Allied Spain

I'm to weak on the politics to create a viable PoD. Actually would it require several?
Hmm. What about General Ritchie (and possibly another) whilst travelling from the front by air gets shot down by the Axis in North Africa at the end of April, 1942? Auchinleck has to take personal command of the 8th Army (or Montgomery gets shipped out early), and Rommel gambles big, but loses the battle of Gazala in spectacular fashion. The British and allies still hold Tobruk, at the end of June, 1942, and suddenly Rommel is on the defensive and falling back.
The Axis no longer look like invincible, all-conquering, supermen in North Africa, in mid-1942, and the British and allies are suddenly months ahead of their push back westwards in the original timeline (and importantly, with Ritchie (and possibly some other 8th Army figure who hurt the Allies more than the Germans - insert desired name here) who doesn't seem (edit: from what I've read about him) to have been a very effective leader against Rommel, removed from the scene.)
 
Last edited:
Here is a quick illustration of some ranges for aircraft based near Barcelona Spain. Everyone is welcome to quibble over the exact range of each. Extreme reach of the SM79 & He111 are tossed in for comparison.

I think this illustration shows clearly some of the pros and cons on Spain as a Allied air base. Should not be to difficult to see why the USAAF leaders pushed so hard for securing south Italy and Corsica for their air bases. It also shows how, if the Allies are stuck with Spain there are local operational benefits for air bases there. One of those is the length of France is under Allied air cover from Bourdeux through Bayonne, the Pyrnees passes, & on to Marsailles/Toloun. That creates a larger headache for planning a defense against Allied invasion threats.

Error correction: The P38 range line is mislabeled P39

Aircraft Ranges.jpg
 
Here is a quick illustration of some ranges for aircraft based near Barcelona Spain. Everyone is welcome to quibble over the exact range of each. Extreme reach of the SM79 & He111 are tossed in for comparison.

I think this illustration shows clearly some of the pros and cons on Spain as a Allied air base. Should not be to difficult to see why the USAAF leaders pushed so hard for securing south Italy and Corsica for their air bases. It also shows how, if the Allies are stuck with Spain there are local operational benefits for air bases there. One of those is the length of France is under Allied air cover from Bourdeux through Bayonne, the Pyrnees passes, & on to Marsailles/Toloun. That creates a larger headache for planning a defense against Allied invasion threats.

Error correction: The P38 range line is mislabeled P39
Awsome Carl, and thanks for posting this. I have a few observations, and hopefully they will better explain why I have taken the position that an early ground invasion of France is not a good idea.

The German army had been at war for 38 months, giving their troops plenty of time to learn how to survive in modern combat, while the US forces (the great majority are going to be young fellows, from late teens to late twenties, as Infantry is a young mans business), will have some 'old timers' that may have been in at the tail end of WWI, but zero experience working together, on modern battlefields.

When I was in the Infantry, I was in my early to mid twenties, and most of the places I was stationed at in the military were good, clean, well set up bases. Despite that, when getting stationed in a new place, the local bug population will be making it's rounds amoung the new comers, and I remember getting quite sick when I got stationed at aberdeen proving ground MD. When I got there, along with all the other newbies, we didn't report directly to our training units, but rather were put in a seperate outfit, for acclimitaztion to the local environment. Within days, every single one of us was sick as a dog, and miserable, and then, after a week or so, all of us got better. That whas when I and the others found out that going to a new area was known to expose the new troops to the local bug population, and everyone went through that, and rather than have us in our training units and being out sick, they would just stick all the newbies into their own unit for the first couple of weeks, till it had run its course.
This took place in the USA, in the 1980's, at a clean, and well setup base.

Now think about that for a moment, that was going from one base in the USA to another, and in the 1980's, now picture what it had to be like for our troops going from the USA to africa, (Or in this ATL, Spain), in the 1940's, and you can get a feeling for what almost surely happened to our troops when the got there. Another oft overlooked factor, is that climate, altitude, and humidity all also can take some getting used to, and thus we could expect our guys to be 'under the weather' for a week or two, when they first get there. Also, the bases I was at were all permanent, existing bases with full facilities, the places our troops were going, likely were not.

So, you have an unblooded US army, comprised mainly of green, inexperienced young fellows, prone to making stupid mistakes (one need only look at the casualties in operation torch to see this graphically demonstrated), who are probably not going to be at their best, at least for a few weeks as they get over the local bugs 'welcome', and their bodies adjust to the climate, and I sure wouldn't want to send them into battle on anything like even terms.

Going into Vichy in late 1942, with such troops, and expecting them to be able to fight a battle hardened force, without the benifit of good, defensive terrain and a chance to 'settle in', would be a clear recipe for disaster.

OTOH, if you use your time wisely, you dig in, get over the body's adjustment to the new place, in the best defensive positions you can get. Then you give your airforce/navy fellows time to weaken the enemy by tearing up their supply train, so that when you do finally go into battle, they will not be at THEIR best.

Many folks, without ever having served in the armed forces themselves, make the mistake of assuming that troops are troops, and one day is as good as another, but don't know about the thousand and one things that can (and will), go wrong.

Climbs off soapbox.
 
The counter argument is you only get combat experience formations by committing them to combat.

Note that when Op Overlord kicked off the US Army had only four combat experienced divisions in the UK out of 22. Two of those divisions, the 82AB & 2AD had only a few days or weeks experience. A quick count shows 62 US Army divisions snt to France in 1944-45 & four of those had more than thirty days combat experience. A total of seven had any at all. The other 55 divisions & a similar ratio of combat support units had to become veterans while defeating the German army and running it off.

Two other points: First the US Army did not have a good system for transfering the knowledge of the veteran formation to the 'green' ones. Unlike the Army Air Force the Army Ground Force had no coherent system for returning veterans to the US to improve the training of the non veteran formations. Some medical cases like Lt Gen Collins were used that way when they recovered, but that was a tiny minority. There area few other examples such as in some of the airborne formations, but those are exceptional. The use of AARs to improve the training had mixed results. In some cases the reports from the battlefield were rejected and not used.

Second point is that at the pace the US Army operated in Europe most formations had trouble taking advantage of the lessons they learned. To use the combat experience to bring replacements up to speed extended interludes of training are needed. The US 82 & 101 AB divisions had this to some extent, so did the 1st & 9th ID, & 2d AD. Most were shoved from battle to battle with little time for finishing training of the mass of infantry replacements or the many staff officers who rotated through the HQ. This was counter to US Army doctrine, which assumed formations would be rotated to the rear for 'recovery'. In the Pacific & a lesser extent that occured in the Med in 1943. There was extended down time which was used by many, tho not all, commanders to sharpent the training f the veteran formations.

This latter led to what has been refered to the "greening" of US combat units in Europe. Their combat effeciency would peak at 60-90 days & then decline as the original highly trained infantry or staff officers were replaced by those out of the replacement pool & usually fresh out of their school training.
 
Note that if you want Spanish cooperation, then at least the garrisons of the Spanish ports are going to know ahead of time (otherwise they may start firing out of a belief that it's a hostile invasion); that's a lot of potential leaks. And obviously, if Spain declares war before the landing, the cat is out of the bag; Hitler almost has to launch Anton immediately, as it's the only way to effectively defend against an Allied invasion that he would have to know was coming at that point.

Also note that invasions (even welcome ones) aren't something that can be pulled out of a hat without planning; if they intend to hit Southern France at the same time, that needs to be included in the initial planning (which complicates things significantly, especially if they want to somehow arrange air cover for this alt-Dragoon).

More broadly, I'm not sure why we're getting so hung up over the 100,000 Vichy soldiers; OTL they didn't do anything to stop Case Anton outside of some negotiations in Toulon to cover the scuttling of the fleet, so I'm not sure why they would here.
 
More broadly, I'm not sure why we're getting so hung up over the 100,000 Vichy soldiers; OTL they didn't do anything to stop Case Anton outside of some negotiations in Toulon to cover the scuttling of the fleet, so I'm not sure why they would here.

You've been here long enough to know people nerd out on minutiae with WWII and ACW. In my case, I was just curious if it had potential to be anything more than traffic cops for the Wehrmacht.
 
The counter argument is you only get combat experience formations by committing them to combat.
All to true.

Note that when Op Overlord kicked off the US Army had only four combat experienced divisions in the UK out of 22. Two of those divisions, the 82AB & 2AD had only a few days or weeks experience. A quick count shows 62 US Army divisions sent to France in 1944-45 & four of those had more than thirty days combat experience. A total of seven had any at all. The other 55 divisions & a similar ratio of combat support units had to become veterans while defeating the German army and running it off.
This is the kind of detailed, fact filled, information that makes it such a joy to interact with you and other members of the forum community. More on this at the end of reply.

Two other points: First the US Army did not have a good system for transfering the knowledge of the veteran formation to the 'green' ones. Unlike the Army Air Force the Army Ground Force had no coherent system for returning veterans to the US to improve the training of the non veteran formations. Some medical cases like Lt Gen Collins were used that way when they recovered, but that was a tiny minority. There area few other examples such as in some of the airborne formations, but those are exceptional. The use of AARs to improve the training had mixed results. In some cases the reports from the battlefield were rejected and not used.

Second point is that at the pace the US Army operated in Europe most formations had trouble taking advantage of the lessons they learned. To use the combat experience to bring replacements up to speed extended interludes of training are needed. The US 82 & 101 AB divisions had this to some extent, so did the 1st & 9th ID, & 2d AD. Most were shoved from battle to battle with little time for finishing training of the mass of infantry replacements or the many staff officers who rotated through the HQ. This was counter to US Army doctrine, which assumed formations would be rotated to the rear for 'recovery'. In the Pacific & a lesser extent that occured in the Med in 1943. There was extended down time which was used by many, tho not all, commanders to sharpent the training f the veteran formations.
I agree, our leadership did a PP job of it, but unfortunately, were never called out on the carpet and made to answer for it, and worse still, we therefore didn't learn from it.

This latter led to what has been refered to the "greening" of US combat units in Europe. Their combat effeciency would peak at 60-90 days & then decline as the original highly trained infantry or staff officers were replaced by those out of the replacement pool & usually fresh out of their school training.
Yep, a sad commentary on the state of the 'high command' of us forces, both then and now. I don't lay all the blame on the chain of command, though surely they deserve to get their fair share of it, but the civilian government must take some of the blame as well.

Basically, the USA had a bunch of amatures running the whole shebang, and after all the dust had settled, no one called them out on any of it, which meant that the lessons learned and paid for with the blood of our servicemen, were lost to us. Guadalcanal, The Aleutian island campaign battles of Attu and Kiska, the "Black forrest" battle in the ETO, the list goes on and on.

One thing I learned about decades ago, was that at one time, the French were the best builders of wooden warships, and would routeinly produce ships superior to any of those in the RN, due to paying attention to the science of shipbuilding more so than the English. This should have meant, all else being equal, that their ships, one on one, would be more than a match for an English ship with the same loadout of cannons. However, these superior ships often were captured into the RN, when boarded and taken as prizes, becaues while the French learned how to build the better ships, the English learned how to better command and crew their own ships. In the RN, ship and
fleet commands were often filled by a leader that had proven themselves the better officer, while in the French fleet, their own commanders were often some rich blokes son, who had bought a commission in the French navy, and this often led to the French ships and fleets defeat at the hands of the English.

Apply this to the Japanese standards of training and excellence, and then compare that to the levels seen in the US forces they first encountered in WWII. Ouch!

One example of experience talking, and incompentence not listening, would be glaringly obvious to anyone that read "the thousand mile war" by Brian Garfield, and looking at the warnings that were given to the commanders of the Infantry division that would be going ashore and storming the Japanese defenses on Attu island. That shows the failures in the chain of command, and also the failures in the government for not securing a supply of the needed equippment, for use in theater.

It does, also tell the tale, after having paid a high cost in lost lives and lost limbs, about changes that were subsecquently made in the way things were done, so that our guys, well aware of the dangers, never had to pay that cost again.
 
Note that if you want Spanish cooperation, then at least the garrisons of the Spanish ports are going to know ahead of time (otherwise they may start firing out of a belief that it's a hostile invasion); that's a lot of potential leaks.
Or at least, the commanders of those units, who could be locally informed when the Spanish DoW was made public, and/or, when the leading ships first came into view. Still, you are correct in that more mouths that can speak a thing, does indeed increase the risks that one or more of them will speak a thing.

And obviously, if Spain declares war before the landing, the cat is out of the bag; Hitler almost has to launch Anton immediately, as it's the only way to effectively defend against an Allied invasion that he would have to know was coming at that point.
I think the choice is a tiny bit more complex, in that Hitler is still going to want to get his hands of the French fleet, so he probably offers a choice between an all out occupation, or at least a joint defense, of Vichy territory. If the Vichy don't agree, and right quickly, then its on for sure.

Also note that invasions (even welcome ones) aren't something that can be pulled out of a hat without planning; if they intend to hit Southern France at the same time, that needs to be included in the initial planning (which complicates things significantly, especially if they want to somehow arrange air cover for this alt-Dragoon).
The difficulty here, just in making the landings in a newly allied Spain, would be quite enough for me, so for that and the other reasons I have already listed up thread, is why I oppose an 'immediate advance' into Vichy, even if they ask for help, as we are not going to be operating from a position of 'supply strength' for some time (months at least). More on another option below.

More broadly, I'm not sure why we're getting so hung up over the 100,000 Vichy soldiers; OTL they didn't do anything to stop Case Anton outside of some negotiations in Toulon to cover the scuttling of the fleet, so I'm not sure why they would here.
Quite right.

The allies are just handed a huge, potentially game changing advantage with an allied Spain, and their first action should not be to risk it all on an immediate invasion, either from Vichy ports or accross the Pyreens, whose supplies are going to be comming from ports that are mostly going to be within air raiding distance from Italian positions, as well as from within Occupied France, initially, and newly occupied Vichy bases, in a few days, or accross those same mountian passes.

Instead, make the most of the terrain features, and establish your forces to keep the Germans and Italians out of Spain, and use your time spent building up your supply stockpiles and Spanish transportation infrastructure (weather that be road, rail, sea or air ports), and only advance when fully prepared, and after taking the time to wrest control of the air and sea from the Axis forces, and using your advantages to weaken their front line forces by supply starvation.

The biggest thing for me here, in this hypothetical situation, is the oppurtunity the allies now have to make use of infiltration teams, arial photo-recon backedup up with freedom fighter, boots on the ground intel, to pick out the German supply lines, learn their scheduals, and combine partisan/commando ambushes (with minefields hastily laid along side the road/rail, as a special "welcome to the revolution" kinda gift for when the ambushed supply trains troops attempt to dismount/counter charge the their ambushers), with dedicated use of strategic bombers for pinpoint (we now have boots on the ground, mind you, so flares and navigation beacons can be used) annhiliation of the German supplies, supply vehicles, and their forces. Don't give away a massive buildup of supplied freedom fighters by making a small raids (that have huge civilian repercussions), rather, wait until your forces are advancing, and then attack everywhere, all on the same day/night, to maximize effectiveness and minimum time for reprisals. Just food for thought.
 
You've been here long enough to know people nerd out on minutiae with WWII and ACW. In my case, I was just curious if it had potential to be anything more than traffic cops for the Wehrmacht.
you both have valid points there. BTW, I just started reading your ATL, and wanted to take the time to thank you for the interesting and entertaining content. Well done, and thanks.
 
you both have valid points there. BTW, I just started reading your ATL, and wanted to take the time to thank you for the interesting and entertaining content. Well done, and thanks.

Thanks. It's on hiatus as I have had real world things to do and I got bogged down in the writing. But I hope to revive it next month.
 
I have to agree the base course for the Allies is consolidation of the new position. Thats clear if unoccupied France is not invaded. If the French are trying to resist a final invasion its going to be tempting to send any reserve to Marsailles. Thats a gamble I dont care to judge at the moment.

If the Allies are going to support the French a safer move would be to rush support to Tunisia to prevent a Axis lodgement there. If the French remain unmolested then preparations for either a island campaign in the Med or a late summer (43) invasion of NW France would be in order. But, so much here depends on if unoccupied France is attacked. Still have seen many arguments pro & con for the Germans doing this. Any other opinions?
 
If the Allies are moving into Spain, the only logical reason is to use it as a staging board for future attacks (either across the Pyrenees or just as a logistic/air base). In both cases, the logical target is somewhere in France, and the Germans can't expect the Allies to recognize Vichy neutrality (as indeed, they didn't OTL with Torch). And Hitler ITTL will want revenge for Spanish "treachery," as well as to prepare to drive the Allies off the continent, both of which are going to be much easier if he has troops in Southern France beyond the coastal occupation zone. So Anton is definitely getting the go ahead as soon as Hitler gets word of either the landing or the Spanish DOW (whichever comes first).

I don't see the Allies putting together a relief force for Marseilles (or more likely, Toulon) in time to do anything. Anton only took a few days, and that's not nearly enough time to put together a force and launch it (especially with the complications of already doing Spain). An alt-Torch is much more doable.
 
Somewhere I have a list of US combat ready divisions for 1943. Also a partial of the British, but not the Commonwealth. One thing I notice that would help in the short run was the constant practice of splitting formations for cadre to activate new units. Each time that was done the unit needed to go back through a training cycle to bring all the replacements up to speed. Not sure exactly how long that took. The complete work up for a 'new' infantry division was eighteen months, including school training for key leaders and technicians before the official activation. So maybe six to eight months for a division that was split?
 
Last edited:
Somewhere I have a list of US combat ready divisions for 1943. Also a partial of the British, but not the Commonwealth. One thing I notice that would help in the short run was the constant practice of splitting formations for cadre to activate new units. Each time that was done the unit needed to go back through a training cycle to bring all the replacements up to speed. Not sure exactly how long that took. The complete work up for a 'new' infantry division was eighteen months, including school training for key leaders and technicians before the official activation. So maybe six to eight months for a division that was split?
I don't know, but would ask if the 'split' in the army divisions was 50/50? I remember reading something once, about how the WWII US Navy dealt with this problem, and it was supposed to be something like 60% veteran, 20% on 2nd cruise, and 20% on 1st cruise. Of course, with ground combat forces, that system is probably not going to be workable, due to the high turnover.

I wonder if this idea might be worth something;
For Offensive Divisions that are likely to be used offensively, make their replacement split 2:1, so two veterans for each new guy, and for Defensive Divisions that are unlikely to be used to make attacks but rather only to defend their positions, reverse that to a 1:2 split, as defending is eaiser to do and requires less training and experience, would you think that that kind of a system might work better?

For the new guys, the top 1/3 goto the Offensive Divisions, and the remaining 2/3 goto the Defensive Divisions. In theory then, the best new troops would quickly get up to speed, while the bottom 2/3 would be slowed down getting 'up to speed' but that would be one possible way to try to maintain offensive capabilities of your best divisions.

Of course, no battle plan and all that, but hey...
Thoughts?
 
Last edited:
To answer your question Carl, of "What will Petain do?" It may not matter. The key figure here IMO, is Admiral Darlan. What no one has really examined in all this is what an absolutely HUGE prize the MN (French Navy) is. We are talking about what was (IIRC) the 4th largest fleet in the world in 1939, and its about to declare for the Allies. In OTL Darlan made it clear he would NEVER allow the Germans to get the fleet, and this was one of the points of the armistice between France and Germany. When the Germans abrogated the Armistice OTL and invaded Vichy, his orders to scuttle were followed. in this case, once the Germans cross into Vichy (regardless of what they say they are doing) Darlan can either scuttle or sortie to N. Africa, and I think he will head for N. Africa. Why? The French aren't being attacked by the Allies as in OTL, but just as in OTL they desperately want to get back into the fight, the Germans crossing the border gives them the option to do so, and I simply can't see them not taking it. They've nothing to loose, as they are being occupied anyway.
So how does this play out? French intelligence was not entirely moribund in this time, so preparations in Occupied France will be noted. Petain and Darlan will know whats about to happen. Petain deploys the army, at critical areas as a blocking/delaying force. A tragic multitude of Poilu will die in desperate, small unit actions delaying the German advance. Others will move towards the French Naval bases and ports, to defend those. The Fleet, and everything it can cram onto its ships will depart for the North African Colonies. A not insubstantial number of demobilized troops, technicians, pilots etc will leave also. If Petain does not do this, Darlan will act on his own.
Ammunition stocks for the Fleet will be less than optimal, putting it mildly. However, they should be enough to allow them to interdict RM and KM efforts to reinforce or withdraw from N. Africa. The addition of a few dozen submarines in that narrow stretch of sea will have a marked impact on Rommel's supplies. Add operations of the Spanish and Portuguese navies into this (this will also cause ripple effects in Asia, with the Portuguese loosing their colonies to the Japanese completely) and the Axis are in a world of hurt.
Equipping the Spanish and French armies with more modern equipment will take months, but is doable. In the interim they will use what they have to defend and launch limited attacks to consolidate positions. The French are good, and will be motivated by the occupation of France. The Spanish, while tired and ill equipped, are almost without exception, veteran troops, hard-bitten, tough, they've fought a major war and will not be easy opponents.
Sigh, ok, enough for now. I have to get ready for work, slaving away to earn Kopeks for kibbel to keep the hounds and family fed.
 
I don't know, but would ask if the 'split' in the army divisions was 50/50? I remember reading something once, about how the WWII US Navy dealt with this problem, and it was supposed to be something like 60% veteran, 20% on 2nd cruise, and 20% on 1st cruise. Of course, with ground combat forces, that system is probably not going to be workable, due to the high turnover.

IIRC roughly 1/3 were split off. It varied according to needs. There was also a flow of individuals from the units, to schools, & then to a similar or higher job in another formation. That had its own problems. I notice few or none of the National Guard divisions are shown as 'split'. they did have a outflow of individuals, but no abrupt wholesale exodus for building a new unit.

I wonder if this idea might be worth something;
For Offensive Divisions that are likely to be used offensively, make their replacement split 2:1, so two veterans for each new guy, and for Defensive Divisions that are unlikely to be used to make attacks but rather only to defend their positions, reverse that to a 1:2 split, as defending is eaiser to do and requires less training and experience, would you think that that kind of a system might work better?

That is something like the static divisions or security divisions & Luftwaffe field service inf divisions. It worked as long as those were not needed for attacking somewhere. Early on the US had a dozen "Separate" infantry regiments. They filled local defense missions, in Panama, of Fiji. In 1943 they started rolling those into the replacement pool & using them for infantry replacements & new unit cadre. In Europe there was not much of defense mission. Keeping the offensive rolling at whatever the cost made more sense than slowly & methodicly taking a extra eight months to end the war. That was the fear at least. Eisenhower saw it that way & pushed harder than most folks understand to keep the offensives underway. Between that & the advance to Germany going twice the expected rate, and the number of divisions being lower than required. There was no ability to rotate many units out of the battle to rest & train.
 
An overlooked consequence of Allied Spain is that it considerably helps neutralize the U-Boot bases in the French Atlantic: airbases in Cantabria can easily cover the whole Bay of Biscay. The British are going to love this. This also makes the Germans need an even longer Atlantic Wall, since in addition to the Channel Coast they now need to fortify the (somewhat longer) Atlantic Coast. Despite being situated even further from industrial Germany, this coast is also excellent for landings, being basically one very long beach from the Pyrénées to the Loire.

Also, if the Allies plan something in Spain, they will probably give some instructions to the Résistance to blow things up a few days before- such things as railway bridges over the Loire and the Garonne, for instance. This is very likely to slow down any German answer, without tipping them off to what exactly is going to happen (as it did in OTL Overlord).
 
Last edited:
To answer your question Carl, of "What will Petain do?" It may not matter. The key figure here IMO, is Admiral Darlan. What no one has really examined in all this is what an absolutely HUGE prize the MN (French Navy) is. We are talking about what was (IIRC) the 4th largest fleet in the world in 1939, and its about to declare for the Allies. In OTL Darlan made it clear he would NEVER allow the Germans to get the fleet, and this was one of the points of the armistice between France and Germany. When the Germans abrogated the Armistice OTL and invaded Vichy, his orders to scuttle were followed. in this case, once the Germans cross into Vichy (regardless of what they say they are doing) Darlan can either scuttle or sortie to N. Africa, and I think he will head for N. Africa. Why? The French aren't being attacked by the Allies as in OTL, but just as in OTL they desperately want to get back into the fight, the Germans crossing the border gives them the option to do so, and I simply can't see them not taking it. They've nothing to loose, as they are being occupied anyway.
I think that you have nailed this right on the head. We know that the Vichy crews had cheated on the terms, and actually had enough fuel aboard their ships to make a one way trip to N africa. OTL, that would just mean they would be sailing into being seized by the allies, rather than the Germans. ITTL though, the allies have landed not in Vichy territory, but in a newly allied Spain, so they now have the option of scuttling in place, or making a dash for freedom. I think that they would choose freedom.
 
An overlooked consequence of Allied Spain is that it considerably helps neutralize the U-Boot bases in the French Atlantic: airbases in Cantabria can easily cover the whole Bay of Biscay. The British are going to love this. This also makes the Germans need an even longer Atlantic Wall, since in addition to the Channel Coast they now need to fortify the (somewhat longer) Atlantic Coast. Despite being situated even further from industrial Germany, this coast is also excellent for landings, being basically one very long beach from the Pyrénées to the Loire.
I would point out, wouldn't these attacks on the submarine bases be ESCORTED bomber raids? You are quite correct, the Germans are now faced with a much longer coast/boarder, and the Italians are not going to have much of a merchant fleet left to supply N africa if the MN can soon re-enter the war fighting along side the RN in the med.
 
Top