Alliance System sans Dreadnoughts

Stuff and nonsense.

Snip

I suggest reading The Sleepwalkers by Christopher Clark for a non-Brish-partisan view of British diplomacy in the pre-1914 years.

Well since the question asks about the Alliance situation sans a chunk of German dreadnoughts (and pre-dreadnoughts per the OP) you need to address whether or not you think that doing such a thing might alter Britain's attitude to Germany. Then consider whether this might then effect the British attitudes to alliances? Perhaps you may wish to argue that the British being evil might even enter a full on alliance against Germany?
 

Deleted member 94680

One last time, then.

What the Germans were doing was part of Imperial politics, as was the British response.

The Germans offered assistance (veiled or otherwise) to a nation in conflict (diplomatic, economic or military) with Britain. This was considered an act hostile to Britain, by the British.

Was the British response high handed? Undoubtably. Was it unprecedented within the diplomatic norms of the era? Not at all. Bismarck had manipulated this 'high handed' nature of diplomatic relations to his (and Germany's) advantage with the Ems Dispatch in 1870.

My point is that the German actions were antagonist to the British, with their self-avowed 'primacy' in South Africa. This itself was completely fine in the context of the times, just not an action to gain an alliance or benevolent neutrality from the British. The same goes even further for the HSF.

Not "right" or "wrong" just not the best course of action to keep the British out of the entente orbit.
 
Well since the question asks about the Alliance situation sans a chunk of German dreadnoughts (and pre-dreadnoughts per the OP) you need to address whether or not you think that doing such a thing might alter Britain's attitude to Germany. Then consider whether this might then effect the British attitudes to alliances? Perhaps you may wish to argue that the British being evil might even enter a full on alliance against Germany?

Sure.
The Alliance system will not greatly change.
The British still need to cozy up the the French and Russians, because these have greater ability both to offer concessions on colonial matters, and to potentially threaten Britain's possessions.
The Germans simply have less to offer. Again, read The Sleepwalkers.

So even if the Germans don't Outrage! the British by building a fleet in order to compel the British to respect their legitimate interests, or by daring to congratulate republics who fend off unprovoked invasions by unaligned freebooters, Britain will still gravitate toward the Franco-Russian Entente.

As for the British being "evil", that's a strawman. Being truthful about Britain's power-diplomacy is hardly calling them evil.
 
Sure.
The Alliance system will not greatly change.
The British still need to cozy up the the French and Russians, because these have greater ability both to offer concessions on colonial matters, and to potentially threaten Britain's possessions.
The Germans simply have less to offer. Again, read The Sleepwalkers.

So even if the Germans don't Outrage! the British by building a fleet in order to compel the British to respect their legitimate interests, or by daring to congratulate republics who fend off unprovoked invasions by unaligned freebooters, Britain will still gravitate toward the Franco-Russian Entente.

As for the British being "evil", that's a strawman. Being truthful about Britain's power-diplomacy is hardly calling them evil.

So August 1914 Britain is confronted by a host anti-butterflies sorry an army of German soldier (obviously they can't see the anti-butterflies here) marching through Belgium. Do you think the British more or less likely to declare war or about the same?
 
One last time, then.

What the Germans were doing was part of Imperial politics, as was the British response.

The Germans offered assistance (veiled or otherwise) to a nation in conflict (diplomatic, economic or military) with Britain. This was considered an act hostile to Britain, by the British.

Was the British response high handed? Undoubtably. Was it unprecedented within the diplomatic norms of the era? Not at all. Bismarck had manipulated this 'high handed' nature of diplomatic relations to his (and Germany's) advantage with the Ems Dispatch in 1870.

My point is that the German actions were antagonist to the British, with their self-avowed 'primacy' in South Africa. This itself was completely fine in the context of the times, just not an action to gain an alliance or benevolent neutrality from the British. The same goes even further for the HSF.

Not "right" or "wrong" just not the best course of action to keep the British out of the entente orbit.

The text actually shows the Germans congratulating the Boers for fending off an invasion by nonaligned freebooters. There is no offer of assistance (see, here's how an offer for assistance sounds: "Next time you need help repelling freebooters who are clearly not acting on behalf of the British government, let us know so we can help")

The British considered it a hostile act because they did indeed intend to forcibly annex the Transvaal without any concession or consideration of legitimate German interests there, and they considered it repugnant that the Germans would even dare standing up for rights that the British took for granted for themselves.

If Britain actually cared about having a non-hostile Germany, they would have played ball behind closed doors, offering concessions in exchange for a free hand, as they did with the French. Had they done this, it is far less likely that Germany would have even felt the need to build up the HSF. Instead, they insisted (as some folks do even today) that Germany just needed to follow an inoffensive course, with "inoffensive" being defined as "accepting British hegemony in all your foreign dealings".

Hey, Britain wasn't the first or only hegemon to play hardball, so no demonization implied; but why not be honest about it?

Anyway, to tie this back into the OP, if we want Germany to build fewer dreadnoughts, one thing we need is for Britain to accept her into the Good Old Boy club as she had with France. By making back-room deals with Germany, giving concessions in exchange for noninterference, this probably could have been achieved. But since the British obviously weren't interested in doing this, we're set up for some form of Anglo-German hostility, whether it takes the shape of battleships or not, regardless of other circumstances.
 
So August 1914 Britain is confronted by a host anti-butterflies sorry an army of German soldier (obviously they can't see the anti-butterflies here) marching through Belgium. Do you think the British more or less likely to declare war or about the same?

About the same, unless a prior POD results in the OTL near-detente between Britain and Germany growing into an actual Anglo-German Entente, which I don't believe it can -- Russia and France have too much to offer, or to threaten, for Britain to anger them lightly.

What we might see is a Germany that has enough hope of Britain remaining out of the war, that they consider foregoing the invasion of Belgium in order to placate Britain. As it was, the Germans evaluated the chance of Britain staying neutral under any circumstances as so low that they might as well invade.
 
Yes, I know I'm being tough on Britain. The thing is, we already know all about how pushy Germany was. We might as well be honest and admit that Britain was pushy, too.

And prior to 1914, just what was Germany pushy about?
She insisted on seizing A-L after France attacked her over an invented, admittedly manipulative yet harmless slight (and frankly, France just used that slight as a convenient pretext, not even trying to confirm it with her own ambassador first).
She kicked up a big fuss when Britain and France went behind her back, undercut international agreement over Morocco, and deliberately left her out of the deal.
She wanted Britain to not annex a republic in which she had legitimate investments (at least, without making concessions first).

Not really insurmountable or objectionable stuff.
 
Yes, I know I'm being tough on Britain. The thing is, we already know all about how pushy Germany was. We might as well be honest and admit that Britain was pushy, too.

And prior to 1914, just what was Germany pushy about?
She insisted on seizing A-L after France attacked her over an invented, admittedly manipulative yet harmless slight (and frankly, France just used that slight as a convenient pretext, not even trying to confirm it with her own ambassador first).
She kicked up a big fuss when Britain and France went behind her back, undercut international agreement over Morocco, and deliberately left her out of the deal.
She wanted Britain to not annex a republic in which she had legitimate investments (at least, without making concessions first).

Not really insurmountable or objectionable stuff.


Which is why think that a smaller HSF might have been enough to shade the British into not going to war against Germany in 1914, less sure about an Anglo-German entente but a slim chance there.

The Germans did have reasons for what they did. The question though is did building a large surface fleet of battleships aimed primarily at the British really help Germany's pursuit of her strategic goals? Now the argument has been made, at length, that the Kruger Telegram was not an incident that justified the British going to war with Germany...I am yet to find a single respondent that has argued otherwise and yet the argument has been repeated, at length.

The thing is to my mind that the British were not a monopolar monolith but like most polities actually a slew of competing factions. I am not sure that without the HSF enough of the British factions would have included don't trust or outright fear Germany in their motivations to propel them to war with Germany.

Of course I could be wrong but that brings us back to the third part of the question which is would Germany really lose in the alliance game if she lacked such a strong HSF?
 
Which is why think that a smaller HSF might have been enough to shade the British into not going to war against Germany in 1914, less sure about an Anglo-German entente but a slim chance there.

The Germans did have reasons for what they did. The question though is did building a large surface fleet of battleships aimed primarily at the British really help Germany's pursuit of her strategic goals? Now the argument has been made, at length, that the Kruger Telegram was not an incident that justified the British going to war with Germany...I am yet to find a single respondent that has argued otherwise and yet the argument has been repeated, at length.

The thing is to my mind that the British were not a monopolar monolith but like most polities actually a slew of competing factions. I am not sure that without the HSF enough of the British factions would have included don't trust or outright fear Germany in their motivations to propel them to war with Germany.

Of course I could be wrong but that brings us back to the third part of the question which is would Germany really lose in the alliance game if she lacked such a strong HSF?

Building the HSF was counterproductive, though certainly understandable. The Germans weren't able to build as much, as fast, as the British. And unless they managed that feat, the British had no intention of stooping to a deal.

You might be right about the effect on British political factions. However, the only one I can think of that might've been swayed are the Liberals, and they were getting much weaker before 1914, anyway.

I don't think Germany would've lost anything in the Alliance Game by not building the HSF; I'm very doubtful she would've gained much, if anything.

Except perhaps she might've devoted more money to her Army, but that's a different topic.
 
Building the HSF was counterproductive, though certainly understandable. The Germans weren't able to build as much, as fast, as the British. And unless they managed that feat, the British had no intention of stooping to a deal.

You might be right about the effect on British political factions. However, the only one I can think of that might've been swayed are the Liberals, and they were getting much weaker before 1914, anyway.

I don't think Germany would've lost anything in the Alliance Game by not building the HSF; I'm very doubtful she would've gained much, if anything.

Except perhaps she might've devoted more money to her Army, but that's a different topic.

I think that factions within the Liberals were probably the most important ones to sway still I recognise the difficulty of being sure about whether enough voices in Cabinet would be swayed at the moment of decision.

Even assuming that the money did not go to the army one wonder what extra factories and other infrastructure might have been built with that capital by either entrepreneurs or the Reich Government because that might have helped but like you do well to remind us it risks drifting off the question.
 
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you do well to remind us it risks drifting off the question.

Lol, "drifting off"? I admit, I charged headlong off the question! Anyway, I do think the best chance, under the circumstances, is to not build the HSF, and grovel to Britain in the colonial-diplomatic arena as needed. While standing firm on Continental matters, of course.

Now, there is one thing I hadn't considered. OTL, Grey promised to protect the French coast from the HSF (he lied about it later, pretending he had made no commitments to France). That promise was used to help sway Cabinet a little closer to War in 1914.

Without a large HSF, perhaps that promise doesn't get made.

It may not even be important, since of course if Germany invades Belgium, it won't matter.
 
Without a large HSF, perhaps that promise doesn't get made.

It may not even be important, since of course if Germany invades Belgium, it won't matter.

Well there a range of response short of war even if the Germans do go into Belgium. The British concern is after all over the Belgian ports. If they are secured either by trust or troops then I suspect there is a much stronger chance of the British getting out the old abacus and deciding that war is a tad expensive so better to save the pennies.
 

Deleted member 9338

So August 1914 Britain is confronted by a host anti-butterflies sorry an army of German soldier (obviously they can't see the anti-butterflies here) marching through Belgium. Do you think the British more or less likely to declare war or about the same?

It depends, I can Britain landing in the ports and holding the coast, and there will be no combat between them if the Germans continue with the original plan
 
How would the situation develop with a smaller HSF? Good question and one where I certainly do not have a definite answer for. Even for myself.
The problem for me is that the timeframe would be about 15 years. And that are ones that had a lot of dynamic changes, political, economic, social and military, in them. But there are some points and questions that are more or less solid for me.

- The Kaiserreich would probably be less in debt then OTL. They AFAIK tried to keep the book balanced. So most of the not spend money may be the one that was borrowed. But I do not as of yet have definite numbers on that.
- The British reaction hinges in many parts on the German action to the Dreadnought. If they decide to keep the fleet modern, as in enter into the Dreadnought building, then it could default back to the OTL British behaviour. Scaremongering for more money for the RN was a time honoured tradition after all.
- How does the German economy develop with the more balanced budget, but also without as much contracts for the navy.
- How do the British evaluate the power structure with a less "offensive" HSF versus the French and British. And how does that translate to international relations (see second Maroco and such)
- Very important, how do the French and Russians percive the changed ralations and how does that translate to policies for them.

As said I could see both way happen, a "weaker" Germany could be seen by the British as the sure looser even more so then OTL so they could gravitate towards the Entente to ensure they are on the winning side. On the other hand a stronger Entente vs. the Centrals could also invite some balance of power nostalgia in the British that could bring them towards the CP.
Simply put the time is too dynamic to definitly say anything.
Another point to Imo think about is that the Anglo-German detractores in Britain may not come to power or change their view in all this. I here mostly think of Sir Edward Grey, Winston Churchill and I think a Mister Crow (?) also is often mentioned for his Germanophobe views. On the other hand we certainly also do not lack for figures that could put a spanner in the works. Chiefly Wilhelm II as he Imo had a certain love / hate relationship with Britain, but also Tirpitz may or may not strocke his forked beard...
 
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