Allied response to no German surface fleet in Atlantic?

  • Thread starter Deleted member 1487
  • Start date

Deleted member 1487

What if the Bismarck and the rest of the surface fleet stays in the Arctic/North Sea/Baltic area throughout the war, not raiding in the Atlantic at all, just maintaining their fleet in being status, controlling the Baltic, and threatening any supplies to Murmansk? How do the Allies respond to that and what changes for the rest of the war? I'd imagine for starters likely Brest isn't bombed so heavily, but Norwegian/German naval bases are bombed harder than IOTL, while there is not a commando raid on St. Nazaire. Perhaps more commando raids in Norway? What would the Brits/US keep locked down to defend against the concentrated German surface fleet?
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
I think there would still be a raid on St. Nazaire, since the whole point of that was to prevent the Tirpitz from going into the Atlantic in the first place. Even if the Germans intend to keep their fleet in Norway, the Allies would have no assurance that this would remain the case forever. And Brest and the other French ports would still be pummeled from the air, due to the presence of the U-boat pens.
 
Any chance the Germans could support the attack on Murmansk to a successful conclusion from North Norway with a Naval Task force in 1941? A landing, escorting convoys or shore bombardments. (Bismarck. Sharn and Geis in Alta as distant cover, Hippers, Light cruisers and destroyers doing the actual work.)

Regardless. A serious task force in Norway (the 4 capital ships) might stop any Murmansk convoys (they just won't be sent) until the Winter 43-44 when the Allies might be willing to pick a fight. (Italy has surrendered. Allied radar completely superior by this point that they would own a night fight). Stopping the late 41 Matildas and such Lend Lease might be extra beneficial even if small compared to later shipments.
 
Hood goes to Force Z after a refit (possibly in the US) after POW is worked up by June 1941 so may actually not make it to Malaya in time for the big show and who knows reaches a scrap yard in 1948

POW stays with the Home fleet as they need all the modern Fast BBs to match the German Ships (with Bismarck not being sunk) and be capable of providing 2+ heavy modern units for covering forces for the Arctic convoys (which I don't see being stopped)
 

Deleted member 1487

Hood goes to Force Z after a refit (possibly in the US) after POW is worked up by June 1941 so may actually not make it to Malaya in time for the big show and who knows reaches a scrap yard in 1948

POW stays with the Home fleet as they need all the modern Fast BBs to match the German Ships (with Bismarck not being sunk) and be capable of providing 2+ heavy modern units for covering forces for the Arctic convoys (which I don't see being stopped)
So perhaps a Bismarck twins battle vs. some King Georges?
 
Regardless. A serious task force in Norway (the 4 capital ships) might stop any Murmansk convoys (they just won't be sent)

Doubt it. As it was, the WAllies never really prioritized the Murmansk convoys and their 1942 suspension was very voluntary. The Soviets didn't regard the route as that important either... they pushed the WAllies to emphasize the Persian and Vladivostok route a lot more.
 

Deleted member 1487

Doubt it. As it was, the WAllies never really prioritized the Murmansk convoys and their 1942 suspension was very voluntary. The Soviets didn't regard the route as that important either... they pushed the WAllies to emphasize the Persian and Vladivostok route a lot more.
Huh? The Soviets preferred the Northern Route.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arctic_convoys_of_World_War_II
Leningrad under the siege was one of important destinations for supplies from the convoys. From 1941 food and munition supplies were delivered from British convoys to Leningrad by trains, barges, and trucks. Supplies were often destroyed by the Nazi air-bombings, and by Naval Detachment K while on the way to Leningrad. However, convoys continued deliveries of food in 1942, 1943, and through 1944. Towards the end of the war the material significance of the supplies was probably not as great as the symbolic value hence the continuation—at Stalin's insistence—of these convoys long after the Soviets had turned the German land offensive.[9]

https://books.google.com/books?id=w...age&q=stalin preferred murmansk route&f=false

https://books.google.com/books?id=b...age&q=stalin preferred murmansk route&f=false

https://books.google.com/books?id=d...TAD#v=onepage&q=stalin murmansk route&f=false

https://books.google.com/books?id=d...jAF#v=onepage&q=stalin murmansk route&f=false
 
This article talks of some specifics in British Lend Lease.

http://www.historynet.com/did-russi...ase-helped-the-soviets-defeat-the-germans.htm

A fair number of tanks, planes and machine tools were early shipped via the Arctic. As far as the net effects of that. If you can avoid something like the Demansyk airlift, mitigate the Kiln bulge then that's a big deal. Little things add up, of course the Germans could just overextend themselves to no real advantage (or Leningrad could fall to the German in a Winter siege).

Mahan would say controlling the Arctic should be a priority and to concentrate the fleet there vs raiding at a small percentage of British bulk imports (where is Tirpitz when you need him to talk sense into people.)
 
This article talks of some specifics in British Lend Lease.

And inspite of pretty blatantly trying to paint as pretty a picture as possible for the idea of lend-lease being hugely important for the Soviets in the winter of 1941-42, it still can't help but clearly come out and state that the difference was not decisive.

In any case, the idea rather ignores that the British can now take all the capitol assets they were historically forced to spread out across the Atlantic in order to find and chase down the German surface raiders and concentrate them to bottle the Germans up in Norway so as to defend the Arctic routes, so I'm not really seeing why they would decide to cancel them.

Mahan would say controlling the Arctic should be a priority and to concentrate the fleet

Except the Germans can't control the Arctic lines. They can threaten them, something which their historical attempts came at enormous cost to themselves in the form of getting large chunks of their most elite anti-naval aviation forces shredded, but that isn't the same thing. The main reason German surface raiders ultimately did so little damage is because the British devoted significant naval resources to hunting them down... resources that can now be used elsewhere to greater effect.
 
Last edited:
In any case, the idea rather ignores that the British can now take all the capitol assets they were historically forced to spread out across the Atlantic in order to find and chase down the German surface raiders and concentrate them to bottle the Germans up in Norway so as to defend the Arctic routes, so I'm not really seeing why they would decide to cancel them.

Except the Germans can't control the Arctic lines. They can threaten them, something which their historical attempts came at enormous cost to themselves in the form of getting large chunks of their most elite anti-naval aviation forces shredded, but that isn't the same thing. The main reason German surface raiders ultimately did so little damage is because the British devoted significant naval resources to hunting them down... resources that can now be used elsewhere to greater effect.

OTL the big surface raiders achieved so little actually raiding, the threat of raiding might have achieved more. Bismark sunk in June 41, After February 1942. Gneisenau was out of action permanently, Scharnhorst didn't arrive in Norway until 1943 (both never really operational in Brest). 3 capital ship losses for really nothing gained. 4 operational capital ships would probably force the British to keep 6 of their best Battleship and a couple of carriers in home fleet in 1942 when they are stretched thin globally.

The Germans in Norway or even operational in the Baltic would still be a threat to raid. (OTL though at what point did the British really have to spread out their capital assets. They could stick the older assets like Queen Elizabeth and Ramilles classes on convoy duty.)

Generally your probably right though on east front impact, the effect of the historical aid is debatable at best, plus the British would still send convoys and individual sailings through hoping as OTL the Germans wouldn't detect most of them, or the Germans would not be tempted to risk their fleet to a submarine torpedo (or expend fuel). It would probably be worth 50% losses to the British on the limited scale of the convoys to send aid.
 
Top