Allied Spain

Trying to get a handle on relative air strengths during November. They are rapidly moving targets. I'm getting the sense the Allies are limited in the opening weeks by the number of aircraft they can deploy to the Med. In Feb/March they have a huge advantage OTL, but Nov/Dec they look weaker. Need a lot more research on this.

Corsica/Sardinia is a powerful stratigic position for the Allies in the western Med. Unfortunately they appear a island too far in November. A better target for Jan or Feb. I'd like to think I'm wrong on this & maybe more evidence for the air strength and other items will tip the balance. But, for the moment it looks like any reserve the Allies have from 10 Nov & beyond would go to Algeria/Tunisia.
 
Corsica/Sardinia is a powerful stratigic position for the Allies in the western Med. Unfortunately they appear a island too far in November. A better target for Jan or Feb. I'd like to think I'm wrong on this & maybe more evidence for the air strength and other items will tip the balance. But, for the moment it looks like any reserve the Allies have from 10 Nov & beyond would go to Algeria/Tunisia.
That would likely be the logical thing to do.

Of course, there was another island battle, where the allies didn't have control of the air or sea, raging at the time, and it would be interesting to see how such a battle would play out, if the allies could get ground forces on Corsica.
 
As in the 'other' island battle it would be intially running it close. Then after 60- to 90 days Allied air superiority would be achieved in the western & central Mediterranean. Of course Allied air preponderance will be achieved in some 90 days anyway, so the Sardinia/Corsican gambit can be played from a stronger position in March or February. ie: 1000 Allied aircraft in the western Med in November vs 3000+ in March. Of course there is a possibility the Axis will expend major reinforcement to those two islands (which they did not do OTL). So, a earlier invasion may be easier for the ground forces. Conversely the lack of Allied air force numbers in a early attack places the burden on the naval aviation. In that other battle the Wasp & Hornet were sunk, Saratoga put out of action for three months, the Enterprise nearly sunk, the South Carolina torpedoed and dry docked and a substantial fleet of cruisers and lighter ships sunk or severly damaged. Hate to risk that cost for securing Corsica three months sooner.
 
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Rather than going on the offensive against Sardinia/Corsica you will probably have the German Army hammering on your frontlines in the Pyrenees mountains so the odds are good that you don't have the troops to spare on an offensive on Corsica or Sardinia. Also if the Allies win the battle of the Pyrenees and force their way into Frances why bother you don't need those islands all that much.
 
I don't know what the Germans or Allies would actually be able to accomplish in the Pyrynees region. The place still looks like a sink hole for Allied logisitcs. On the German side they only have two motor/mech corps in France. One of those was drawn down OTL for the Tunisian campaign, the other the shiny new SS corps was hustled off to the Russian Front at the end of the year. That left a couple 'mobile' infantry corps in France and a newer unequipped & untrained Pz Corps working up in France. The rest was static or unready formations. To put real pressure on the Pyrenees front the Germans must either keep all the Pz Corps in France, and ramp up supply of ammunition and all the other supply requirements. This means the neglect of two or more other fronts. The middle way is Hitlers attempt to divide the strength among all fronts.

Given the risk aversion of many of the Allied leaders, or perhaps more accurately their not understanding the weaknesses of the Axis. I'd not see a quick move to Sardina/Corsica. The 'Brooke Factor' is at work here too. His ideas on peripheral strategy would be pushing Allied efforts to securing Tunisia as a step to opening the Mediterranean Sea route.
 
The Med is very important. The amount of shipping that can be utilized by having the Med under control is significant. We had a discussion on this some months or more ago over on another board, I'll see if I can find it to link to it.
 
I'd like to see the hard numbers in that. Some of the general numbers & other macro evidence does not add up to a critical importance. Guess it depends on how much it costs to open the Med route. In the autumn of 1942 Churchill, Brooke, and others seem to have thought it would be a affordable victory. Its not clear if they anticipated another six months warfare in Africa & seven months before the route was safely opened. Note: first convoys passed Tunis/Sicilly in May & June, before the Sicillian campaign.
 
Implications for the Pacific

Its been tangentially mentioned in this thread, but there are some implications for the Pacific theatre in 1943. Specifically with the South Pacific. In part Marshals support of MacAurthurs S Pac operations in 1943 derived from his disappointment in the lack of a large scale battle front in Europe. He balked at committing US resources in the Med & sent much of what was available to MacAurthur to use. This hypothetical Spanish front almost demands a reduction in material and shipping used in the S Pacific. Probablly to the point where only a reduced Cartwheel operation is possible, to consolidate the Guadalcanal victory.

This frees up a considerable chunk of US cargo shipping for use in the Atlantic. Which enables a faster Bolero operation, that can include Spain. Or operations in the Med. The effect would not be immediate, but perhaps visible as early as March 1943 & certainly by June.

If the USN plan for the Central Pacific offensive is still supported, then that kicks off with Op Galvanic in Nov 1943. But that without the distraction and diversion of the S Pac offensive. I'm wondering how much that changes the Cet Pac ops, and the campaigns in the Med?
 
An Axis invasion of Spain would certainly result in a Guerilla warfare. There would be certainly Basque partisans in the Pyrenees.
Here I can think in a worse political problem, since we talk about guerrillas. There were thousands of exiled republican spaniards fighting alongside the FFI, often with their own command and direction. And most of them where fighting in southern France (Toulousse was liberated by spanish units and the spanish tricolor waved from the city hall besides the french tricoleur) They fought with the hope that after Hitler and Mussolini, Franco would be toppled by the allies, and even in late 1944 about 10.000 spanish partisans tried to invade the Aran Valey to establish a provisonal government there in what was named Operation Reconquista.

So, how are they going to react to the (to be honest, very very unlikely) fact of Franco being now on the side of the Allies? How is Franco going to deal with the fact that his archenemies, the "anti-Spain" are part of the allied armies? Not only in the FFI, also you have some thousands of spanish republicans fighting for the Free France and even in the british ranks, not to mention those fighting with the Red Army (you had cases of strange encounters amogst spaniards from both sides meeting in the east front...)
 
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Here I can think in a worse political problem, since we talk about guerrillas. There were thousands of exiled republican spaniards fighting alongside the FFI, often with their own command and direction. ....

....So, how are they going to react to the (to be honest, very very unlikely) fact of Franco being now on the side of the Allies? How is Franco going to deal with the fact that his archenemies, the "anti-Spain" are part of the allied armies? t...)

A legitimate question. My answer is it will make French politics of those same years look like a walk in the park. Franco will not be able to control every faction and the hard core anti communist and pro facists will organize a resistance to both the Allies and any returning exiles. Franco will best prevent any exiles from returning & those already serving with the Allies need to be kept in segregated formations, much like some of the more rabid French factions had to be kept apart. The Germans & Italians will sponsor the return of the Division Azul (if it exists in this ATL) to fight the Allies. Since the Germans established agents in Algeria when the Allies invaded there OTL its likely they will do the same in Spain. Its closer, so parachute delivery is practical, as well as submarine and infiltration across the Pyrnees. No doubt profacists in Spain would attempt the Pyrenees in the winter to join with whatever Axis sponsored group exist.

Worst case for the Allies is a coup eliminate Franco & the Spanish army disintegrates into several factions struggling for power. In that case both the Andalusians & Basque may attempt to negotiate something with the Allied commanders in their territory.

Best case for the Allies is of course a surviving Republican government. There may still be attempts at coups, and there may be tens of thousands of pro facist Spaniards on Axis turf, and a anti Allied resistance inside Spain. Still this alternate favors the Allies in a number of ways.

in late 1944 about 10.000 spanish partisans tried to invade the Aran Valey
For those who don't know this story, it did not stop there. Efforts by Republican exiles to infiltrate into Spain and start a uprising went on after 1945. While by 1950 the movement was a dead letter, exiles continued attempts to revive it up to Francos death in the 1970s. The Basque independence movement was a independent faction of this effort.
 
Possible, but improble. That route was discussed a bit early in this thread, however the OP was aimed primarily at the results of & not the causes.

As has been discussed here & at length elsewhere any Spanish government has a large incentive to stay out of the war. It would take a hell of a bribe under any circumstances, or a outright offer that could not be refused, to bring Spain to war.
 
Spain is a logisitcal sinkhole of the Allies. Its ports were not as capable as the French or Netherlands ports. Its railways suffered from three years of war & decades of marginal economic growth....

And as the cherry on top, the trunk lines were wide gauge (1,668 mm = 5 ft 5 21⁄32 in) and local lines narrow gauge (apparently there were more than one local gauge) - so you might as well rebuild the whole thing to standard gauge given their general state.

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Having read up on the whole tread, if this is a spur of the moment thing like the (carefully timed) Torch scenario some have outlined, they you are stuck with what materiel is available in Spain and may not even be able to use all materiel if some lines do not interconnect with same gauge.

If parts of Spain are "unstable" that may also reduce the lines & materiel available, specially in the critical days after a landing

Basically Spain is utterly unsuitable for a quick landing & advance scenario, and if you are digging in for 6-9-12 months you may as well rebuild as standard gauge starting with the line from Barcelona to the border
 
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