Allied Spain

We would need to present some parameters.

1) Do the allies leave port knowing they are going to be landing in a newly allied Spain? Or do they leave as in OTL, and the plan changes only once the Spanish learn they have troops afloat/in motion?
2) Do the Vichy French know what is in the works?
3) Does the Spanish DoW trigger Anton? Or do the Germans wait until they see what happens?

For #1 above, the more folks know about it, the less likely it will come as a surprise to either the Germans or Vichy. My personal preference would be that the allies know nothing of Spanish intentions, except at the very highest levels. Given that we are positing the Spanish entering the war suddenly, do they mass troops at the Vichy boarder, and thus likely tip off the Germans by doing so? Either way, do the Spanish plan to themselves to enter Vichy, with or without Anton? My vote would be that they plan to sit tight, and adopt a wait and see approach, and do nothing with reguard to Vichy until after allied boots are firmly on the ground on Spanish soil. This means there would have to be a move on the part of Germany, into Vichy, before a boarder crossing would take place.

For #2, if the Vichy do not know anything about the Spanish entry into the war until they hear about it on the radio (the most likely to maintain surprise), then we need to know if they have their 100,000 troops mustered, or do they need time to moblise them/move them into position, and if so, what is to be their disposition? For all I know, the Vichy forces may either be in their homes, or deployed in operational formations, but from learning that the coastal batteries in Toulon were being manned by sailors, I would assume that their 100,000 man allowed light infantry are not mobalized. Just speculation on my part there, anyone know what the Vichy troop strength/disposition was?

For #3, this is the problem that Hitler faces. His best bet IMHO, is to go with Anton right off, and order attacks against newly enemy locations in the med and NW africa. He just lost a great big deal of his willing foreign trade (his plunder is unaffected), and he will be greatly affected by Franco's betraying him, so I would expect him to order some type of immediate reprisal to take place. OTOH, we know that historically, Hitler hoped to that the British betrayal, would lead to the Vichy french joining him against the UK. As it turned out, it didn't, but in OTL there were not UK and US (nor Spanish, for that matter), boots on the ground, IN FRANCE. This situation here, however, could go either way.

So basically we need to know who does what and when, and who knew about it ahead of time (long enough to be able to do something about it), and what reactions their preparations may trigger. Does Franco have allied assurances that their troops are going to be landing in support of his DoW? Does he want to start off with an initial defensive or offensive posture?

For myself, my feelings are that if this operation has any chance of being a surprise, the Spanish army would not be given a heads up until the DoW is made public, and neither the Spanish nor allied forces would be deployed into Vichy territory initially. On the German side, Hitler, might (stress might), give Vichy Franch the choice of joining the Axis and fighting along side his troops, or to be occupied, and if so, what do they decide if given such a choice?

I know that militarialy, the best offensive plan would be to take the passes, and form a defensive parameter on Vichy soil, but will this incite the French to side with the Germans? Historically, no foreign troops entered Vichy France itself until after the allies invaded their african possessions. My opinion, the allies and Spanish, will want to get things sorted out on the ground, before making any offensive moves, so even though the best theoretical plan would be to take the passes, I don't believe that such would in fact take place. If and when the Vichy join the allies, and request immediate assistance, I wounder if that would be granted, and how that would go if it was.

I think that the most likely course of action (and IMHO best action), would be to make secure landings in newly allied Spanish territory, and wait for the Germans to invade Vichy and await the French reaction before committing troops to France. This gives the Vichy forces the best chance and reason to side with the Allies, and not go over to the German side, or just remain neutral. To me, this consideration would far outweigh any other course of action. The French have already seen one betrayal at the hands of the UK, and the US may well want to make darn sure that any US boots on Vichy ground, to be seen as liberators, not invaders.

Other considerations to think about:
A) At this time, all the European armies have combat experienced ground formations, the USA does not.
B) While the allies seem to be ahead in the air, historical ground war performance in NW africa would seem to indicate that caution would be the better part of valor initially.
C) If the allies wish to fully exploit their airpower advantage, they will need time to set up airbases and move their forces to these bases, work out their supply situations and local laison, before beginning offensive operations. Not sure how long this would take, a week or two would seem not unreasonable as a minimum SWAG.
D) For a ground war front, going into Vichy, without first establishing a firm base of supply from Spain, would probably not be a good idea or gamble. A defensive stance, with the barrier of a mountianous front as a deterrent, would seem to be the best initial goal for the allies, unless their is a belief that the French could hold the Germans off long enough for the allies to bring their ground forces to bare.
E) Fighting a ground war front, in Vichy, within hours/days of Spanish entry to the war, without taking the time to establish a firm foundation for the secure landing and moving forward of supplies, nor taking the time to establish that of the Air-war forces bases and logistics, would be a 'gamble to far' IMHO, one that the Allies should not take.

Thoughts?
 
Last edited:
Looking at it, IMO late 42/early 43 is the best time for Spain, early enough for their contribution to be welcomed and to not look like just jumping on the bandwagon, but late enough that Germany is obviously losing. Spain as a jumping-off point though is a terrible idea, the Pyrenees aren't the Alps, sure, but they're still a mountain-range, and those are damnably hard to cross in force.
 
Last edited:
Looking at it, IMO late 42/early 43 is the best time for Spain, early enough for their contribution to be welcomed and to not look like just jumping on the bandwagon, but late enough that Germany is obviously losing. Spain as a jumping-off point though is a terrible idea, the Pyrenees aren't the Alps, sure, but they're still a mountain-range, and those are damnably hard to cross in force.
I agree with this, in that an opposed ground invasion is not going to be a cakewalk, going through the passes. OTOH, Spain as a forward deployed air-war base, developed and utilized to the fullest, does make good sense. Just looking at the Spanish islands, and picturing allied airforces operating off them, as historically they never could, I think we can see the difference that an Allied Spain makes quite easily. Like in the Pacific theater, go on an island hopping campaign, next stop Corsica. The allies have the advantage in the Air and on the Sea, so pick your battle carefully, where the enemies weaknesses are your best friends, and you can whittle them down. Play into their hands, at the expense of your advantages, and you can loose.

The allies trying to force a land war front, in Eurpoe, from Spain through the Pyrenees, without having established at least air-superiority (if not air-surpremacy), and a decisive advantage in manpower and material, is foolish in the extreme. Instead, bide your time, take Corsica, where any enemy ground forces' logistic trains run into your strengths, and you are taking advantage of your strengths and most likely to achieve success. Fight their Ground forces where they don't have their logistic trains running on water, and you risk everything.

At this time, November, 1942, the UK is fighting 2nd El Alamein, and the US is fighting to take and hold Guadalcanal.
 

Redbeard

Banned
Spain is a logisitcal sinkhole of the Allies. Its ports were not as capable as the French or Netherlands ports. Its railways suffered from three years of war & decades of marginal economic growth. A general rule of thumb for industrial Europe is a common single track railway can support approx 100,000 men or 3-4 divisions with corps support. Like Turkey the Spanish railways may have been adequate to support 25,000 per line. Looking at the map it appears there are only two such main rail lines crossing the Pyrenees. It took some 24 months to rebuild the Persian railway to what was needed for capacity. Ten months after the landings in Normandy the Allies were just starting to get a grip on restoring the Franco/Belgian railways. If the Allies land in Spain in November 1942, they might have a few key trunk lines up to snuff by early 1944. Or not.

Automotive roads were far worse.

Always interested in logistic data :)


What do you reckon a Division needs each day? IIRC a German Infantry Division needed something like 300 tons each day (most of it arty ammo) for offensive operations so 3-4 Divisions + Corps troops would be something like 1200-2000 tons each day for offensive operations. Also from memory a "train" usually could be expected to carry 500 tons. So 3-4 trains each day should support the above mentioned force, but I guess even on a single track railway you ought to be able to operate more each 24 hours, unless of course the employees insist on 30 hour work week and use their work time mainly for sabotage ;-)


But an Allied Division with its larger number of motor vehicles and greater reliance on artillery firepower might need more than 300 tons a day?
 
Always interested in logistic data :)


What do you reckon a Division needs each day? IIRC a German Infantry Division needed something like 300 tons each day (most of it arty ammo) for offensive operations so 3-4 Divisions + Corps troops would be something like 1200-2000 tons each day for offensive operations. Also from memory a "train" usually could be expected to carry 500 tons. So 3-4 trains each day should support the above mentioned force, but I guess even on a single track railway you ought to be able to operate more each 24 hours, unless of course the employees insist on 30 hour work week and use their work time mainly for sabotage ;-)


But an Allied Division with its larger number of motor vehicles and greater reliance on artillery firepower might need more than 300 tons a day?
From the wiki, on operation crusader:

"A German motorised division needed 360 tonnes (350 long tons) per day and moving the supplies 480 kilometres (300 mi) took 1,170 2.0-tonne (2-long-ton) lorries. With seven Axis divisions, air and naval units, 71,000 tonnes (70,000 long tons) of supplies per month were needed. (Vichy agreed to the use of Bizerta but no supplies moved through the port until late 1942.) From February–May 1941, a surplus of 46,000 tonnes (45,000 long tons) was delivered; attacks from Malta had some affect but in May, the worst month for ship losses, 91% of supplies arrived. Lack of transport in Libya left German supplies in Tripoli and the Italians had only 7,000 lorries for deliveries to 225,000 men. A record amount of supplies arrived in June but at the front, shortages worsened."

"There were fewer Axis attacks on Malta from June and sinkings increased from 19% in July, to 25% in September, when Benghazi was bombed and ships diverted to Tripoli; air supply in October made little difference. Deliveries averaged 73,000 tonnes (72,000 long tons) per month from July–October but the consumption of 30–50 percent of fuel deliveries by road transport and a truck unserviceability rate of 35% reduced deliveries to the front. In November, a five-ship convoy was sunk during Operation Crusader and ground attacks on road convoys stopped journeys in daylight. Lack of deliveries and the Eighth Army offensive forced a retreat to El Agheila from 4 December, crowding the Via Balbia, where British ambushes destroyed about half of the remaining Axis transport."

Here
 
Last edited:
Follow that up in late November with Operation Uranus.
OK, will do.

Here:

"The Sixth Army, in the midst of chaos, began to build defensive lines, hampered by the lack of fuel, ammunition and rations, and further burdened by the advancing Russian winter. It was also tasked with plugging gaps in the line caused by the disintegrating Romanian forces.[108] On 23 November, some German units destroyed or burned everything not necessary for a breakout operation and began to pull back towards the northern end of Stalingrad. However, after the Germans had abandoned their winter bunkers, the Soviet 62nd Army was able to destroy the German 94th Infantry Division on the open ground; survivors of the German division were attached to the 16th and 24th Panzer Divisions.[109] Although German military commanders were of the opinion that Wehrmacht forces caught in the encirclement should break out, between 23 and 24 November Hitler decided instead to hold the position and attempt to resupply the Sixth Army by air.[110] The personnel trapped in Stalingrad would require at least 680 metric tons (750 short tons) of supplies per day, a task which the depleted Luftwaffe was actually in no condition to carry out. Furthermore, the revived Red Air Force was a threat to German aircraft attempting to fly over the encirclement. Although by December the Luftwaffe had assembled a fleet of around 500 aircraft, this was still insufficient to supply the Sixth Army and elements of the Fourth Panzer Army with the required supplies.[111] During the first half of December the Sixth Army received less than 20% of their daily requirements."
 
Always interested in logistic data :)


What do you reckon a Division needs each day? IIRC a German Infantry Division needed something like 300 tons each day (most of it arty ammo) for offensive operations so 3-4 Divisions + Corps troops would be something like 1200-2000 tons each day for offensive operations. Also from memory a "train" usually could be expected to carry 500 tons. So 3-4 trains each day should support the above mentioned force, but I guess even on a single track railway you ought to be able to operate more each 24 hours, unless of course the employees insist on 30 hour work week and use their work time mainly for sabotage ;-)


But an Allied Division with its larger number of motor vehicles and greater reliance on artillery firepower might need more than 300 tons a day?

Ruppenthal 'Logisitcs in Overlord' is about the best source for post 1942 Allied logisitcs in Europe. First off the planning was based on "Division Slice". That was all the men ashore divided by the number of division HQ. About 44,000 men, which included corps and army support units & the tactical airforces ashore in France. It did not include naval personnel who were supporting naval operations, but included port operations units controlled by the armies. Second this allowance was for constant offensive operations. Eisenhower planned on constant sustained offensives & not significant periods of a static battle front. For the first 90 days of Op Overlord it was planned 900 tons per day would be provided for each division slice ashore. After 90 days the Overlord logisticians planned to up the requirement to 950 tons per day. Actual consumption varied widely from week to week. Of that 900 tons about 60% (my estimate) went to the corps slice & the balance to the army level support. communications zone, and tactical air forces.

If you really want to get into the weeds there are some good books on logistics in North Africa which would supplement Ruppenthal for this question. One point that may not be clear from those is the wastage the allies had initially in the NW African campaign. Using Logisitcs in Overlord as a guide here 900 tons daily for a initial group of ten Allied divisions would be 270,000 tons for the first month for tactical operations. If the Allies go into the defense in Spain for the winter the requirement for the combat portion of the forces would drop to maybe 200,000 tons per month or less.

That all going to be supplemented by the poor infrastructure of Spain. French Africa was relatively modern and well maintained. Tho the railroads were undersized the ports were fairly well appointed. France had made a good start in building all weather airfields prewar, tho some critical areas for the Allies lacked them. Depending on what the Allies do with Spain theres going to be a major effort to improve Key ports and railways. That is going to add 20% to 40% to the monthly lift. Then there are imports to Spain to support the population. The Allies will have to replace German coal & up the allowance of other items over the blockade allowances of 1941-42. The Spanish army will need its share. Its requirement will be less at first, but at the end of 90 days that requirement could be 200 tons daily for a ten 'division slice' on the battle front, so another 60,000 tons minimum.

What any stratigic airforces based in Spain will require I cant say. Given its location, distance to Germany & other important targets, and limited airbase its only going to be a temporary location.

For the Germans the division slice requirement was lower. They had a lot less in terms of corps and army level combat support. Less corps artillery, no huge pool of independent tank battalions or tank destroyer battalions, tactical air forces were smaller, fewer engineering units (slave labor offset part of that need). Each Brit or US armies division slice had at least double the raw fire power of a German. A alternate way to estimate support is a average single track railway in western or central Europe could support a ground army of 100,000 men. A look at my US Army map of France for 1944 (Thank you Dad) shows enough railways to the Spanish border to be adaquate for that metric.
 
What any stratigic airforces based in Spain will require I cant say. Given its location, distance to Germany & other important targets, and limited airbase its only going to be a temporary location.
This part is what gets first attention, Carl, you provide some good information in your post. Some things that are lacking from it, and I cannot begin to know where to look to supply it myself, are good details on the engineering efforts the allies made OTL in NW africa, in order to get 2-3,000 aircraft up to speed there. I can assume that these same forces, though, would be working within Spain, and that this would result in quick and sustained growth of Spanish airbases capabilities to operate ever larger air forces.

Location/range to important targets: This depends on what is an important target, and that is determined by what you intend to do as the allies.

let's see if my image posting is up to the task

D6eKB
.

Hmmm. Nope, lets try this,

script%3E
.

Ok, lets go with a link, instead

Here.
and Here.

Ok so the link works, but not the images. This second link is why I feel Spain is a worth while addition to the allies, as it shows that Corsica, if taken and used as a forward fighter base, allows ESCORTED bomber raids over huge portions of northern Italy, and it would also make for an easy invasion of Sardina, to the south, by making it's resupply tenous at best, and if Italy is still in the war at that point, you can finish off any resupply efforts to africa by taking Sicily, as well. Note that all three of these "Island hopping" invasions, play to the allies strengths of air and sea power, and force the Axis to try to re-supply via their own weaknesses.
 
Last edited:
We would need to present some parameters.

1) Do the allies leave port knowing they are going to be landing in a newly allied Spain? Or do they leave as in OTL, and the plan changes only once the Spanish learn they have troops afloat/in motion?
2) Do the Vichy French know what is in the works?
3) Does the Spanish DoW trigger Anton? Or do the Germans wait until they see what happens?

For #1 above, the more folks know about it, the less likely it will come as a surprise to either the Germans or Vichy. My personal preference would be that the allies know nothing of Spanish intentions, except at the very highest levels. Given that we are positing the Spanish entering the war suddenly, do they mass troops at the Vichy boarder, and thus likely tip off the Germans by doing so? Either way, do the Spanish plan to themselves to enter Vichy, with or without Anton? My vote would be that they plan to sit tight, and adopt a wait and see approach, and do nothing with reguard to Vichy until after allied boots are firmly on the ground on Spanish soil. This means there would have to be a move on the part of Germany, into Vichy, before a boarder crossing would take place.

For #2, if the Vichy do not know anything about the Spanish entry into the war until they hear about it on the radio (the most likely to maintain surprise), then we need to know if they have their 100,000 troops mustered, or do they need time to moblise them/move them into position, and if so, what is to be their disposition? For all I know, the Vichy forces may either be in their homes, or deployed in operational formations, but from learning that the coastal batteries in Toulon were being manned by sailors, I would assume that their 100,000 man allowed light infantry are not mobalized. Just speculation on my part there, anyone know what the Vichy troop strength/disposition was?

For #3, this is the problem that Hitler faces. His best bet IMHO, is to go with Anton right off, and order attacks against newly enemy locations in the med and NW africa. He just lost a great big deal of his willing foreign trade (his plunder is unaffected), and he will be greatly affected by Franco's betraying him, so I would expect him to order some type of immediate reprisal to take place. OTOH, we know that historically, Hitler hoped to that the British betrayal, would lead to the Vichy french joining him against the UK. As it turned out, it didn't, but in OTL there were not UK and US (nor Spanish, for that matter), boots on the ground, IN FRANCE. This situation here, however, could go either way.

So basically we need to know who does what and when, and who knew about it ahead of time (long enough to be able to do something about it), and what reactions their preparations may trigger. Does Franco have allied assurances that their troops are going to be landing in support of his DoW? Does he want to start off with an initial defensive or offensive posture?

For myself, my feelings are that if this operation has any chance of being a surprise, the Spanish army would not be given a heads up until the DoW is made public, and neither the Spanish nor allied forces would be deployed into Vichy territory initially. On the German side, Hitler, might (stress might), give Vichy Franch the choice of joining the Axis and fighting along side his troops, or to be occupied, and if so, what do they decide if given such a choice?

I know that militarialy, the best offensive plan would be to take the passes, and form a defensive parameter on Vichy soil, but will this incite the French to side with the Germans? Historically, no foreign troops entered Vichy France itself until after the allies invaded their african possessions. My opinion, the allies and Spanish, will want to get things sorted out on the ground, before making any offensive moves, so even though the best theoretical plan would be to take the passes, I don't believe that such would in fact take place. If and when the Vichy join the allies, and request immediate assistance, I wounder if that would be granted, and how that would go if it was.

I think that the most likely course of action (and IMHO best action), would be to make secure landings in newly allied Spanish territory, and wait for the Germans to invade Vichy and await the French reaction before committing troops to France. This gives the Vichy forces the best chance and reason to side with the Allies, and not go over to the German side, or just remain neutral. To me, this consideration would far outweigh any other course of action. The French have already seen one betrayal at the hands of the UK, and the US may well want to make darn sure that any US boots on Vichy ground, to be seen as liberators, not invaders.

Other considerations to think about:
A) At this time, all the European armies have combat experienced ground formations, the USA does not.
B) While the allies seem to be ahead in the air, historical ground war performance in NW africa would seem to indicate that caution would be the better part of valor initially.
C) If the allies wish to fully exploit their airpower advantage, they will need time to set up airbases and move their forces to these bases, work out their supply situations and local laison, before beginning offensive operations. Not sure how long this would take, a week or two would seem not unreasonable as a minimum SWAG.
D) For a ground war front, going into Vichy, without first establishing a firm base of supply from Spain, would probably not be a good idea or gamble. A defensive stance, with the barrier of a mountianous front as a deterrent, would seem to be the best initial goal for the allies, unless their is a belief that the French could hold the Germans off long enough for the allies to bring their ground forces to bare.
E) Fighting a ground war front, in Vichy, within hours/days of Spanish entry to the war, without taking the time to establish a firm foundation for the secure landing and moving forward of supplies, nor taking the time to establish that of the Air-war forces bases and logistics, would be a 'gamble to far' IMHO, one that the Allies should not take.

Thoughts?

#1. Very unlikely. Odds are they would sit on Op Olive until something could be organized after the Eastern & Central TF are ashore in Algeria. Note that a friendly Spain obviates half the mission of the Western TF. Once Morroco is secure the US I Armored Corps is free for use elsewhere.

2. OTL Petain & Darlan suspected, but were not certain. Some of their generals were hoping & actually planning to assist. Others were planning to resist.

3. Op Anton was triggered by the cooperation of some French leaders with the Allies from 6 Nov, by others not cooperating with the Germans, and, at least one outright preparing to attack Bourdeux.

If all that occurs with Op Olive then its likely Op Anton is executed. A key indicator is if communications with the Armistice inspectors is cut off.

2b. The French Army was a standing Army. No reservists to call up. They rehearsed going to battle stations straight from the barracks. There would be a few hours or days to bring the clandestine equipment out of hiding. Otherwise what they had would be deployed in a few hours after orders. Problem is if the order is given in time.

Any other opinions on If Op Anton is executed within 96 hours?
 
Last edited:
Maybe it would be better to secure some islands off the German coast, that would allow escorted bombing raids onto more valuable targets? :)
 
Bombers, if based on Sardina, would be at the limit for axis fighters to make the effort to reach, but allied fighters and a long over water flight, both ways, and...

OTOH, such bomber bases would bring the war to all of Italy, most with fighter escorts, and no ports for supply ships would be safe from allied air attack. Checkmate for African deployed Axis armies.
 
Last edited:

Mrstrategy

Banned
If the german invade Vichy after Spain becomes allied would the french fleet be able to escape or still be sunk by its crew?
 
Maybe it would be better to secure some islands off the German coast, that would allow escorted bombing raids onto more valuable targets? :)

Are there any available?

If the german invade Vichy after Spain becomes allied would the french fleet be able to escape or still be sunk by its crew?

Depends on how much fuel they have aboard. OTL they did not try, partially from the leaders at the top dithering. If the French army resists the Germans the fleet will attempt to escape.
 
Last edited:
An Allied Francoist Spain could occurs if the Spanish ambassador in London, the Duke of Alba, communicates Franco about the huge crowd of Allied soldiers who prepare the Operation Overlord weeks before it occurs -it is difficult to hide the three million soldiers who participated in the landing- in the British coast.

Since the Blue Division had already been withdrawn in October 1943 (this was due to the cessation of Spanish Foreign Minister Serrano Suner, a pro-Nazi politician and married with a sister of Franco's wife, by a general more inclined towards the Allies; however, 1500-3000 Spanish volunteers reneged ordered to return to Spain, continuing the fight against the Soviets, being called their unit as the Blue Legion; but nevertheless, Francoist Spain ordered their returned definitively to home in March and April 1944, due Allied pressures. However, many of the members of Blue Legion continued the fight against the Soviets throught enrolling in the SS until the end of WW2), and in anticipation of a successful Allied landing on the French coast, Franco could predict an Allied victory due the continued Soviet approach to Germany and the expected Allied landing on the French coast (after all, he had experience on the success of a large military landing in a war, through Al Hoceima landing, whose planning was studied in detail by the Allies to plan Operation Overlord), which could mean the possible end of his regime if he doesn't actively cooperated in the Allied victory against Axis -in fact, the true ally of Franco inside Axis had been Mussolini, not Hitler, and he was as leader of a new Italian Republic really dominated by the Germans-.

He was tempted to send a new Blue Division against the Japanese after knowing the Japanese atrocities against the Spanish speaking population of the Philippines, but only really it considered after the German surrender (would be follow the example of Turkey: declares war against the Axis when they were about to collapse). If he would predict a safe German defeat in that time, he could argue any pro-German attempt to overthrow him (to place a pro-German Spanish leader as new head of Spanish government) to declare war against the Axis days before the expected landing of Normandy, distracting German forces essential to beat it. Then he could sell himself publicly as the man who allowed the success of Operation Overlord and could press to the Allies for territorial claims about mainland France (French Basque Country and Roussillon, plus Andorra) and French North Africa (Greater Morocco and Oran region/province) that would satisfy his imperialist ambitions, due the collaborationist state of Vichy France (Free France was a rebel army, without any legal continuity; besides, the Allies were preparing to establish an AMGOT about France, a fact prevented by the arrival of General Charles de Gaulle, who establishing control of the country per the Provisional Government of the French Republic in the name of the Free French Forces and the united French Resistance (FFI) following the Liberation of Paris by the French themselves instead of the Allies, in August 1944).

And not forgetting the fact that, with an Allied Francoist Spain, Germany lost its main trade route through neutral countries (especially the crucial trade of tungsten, mined in Spain and Portugal, and the Spanish mediation in German trade with South American countries), which could cause the success of the July 20 plot, overthrowing Nazi Germany and saving Europe of the worst year of the war.
 
This part is what gets first attention, Carl, you provide some good information in your post. Some things that are lacking from it, and I cannot begin to know where to look to supply it myself, are good details on the engineering efforts the allies made OTL in NW africa, in order to get 2-3,000 aircraft up to speed there. I can assume that these same forces, though, would be working within Spain, and that this would result in quick and sustained growth of Spanish airbases capabilities to operate ever larger air forces.

I recall the US 15th AF had a bit over 600 aircraft stood up in Algeria in 30 days. No information on what the Brits had operating. By April 43 the Allies had close to 5,000 operational aircraft in the Mediterranean & the Axis were hard pressed to show 2500 flyable combat aircraft. I'd have to do some lengthly page turning to pin down the actual numbers. By July 43 there were some 6,000 operating Allied aircraft in the Med & at least that many in the UK. The Red AF may have had another 4000 in the battle zone. Germany started with over 5,500 in January & saw the number slump below 5,000 in the spring and recover somewhat into June. Italy declined from 1200+ to 800 or below.

Location/range to important targets: This depends on what is an important target, and that is determined by what you intend to do as the allies.

...

I'll crack the books & set some range indicators on the Google Earth images I've been posting
 
I recall the US 15th AF had a bit over 600 aircraft stood up in Algeria in 30 days. No information on what the Brits had operating. By April 43 the Allies had close to 5,000 operational aircraft in the Mediterranean & the Axis were hard pressed to show 2500 flyable combat aircraft. I'd have to do some lengthly page turning to pin down the actual numbers. By July 43 there were some 6,000 operating Allied aircraft in the Med & at least that many in the UK. The Red AF may have had another 4000 in the battle zone. Germany started with over 5,500 in January & saw the number slump below 5,000 in the spring and recover somewhat into June. Italy declined from 1200+ to 800 or below.



I'll crack the books & set some range indicators on the Google Earth images I've been posting
Thanks Carl! Good information as always, and many thanks for putting in the time and effort to bring them to light here.
 
#1. Very unlikely. Odds are they would sit on Op Olive until something could be organized after the Eastern & Central TF are ashore in Algeria. Note that a friendly Spain obviates half the mission of the Western TF. Once Morroco is secure the US I Armored Corps is free for use elsewhere.

2. OTL Petain & Darlan suspected, but were not certain. Some of their generals were hoping & actually planning to assist. Others were planning to resist.

3. Op Anton was triggered by the cooperation of some French leaders with the Allies from 6 Nov, by others not cooperating with the Germans, and, at least one outright preparing to attack Bourdeux.

If all that occurs with Op Olive then its likely Op Anton is executed. A key indicator is if communications with the Armistice inspectors is cut off.

2b. The French Army was a standing Army. No reservists to call up. They rehearsed going to battle stations straight from the barracks. There would be a few hours or days to bring the clandestine equipment out of hiding. Otherwise what they had would be deployed in a few hours after orders. Problem is if the order is given in time.

Any other opinions on If Op Anton is executed within 96 hours?

Of the 100,000 Vichy troops, how many are combat? If it's 100,000 total, that's 3 combat divisions? What's the tooth to tail in this case and even though all the troops will end up fighting eventually how effective are supply guys when suddenly they have to hold a line against the Germans? How long does this hold out against the Germans in even a best case scenario? Two weeks, one month?

Are you assuming this is followed up by an allied landing in the South of France? Could this be supported at the time and does the supply line work well enough to support a large enough invasion?

Any pro allied moves by Vichy have a "Warsaw 1944" feel to it unless the allies land. Which cities are leveled (Lyon, Marseille, Toulouse, others?) and how many French civilians are sent to camps?

This is part of why I find this idea dubious. Unless you can immediately move into the south of France with force, you're stuck holding a line at the Pyrenees but not doing anything else. There's also a small matter with the British who clearly wanted to retain their influence in the central and eastern Med. Spain doesnt do much for that but North Africa and Italy do. Do the Brits go along or is this an American campaign? So the Americans land in Spain and piss off both the Russians and the Brits (still fighting in North Africa)? Meh.
 
Of the 100,000 Vichy troops, how many are combat? If it's 100,000 total, that's 3 combat divisions? What's the tooth to tail in this case and even though all the troops will end up fighting eventually how effective are supply guys when suddenly they have to hold a line against the Germans? How long does this hold out against the Germans in even a best case scenario? Two weeks, one month?

Fairly high tooth to tail ratio. Like the Versailles treaty Reichswehr the French used civilian contractors, actually former soldiers to provide service support. Part of the hidden reserve. Cant recall if the treaty army had six divisions, seven, or eight. Best case to hold out is a few days delay of the Germans charging south & maybe a few weeks siege of the fotresses controlling Marsailles & Toloun.

Are you assuming this is followed up by an allied landing in the South of France? Could this be supported at the time and does the supply line work well enough to support a large enough invasion?

Assuming nothing about what the Allies do next. In theory they can have a floating reserve of corps size, but that may or may not be formed, plus there are other targets.

Any pro allied moves by Vichy have a "Warsaw 1944" feel to it unless the allies land. Which cities are leveled (Lyon, Marseille, Toulouse, others?) and how many French civilians are sent to camps?

If Toloun holds out for a while it may be pretty beat up. The rest of unocupied France would be overrun so fast there wont be many opportunities for large scale destruction. OTL the Germans did conscript masses of French civilians for work in Germany, and doubled down on that after the full occupation.

This is part of why I find this idea dubious. Unless you can immediately move into the south of France with force, you're stuck holding a line at the Pyrenees but not doing anything else. There's also a small matter with the British who clearly wanted to retain their influence in the central and eastern Med. Spain doesnt do much for that but North Africa and Italy do. Do the Brits go along or is this an American campaign? So the Americans land in Spain and piss off both the Russians and the Brits (still fighting in North Africa)? Meh.

Actually if the Germans invade the unoccupied territory the Allies can quickly negotiate something with Darlan. OTL it only took three days to accomplish that. If the French fight the Germans in France the Axis are going to have to sieze Tunis & Bizerte by force, if they even try to. OTL they flew into the airfields and docked in the ports with French assistance. The Germans dont have unlimited resources. If they commit a army to sieze Tunisia, what will they give up elsewhere? If the Axis do not seize Tunisa. Its over in Africa by January & the Axis can keep the central Med closed to the Allies only by striping air forces from other fronts. Even at that its questionable. OTL the Allies were running convoys past Axis Sicilly the minute the last soldier surrendered in Tunisia.

i still regard Spain as a logistics sink hole for the Allies, but its not the worst decision that could be made.
 
Top