Algo habran hecho por la historia Argentina

Enjoying your posts, Pete...

...But the Spanish leaves me all at sea!:confused:

Maps are a good idea, but be sure to toss in a picture or two for entertainment - I greatly enjoyed those contributions to British TdF, as you well know.

Going to see how your TL develops - not sure what I can offer, but I'm willing to help.
 
...But the Spanish leaves me all at sea!:confused:

Maps are a good idea, but be sure to toss in a picture or two for entertainment - I greatly enjoyed those contributions to British TdF, as you well know.

Going to see how your TL develops - not sure what I can offer, but I'm willing to help.

Well, you can help me with British history:cool:
 
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2nd Chapter: "Smith's Gully"


The Virrey Sobremonte, the colonial Governor, had been kept informed of British movements but he didn't mobilise his rather raw colonial troops until it was too late. The British were able to disembark near Buenos Aires, in Quilmes, without opposition. The 1.635 troops under the command of William Carr Beresford were now 21 km from Buenos Aires. The troops in Ensenada, the only force aware of this landing, weren't able to attack them, as they were too few. Instead, they raised the alarm with cannon shots, so the Virrey could prepare the militias. Beresford, knowing the meaning of this shots, realised that he must not lose the advantage of battle readiness and ordered his troops to move on rapidly, in a manoeuver later historians called the First March. By the end of the day, they were 7 km from the city. Beresford ordered his troops to camp there. He thought that he would need some help before going to Buenos Aires, and sent Robert Arbuthnot to contact William White and both met before entering the city. Robert Arbuthnot, using one of the few horses they had, was able to cross the creek in the Paso de la Esquina, a small and unguarded bridge. He had a map made by White himself given to Popham while he was in Cape Town. Robert had no problem in finding the meeting place and arranged with White to meet near the Barracas after defeating the garrison. Arbuthnot returned to Beresford, and arrived just in time before the troops moved on.


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Left: Soldier from the 71st. Right: Soldier from Smith's Marines


Beresford ordered his troops to march towards Galvez Bridge, drums and bagpipes playing to give the impression that they were a far larger force. At 10 a.m they reached the Bridge, which was held by 600 militiamen with 3 small cannons under the command of Pedro de Arze. The only barrier to the British force was a gully, created by rain and enlarged by the Spanish, with the addition of the wider central part. But the militia were no match for Beresford’s professional troops. Beresford ordered his cannons to deploy across the road. 10 minutes later, they were ready to attack. The 71st under the command of Denis Pack would enter the thick grassland to create confusion and reach the gully avoiding combat. The 600 sailors serving as Marines had been in tended to be lead by Arbuthnot, but at the last moment he refused to take that duty as he felt he was too tired to do his best. So Beresford decided to put the troop under the command of Lieutenant Harry Smith, a well educated soldier of limited active service and a reputation for being a firebrand; the sailors were promptly dubbed ‘Smith’s Marines’ by one of his sarcastic colleagues, but they were soon to justify the title. ‘Smith’s Marines’ were planned to make a frontal assault on thee enemy lines, with covering fire from the artillery to counter-battery Arce’s guns. The Spanish were badly equipped, most of the militia lacking muskets and very few knew how to fire a cannon, to the point that Arce himself had to supervise the half-trained and inexperienced gunners. This lack of trained artillerymen in the Spanish colony was to lead to an astonishing experience for Smith, later in the operation.


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Pampean Thick Grassland.


At 10.15 a.m, the 71st reached the gully and started crossing it. Although the militiamen had a better position, their lack of experience and equipment played against them. Five minutes later, 60 miliatiamen were dead, 140 captured and 100 more were running towards Buenos Aires. At the same time, ‘Smith's Marines’ reached the central part of the gully where he prudently decided to wait until the attack of the 2nd Battalion of the 71st on the cannons took place. The well-timed and overwhelming attack on the remaining 300 militiamen ended with 20 dead, 260 captured and 20 more escaping. The British lost 15 men from the 71st and 35 sailors, most of them before reaching the gully, and 40 men were injured, but just half of them had severe wounds. 80 militiamen were dead, 400 captured and 120 managed to escape to the city. But Beresford was impressed at Harry Smith's quick-witted action, as he believed he avoided many casualties by waiting. He felt he was talented, and decided to promote him to Captain and make him his aide-de-camp. The sailors were delighted with the prudent care of Smith, who would not waste their lives on a pointless action, considering him a ‘Dam’d good officer’ and regretting he was Army, not Navy.


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William White, American merchant in Rio de La Plata


At 10.32 a.m, William White arrived. With him was James Burke, a British spy in the city, of whom Beresford had been unaware, and Thomas O'Gorman, an Irish merchant who was also strongly for a British occupation. William White commented that he should expect Sobremonte to give some fight before surrendering the city. Burke agreed in this and said he talked to the Virrey some hours ago, and convinced him of the advisability of not leaving the city, saying the British troops were just irregulars. He claimed he was the one who made the Virrey (Spanish Viceroy) avoid burning the Bridge, telling him that the 1.200 militiamen he had in Buenos Aires, plus the 600 in the Barracas (city barracks), were enough for defeating the force. This convinced Beresford. He gave his troops some rest before going to Buenos Aires and seizing the Barracas and capturing ammunition and powder. The amused Scottish bagpipers composed a melody in Pibroch, which they called "Smith's Gully". This also became the name of the Battle. At 11.30 a.m, the Army continued with their march.



Battle Map:

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Open in a new tab for a larger size.





Military actions:
Open in a new tab for a larger size.

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Like the post...

... I like the pictures and the maps/diagrams certainly help those not used to the topography of Buenos Aires.

Think that your references to 'sailors' should really be the Marine detachments ('soldier and sailor too') that were present on all Royal Navy ships above the size of a frigate. Put together, they would have been just about the right number you describe. The Marines generally had their own officers, but Smith would have been a useful man to have.

Waiting eagerly for the next tranche!
 
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3rd Chapter: "Sobremonte's last mistake"



Beresford ordered his force to advance slowly, to prevent them marching unprepared into ambushes in their way to Buenos Aires. But his aide-de-camp proposed a faster march; Smith believed that if Burke was right and the Spanish had 1.200 more Militiamen in Buenos Aires, many more would be elsewhere in the province, mobilising to reinforce Sobremonte. As they should try to avoid casualties, he proposed that Beresford march rapidly and choose positions where he could wait for the enemy and ambush them.

At first, Beresford wasn't too sure about this, as he didn't know if there were that much militiamen and he may have been over-confident of his force’s abilities. But finally he realized that the thick grasslands would help him conceal his forces. Using White's map, he became aware that there were two possible routes from where to access Buenos Aires. The small Calle Sola (Narrow Road) or the bigger Calle Larga (Wide Road). This almost ruined the possibility of arranging an ambush, but Beresford was determined to achieve it. Burke's advice became vital here, when he claimed that most of the Spanish would take the Calle Larga, as the Calle Sola was badly surfaced. Smith with his Marines would take a position in the Calle Sola, in case that some Spanish troops decided to attack that way. In case the Spanish only marched through the Calle Larga, then he would rejoin Pack’s troops as soon as possible. If overwhelmed, he had orders to retreat and join the rest of the expedition. He would be given two cannon to create a distraction, but he had to keep them intact at any cost. With the 71st and the remaining cannon, Pack and Beresford would look for a position in the Calle Larga. The Calle Banderita (Pennant Street) crossed them both, joining them together. Smith had 540 Marines and two cannon, while Pack commanded the 975 remaining men of the 71st and 6 cannon. Beresford would command his forces from Pack's position. Arbuthnot would stay in the Barracas with 30 Marines to keep an eye on the 400 captured militiamen. At 2.00 pm they were in position and waiting for the Spanish.

Meanwhile in Buenos Aires, the Virrey had been joined by the survivors from the battle with the British and the Militiamen who were called from the towns North of Buenos Aires. Among the survivors, was Pedro de Arze, who wasn't punished because of his friendship with the Virrey. But this failure made Sobremonte felt that it would be his duty to dispose of the British threat, although Pedro de Arze begged him to stay in the city, so they could prepare it for the assault. However, the Virrey thought differently; 600 men from the Northern villages had just arrived. He had 1,200 men ready for battle and the 120 survivors who could guard the fort. He was sure the British were as tired, if not more, as the survivors were. He said "Es ahora o nunca" (It's now or never). But he underestimated the British soldiers as much as he overestimated the quality of his own troops. In fact, the 600 Militiamen who had just arrived were as tired as the survivors of the battle, after marching all day. And what's more, they only had 60 muskets, the others only being armed with pikes or swords.

The situation of the 1.200 militiamen from Buenos Aires was just slightly better. The firearms rate among them was 1 every 6 men, so they had 200 muskets. But what they had in common is that they all lacked experience, training and discipline. Neverthless, Sobremonte though they were enough. He decided they would attack the British before they left the Barracas. However, he thought that it was very plausible that his attack would be less effective if all the troops marched together. So the 1.800 militiamen gathered in the Mataderos square were divided in three groups. The 1st Group, the 600 militiamen from Northern Buenos Aires and under Cerviño's command, would march through the Calle Sola. The 2nd and the 3rd group, under the commands of Sobremonte and Arze respectively, would march through the Calle Larga. The 2nd group was composed of the best 650 militiamen, while the 3rd group would be composed of another 550 militiamen. The goal of them was to ambush the British while fighting the 1st Group. At 3.30pm, they started the attack, and so did the battle that was about to define the relationship of South America and the United Kingdom forever.



At the British positions, things were quiet. Smith kept giving instructions and boosting the morale of his troop. Beresford became doubtful abouth using the cannons as a distraction, and finally decided to move them behind a building just in the middle of their position.

He sent a 17-years-old Scottish boy from the 71st, Cayden MacDonald, to give the order to Captain Harry Smith. He did so and the cannons were moved. But just as he was going to return to Beresford's position, the Spanish militia was seen in the horizon. Captain Smith ordered him to stay and fight with them. The key-word was said and all the men prepared for the ambush. Five minutes later, at 4.15pm, it all started. At least 100 militiamen were approaching said one marine, but Captain Smith believed they could be more. They waited and two minutes later, the Spanish were in the position for the ambush. Suddenly, Smith shouted “Up, boys, and at ‘em!” 550 Marines rose from the thick grasslands from all directions and surrounded the Militiamen, muskets aimed and ready to fire. Cerviño, who was neither brave nor a fool, realized he had no option. He had a weapons disadvantage, his men were tired, and if they tried to fight, their defeat would be almost a matter of fact. So he surrendered to Captain Smith. The Marines were rejoicing. They had captured 600 militiamen withouth even shooting, Smith's reputation amongst them even greater. The Captain sent 100 of his men to escort the prisoners to the Barracas and the remaining 450 would join Beresford and Pack.

Meanwhile, in the Calle Larga, action was about to start. On his way to attack the British, Sobremonte became more worried about the time it was taking for them to reach the British positions, so he ordered Arze and his men to advance faster, in order to catch the British by surprise. But this proved to be a fatal mistake. By the time they reached the crossroad between Calle Banderita and Calle Larga, they had a terrible surprise as first one men was killed, then another, and another, panicking Arze’s militiamen. Arze soon spotted the attackers, British troops who were shooting from a warehouse on the corner. He tried to rally his men, but then 400 of the Highlanders charged out from the thick grasslands and slaughtered many Militiamen, Pedro de Arze amongst those lost.. The terrified troops retreated in disorder, running for their lives back to Buenos Aires through the lines of Sobremonte's Militia, who were just 300 metres behind them. Caydem MacDonald then arrived running, informing Beresford that Captain Smith was near with his 400 Marines. Macdonald was sent back again to warn Smith to take cover with his troops in the grasslands 100 metres before the crossroad. Beresford ordered Pack to mass his force of 400 at the crossroads. At the same time, Beresford ordered another 400 men under Alexander Duff, to get ready to surround the Spanish miltia from behind as planned. Beresford himself was in position with the remaining 175 men in front of the Calle Banderita, making that street look to be the least-defended street and so the only possible escape route.

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Highlander Charging at Spanish Militia

At around the same time, Sobremonte was ordering his troops who actually had guns to form in front and at his order, stop. He would make the British fire at, them then attack with the bulk of his force, so he could overwhelm the invaders. Beresford, however, had ordered Pack and his troop not to shoot until his signal. And when the Spanish stopped just 50 metres before them, he shouted "Fire!". Many Spanish were killed. Sobremonte ordered his troops to attack, but the attack from the second line of Pack and Beresford’s soldiers killed more of the militia and made the rest panic. Sobremonte ordered his force to retreat, but as planned, Duff with his 400 highlanders appeared from behind and turned them to run towards Calle Banderita. And as they were entering it, Captain Harry Smith and his 450 Marines came out from the grasslands and blocked the militia’s way, firing at them. But Sobremonte didn't have an option. He had to fight or lose. He ordered his troops to attack the Marines, met by a volley of bullets, which took the lives of many miltiamen. However, this didn't stop the brave militiamen, who by the time they reached the Marines were already reduced to 335. A fierce hand-to-hand battle started, but its result was all too predictable, although the Militia tried fruitlessly to break through the Marines’ lines. When the 71st under Alexander Duff finally arrived, the Militia were forced to surrender, outgunned and outnumbered. The whole battle had lasted for half an hour. Arze’s force suffered 29 dead, 62 wounded and 454 men routed, with no casualities among the British. The attack from Beresford and Packs formations left 46 dead and 82 wounded, with 1 dead and 9 injured among the British. Alexander Duff's action left meant 14 dead and 22 wounded for the Spanish, and 3 British injured. The most bloody part of the battle was the final charge over Smith's position, where 71 Spanish died and 121 were wounded. The British suffered 19 dead and 33 injured, all among the Marines. This last military action became known as "Sobremonte's last charge", or in accounts such as Harry Smith’s ‘Memoirs’ "the Last Charge". The whole battle was called "The Battle of the Two Crossroads". Sobremonte was made a prisioner, and the 294 survivors were escorted under the guard of 30 Highlanders to the Barracas. Beresford again amazed by Harry's actions, told him that if he continued this way he would be promoted soon, and that he had shown great skill in battle.
After this, Beresford proceeded unopposed to Buenos Aires with his force, together with White, Burke and O'Gorman.



Battle of the Smith's Gully

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Battle of the Two Crossroads


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Nice post...

... Any chance of a map/maps of this battle? Nice wiki-like table of the two parts of the battle. I actually felt sorry for Sobremonte. He should have turned BA into a deathtrap...
 
... Any chance of a map/maps of this battle? Nice wiki-like table of the two parts of the battle. I actually felt sorry for Sobremonte. He should have turned BA into a deathtrap...

I'm in Mar del Plata now. When I go to my cousin's house in some days I will try to do the maps;)
 
Of course it did. This timeline has a certain quality that many such attempts at AH lack. :)

Thanks!:) But nothing of it would be possible without Corditeman, who teached me a lot with our first TL, British Tierra del Fuego, and now keeps helping me by correcting the whole bunch of mistakes I commit at writing this.:cool:
 
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