1942 as main battle tanks and were then converted to a host of roles such as mortar tractors (Morserzubmittel) and artillery tractors (Zugkraftwagen). Still other were converted to maintenance vehicles] qte from Wikipedia.

To my best knowledge due to delays caused by numerous defects, only 300 of this tanks reached army prior to Munich. Additional 80 tanks of older design have been also available in 1938.


Skoda LT vzor 38 -German designation Panzerkampfwagen 38(t)
On July 1, 1938, Czechoslovakia ordered 150 of the TNHPS model, although none had entered service by the time of Munich.

Four “fast division” has been planned prior to Munich crisis each one with two battalions of tank. The formation of these divisions was never completed prior to Munich.

So the Czech tank force is about 300 "lemons" at the time of Munich, rather than a WW2 version of Hammers Slammers.

When looking at the Heer 1938 tank force it is worthwhile to consider that this was the Panzer force vehicle at the time (BTW, those are 7.92mm machine guns). The entire Heer had less than 100 Pz II (with the still vastly underpowered 20mm gun) at the time of Munich. There is a very good reason that the Heer had the Pz-35(t) and Pz-38(t) (aka Czech LT-35 & LT-38 with Iron Crosses added to the paint scheme) as the backbone of the tank force that invaded both Poland and France.

As an aside, when the Heer retired the Pz I as their front line tank they turned a lot of the hulls in to tank destroyers, these were armed with a Czech (Skoda) 47mm gun.

 

[The Kiat]

The allies won, how can you do better than that?

Ok, one improvement I can think of is that the USN fixes those stupid duds in its torpedo tubes.

 

[M79]

-Keep the cryptography effort in the US open during the early and mid 1930s as gentlemen certainly do read each other's mail!

-Further US tank development during the interwar period

-A French command not so mindset on a defense at the Maginot line that they are flexible when it goes wrong or when the Germans bypass it altogether

-Not letting the King of Belgium surrender in 1940 so early as to unbalance the whole war effort

-Get American military thinkers to back early jet projects like at Lockheed under Kelly Thomas

-Back the Czechs and create a quagmire for German troops

-Satiate Mussolini and create another (weak but still present) power to offset German influence

-Fire general Smith and get a lot of the planes in Hawaii situated such that they are not easy aerial targets

-Have Monty and MacArthur moved somewhere that they do the least damage to the war effort as possible

-Give Patton more free reign and use him earlier

-Have the British Admiralty realize that submarines were the major threat and push ASW harder than OTL

 

[nwanda]

Get someone to understand the Blitz on London and its effects on civilians properly; Once this is done, scrap the carpet bombing program, shortly after dropping Harris out of a bomb bay whilst at height. Replace the heavy bomber raids with targetted, planned raids using Mosquitos and equivalents. Divert all of the now freed up resources used up in the bombing campaign into more productive channels

 

[Grey Wolf]

-Not letting the King of Belgium surrender in 1940 so early as to unbalance the whole war effort

I'm not sure this one makes sense - how do you "not let" the head of state of a sovereign country do what he wants? Short of kidnappnig him

-Satiate Mussolini and create another (weak but still present) power to offset German influence

Don't know what you mean by this? What would satisfy Mussolini? Tunisia? Corsica? Epirus? I can't see Britain and France doing that

-Have Monty and MacArthur moved somewhere that they do the least damage to the war effort as possible

Don't understand people's dislike of Montgomery, and sure MacArthur screwed up pre-war defence strategy, but I thought his strategy in the fight-back was generally well thought of?

-Give Patton more free reign and use him earlier

I'd send him on a course to go round hospitals and rehabilitation centres so he knows what shell shock etc is. Then MAYBE you'd have him available earlier

Best Regards
Grey Wolf

 

[Grey Wolf]

I always thought that getting rid of this plane would be a useful act
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fairey_Battle

From the article it appears you can't just say "Don't build it" so you need to get it properly assessed as out-dated earlier, and focus those resources into single-role aircraft - whether dedicated fighters like more Spitfires and Hurricaines, or dedicated bombers.

Best Regards
Grey Wolf

 

[Ian Hathaway]

I'd send him on a course to go round hospitals and rehabilitation centres so he knows what shell shock etc is. Then MAYBE you'd have him available earlier

That and make him less self absorbed with his own fame and teach him how to be less cautious.