Allied troops reach Germany by October 1944

Also from the same episode of the World at War I saw a General claiming that in about August 1944 allied advances were stopped for fear of running too far ahead of supplies, He alleged that German forces in the Netherlands were very weak at that point and might easily have surrendered without too much resistence.

Could the Western Allies have precipitate a route rather as the Nazis had in 1940?

Would the West being stronger on the ground by that Autumn have changed things in terms of the negotiations with Stalin?
 
Also from the same episode of the World at War I saw a General claiming that in about August 1944 allied advances were stopped for fear of running too far ahead of supplies, He alleged that German forces in the Netherlands were very weak at that point and might easily have surrendered without too much resistence.

Could the Western Allies have precipitate a route rather as the Nazis had in 1940?

Would the West being stronger on the ground by that Autumn have changed things in terms of the negotiations with Stalin?

Yes, they could have. clearing Schelde estuary earlier would give Wallies another big port close to UK from which to supply troops allowing them to move further faster.
 
Allied forces did reach Germany by October, 1944. Aachen fell towards the middle of that month, about the point where the the Western Front froze in place until the launch of Hitler's Ardennes offensive in December.

An earlier clearing of the Scheldt estuary would help the supply situation, but that doesn't change the fact that the Germans had been pushed back to pretty good defensive positions. If old Addie hadn't blown his wad in the Battle of the Bulge, the Germans might well have held out long enough for a couple of mushroom clouds to sprout over central Europe.
 
Allied forces did reach Germany by October, 1944. Aachen fell towards the middle of that month, about the point where the the Western Front froze in place until the launch of Hitler's Ardennes offensive in December.

An earlier clearing of the Scheldt estuary would help the supply situation, but that doesn't change the fact that the Germans had been pushed back to pretty good defensive positions. If old Addie hadn't blown his wad in the Battle of the Bulge, the Germans might well have held out long enough for a couple of mushroom clouds to sprout over central Europe.

defensive positions are that only if there are enough good troops to man them. If not they are merely obstacles
 
As I recall, Marshall, and by extension Eisenhower, pushed for a landing in Europe as early as 1942. Churchill would never commit. I infer that he was more concerned with maintaining the Empire than defeating Germany.
 
I feel I must elaborate on my previous post. From the perspective of Marshall, an invasion of Europe in late 1942 could have only two possible outcomes.

1. The invasion gains a foothold, and the war is shortened by as much as 30 months.

2. The invasion force is thrown back into the sea. A maximum of five American divisions are destroyed. The USSR makes use of the draw of German forces to the West to rebuild. The five American divisions are rebuilt in a matter of months, and the worst case scenario is that both sides end up right back where they started.
 
The question is WHERE to make the invasion in 1942. There were some areas in German occupied Europe, where an 1942-invasion could indeed succeed and accelerate the fall of Germany.
For example:

1. Crete plus Aegean islands (+/- mainland Greece)

or

2. Norway
 
As I recall, Marshall, and by extension Eisenhower, pushed for a landing in Europe as early as 1942. Churchill would never commit. I infer that he was more concerned with maintaining the Empire than defeating Germany.

Do you have any evidence for that? How does not defeating Germany and so continuing with an economically ruinous war maintain the Empire? IMO if Churchill's main concern was to maintain the Empire then he would have made peace in 1940 or 41.

IIRC the usual consensus is that Churchill, strongly advised by his generals, knew that an invasion in 1942 would be a dismal failure, and that the disaster would put off the real invasion and hence lengthen the war.
 

Redbeard

Banned
I feel I must elaborate on my previous post. From the perspective of Marshall, an invasion of Europe in late 1942 could have only two possible outcomes.

1. The invasion gains a foothold, and the war is shortened by as much as 30 months.

2. The invasion force is thrown back into the sea. A maximum of five American divisions are destroyed. The USSR makes use of the draw of German forces to the West to rebuild. The five American divisions are rebuilt in a matter of months, and the worst case scenario is that both sides end up right back where they started.

If Marshall really thought as you claim he should have been shot as a German collaborator!

Five Divisions would be more than 100.000 men and a large part of the trained forces available in 1942 - throwing them away in a failure can/will lead to unpredicatable political reactions. Both the US and British armies actually had problems manning their combat Divisions, especially with capable infantrymen.

If 5 Divisions is all that the allies are willing to risk, the North African and Italian options from OTL would provide much better bang for the buck, incl. a much lower risk.

Try and read Rick Atkinson's book on the North African campaign (Army at Dawn) and you will see how far the US Army was from being an efficient combat machine in 1942.

Anyway the number of Divisions availabale is only one factor, at least as important was landing craft and logistic capacity. in 1942 the allies were hard pressed in the North Atlantic and shipping tonnage was in acute shortage. So even if a large port could have been taken early in an invasion, the allies would seriously have risked not having the ships to unload.

A basic allied strategic problem was that the Germans, being on the shorter inner circle and with a very efficient railway system (even under allied airspremacy) much faster could move troops from one front to another. In short the Germans, certainly by 1942, could concentrate forces at any landing place in France much faster than the allies could.

If Churchill, as already said by other, had preserving the Empire as his first priority, he would have taken up the German approaches in 1940-41 - they basically promised the British to keep their Empire if they left the Germans alone in Europe. Actually I think you can say that the British sacrificed their Empire in order to save the world from the nazis. The Americans OTOH got world supremacy handed over almost for free, as the previous "global policemen" had become too exhausted (from fighting the nazis) to stay in the job.

That doesn't change that the Americans IMO have proved to be the best "Golbal cops" ever seen in history, as it doesn't change that they got the job under very favourable conditions.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard
 
The difference being that Churchill had actually seen just how a landing could go at Gallipoli. The idea that you either get a foothold or lose five divisions is deeply, deeply flawed.

The sensible thing for the Germans to do would be to let the Allies get their beachead and let them deploy as many green divisions as they have available. Then, since the Allies do not yet have air supremacy anything like they had in 1944, close the pocket and capture them all. A Kasserine Pass when your only a few dozen miles inland is going to be a disaster which quite possibly claims significantly more than 'just' five divisions.
 
As to point 2, someone has already pointed out that this is 100,000 men. your 'worst case' sees a large percentage of those dead or captured. Are you sure that less than one year after PH and with the recent losses in the Phillipines the American government would really want to lose these men or that the American public would stomach it?

Do bear in mind that Dieppe was in August 42 and that hardly counts as a success. Put simply the western allies were not ready to invade at this stage. With hindsight I have to say Churchill was clearly a lot better military leader than Marshall in objecting to such an idea.



I feel I must elaborate on my previous post. From the perspective of Marshall, an invasion of Europe in late 1942 could have only two possible outcomes.

1. The invasion gains a foothold, and the war is shortened by as much as 30 months.

2. The invasion force is thrown back into the sea. A maximum of five American divisions are destroyed. The USSR makes use of the draw of German forces to the West to rebuild. The five American divisions are rebuilt in a matter of months, and the worst case scenario is that both sides end up right back where they started.
 

Markus

Banned
Reaching Germany sooner and destroying more german units in the process is soooo easy. Just aviod this clusterfuck at Falaise and close the damn thing immediately, after that you can pretty much cakewalk into the Netherlands. Just like the allied troops could have easily advanced into the Walerchen peninsula, if they had been ordered to do so immediately.

If the POD is later, than cancel M-G and clear the approaches to Antwerp the hard way.
 

hammo1j

Donor
There's loads of stuff the Allies could have done better. (with hindsight sat in my nice safe bed tho')

1. Ditching Morgenthau and offering the Germans superior terms could lead to the overthrow of the Nazis from within.

2. Falaise pocket could have been more of a success as mentioned.

3. Intelligence on Arnhem could have been followed about there being a Panzer division there.

4. More bombing of oil targets.

As to D-Day being earlier we have to appreciate the one chance only nature of the operation and the extreme difficulty of amphibious landings.

The allies get an A+ for the D-Day landings and C+ for the rest of the campaign.
 
Reaching Germany sooner and destroying more german units in the process is soooo easy. Just aviod this clusterfuck at Falaise and close the damn thing immediately, after that you can pretty much cakewalk into the Netherlands. Just like the allied troops could have easily advanced into the Walerchen peninsula, if they had been ordered to do so immediately.

If the POD is later, than cancel M-G and clear the approaches to Antwerp the hard way.

As Antwerp was reached on September 4., not undertaking M-G but going into clearing the Schelt Estuary instead could have saved 21. Army Group a months fighting later in fall.

Then to have Antwerp operational after five weeks (clearing the Estuary in 2 and sweeping it for mines in 3) would change the Allied supply situation in early October perhaps making room for both a drive in the Low Countries and in Lorraine that month.
 
My post is based on a book regarding the working relationship of Eisenhower & Marshall, called "Partners in Command". Marshalls logic was as follows:

1. Defeating the Germans in Africa will not win the war.

2. Defeating the Germans in Europe would win the war.

In response to losing 100,000 men, so what? In 1942, the average American was not aware of the Europe First strategy, and people wondered why we didn't just concentrate on the Pacific. America did not go to war with Germany. We went to war with Japan, then Germany declared war on us, so then we declared war on them. Even immediately after Pearl Harbor many Americans did not see Europe as our problem.

100,000 is a drop in the hat. Over the course of the war America raised 80 divisions.
 
My post is based on a book regarding the working relationship of Eisenhower & Marshall, called "Partners in Command". Marshalls logic was as follows:

1. Defeating the Germans in Africa will not win the war.

2. Defeating the Germans in Europe would win the war.

In response to losing 100,000 men, so what? In 1942, the average American was not aware of the Europe First strategy, and people wondered why we didn't just concentrate on the Pacific. America did not go to war with Germany. We went to war with Japan, then Germany declared war on us, so then we declared war on them. Even immediately after Pearl Harbor many Americans did not see Europe as our problem.

100,000 is a drop in the hat. Over the course of the war America raised 80 divisions.

There was no dispute that the Germans had to be defeated in Europe and Germany itself invaded. Your characterisation of Marshall as the strategic genius who worked that out is wrong, it was blindingly obvious to everyone.

The dispute was over what would happen if there was an attempt to invade Europe in 1942 (and, more realistically, in 1943). The consensus rightly IMO was it would be a total fiasco and set the war effort back and Marshall came to accept that fact. He wasn't duped, browbeaten or otherwise tricked by Churchill and Churchill's motivation in resisting pressure for the 'second front' was not trying to preserve the British Empire as you previously claimed.

It's easy enough for you to claim 100K casualties as a drop in the ocean, I suspect the politicians and generals at the time were somewhat more circumspect; the total number of Americans killed in the entire war was less than 500K.

I've got to say, you seem to be making a lot of wild claims here based on little and/or irrelevant evidence.
 
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